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ABSTRACT 
The complex, remote, and seamless nature of ATM/debit card operations, the relatively 
outmoded and vulnerable technology employed in the ATM/debit card technology, the 
innovative and adaptive identity theft and fraud methods, and the severe asymmetry of 
information suffered by the consumer due to bank reluctance to provide fraud risk 
education have made unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions an inherent risk and 
real threat in the rapid development of electronic payment in Indonesia.  
The absence of specific fraud liability regulation and the lack of a clear understanding 
of the facts about unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions have contributed to 
prolonged disputes between banks and consumers about who should bear liability for 
the losses. The deficiency in adjudicator knowledge about empirical facts that are 
intertwined with the unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions as well as of relevant 
economic and technological facts, and the legal aspects specific to ATM/debit card 
regulation has also made the adjudicator’s decisions in the alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) forum and courts tend towards being unjust and misleading, and failed to create 
incentives for optimum identity theft/fraud containment. 
This thesis, therefore, investigates quite exhaustively the technicalities and standard 
operating procedures of ATM/debit card system, methods and typology of identity theft 
and fraud, the fraudsters, the pertinent laws and regulations, and the adjudicator’s 
verdicts that are relevant to unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions in Indonesia. To 
enrich the research, comparative analysis was also undertaken with the United States 
and Australia’s fraud liability/fraud loss allocation rules regulations.  
To overcome the legal ramifications and disincentives that might otherwise occur 
because of lack fraud liability regulation and poor adjudicator decisions on unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transaction disputes, this thesis proposes law reform on Indonesian 
fraud liability regulations using multi-disciplinary approaches, namely economic, 
technological and legal. The thesis concludes by arguing that reform can be achieved by 
creating clear, fair, enumerated, and decisive loss allocation rules for unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions. To assure sensible adjudicator decisions, this thesis also 
argues that the old and unjust pure contributory negligence in legal proceedings should 
be replaced by the comparative negligence principle as part of the law reform. 
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I’m quite certain that if the infamous Willie Sutton had his heyday in the present 
culture, Sutton’s fabled answer to the question of why he robbed online banks 
would have been, “Because that’s where the *easy* money is”.
1
 
Brian Krebs (2010)
2
CHAPTER 1  GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background and Significance of the Study 
In the development of electronic commerce, electronic payment methods and retail 
electronic banking services and products are very important and provide significant new 
opportunities for banking business.
3
 Banking consumers can now access a wide
selection of banking products and services more efficiently through an electronic or 
digital distribution channel referred to as electronic banking or e-banking.
4
 Nowadays,
e-banking is used by banking consumers by way of its many features, such as automated 
1
William ‘Willie’ Sutton (30 June 1901 – 2 November 1980) was a prolific US bank robber. Executing 
robberies in disguises, he gained two nicknames, ‘Willie the Actor’ and ‘Slick Willie’. He claimed tohave 
stolen approximately $2 million during his four decade long’ career’, and although he broke out of prison 
three times, he ended up spending more than half his adult life there. See Peter Duffy, 'CITY LORE; 
Willie Sutton, Urbane Scoundrel', The New York Times (online), 17 February 2002 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/17/nyregion/city-lore-willie-sutton-urbane-scoundrel.html>. 
2
 Brian Krebs, Cyber Crooks Leave Traditional Bank Robbers in the Dust (13 March 2010) 
<http://krebsonsecurity.com/2010/03/cyber-crooks-leave-bank-robbers-in-the-dust/>. 
3
  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), Risk Management for Electronic Banking and 
Electronic Money Activities (Bank for International Settlements, 1998) 1. 
4
 In the banking industry, the terms ‘consumer’ and ‘customer’ are both used frequently and 
interchangeably. According to <DifferenceBetween.net>, by definition, ‘a customer is someone who buys 
services or goods from someone else while a consumer is someone that consumes a certain product or 
commodity’. In Indonesia, a difference is seen to exist. A ‘bank consumer’ or ‘nasabah bank’ is someone 
that has a legal relationship with banks (has signed a bank–consumer contract) to utilise one or more of a 
bank’s services or products, such as contract to open a saving or deposit account, credit line agreement, 
etc. In contrast, a bank ‘customer’ is someone that might utilise one or more of a bank’s services or 
products but does not have a specific consumer-bank contract (for example, a ‘walk in’ customer wanting 
a bank cheque or money changed). In this thesis, however, ‘consumer’ is used to cover consumers, and 
specifically refers to a person who has an account at a bank (business actor) and is equipped with the 
relevant ATM/Debit card as a means to conduct electronic funds transfer (EFT) at an ATM or via 
EFTPOS. See Julita, Difference between Customer and Consumer (12 January 2011) 
DifferenceBetween.net <http://www.differencebetween.net/language/difference-between-customer-and-
consumer/>. 
2 
teller machines (ATMs),
5
 credit cards,
6
 ATM cards,
7
 debit cards,
8
 ‘electronic funds
transfer at the point of sale’ (EFTPOS) transactions,
9
 mobile transactions, and Internet
banking.
10
 E-banking also involves ‘electronic funds transfer’ (EFT).
11
The rapid development of e-banking services carries both risks as well as benefits. Both 
brick-and-mortar companies and criminal organisations have shifted their focus to the 
‘cyber world’ in the pursuit of wealth opportunities.
12
 Fraudsters have found that e-
banking transactions can provide great potential rewards with little risk of detection. 
Both consumers and banks are seriously concerned about e-banking fraud,
13
 particularly
5
See Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), A Glossary of Terms Used in Payment 
and Settlement Systems (Bank for International Settlements, revised ed, 2003) 8 (CPSS, A Glossary of 
Terms). Text of this document can be retrieved from: 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss00b.pdf?noframes=1>. Automated teller machine or (ATM) is ‘an 
electromechanical device that permits authorised users, typically using machine-readable plastic cards, to 
withdraw cash from their accounts and/or access other services, such as balance enquiries, transfer of 
funds or acceptance of deposits. ATMs may be operated either online with real-time access to an 
authorisation database or offline.’  
6
 Ibid 16: A credit card is ‘a card indicating that the holder has been granted a line of credit. It enables 
the holder to make purchases and/or withdraw cash up to a prearranged ceiling; the credit granted can be 
settled in full by the end of a specified period or can be settled in part, with the balance taken as extended 
credit. Interest is charged on the amount of any extended credit and the holder is sometimes charged an 
annual fee.’ 
7
 See art 1.5 Peraturan Bank Indonesia Nomor: 11/11/PBI/2009 Tentang Penyelenggaraan Kegiatan 
Alat Pembayaran Dengan Menggunakan Kartu sebagaimana telah diubah dengan Peraturan Bank 
Indonesia Nomor 14/2/PBI/2012 Tentang Perubahan Atas Peraturan Bank Indonesia Nomor 
11/11/PBI/2009 Tentang Penyelenggaraan Kegiatan Alat Pembayaran Dengan Menggunakan Kartu 
[Bank Indonesia Regulation Number: 11/11/PBI/2009 Concerning Card Based Payment Instrument 
Activitiy as amended by Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 14/2/PBI/2012 Concerning Amendment of 
Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 11/11/PBI/2009 Concerning Operation of Card-Based Payment 
Instrument Activities] (BIR-CBPI): ‘ATM card is a card-based payment instrument that can be used for 
cash withdrawal and/or fund transfer in which cardholder obligation fulfil immediately by debiting 
cardholder fund in Bank or other institution that have authorisation to raise fund in accordance to 
applicable law.’  
8
 See also: CPSS, A Glossary of Terms, above n 5, 19: A debit card is ‘card enabling the holder to have 
his purchases directly charged to funds on his account at a deposit-taking institution (may sometimes be 
combined with another function, e.g. that of a cash card or cheque guarantee card).’ 
9
 Ibid 38: EFTPOS is a term that ‘refers to the use of payment cards at a retail location (point of sale). 
The payment information is captured either by paper vouchers or by electronic terminals, which in some 
cases are designed also to transmit the information. Where this is so, the arrangement may be referred to 
as “electronic funds transfer at the point of sale” (EFTPOS).’ 
10
  Saleh M Nsouli and Andrea Schaechter, 'Challenges of the E-Banking Revolution' (2002) 39(3) 
Finance and Development <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2002/09/nsouli.htm>. 
11
  Federal Trade Commission, Facts for Consumers: Electronic Banking (2012) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/credit/cre14.shtm>. 
12
  Phil Williams, 'Organized Crime and Cybercrime: Synergies, Trends, and Responses' (2001) 
<http://www.crime-research.org/library/Cybercrime.htm>. 
13
 For fraud definition in Indonesia, see Surat Edaran Bank Indonesia Nomor 13/28/DPNP Tanggal 9 
Desember 2011 Perihal Penerapan Strategi Anti Fraud bagi Bank Umum [Bank Indonesia Circular Letter 
Dated 9 December 2011 Concerning Implementation of Anti-Fraud Strategi for Commercial Bank] 
(purposeful neglect undertaken in order to deceive, cheat, or manipulate bank, customer, or another party, 
that occurs inside the bank and/or using a bank’s facility so as to cause the bank, customer, or another 
party to suffer a loss and/or to cause the fraudster gain a financial benefit, both directly and indirectly’.  
3 
unauthorised EFT,
14
 that targets internet banking, phone banking, and credit and
ATM/debit card (payment card) transactions.
15
Fraudsters have equipped themselves with modern and sophisticated technologies and, 
in response to anti-fraud security measures adopted by financial institutions, are 
continuously developing their capabilities to avoid the risk of being caught. They 
continue to pursue their dishonest activities and reap the benefits of ineffective bank 
security systems, particularly in relation to obtaining e-banking passwords and account 
information.
16
Many scholars, such as Gifford,
17
 Davidson,
18
 and Phair,
19
 have noticed that technology
creates the possibility of e-banking crimes of great magnitude and complexity being 
committed quickly and anonymously. Such crimes include unauthorised system access, 
and both employee fraud (bank employee, merchant or bank’s third party agent), and 
card payment fraud. Iannacci and Morris
20
 have identified in their studies different types
of payment card fraud, including account application fraud;
21
 account takeover;
22
 use of
14
See Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC), ePayments Code (29 January 2014) 
<http://www.asic.gov.au/epaymentscode> (‘ePayments Code’). Text of this document can be retrieved 
from: <http://asic.gov.au/for-consumers/codes-of-practice/epayments-code/>. In Australia, the ePayments 
Code regulates consumer electronic payment transactions, among other things are ATM, EFTPOS, credit 
card transactions, online payments, internet and mobile banking, and BPAY. Previously, it was known as 
the Electronic Funds Transfer Code of Conduct (EFT Code) which had existed since 1986.  
The ePayments Code defines unauthorised transactions as ‘transactions which are not authorised by a 
user. It does not apply to any transaction carried out by the user or by anyone performing a transaction 
with the user’s knowledge and consent’. Further, under US Regulation E § 205.2(m), ‘an “unauthorized 
electronic fund transfer” is “an electronic fund transfer from a consumer’s account initiated by a person 
other than the consumer without actual authority to initiate the transfer and from which the consumer 
receives no benefit...”.’ 
15
 Iman Sjahputra, Perlindungan konsumen Dalam Transaksi Elektronik [Consumer Protection in 
Electronic Transaction] (Alumni, 2010) 87.  
16
 Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC), 'Review of the Electronic Funds Transfer 
Code of Conduct 2007/08: ASIC Proposals' (2008) 9. 
17
Nick Gifford, Information Security: Managing the Legal Risk (CCH Australia Limited, 2009) 29–37. 
18
Alan Davidson, The Law of Electronic Commerce (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 292–5. 
19
Nigel Phair, Cybercrime: The Reality of the Threat (E-Security Publishing, 2007) 15–40. 
20
 Jerry Iannacci and Ron Morris, Access Device Fraud and Related Financial Crimes (CRC Press LLC, 
2000) 30. 
21
 ‘A type of ID theft crime in which payment cards are obtained through a fraudulent application 
process using stolen or counterfeit documents’: INTERPOL, Payment Cards (2010) 
<http://www.interpol.int/Public/CreditCards/Default.asp>. 
22
 ‘Another type of ID theft crime, usually involving ‘deception of a financial institution, re-issue of a 
payment card and its redirection to a different address’: Ibid. 
 
4 
 
  
cards that are lost/stolen,
23
 altered,
24
 or counterfeit;
25
 or criminal activity involving ‘card 
not present’ (CNP) transactions,
26
 merchant collusion,
27
 and cardholder fraud.
28
  
Banks have long been well aware of the range of perpetrators or masterminds of 
unauthorised EFT targeting bank ATMs or EFTPOS terminal facilities. They can have 
had an association with the bank (employees, subcontractors or consumers) or be from 
completely outside its population (external or unrelated fraudsters). In some instances, 
the fraudster can be a third party, or bank employee or an employee of its agent that has 
access to or knows how to defraud ATMs or EFTPOS terminals. However, there also is 
the possibility that the fraudsters are the cardholders themselves who misuse their own 
PIN deliberately or inadvertently. According to Iannacci and Morris,
29
 cardholder fraud 
occurs when a card payment customer receives a card under his or her own identity but 
with the intent to defraud the issuer.  
In Indonesia, from author’s research result  many of the bank ATMs/EFTPOS 
machines in use today are not state-of-the-art machines. They would require much effort 
for security to be enhanced to meet more acceptable contemporary standards. This 
situation is exacerbated by the current practice of operators of ATMs and EFTPOS 
terminals (banks, Independent Sales Organisations (ISOs) and switching companies)
30
 
which fail to furnish all their infrastructure with the best closed circuit television 
                                                          
23
 ‘This type of fraud involves misuse of actual cards that have been either lost [by] or stolen from the 
genuine cardholder’: Ibid. 
24
 ‘Any access device that is changed in any way to change the appearance or electronic information 
contained within the device is said to be altered. Criminals often use stolen, valid card numbers on stolen 
devices to create the appearance of a valid card’: Iannacci and Morris, above n 20, 29.  
25
 ‘Fraud undertaken using plastic cards that have been specifically produced or existing cards that have 
been altered. These cards are encoded with illegally obtained payment card account data in order to pay 
for goods and services or to withdraw cash’: INTERPOL, Payment Cards, above n 21. 
26
 Fraud committed ‘using payment card account data to undertake transactions where there is no face-
to-face contact between the seller and purchaser. Typically, this type of fraud is committed by Internet, 
mail order or telephone. Card not present (CNP) fraud is currently the fastest growing payment card 
related type of fraud in many areas of the world’: Ibid. 
27
 Sometimes a merchant will work in concert with the criminal to perpetrate the fraud. Not only do 
employees working for merchants get involved in these schemes, but the company owners also do.  
28
 Cardholder fraud occurs when a credit card customer receives a credit card under his own identity but 
with the intent to defraud the issuer. 
29
 Iannacci and Morris, above n 20, 30.  
30
 A ‘switching company’ is a company that operates a system used to switch/route card-based payment 
instrument transactions from certain financial acquirer systems (such as ATM and EFTPOS) to an issuer 
system for authorisation purposes. In Indonesia, a switching company is one of the payment system 
providers governed by the Bank Indonesia Regulation (BIR-CBPI). In this regulation, a switching 
company is also treated as a ‘clearing and settlement agent’, because it provides clearing and settlement 
for banks that utilise its services. In this regard, a switching company requires operational licence prior 
their operation from Bank Indonesia.  
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(CCTV) function (that is, fully operational and able to record the ATM/EFTPOS 
environment for a reasonable length of time with good quality). This situation was later 
confirmed in the author’s interviews with bank officers (conducted during fieldwork in 
Jakarta), when they admitted that due to storage capacity problems, most ATM CCTV 
systems only record CCTV footage for one week (depending upon how busy each ATM 
is — since the recording function of some ATMs is triggered by the consumers 
attendance). Once the CCTV storage is full, the system will automatically delete the 
CCTV footage without creating back-up files. The quality of the video-recording (where 
it does exist) is often also not clear and the footage dark.
31
  
Author’s investigation also revealed that most banks also do not employ sophisticated 
transaction analysis and monitoring systems in effecting the EFT (known as neural 
network application), such as in a credit card’s neural system.
32
 Sullivan asserts that in 
such a neural system, ‘[r]isk parameters used in the analysis might include the location 
of the transaction, the number and value of recent transactions, the specific merchant 
where the transaction is taking place, and so on.’
33
  
Due to a lack of security standards, monitoring, and consumer education, as well as 
unclear fraud liabilities regulation and loss allocation rules, and relatively ineffective 
oversight of the bank payment card system in Indonesia, much payment system 
infrastructure may operate quite smoothly but fail to maximise the protection of its 
consumers. This inadequate practice in the payment system seems to go unnoticed by 
both consumers and authorities, and often leads to a massive occurrence of crime. 
                                                          
31
 See, eg, Bank Officer 1 (BO-1); BO-2; BO-3. See also Dian Ade Permana, Rekaman CCTV Gelap, 
Petugas Terjunkan TIM [CCTV Record Dark, Law Enforcer Deploy Team] (20 March 2009) 
Wonogiripos.com <http://www.wonogiripos.com/2009/jogjapolitan/kota-jogja/rekaman-cctv-gelap-
petugas-terjunkan-tim-130451>. Note persons interviewed are de-identified when reluctant to be named 
in citation. Category is indicated by letters, the number is the interviewee number (BO =Bank Officer). 
For details, see Design Methodology [1.6.1] below. 
32
 Dominique Rambure and Alec Nacamuli, Payment Systems: From the Salt Mines to the Board Room 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 67. In the credit card system, in order to ensure the authenticity of the card 
holder, sophisticated transaction monitoring systems are employed by credit card providers. These 
systems detect unusual activity or behaviour patterns (including geographically separated locations 
combined with transaction time) on an account and can take the appropriate actions to stop fraud as early 
as possible. For example of neural network policy, see Visa Neural Networks (24/7 Monitoring): Visa, 
Counterfeit Fraud (2010) <http://www.visa.ca/en/personal/pdfs/counterfeit_fraud.pdf>.  
33
 Richard J Sullivan, 'Can Smart Cards Reduce Payments Fraud and Identity Theft?' (2008) 93 
Economic Review (Kansas City) 35, 40–1. In the absence of the implementation of the neural network 
system to proprietary ATM/debit cards systems in Indonesia, if there are ATM/debit card transactions that 
should be suspected to be unauthorised — such as cash withdrawals performed repeatedly on the same 
ATM or different ATMs (either domestically or overseas) almost at the same time — these will go 
undetected by both banks and (at least initially) by customers. In most cases, banks in Indonesia will only 
become aware of the unauthorised ATM/debit transactions if bank customers report them. 
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Consequently, unauthorised payment card transactions in Indonesia have existed for 
quite a long time as is evidenced by revelations within bank meetings themselves as 
early as the 1990s.
34
 A storm of ATM/debit card fraud incidents was reported in January 
2010 throughout all provinces in Indonesia (though more concentrated in Bali) and 
involved a great loss of funds.
35
 Based on monthly reports from banks to Bank 
Indonesia (BI) as the Central Bank of the Republic of Indonesia, skimming devices 
were very frequently used at various banks’ ATMs in Bali to perpetrate fraud on 
consumer ATM/debit cards. Hundreds of consumers from at least 10 banks became 
victims of these frauds, involving losses of least IDR12.1 billion. Even more alarming 
news came from a statement by the Chief of Bali Police suggesting that the fraud was 
being committed by syndicates with potential links to known criminal groups in 
Australia, Russia and Canada.
36
 
EFT fraud occurs at varying levels of criminal professionalism and criminal intent. With 
the proliferation of EFT transactions around the globe and relatively common and 
standardised technology being used by banks around the world (to enable 
                                                          
34
 In 1997, the author attended a meeting at Bank Indonesia, where one of the commercial banks 
reported the occurrence of ATM skimming that causes the loss of bank consumers’ money. In general, 
consumers do not want to report the loss to the police as they wish to avoid further complications and the 
possibility of the occurrence of additional ‘administrative’ costs requested by the police. In the case of 
crimes reported to police, the police generally enter the data of e-banking fraud as ordinary ‘theft’, which 
results in the data related to e-banking fraud in particular to not be accessible as a separate category on the 
database, making it impossible to know the trends in e-banking crime ‘year on year’; however, there are 
several unauthorised EFT transactions cases that have been successfully prosecuted by the police, where 
perpetrators have been arrested, tried and sentenced by a court, eg: John Petrus (Indonesian), ATM 
skimmer, was sentenced to 6 years’ imprisonment imposed by the Central Jakarta District Court (verdict 
number 532/PID.B/2003/PH.JKT.PST, 4 June 2003); Eng Kim Hook (Malaysian), ATM skimmer, was 
sentenced to 3 years’ imprisonment by the Central Jakarta District Court (verdict number 
427/PID.B/2003/PN.JKT.PST, 12 June 2003). In 2007, the Indonesian Police Department had much 
success in uncovering the world’s biggest credit card counterfeiting network and apprehended more than 
14 suspects in Indonesia, although the two Malaysian citizens believed to be the masterminds of the fraud 
remained at large. The Indonesia Credit Card Association has asserted that loss due to credit card fraud in 
Indonesia in 2007 was around IDR 30 trillion. See: Polri Diakui Berhasil Ungkap Jaringan Pemalsuan 
Kartu Kredit Terbesar Dunia [Republic of Indonesia Police (Polri) Admitted has Success to Revealed 
World Biggest Credit Card Counterfeiting Network] (12 March 2008) Antara News.Com 
<http://www.antaranews.com/view/?i=1205297983&c=NAS&s=>. 
35
 Russell, Douglas, ATM Skimming/Skimming/Data Compromise (January 2010) ATMSecurity.Com 
<http://www.atmsecurity.com/monthly-digest/atm-security-monthly-digest/atm-fraud-security-digest-
january-2010.html>. See also 45 Nasabah Laporkan Pembobolan ATM di Bali [45 Consumers Report 
Thieves on ATM in Bali] (29 January 2010) Antara News 
<http://www.antarasumbar.com/berita/nasional/d/0/78396/45-nasabah-laporkan-pembobolan-atm-di-
bali.html>. 
36
 Anita Rachman and Emmy Fitri, ATM Skimming Attacks Signal Bank Security 
Shortcomings (22 January 2010) JakartaGlobe <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/atm-
skimming-attacks-signal-bank-security-shortcomings/>. See also See also 119 Foreigners Arrested 
for ATM Skimming (20 October 2015) The Jakarta Post 
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/10/20/119-foreigners-arrested-atm-skimming.html>. 
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interoperability of payment system transactions between different banks domestically or 
internationally), there is a growing trend of involvement of transnational criminal 
organisations in EFT fraud all over the world. This is exacerbated by easy, low cost and 
rapid movement of people between countries and the number of underground chat 
rooms and web pages on the Internet that provide information and access to fraud 
methods, techniques and devices.  
Besides the ATM incident, EFTPOS machines at Body Shop merchants in Indonesia 
also came under massive attack from fraudsters that affected thousands of payment card 
consumers in Indonesia (‘the Body Shop case’) at the end of 2013.
37
 Likewise, in the 
Body Shop EFTPOS machine attacks, international syndicates were apparently also 
involved in the fraud operation.
38
 In early 2014, when Bank’s ATM security had been 
relatively improved, an ATM skimming incident that targeted consumers of Bank 
Central Asia (BCA) (the biggest private bank) again occurred, causing total losses of 
around IDR1.2 billion. A group of fraudsters from overseas had once again perpetrated 
this ATM skimming fraud. This time, they came from a neighbouring country, 
Malaysia.
39
 Jahja Setiaatmadja, a Bank Central Asia (BCA) president and director, 
admitted that ATM transactions are very difficult for the bank to monitor since it 
involves monitoring more than two million transactions per day that occur at thousands 
of ATMs. This is exacerbated by the possibility of the use of other banks’ ATMs as a 
result of a national ATM interoperability program in Indonesia.
40
 Meanwhile, Bank 
Mandiri  the biggest government bank in Indonesia — had to shut down their ATM 
operation for two days in early May 2014, to prevent loss from suspected ATM/debit 
                                                          
37
  Gina Nur Maftuhah, Pencurian Data Body Shop Terjadi di Jakarta & Padang [Body Shop Data Theft 
Happened in Jakarta & Padang] (25 March 2013) Okezone.com 
<http://economy.okezone.com/read/2013/03/25/457/780852/pencurian-data-body-shop-terjadi-di-jakarta-
padang>. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
  Tri Artining Putri, ‘Sindikat Malaysia Pembobol ATM Dibekuk [Malaysia’s ATM Theft Syndicate is 
Apprehended]’, Koran Tempo, 4 March 2014, 5. In this fraud event, there were 112 BCA consumer 
accounts that had been reported compromised by the ATM skimming fraud method, which was 
accompanied by a hidden pinhole camera to capture a consumer’s PIN number. However, it is believed 
that more accounts were actually being compromised but have not yet been reported. A group of 21 
perpetrators from Malaysia is believed to be involved in this fraud; 15 of them are still at large while the 
rest were successfully apprehended by Indonesian police.  
40
 Ibid. 
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card data skimming that compromised more than 2000 cardholders’ data in their 
system.
41
  
Unauthorised payment card transactions can lead to the consumer and/or bank incurring 
direct financial losses. However, consumers with unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions suffer more compared to those with unauthorised credit card transactions. 
Even though payment card fraud will cause problems and anxiety for both types of 
cardholders, the levels differ, with ATM/debit cardholders suffering worse 
repercussions. Signature credit card holders are ‘spoiled’ by the many different types of 
protection offered by the issuer/principal (scheme networks such as Visa and 
MasterCard), with such protection including state-of-the-art Europay, Mastercard and 
Visa (EMV) chip technology for these payment cards (also able to be used in the debit 
card scheme network), zero liability rules for unauthorised transactions,
42
 the existence 
of a neural network system, monthly statements (along with consumer education 
material that covers areas such as fraud threat), and proactive notification by a bank 
officer when unusual patterns of transactions have occurred. In contrast, all these useful 
risk management features do not yet exist for proprietary ATM/debit card transactions 
or PIN based scheme network debit card in Indonesia that are a focus of this thesis.
43
  
To make matters more complicated for the ATM/debit cardholder, if fraud does occur, it 
is their money in the bank that is missing, not the bank’s money as is the case in credit 
card fraud. As indicated previously, most of the banks have not equipped their 
ATM/debit card system with neural network programs nor do they issue regular 
monthly transaction statements such as is the case for the credit card system. Hence, in 
most instances, by the time an ATM/debit card consumer notices unauthorised 
ATM/debit transactions on their account, their money has already been simply drained 
                                                          
41
 See Wahyu Daniel, ATM Sejumlah Nasabah Diblokir, Ini Penjelasan Bank Mandiri [Numbers of 
Consumer's ATM Blocked, this is Bank Mandiri's Explanation] (13 May 2014) detik.com 
<http://finance.detik.com/read/2014/05/12/205424/2580730/5/atm-sejumlah-nasabah-diblokir-ini-
penjelasan-bank-mandiri>. 
42
 The zero liability policy of Visa and MasterCard basically eliminates consumer liability for fraudulent 
transactions. However, this protection has several conditions and only applies to signature-based payment 
cards. Hence, any fraudulent transactions that happen in PIN based scheme networks - debit/credit card 
(such as Visa or MasterCard), then the resolution for unauthorised transactions and bank liability will be 
governed in accordance with the cardholder agreement with the issuing bank. See MasterCard, 
MasterCard Zero Liability (2012)  <http://www.mastercard.com.au/zero-liability.html>; Visa, Counterfeit 
Fraud, above n 32. 
43
 The term ‘proprietary ATM/Debit’ is used in this thesis to distinguish between the original bank-
issued ATM/debit cards and scheme networks debit cards (from Visa and MasterCard). However, all 
these payment cards cover EFTPOS and ATM transactions. 
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from the account. This situation can become worse, when money in the account is the 
only resource for covering daily living expenses or is the source of other payment 
obligations such as the fund on which cheques are drawn or from which utility accounts 
are directly debited.
44
  
Following the loss, some consumers try to seek recourse (in this case, damages) from 
their bank. However, most claims regarding unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions 
(also known as ‘phantom withdrawals’) are rejected by the banks. As a last resort, 
consumers usually will write of their ordeal to the mass media or utilise social media. 
The purpose is simple: to seek attention in order to gain help and a better resolution 
from the bank itself or others. In most cases, a bank will use their right to refute 
consumer allegations by repeating the reason for their initial decision, that is, that the 
disputed transactions were deemed valid because of the use of the correct card and 
PIN.
45
 Nevertheless, some banks will recompense consumers for their loss only if the 
fraud incident is widely publicised in the mass media (in that instance to avoid 
                                                          
44
 See Krista Tedder, 'Now You See It, Now You Don't: A Review of Fraud Costs and Trends' (A First 
Data White Paper, First Data, 2009) 7; Claes Bell, 4 Places Where You Don't Want To Swipe Your Debit 
Card, Business Insider (4 January 2012)  <http://articles.businessinsider.com/2012-01-
04/news/30587769_1_debit-card-card-terminals-skimmers>; Gail Hillebrand, 'Before the Grand 
Rethinking: Five Things To Do Today with Payments Law and Ten Principles To Guide New Payments 
Products and New Payment Law' (2009) 83(2) Chicago-Kent Law Review 769, 774; 
ConsumerReports.org, Debit-Card 'Skimming' Scams (16 January 2010) Media Indonesia Online 
<http://www.indonesiamedia.com/2010/01/16/debit-card-skimming-scams/>. See also Edward A Morse 
and Vasant Raval, 'PCI DSS: Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards in Context' (2008) 24 
Computer Law and Security Review: International Journal of Technology and Practice 540, 543. 
45
 For an instance of this matter, see Orlina Simamora, 'Pembobolan Lewat ATM Mandiri [ATM 
Mandiri Theft]', Kompas (Jakarta), 20 November 2006. In this rubric, Ms Simamora reported four 
unauthorised ATM withdrawals that caused an IDR4 million loss from her account, and made a request 
for restitution from Bank Mandiri. Later the bank showed her only the decision letter (which cannot be 
taken home nor a photocopy supplied) that essentially rejected the claim. Upon receiving this decision, 
Ms Simamora questioned the extent to which the bank was responsible for the security of a consumer’s 
funds held in the bank. Corporate Secretary PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk then replied to Ms 
Simamora’s letter in the same column in Kompas dated 13 December 2006, stating that based on the 
study by Bank Mandiri, the fourth withdrawal was considered valid because it was done with the card on 
behalf of Ms Orlina Simamora and via access to the account in question. ‘Success’ in terms of a 
transaction involving an ATM means that the ATM has to issue money according to the amount requested 
and the account in question has been debited accordingly; Hotman Simbolon, 'Transaksi dengan Kartu 
Mandiri [Transaction with Mandiri Card]', Kompas (Jakarta), 13 December 2006. From a technical point 
of view, unless bank systems have created unique data in each card to distinguish it from a possible 
counterfeit card, data in a counterfeit card that has been created by the use of data obtained utilising the 
skimming device method is identical to the genuine card; thus, the ATM/Debit card system will never be 
able to distinguish the data in counterfeit card from the data in the original ATM/Debit card. See also 
Mahesa Jati Kusuma, Hukum Perlindungan Nasabah Bank: Upaya Hukum Melindungi Nasabah Bank 
Terhadap Tindak Kejahatan Informasi dan Transaksi Elektronik (ITE) di Bidang Perbankan [Bank 
Consumers Protection Law: Legal Measures to Protect Bank Consumers from Information and 
Electronic Transactions Crime (ITE) in Banking Sector] (Nusa Media, 2012) 125. 
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reputation risk) and/or if there is widely publicised encouragement from central bank to 
do so.
46
  
When an unauthorised withdrawal of money from a customer account takes place (and 
is not widely publicised in the mass media), a legal question reasonably arises as to 
whether the bank or customer should himself/herself bear the responsibility for the loss 
incurred from the disputed transaction.
47
 However, failure to meet customer 
expectations regarding the safety of their accounts can undermine customer confidence 
and trust. This could hinder the bank’s ability to retain existing customers and to offer 
other e-banking products and services in the future. Significant consumer confidence or 
trust issues have been created through the common defensive bank position in fraud 
cases,
48
 as well as prompting some debate about the appropriate level of consumer 
education in Indonesia.
49
 Many scholars (such as Tyree,
50
 Glaessner, Kellermann and 
McNevin,
51
 Edwards)
52
 and institutions (for example, the American Bankers 
Association)
53
 believe that e-banking will not survive without consumer confidence. 
Before consumers will widely embrace e-banking, they must be convinced of the 
trustworthiness of this system. Within the banking industry, public confidence is very 
important and long touted as paramount.
54
 Sound consumer protection regulation to 
                                                          
46
 See Tri Artining Putri, above n 39. See also REI et al, Bank Harus Bayar Nasabah [Bank Has to Pay 
Consumer] (22 January 2010) KOMPAS.COM (online) 
<http://bisniskeuangan.kompas.com/read/2010/01/22/07010927/Bank.Harus.Bayar.Nasabah>. 
47
  Reinhard Steennot, 'Allocation of Liability in Case of Fraudulent Use of an Electronic Payment 
Instrument: The New Directive on Payment Services in the Internal Market' (2008) 24(6) Computer Law 
and Security Report 555, 555. See also Dana Aditiasari, Bank Mandiri Akan Ganti Seluruh Dana 
Nasabah yang Dibobol [Mandiri Bank to Make Restitution for All Consumer Funds Which had been 
Robbed] (3 September 2014) Detik.com 
<http://finance.detik.com/read/2014/06/03/134152/2598382/5/bank-mandiri-akan-ganti-seluruh-dana-
nasabah-yang-dibobol?f990101mainnews>. 
48
 See, Kompas, 31 January 2010. In response to recent ATM fraud in Indonesia, Kompas, one of the 
largest newspapers in Indonesia, conducted an ATM survey and found that most respondents (75.5%) 
worried about the safety of their money in the bank, and that such incidents jeopardised their trust in the 
bank.  
49
 Russel, above n 35.  
50
 Alan Tyree and Andrea Beatty, The Law of Payment Systems (Butterworths, 2000 ).  
51
 Thomas C Glaessner, Tom Kellermann and Valerie McNevin, 'Electronic Safety and Soundness: 
Securing Finance in a New Age' (The World Bank, 2004) 8. 
52
 Robin Edwards, 'Working Out Loss Liability in the Light of Efficiency Principles' in Wickrema 
Weerasooria (ed), Financial Regulation and Payment Systems (Prospect Media, 2001) 13. 
 
53
  American Bankers Association (ABA), Security in Electronic Banking (2010)  
<http://www.aba.com/Issues/Issues_SecurityElectronic.htm>; American Bankers Association (ABA), 
Security in Electronic Banking (2012)  
<http://www.aba.com/Issues/Index/Pages/Issues_SecurityElectronic.aspx>. 
54
 Anita K Pennathur, '"Clicks and Bricks": e-Risk Management for Banks in the Age of the Internet' 
(2001) 25 Banking and Finance 2103, 2112. 
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protect bank consumers against unfair contract provisions when dealing with the 
allocation of liability for unauthorised EFT is then very important.
55
  
Although modern technology facilitating e-banking has been popularly used in 
Indonesia for more than two decades, the laws and policies governing fraud liabilities of 
parties (loss allocation rules) involving such transactions remain uncertain, unclear and 
ineffective. These problems occur in many respects, such as in regard to the definitions 
of ‘valid transactions’, what conduct is deemed to constitute fault or negligence, what 
sort of principle can be used in the determination of parties liable for incidents of 
unauthorised e-banking transactions, the basis for defence to such liabilities, onus of 
proof, and what is the most appropriate forum for settlement of liability disputes. One 
can argue that these weaknesses are contributing to the rise of irregularities and criminal 
activities surrounding EFT in Indonesia, as alluded to earlier. 
In general, the allocation of losses in e-banking transactions in Indonesia occurs via a 
combination of government regulation and private ordering (contract). Very 
unfortunately, the most recent funds transfer legislation amongst others, namely Law 
Number 3 of 2011 on Fund Transfer (LFT),
56
 does not regulate the loss allocation rule 
(civil liability) in the event of e-banking fraud. Law Number 7 of 1992 on Banking as 
amended by Law Number 10 of 1998 (LB)
57
 is also silent about this issue.
58
  
However, some other Indonesian law such as the Civil Code,
59
 Law Number 8 of 1999 
on Consumer Protection (LCP)
60
 and Law Number 11 of 2008 on Information and 
                                                          
55
 In the United States, the importance of consumer protection is established by the enactment of the 
Federal Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) as a consumer protection statute governing consumer 
rights and liabilities vis-à-vis financial institutions. In Indonesia, the consumer protection aspect has been 
established as one of the six important aspects that underpin Indonesian banking architecture. In practice, 
consumer protection provisions exist in many Bank Indonesia regulations, such as in the card-based 
payment system regulation whereby banks are obligated to improve their e-banking/EFT security 
features. Bank Indonesia also provides mediation services in order to assist and overcome disputes 
between consumers and banks. 
56
 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 3 Tahun 2011 Tentang Transfer Dana [Law No 3 of 
2011 on Fund Transfer] (Indonesia) ('LFT''). 
57
 Undang-undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 7 Tahun 1992 Tentang Perbankan Sebagaimana Telah 
Diubah Dengan Undang-Undang Nomor 10 Tahun 1998 [Law No 7 of 1992 on Banking as Amended by 
Law No 10 of 1998] (Indonesia) ('LB').  
58
 AZ Nasution, Aspek Hukum Perlindungan Konsumen: Tinjauan Singkat UU Nomor 8 Tahun 1999-
L.N. 1999 No 42 [Consumer Protection Legal Aspect: Brief Analysis Law Number 8 of 1999] (2010) 
Masyarakat Pemantau Peradilan Indonesia 12 
<http://www.pemantauperadilan.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=121&Itemid=12>.  
59
 Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata [Civil Code] (Indonesia). See art 1365: ‘A party who commits 
an illegal act which causes damage to another party shall be obliged to compensate therefore’; art 1366: 
‘An individual shall be responsible, not only for the damage which he has caused by his act, but also for 
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Electronic Transactions (LIET),
61
 in general have provisions that govern liabilities. 
Specific to LCP, Samsul,
62
 Azhari,
63
 and Owen et al,
64
 argue that although generating 
much hope regarding the protection of bank customers, the LCP still fails to clearly 
define the rights and liabilities of parties involved in banking activities.  
Referring to the complex and compounding issues described above, most of the 
problems pertaining to the specific liabilities of the parties to such an unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transaction are, therefore, at the first stage usually governed by, and 
settled almost exclusively in accordance with, the terms and conditions of the contract 
that exists between the consumer and the bank.  
However, contentious issues between banks and customers are also generally derived 
from what are termed the banks’ ‘standard agreements’, which in most cases distribute 
risks associated with consumer e-banking transactions in a manner that seems to 
strongly favour the banks (exemption clauses) and which consequently may be viewed 
by consumers as ‘unjust’.
65
 According to the standard agreement of a number of banks 
about payment card transactions, all consumer transactions will be deemed valid if the 
correct consumer card data and PIN is used, and the bank will not be responsible for 
unauthorised use of it by an unauthorised party (liability dumping).
66
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
that which was caused by his negligence or carelessness’; art 1367: ‘An individual shall be responsible 
for the damage which he has caused by his own act, as well as for that which was caused by the acts of 
the individuals for whom he is responsible, or caused by matters which are under his supervision.’ 
60
 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 8 Tahun 1999 Tentang Perlindungan Konsumen [Law 
No 8 of 1999 on Consumer Protection] (Indonesia) ('LCP'). See art 19(1): ‘Business actors are obligated 
to give compensation for the damage, taint and/or losses the consumers suffer as a result of using or 
consuming the goods and/or services produced or traded by the business actors.’ 
61
 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 11 Tahun 2008 Tentang Informasi dan Transaksi 
Elektronik  [Law No 11 of 2008 on Electronic Information and Transactions] (Indonesia) ('LIET'). See art 
21(3): ‘If the loss in an Electronic Transaction takes place due to the operation failure of the electronic 
agent caused by the third party’s action directly to the electronic system, all of legal outcome shall 
become the responsibility of the electronic agent organizer.’ 
62
 Inosentius Samsul, 'Pengembangan Model Penyelesaian Sengketa Perbankan Dalam Perspektif 
Perlindungan Kepentingan Konsumen [Development of Banking Dispute Settlement Model from 
Consumer Protection Perspective]' (2009) 7(1) (January) Buletin Hukum Perbankan dan Kebangsentralan 
15.  
63
 H M Azhari, Perlindungan Hukum Bagi Nasabah Perbankan Syari'ah [Legal Protection For Sharia 
Banking Consumer] (2009)  <http://www.pa-tanahgrogot.net/utama/images/stories/pdf/artikelazhari.pdf>. 
64
  Darrell E Owen et al, 'Indonesia - Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) Assessment 
(Technical Report)' (USAID/ECG, 16 January 2001) 24.  
65
 Iwan Setiawan, 'Pembobolan ATM Bank [Theft from Bank ATMs]', Gatra (Jakarta - Indonesia), 24 
February 2010, 57.  
66
 Try Widiyono, Aspek Hukum Operasional Transaksi Produk Perbankan di Indonesia [Legal Aspect 
of Operational Transaction Banking Products in Indonesia] (Ghalia Indonesia, 2006) 73. It is important to 
note that the standard form for ATM card usage issued by PT Bank Perkreditan Rakyat Karyajatnika 
Sadaya (BPR KS) states that liability is attributed to the consumer, such as: 1. Consumer is obligated to 
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Thus, it is easy to assume that unless there is strong evidence indicating that the 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction was performed by a third party fraudster or 
cardholder or is associated with family, work colleagues and the like, most of the 
‘phantom withdrawals’ will be deemed valid because the transaction used the correct 
consumer card data and PIN. Banks usually believe consumers to be, at least to some 
extent responsible for the transaction, accusing them of having disclosed their PIN to 
someone else, either accidentally or deliberately. Hence, money lost from a consumer 
account most likely will not be redeemed from the bank.
67
 Fuady contends that the 
bank’s rejection of a consumer’s claim of unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions is 
mostly based on the implementation of the ‘non repudiation principle’, where all 
successful transactions (based on a consumer’s correct data, that is card and PIN data) 
will be treated as valid transactions, regardless of whether they were authorised or 
unauthorised transactions.
68
  
Even more severe from a consumer protection point of view, there was an occasion 
when a bank consumer became a victim of card trapping fraud at an ATM, and the bank 
confirmed the fact after re-playing the CCTV footage which showed that there had been 
a fraudster tamper with the ATM by using card trapping devices and the display of a 
sticker with a fake call centre’s phone number. However, the consumer’s claim for 
redress was eventually rejected by the bank for three reasons: (1) that the bank does not 
have a legal basis for the restitution (unless there is a court decision); (2) as the 
government bank, it would be accused of corruption if it redressed the consumer’s loss 
without a court verdict; and (3) the payment for redress if any, would trigger similar 
                                                                                                                                                                          
safeguard the ATM card and keep its PIN secret; 2. Any use of consumer ATM and PIN by an 
unauthorised party becomes the consumer’s responsibility and [the] bank will not be responsible for 
unauthorised use of ATM card and PIN by unauthorised party. See also, eg, point number 6 at PT Bank 
Mandiri (Persero) Tbk ‘Syarat dan Ketentuan Penggunaan Mandiri Debit’ [General Condition and 
Provision of the Usage of Debit Mandiri]: The cardholder shall maintain the confidentiality of the PIN of 
the card and take full responsibility for its use, hence the Bank will not in any way responsible for the 
misuse of the PIN. Point VII.D.7 PT Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) Tbk, Ketentuan Umum dan 
Persyaratan Pembukaan Rekening [General Terms and Conditions for Account Opening] (2012): User ID 
and PIN of electronic channel facilities only known by and become the consumer’s secret. Any abuse of 
consumer user ID and PIN of electronic channel make consumers fully responsible and risk-bearing, and 
bank is indemnified from any kind of lawsuit resulting from such abuse; Point 6 of ‘Pernyataan & 
Persetujuan Anda Sebagai Pemohon [Consumer Statement and Agreement as an Applicant] – PT Bank 
Permata (Persero) Tbk, 'Formulir Pembukaan Produk Terpadu [Integrated Product Opening Form]' 
(2012): ‘... I [the consumer] will keep PIN secret and will not reveal it to anyone and I herewith declare to 
be responsible upon any loss associated with card and PIN abuse and indemnify bank from any risk, 
damage, or liability that may occur due to it.’ 
67
 See, eg, Simamora, above n 45.  
68
 Muhamad Djumhana, Asas-Asas Hukum Perbankan Indonesia [Principles of the Indonesian Banking 
Law] (PT Citra Aditya Bakti, 2008) 283. 
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claims from other victims. The dispute became even worse for the consumer, since the 
bank indicated that it is only willing to settle the dispute by using the court litigation 
instead of an alternative dispute resolution body such as the Consumer Dispute 
Settlement Body (CDSB).
69
 
Fraudulent transactions could potentially jeopardise consumer trust and hinder the viability of 
payment system development. Hence, the existing legal provisions with respect to civil/fraud 
liability for unauthorised EFT transactions will be critically analysed as a legal alternative for 
consumers to obtain redress from bank when a consumer’s claim regarding unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transaction/s was rejected by a bank based on the bank’s liability dumping 
provisions in the bank-consumer contract. 
It is argues that the question of liability then can be established clearly and more easily 
if the party responsible for the fraud can be determined as well as the method of attack 
that has enabled an unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction to be made. However, 
even if the fraudsters and their attack method could not be revealed, for the sake of 
certainty, fairness and justice to the victim, the law should determine which party is 
most likely to have to bear the burden of the loss and the circumstances in which they 
should do so.  
From the point view of Indonesian statutes,
70
 the basic concept of civil liability in 
Indonesia is that an at fault or negligent party must bear any losses that other parties or 
themselves incur because of his or her negligence. Sometimes frauds have occurred not 
only due to a bank’s security weaknesses but also because consumers might have 
contributed or been responsible via their own ‘fault/negligence’ (that is, demonstrated a 
degree of negligence), such as by writing their PIN on the ATM/debit card, or using a 
date of birth as their PIN.  
Electronic banking is a special product offered by banks and one that utilises extensive 
technology. In spite of its nascent development, it is very rare for banks in Indonesia to 
offer enough education to consumers regarding how to safeguard ATM/debit card 
transactions from the risk of fraud, that is, about the exhaustive methods adopted by 
fraudsters and how to avoid them. Indeed, as the author’s fieldwork research later 
                                                          
69
 A Bank DKI legal officer statement made before the Jakarta Consumer Dispute Settlement Body 
hearing concerning unauthorised ATM withdrawal claimed by Mr Samuel Panggabean, Jakarta, 30 July 
2013. See text above footnote n 1040 (below) for detailed case of Mr Samuel Panggabean. For pros and 
cons of dispute settlement in the court and CDSB, see their description in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
70
 See Chapter Five / section 5.4.1 of this thesis. 
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revealed, education by banks generally revolves around the necessity to keep cardholder 
PIN secret and on the prohibition on writing the PIN on a card/storing a PIN record in a 
wallet. Based on an interview conducted with the head of a major bank’s ATM 
Division, it can be observed that banks are reluctant to educate consumers regarding 
transaction risks (such as the various risks associated with ATM/Debit card 
transactions) in order to avoid a false perceptions among bank consumers that the bank 
system was not secure. In addition, a private bank consumer services officer interviewee 
noted that while some of her duties were to facilitate account opening, supply an 
ATM/debit card and provide consumer education about bank products or services 
(including their inherent risk) for new customers, she herself used her own birth date as 
her ATM PIN (in the banking industry, for security reasons most banks forbid 
consumers using this as a PIN). Though this fact probably cannot be used to create a 
general picture of the Indonesian banking industry, it nevertheless raises concerns about 
the seriousness of the bank’s attempt to mitigate fraud risk by educating its own 
employees correctly.
71
  
From a technical viewpoint, every fraud might have different techniques or modus 
operandi. What constitutes being at fault or negligent for one party in one fraud case 
might differ from that in another case. A deeper understanding about who committed 
the fraud, and when, where, and how that fraud was committed, including the specific 
fraud technique or method employed by the culprit, should enlighten fraud liabilities 
stakeholders regarding the circumstances of the case.  
Along with economic framework for loss allocation and legal principles on civil 
liabilities, it is argued that the party that should be liable for damage in unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions will be easier to nominate if the point of compromise that 
enabled the fraudulent transaction to occur can be determined. On the other hand, a 
failure to understand the technical background in a case involving the extensive 
deployment of electronic and technical knowledge will lead to decisions that are far less 
likely to demonstrate fairness, justice and certainty. Thus, information 
security/technology infrastructure used in a payment card system relating to 
                                                          
71
 This first interviewee cited is Siti Sekarwati, Division Head ATM Operation, PT Bank Mandiri, Tbk 
(Persero) (Jakarta, 5 August 2012); the second interviewee is a consumer services officer (BO 5). 
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unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions will be analysed extensively to provide a 
basis for establishing liability in the event of fraud.
72
  
Referring to the problems of unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions mentioned 
above, this study attempts to examine the adequacy and effectiveness of the relevant 
laws of Indonesia in dealing with increasing levels of ATM/debit card fraud. This thesis 
argues that creating the legal framework for fair and clear loss allocation rules in the 
case of unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions is very important. Such a framework 
could become a common guide to settling any disputes between banks and consumers, 
either in the banking industry itself, or in any Court or alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) forum. It could also provide incentives to the liable party to increase their level 
of ‘duty of care’ both in the administrative and technological sense. It is to be hoped 
that the uncertainty that has long existed in relation to the results of disputes involving 
unauthorised EFT transactions will then be reduced. 
Nonetheless, to the best of the writer’s knowledge, no in-depth studies have been 
undertaken thus far on Indonesian law and practice concerning economic, technological, 
and legal aspects of unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions. The need for a 
comprehensive investigation of loss allocation rules (civil/fraud liability) for losses 
derived from unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions in Indonesia has become more 
important as the proliferation and greater popularity of payment cards systems has 
unfortunately also been accompanied by increased payment card fraud. 
The dearth of studies on what is an increasingly important area of law and regulation 
demands a comprehensive investigation into the problems in order to arrive at 
recommendations for the development of the banking sector in regard to strengthening 
the protection of banking consumers in Indonesia.  
Legal reform in the electronic banking area — especially in payment card system — is 
thus always essential, simply to keep abreast of the changing technology and the 
challenges such technology presents. It requires a greater understanding and knowledge 
of the technology involved.
73
 In addition, it is submitted in the thesis that the 
apportionment of liability rules in the payment system requires greater attention not 
                                                          
72
 Carl H Meyer and Stephen M Matyas, Cryptography: A Guide for the Design and Implementation of 
Secure Systems (John Wiley & Sons, 1982) 451. 
73
 Glaessner, Kellermann and McNevin, above n 51, 25.  
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only to the legal aspects, but also to a multitude of factors such as economic factors, and 
human factors (for example, consumer awareness and education) as well as the 
processes and technology utilised.
74
 Failure to do so tends to render loss allocation rules 
misleading and inaccurate. 
1.2. The Scope and Limitations of the Study 
E-banking/EFT has a very wide array of manifestations. However, for the purpose of 
this thesis the study will be restricted to payment card transactions in Indonesia where 
the consumer (and also fraudster) is directly involved in initiating the ATM/debit card 
transaction in the brick-and-mortar world
75
 (card present transaction) for transactions at 
ATM/EFTPOS terminals. In terms of the technology used in payment cards, this thesis 
will only focus on ATM/debit cards that are most widely used in Indonesia, where 
identification, authentication and authorisation of consumer transactions still rely on a 
magnetic stripe and PIN.
76
  
                                                          
74
 Relevant processes and technological factors for consideration include the strength or sophistication of 
electronic systems used for identification, authentication and authorisation of ATM/debit transactions, 
fraud methods, and the points at which ATM/debit card data is being compromised. The technological 
aspects of ATM/debit card transactions also will be discussed from a legal perspective, especially in 
regard to testing the validity of electronic card data and electronic signatures used in e-banking 
transactions in Indonesia in order to ascertain and legitimise the mandate of customers. In this respect, 
issues to be taken into account include how the law ensures authentication and authorisation in terms of 
integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation for card-based payment transactions. 
75
 A traditional ‘street-side’ or ‘shop front’ business that deals with its customers face-to-face in an 
office or store that the business owns or rents. The local grocery store and the corner bank are examples 
of brick-and-mortar companies. For more, see Investopedia, Dictionary: Brick and Mortar (2012)  
<http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/brickandmortar.asp#ixzz1aJkP6Zm9>. ‘Brick-and-mortar’ and 
‘bricks-and-mortar’ are used interchangeably by various writers. 
76
 There are other reasons why this thesis focuses on unauthorised ATM and debit card transactions:  
In terms of card-based payment transaction data in Indonesia, the Bank Indonesia, Payment System 
Annual Report 2010 concluded that in Indonesia ATM and debit card transactions are the most prevalent 
in the retail payment systems market place as compared to other non cash payment instruments such as 
credit cards, prepaid cards, Internet banking or SMS banking (at 11). However, the popularity in the use 
of ATM and debit cards has also attracted criminals, as evidenced by an increase in card-based payment 
fraud to IDR 11 billion in 2010. By contrast, credit card fraud data decreased both in volume and value by 
7.06% and 20.88% respectively in 2010.  
From 1 January 2010, all new credit cards issued in Indonesia were equipped with new ‘chip’ or ‘smart 
card’ technology. The new secure and tamper resistant cards resulted in a decrease in credit card fraud 
figures in 2010 (at 51). In contrast, there are not yet such obligations to implement smart card technology 
for proprietary ATM and debit cards, even though the draft of national standard for ATM/Debit card 
based on chip technology was created (at 30). Most ATM and debit cards in Indonesia are proprietary 
cards (issued by the bank with its own local brand) and still rely on magnetic stripe technology, and are 
thus more vulnerable to fraudster attack. See: Biro Pengembangan dan Kebijakan Sistem Pembayaran 
Tim Perizinan dan Informasi Sistem Pembayaran, Direktorat Akunting dan Sistem Pembayaran, 'Laporan 
Sistem Pembayaran dan Pengedaran Uang 2010. "Arah dan Kebijakan Sistem Pembayaran dalam 
Menyongsong Era Integrasi Ekonomi serta Upaya Meningatkan Kualitas Uang dan Kehandalan 
Manajemen Pengelolaan Kas" [Payment System Annual Report 2010. "Payment System Direction and 
Policy in the Era of Economic Integration and Efforts to Improve the Quality and Reliability of Cash 
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Hence, this study will focus first on unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions and 
relevant loss allocation rules (fraud liabilities) between consumers and the ATM/debit 
card issuer bank.
77
 Therefore, it does not cover:  
 Disputes caused by: a) technical malfunction or system errors; b) unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions involving non-consumer transactions; and c) 
unauthorised ATM/debit card not present (CNP) transactions conducted without 
the physical use of ATM/debit cards, such as in Internet transactions or mail 
order/telephone order (MOTO) transactions; 
 debit card transactions where the authentication and authorisation method is 
using a handwritten signature; and 
 transactions between merchants and financial institutions.  
Secondly, with a view to strengthening the existing provisions concerning prevention 
and legal mitigation of ATM/debit card related crimes in Indonesia, this study will 
investigate and examine legal flaws in the existing unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transaction dispute resolution processes between consumers and their bank in the ADR 
and/or court of justice based on payment cards and their liability regulation, and 
propose better rules and procedures to further safeguard consumer transactions and 
encourage consumer confidence in the system and its use.” 
Even though the study is limited to unauthorised ATM/debit Card transactions, to some 
extent all the principles, findings and recommendations pertaining to fair and just loss 
allocation rules basically can be applied to other e-banking or EFT transactions, such as 
credit card, Internet banking, mobile banking, phone banking, and so on. 
1.3. The Contribution of the Study 
Indonesia introduced electronic banking in the early 1990s.
78
 This new method of 
transacting has been popular since its inception, resulting in a significant increase in 
electronic banking transactions in Indonesia. This has been followed by a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Management"]' (Bank Indonesia, 2010) 512. This document can be retrieved from 
<http://www.bi.go.id/NR/rdonlyres/71144447-
A46645A0B756D9C0A627B710/22745/LSPPU2010_Final_Publish_Web.pdf>. More recent 
developments that indicate the delay in implementing such technology in relation to ATM/debit card 
payments are also detailed in this thesis. 
77
 Unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions in this thesis means: those ATM or debit card transactions 
not authorised by the legitimate cardholder but limited to bricks-and-mortar card present transactions.  
78
 Dyah Nastiti K Makhijani, 'Payment Systems in Indonesia' in Payment Systems in EMEAP Economies 
(Executives' Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks and Monetary Authorities (EMEAP) 2002) 148. 
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commensurate increase in the number of consumer complaints due to a continued rise in 
the number of unauthorised ATM/debit card incidents. According to the 2010 payment 
system report from Bank Indonesia, fraud loss in ATM/debit card transactions increased 
by IDR11 million compared to previous year, that is, from just IDR44.997 million in 
2009 to IDR55.224 million in 2010. The biggest fraud losses were from counterfeit card 
fraud where consumer data was obtained using the card skimming method.
79
  
Despite these momentous changes in the banking sector in terms of method of 
transactions and fraudulent transfers of customer deposits, there has been no 
comprehensive study carried out thus far addressing the problems referred to earlier.  
In view of the dearth of material in this area of study in Indonesia and the fact that there 
is no clear, simple, fair and decisive set of laws covering unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions in Indonesia, this study intends to make a significant contribution towards 
the development of comprehensive loss allocation rules and EFT regulation in 
Indonesia. It will conduct a critical analysis of the economic, technological, and legal 
framework for this electronic banking service. 
The study will be the first of its kind in Indonesia, and will comprehensively:  
 Critically review the implementation of the laws addressing civil liability resulting 
from fraud or unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions in Indonesia (fraud 
liability) and examine the fraud from legal, economic, and technological points of 
view in order to make a comprehensive analysis of unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions and the ramifications for Indonesian law.  
 Compare and benchmark other countries’ unauthorised EFT regulations covering 
loss allocation (allocation of liability) between consumers and banks, including the 
Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA)
80
 and Regulation E in the United States
81
 and 
the e-Payments Code in Australia.
82
 The thesis will analyse liability allocation 
thoroughly, according to its context, background policy and possible 
appropriateness within an Indonesia context. 
                                                          
79
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 Fill the gap resulting from the relative legal vacuum concerning clear and detailed 
allocation rules for (enumerated) losses resulting from unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions. Therefore, the thesis will propose a comprehensive ATM/debit card 
regulation addressing the perspectives and interests of both the consumer and the 
bank, which will provide clear, fair, just, simple, and decisive loss allocation rules 
concerning unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions, along with relevant 
considerations and principles that will fit Indonesia’s specific situation and its civil 
liability regime.  
1.4. Literature Review 
One of the most important outcomes for consumers in the development of electronic 
commerce (e-commerce) has been the introduction of the electronic means of making 
banking transactions, better known as electronic-banking or e-banking. Many 
researchers, scholars, and practitioners, such as Geva,
83
 Nitsure,
84
 Nsouli,
85
 Tyree,
86
 
Gleason and Heimann,
87
 and Schechter,
88
 and international institutions such as the Bank 
for International Settlement,
89
 the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 
and the International Monetary Fund agree on the significant benefits of e-banking 
service delivery.  
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision – Bank for International Settlements in 
their study noted that the development of e-banking may contribute to improved 
efficiencies in the banking and payment system, which could give banks greater 
capabilities to offer a newer and wider range of products and services with lower 
operating costs, expand their market for traditional deposit-taking and credit extension 
activities, and strengthen their competitive position in offering existing payment 
services.
90
 Schaechter
91
 further noted that e-banking enables new and existing 
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2000.html> 1.  
87
 Kristeen Gleason and Dan Heimann, Electronic Banking, Doing Business Electronically (Springer-
Verlag, 1998) 177–80. 
88
 Nsouli and Schaechter, above n 10, 1. 
89
 Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has conducted many studies in regard to e-banking and 
banking payment instruments, such as Risk Management for Electronic Banking and Electronic Money 
Activities (March 1998) and Risk Management Principles for Electronic Banking (July 2003).  
90
 BCBS, Risk Management for Electronic Banking and Electronic Money Activities, above n 3, 1. 
 
21 
 
  
customers to no longer be subject to time and geographic limits, with a form of banking 
that was relatively convenient, easy and involved low transaction costs.
92
 In relation to 
the banking processing capabilities, Storer furthermore explained how e-banking could 
convey large quantities of data over great distances, quickly and securely.
93
  
In contrast, a study conducted by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
94
 as 
well as those by Akindemowo,
95
 Pennathur,
96
 and Nsouli and Schaechter, 
97
 found that 
besides a standard risk for traditional banking activities, particular risks are pertinent  
across e-banking activities or an electronic payment system, namely operational risk,
98
 
reputational risk
99
 and legal risk.
100
  
Many scholars (such as Gifford,
101
 Davidson,
102
 and Phair)
103
 have noticed that 
technology creates the possibility for e-banking crimes of great magnitude and 
complexity to be committed quickly and anonymously. Such crimes include 
unauthorised system access, employee fraud (both bank employee and merchant), and 
card payment fraud. Techniques used to obtain the information necessary to perform 
unauthorised e-banking consumer transactions include the insertion of key logging 
applications, ‘shoulder surfing’, illegal interception of transaction data, ‘packet 
sniffing’, and ‘social engineering’ (described in Chapter 4).  
In most cases, it is not possible to identify the person who has committed the fraud. 
Unauthorised e-banking transactions can lead to the consumer and/or bank incurring 
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direct financial losses. When an unauthorised withdrawal of money from a customer 
account takes place, a question reasonably arises as to whether the bank or customer 
himself/herself should bear the responsibility for the loss incurred from the disputed 
transaction.
104
  
It is submitted that the central issue of this thesis, and an issue that has been a concern 
of many scholars (such as Cooter and Rubin,
105
 Rusch,
106
 Geva,
107
 Pennathur,
108
 
Radhakrishna,
109
 Steennot,
110
 White,
111
 Franz and Asbill,
112
 Edwards,
113
 and Levitin)
114
 
and for institutions (such as the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 
(FFIEC))
115
 is how to allocate liability between banks and their consumers for 
unauthorised EFT transactions. 
The importance of loss allocation rules has been long recognised by many scholars, 
because such rules distribute consequences to and create incentives for the parties 
involved in the transactions. Moreover, as Levitin observes, there is a relationship 
between liability and preventive behaviours: ‘The greater a party’s liability for fraud 
losses, the greater incentive the party will have to take care to avoid fraud.’
116
 
The more difficult legal issue to be resolved in terms of liability is when there is no 
clear evidence concerning who actually accessed the e-banking system and transferred 
funds from the consumer account or when both the consumer and the bank have by their 
own contributory negligence or fault enabled the fraud to occur. To complicate matters 
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further, concerning problems of identity and authentication, the studies of Sharpe,
117
 
Edwards,
118
 Niven,
119
 and Zahir
120
 reveal the difficulties in identifying who actually 
performed unauthorised EFT transactions. Generally, banks maintain that most 
transactions are indeed ‘authorised’ since they are made using correct consumer PIN 
and card data. Banks and cardholders are often involved in contentious disputes 
concerning who should be liable for loss of funds suffered by cardholders/consumers.  
Currently, many countries have different approaches both to the form of regulation and 
liability principle adopted to resolve this liability issue. The differences can be 
attributed to each country’s consumer policy, formal or informal regulatory approach, 
level of consumer awareness, existence of pressure groups, stage of technological 
development, and/or fraud incident rates.  
In regard to the degree of variation between jurisdictions, a few details prior to 
presenting further relevant review materials could prove helpful. The United States 
chose to govern liability rules by statute, with the adoption of a strict liability principle 
that apportions liability to the financial institution (with just a single limitation imposed 
regarding consumer reporting). Levitin maintains that such regulation uses strict 
regulation combined with contributory negligence, with a responsibility on the banking 
consumer to report unauthorised EFT transactions as soon as they come to the 
consumer’s attention; nevertheless, the term ‘negligence’ here relates only to the 
reporting of the unauthorised transactions and not to the conduct or situation that caused 
the loss.
121
 In stark contrast to banking entities in Indonesia, banks in the United States 
bear the risk of unauthorised EFT transactions, regardless of consumer negligence, with 
— as Douglass notes — consumers only liable for (limited) losses should they fail to 
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immediately report such transactions.
122
 Conversely, Australia regulates liability with 
liability rules based on negligence principles (a fault-based system).  
In their ePayments code (previously known as Electronic Funds Transfer Code of 
Conduct 2008), the liability rules are enumerated, prescribed and precise; and in these 
jurisdictions, a bank is basically responsible for unauthorised EFT transactions, unless it 
can prove on the balance of probability that consumers have contributed to the losses. 
Clearly, the Australian and the United States of America (US) systems place a greater 
degree of responsibility on the banking sector.  
Nonetheless, regardless of which international variant of form and liability principle is 
adopted, it is important to understand the philosophy about liability rules before 
determining the particular approach to be adopted. 
More than two decades ago, Cooter and Rubin in their well-known work used economic 
analysis to develop three general principles of loss allocation between consumers and 
financial institutions: loss spreading,
123
 loss reduction,
124
 and loss imposition.
125
 They 
concluded that when unauthorised transactions occur, the financial institutions should 
bear most of the loss because they are in the better position (compared to the consumer) 
to spread the losses or prevent the fraud. Meanwhile, the consumer should only be 
strictly liable for the loss up to a relatively low and fixed limit.
126
 Geva echoes this 
finding.
127
 
Many other scholars or experts, such as Rusch,
128
 White,
129
 and Gillette,
130
 extend the 
findings of Cooter and Rubin in exercising existing liabilities rules. Rusch extends 
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Cooter and Rubin’s work by considering a policy perspective as a determinant factor in 
creating new rules that should be feasible to be implemented with the current state of 
technology. According to her, this policy should balance the cost of operating the 
current system against the cost and feasibility of implementing clear, transparent and 
functional liability rules in order to create incentives to the appropriate party to reduce 
the loss.
131
  
White, in his thesis, found that US regulations are examples of regulations that apply 
Cooter and Rubin’s third principle (loss imposition), while Australia’s regulations are 
examples that apply a mixture of Cooter and Rubin’s first and second principles 
(producing a ‘hybrid’ of the ‘spreading loss’ and ‘loss reduction’ principles).
132
 Further, 
he asserted that the Australian EFT Code of Conduct,
133
 which follows a fault-based 
system, is ambiguous and does not clearly assign definitive apportionment of liability, 
burden of proof, or outline how to weigh the evidence, and leaves the Australian 
Banking Industry Ombudsman (ABIO) in the difficult situation of having to make 
judgments on unclear facts.
134
 In contrast, he compares this to the US regulation that 
seems to be simpler because it always apportions liability to the financial institution 
unless the consumer does not report the loss in the acceptable timeframe, or if the 
transaction is due to theft or misuse of an access device. Therefore, the US approach is 
easier to adjudicate and administer and could avoid contentious disputes between the 
financial institution and consumer. However, most of these studies were based on an 
economic and legal perspective with only little consideration of the technology inherent 
in ATM/debit card systems.  
As can be seen above, issues that exercise authors include fault/negligence and its 
effects (if any) on loss allocation, and its attribution whether to one party or the other or 
jointly (according to the various circumstances and legislation, regulation, voluntary 
code or contract). The knowledge base differential is one source of justification for 
change as is the banking sector’s resistance to implementing safer, more modern 
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technology, as well as consumer education programs. The lack of such changes leaves 
consumers vulnerable, but without redress.  
This knowledge asymmetry was later confirmed by the author in his field research. 
Prominent fraud methods for ATM/EFTPOS, such as skimming, card trapping, and so 
on have long been known to banks. They commonly are members of an EFT security 
association, a network scheme like Visa and/or MasterCard, and have regular gatherings 
with other banks and/or the central bank. Such memberships and/or routine meetings 
can be sources of information as to current fraud methods in EFT/card-based 
transactions. One bank respondent reporting document to the central bank regarding its 
payment card service (unpublished) revealed that risks in payment cards include 
skimming, lost and stolen cards, and so on (hence these are foreseeable risks). In 
contrast, most consumers from major banks that have been interviewed during the 
author’s field research in Jakarta, Yogyakarta and Denpasar (Indonesia) do not have any 
idea about the function and vulnerability of the magnetic stripe in their ATM/Debit card 
nor the fraud risks or methods that are commonly employed by fraudsters in Indonesia, 
such as skimming, shoulder surfing, card trapping and so on (and so for consumers the 
risks are unforeseeable).
135
 
Given the lack of consumer knowledge and the failure by banks to provide safer 
systems, the numerous instances of unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions (as 
fraudsters take advantage of both) cannot come as a surprise, nor can the resulting 
disputes that are further complicated by unclear fault or negligence terminology within 
the legislation. Geva nevertheless argues that ‘any such rule may lead to wasteful 
litigation and may be unfair to a consumer who may have underestimated the risk’.
136
  
This point of view is reflected in many unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction 
dispute cases in Indonesia. There are no rules linking liability to enumerated prescribed 
and precise acts or omissions constituting negligence in regard to EFT transactions. This 
unfortunate situation is further exacerbated by the judges’ lack of knowledge of 
consumer dispute cases, current development of tort law (especially regarding the law 
of negligence), and the technology, ATM/debit card security standards required by 
authority (Bank Indonesia), and identity theft/fraud methods involved.  
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Court decisions tend, therefore, to be varied and inconsistent, even where cases are 
relatively similar. Most court decisions concerning unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transaction disputes between banks and consumers tend to be always in favour of banks, 
even though it could be proved that consumers were the victims of fraud. The fact that 
the bank failed to secure its consumer activated terminal/electronic agent that enable the 
occurrence of fraudulent activities, was denied.
137
  
Along with the practice of unauthorised EFT transactions, the forums to settle disputes 
arising from such transactions have also become a big problem in their own right in 
Indonesia. This is mainly because court proceedings in Indonesia are very costly and 
time consuming, as mentioned by Sukarmi,
138
 Irawan,
139
 and Samsul.
140
 In terms of 
time-frames for court proceedings, Carl and Reni have noted that in practice a trial 
judgment in the District Court (court of first instance) is usually rendered within one 
year, while appeals to the High Court may take around two or three years, and the 
Supreme Court appeals may take between three to five years.
141
 Hence, total litigation 
processes in these three different stages of court proceedings will take approximately six 
to eight years to complete.  
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Adding to this constraint, Priliasari and Winarta observes that judicial decisions often 
do not reflect a unified approach to the resolution of disputes.
142
 The findings of 
different courts may differ on the same issues, creating uncertainty concerning the 
expected outcomes of the legal proceedings.
143
  
This uncertainty occurred partly because of the lack of status of the principle of 
precedent in the Indonesian court (relative to its use in common law countries). In 
Indonesia, there are several types of courts over which the Supreme Court (Mahkamah 
Agung) ultimately presides.
144
 As a Dutch colony, its legal system was formed as a civil 
law system.
145
 After independence, Indonesia continued to follow the civil law tradition 
of the Dutch;
146
 thus, ‘Indonesian courts do not apply the principle of precedent,
147
 
which is so familiar among common law jurisdictions’.
148
 As Manan observes, ‘In a 
civil law system, the courts are not bound by decisions of the courts at the same level or 
higher level (District Court or High Court).’ Therefore, the court’s verdict is a very 
common cause of legal uncertainty,
149
 a point also emphasised by Pompe in his book.
150
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Nevertheless, there was encouragement for change expressed at the first National Law 
Seminar in 1963, which recommended that the judges in Indonesia develop national law 
based on case law.
151
  
According to Mertokusumo, in the Continental law (or Civil Code) system, a court’s 
verdict has what is called ‘persuasive precedent’, where the court’s verdict only has the 
power to convince, and lacks binding force.
152
 Instead, the courts ‘will use the statutes 
as their basis for deciding the cases’.
153
 As a consequence, many relatively similar cases 
have produced different verdicts. Although this is legally possible since each judge or 
panel of judges has the independence to decide their own verdicts, the absence of the 
doctrine of precedent and the lack of adequate publication of and publicity for judicial 
decisions prevents a court becoming aware of, and learning from, the decisions of 
another. Hence, this often creates legal uncertainty. 
Lemek concluded that the blame for legal uncertainty in Indonesia can be attributed to 
Indonesia’s legal doctrine which gives court judges freedom to examine each case very 
individually (without utilising a system of ‘precedents’) and to interpret law. 
Furthermore, he hypothesised that given the freedom to judge, some were sometimes 
biased because their judgment may have been influenced by personal feelings and 
certain ‘X’ factors.
154
 Nurdin further indicates that many court decisions were not 
independent but driven by corruption, collusion, nepotism, and/or having been subject 
to interference from the executive or legislative arms of government.
155
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As a result of the legal hurdles mentioned above, most bank consumers are not keen to 
go to court to contest a bank’s unfavourable decision, especially if the disputed amount 
of money that was lost through the fraudster’s activities was not significant. There is no 
guide to what amount is to be considered as ‘significant’ or ‘insignificant’; however, in 
interviews conducted by the author many bank consumer respondents seem to consider 
an amount in excess of IDR10 billion as sufficient to drive consumers to seek justice 
beyond just writing a complaint to the mass media.
156  
In order to undertake legal and regulatory reforms, Owen et al argue that Indonesia 
should take advantage of the best practices and experiences of other countries with 
respect to the complicated issues surrounding the law and policy of e-commerce.
157
 
Adding to the complexity, rules regarding liability of the legitimate cardholder for an 
unauthorised use of the card differ from country to country, as Rosenberg observes.
158
 
This is a disadvantage but also an opportunity.  
Contemporary developments of substantive law in Indonesia tend to follow the world 
trend towards harmonisation on global issues. Many other countries’ regulations 
(regardless of the origin of the country’s law system) and international conventions 
(such as the EU convention on cybercrime or UNCITRAL model law on e-commerce 
and electronic ‘signatures’) have already been adopted in many of Indonesia’s 
regulations.  
Lemek argues that it is all right for Indonesia, a country that follows a civil law system, 
to learn from the experience of Anglo Saxon countries since the demarcation line 
between Anglo Saxon and civil law countries is now ‘a blur’ and codes adopted in 
common law countries can be transposed into civil law countries.
159
 Irianto further 
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argues that even in the Netherlands from which Indonesian law was derived, judicial 
decisions now are deemed a very important source of law, which proves that there is 
closer intersection between the common law system and the continental law system than 
some maintain.
160
 Hence, relevant legislation and regulations for consideration include 
EFTA and Regulation E (US), and the ePayments Code (Australia).  
Whilst one can argue that weaknesses in legislation and policy
161
 as well as 
technological lag in the area are contributing to the rise of EFT-related irregularities and 
criminal activities in Indonesia, nonetheless, to the best of the writer’s knowledge, no 
in-depth studies have been yet undertaken on Indonesian law and practice concerning 
EFT, in particular related to unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction; and it was 
without success that the writer searched for such materials to include in the literature 
review. This reinforced the writer’s conviction of the need for this study.  
Hence, a comprehensive investigation of the problems needs to be conducted in order to 
gain a true picture of the situation in Indonesia. Investigation results will be analysed 
comprehensively to enable appropriate law reform recommendations to be made, in 
order to strengthen consumer protection in banking industry practice in Indonesia.  
1.5. Research Questions 
To attempt the analysis of the problems briefly introduced in the previous sections of 
this chapter, the central questions to be addressed by this research project are: 
Primary Questions: 
1. What sort of legal principles can be used and how to formulate fair, clear and 
decisive loss allocation rules between banks and their customers for unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions, especially when: 
a. there is no clear evidence in regard to who has actually performed unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions and whether there is a fault or negligence on the 
banks’ or consumers’ side; and 
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b. both banks and customers had demonstrated negligence that enabled the 
fraudster to perform unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions.  
In order to ascertain the apportionment of fraud liability, a number of issues need to 
be resolved: what are the methods employed by fraudsters to commit e-banking 
fraud in Indonesia and where were the point of compromised? 
Secondary Questions: 
When an unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction occurs, and a process of dispute 
resolution is required in order to settle contentious disputes between consumer and 
banks regarding the fraud liability, then: 
1. What system of burden of proof should be adopted and who should bear the burden 
of proof in establishing an allegation of unauthorised ATM/debit transaction 
between a cardholder and bank? And 
2. What sort of approach is required in order to create legal reform for unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions? 
1.6. Research Design 
1.6.1. Methodology 
This research emanates from the observation of the frustrating experiences of numerous 
helpless victims of e-banking frauds or unauthorised ATM/debit transactions in 
Indonesia. The victims accrue substantial and/or damaging losses (a small loss can 
disproportionately affect a person of little means) before becoming aware of the 
situation and their apparent lack of access to redress. Having been concerned about such 
a serious problem, several commentators have contended that it is necessary to engage 
in research to devise appropriate legal principles to redress the loss sustained by such 
innocent victims.
162
  
This research aims to enhance the effectiveness of regulation pertaining to unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions in Indonesia, by establishing clear, detailed and just loss 
allocation rules for unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions (civil liability), whereby 
on the one hand, incentives will be provided to banks and consumers to increase their 
awareness and duty of care to ATM/debit card system, and on the other hand, the 
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number of unresolved disputes between customers and their banks regarding 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions will be reduced and/or existing disputes more 
equitably and predictably resolved. 
In order to answer the research questions and address the problems stated above, a 
theoretical legal research framework
163
 will be developed in regard to civil liability 
associated with unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions. The relevant legal doctrines 
will be identified and analysed. In order to achieve the aims of this study (as outlined 
above), a qualitative research study will be carried out relying upon the personal 
extensive practical experience of the present author gathered by working with the 
central bank of Indonesia (Bank Indonesia) and both primary and secondary archival 
resources available in hard copy and/or electronic forms. Quoting from Denzin and 
Lincoln, Creswell noted that qualitative research could be defined in the following 
terms:  
Multi methods in focus, involve an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject 
matter. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, 
attempting to make sense of or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people 
bring to them. Qualitative research involves the studied use and collection of a variety 
of empirical materials – case study, personal experience, introspective, life story, 
interview, observational, historical, interactional, and visual texts that describe routine 
and problematic moments and meaning in individual lives.
164
  
In order to determine a set of updated and improved fraud/civil liability rules for 
banking regulation in Indonesia and recommendations for their implementation, a 
specific framework for legal and regulatory reforms will be furnished by this study.  
William Hurlburt defines ‘law reform research’ as denoting ‘the alteration of the law in 
some respect with a view to its improvement’.
165
 Law reform research is chosen in order 
to provide advice on changes to and reform of existing law. It involves the process of 
analysing fundamental social problems in order to provide policy-makers with action-
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oriented and practical legal recommendations to assuage the problems.
166
 Therefore, this 
research will use both descriptive and normative theories approaches.
167
 
This research is characterised by a multidisciplinary approach. Beside the legal aspects, 
the technological and economic aspects will be investigated and hopefully will provide 
a comprehensive approach to reforming the law concerning civil liability that is derived 
from unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions. The researcher will conduct interviews 
with and gather information from relevant parties (stakeholders) involved in ATM/debit 
card transactions in relation to the problem as it exists in practice, such as in regard to 
the denial of consumer rights or the improper application of law by banks and/or by 
court. As a main part of the strategy to obtain information, an open-ended interview will 
be devised to target consumers from several banks, victims of unauthorised ATM/debit 
card transactions, relevant bank officers/bank maintenance officers, law enforcement 
personnel, Bank Indonesia officers, alternative dispute resolution institution officers, 
and practitioners in related areas. 
As part of law reform research, and given the fact that unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions involve cross jurisdictional problems where many countries share common 
EFT technology (including its perceived risks), comparative and benchmarking 
methodology will also be employed and become an important source for understanding 
current trends and regulatory standards in other countries that have similar problems 
concerning unauthorised EFTs and how they have resolved the loss allocation 
problems.
168
 Other countries’ regulations on loss allocation rules for unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transaction losses will be reviewed. Key requirements in regard to their 
approaches to overcoming the problems (and the degree to which they succeed) will be 
examined, interpreted and assessed under Indonesian conditions in order to fill the 
vacuum regarding the provision of detailed guidance on ATM/debit card regulation with 
respect to loss allocation rules. This will allow recommendations as to possible adoption 
to be made.  
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Pertinent provisions from Indonesian regulations will be critically analysed where 
appropriate from the relevant perspectives in this research.The data analysis method is 
used to interpret the statistical information to elicit relevant data, and to determine the 
wrongdoing patterns of, and regulatory trends in, unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions in Indonesia. This is an important aspect of the contextual background for 
understanding the threat posed by such transactions to the banking sector. This analysis 
will also contribute to a better understanding of banking practices concerning 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions and the legal aspects pertinent to such 
transactions. 
The rise of ATM/debit card fraud commensurate with the growth of e-banking has been 
a common problem in many countries, some of which have already worked out viable 
solutions. Considering the dearth of literature in Indonesia and law governing e-
banking, regulations dealing with unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions in different 
jurisdictions will also be identified and analysed with a view that Indonesia could 
‘identify solutions to specific or novel legal problems already encountered in other 
jurisdictions and learn from other practices and performance’.
169
 As an end result, an in-
depth analysis of materials will be provided in this thesis together with 
recommendations. Hutchinson provides an apt diagrammatic representation of the 
process to be undertaken in this thesis in his work on legal research. It is reproduced 
below. 
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Figure 1: Law Reform Research Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Terry Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law (Thomson Lawbook, 2
nd
 ed, 2006)  
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1.6.2. Data Collection  
This normative legal research will be conducted based on various primary and 
secondary sources of data. The primary sources of data are collected from interviews or 
surveys. Interviews were conducted with banking consumers, unauthorised ATM/debit 
card transaction victims, bank officials from seven big banks that were victims of the 
deluge of ATM/debit card fraud in Indonesia in early 2010 (namely: PT Bank Permata, 
PT Bank Central Asia, PT Bank Danamon Indonesia, PT Bank International Indonesia, 
PT Bank Mandiri (Persero), PT Bank Negara Indonesia 1946, and PT Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia),
170
 law enforcement agency and judiciary personnel (such as police, 
prosecutors and/or judges), external disputes resolution officers, personnel from the 
payment system regulator (Bank Indonesia), banking experts, technology experts, 
academic lecturers, and personnel from Indonesia’s payment system associations. 
In principle, participants will be chosen on voluntary basis, and they will be selected 
based on their interest and consent to participate. The participants have the right to 
decide what questions they wish to answer and those which they do not wish to answer. 
The interview material will generally be de-identified for use in this thesis (unless the 
person gives permission for their identity to be divulged).  
In order to ensure access to information, the possibility of anonymity was offered to 
informants reluctant to have their identity divulged. (Such requests from interviewees 
are understandable in the context of their employment). If respondents refused 
permission for their identity to be revealed, their interview responses and information 
supplied was de-identified in the author’s database, using letters to identify a category 
of respondent (BO for bank Officer, C for consumer, BMO for bank maintenance 
officer) and  a number allocated for the particular respondent in that category. For 
example Mr X (bank officer) will be written as BO-1; Mr Y (bank maintenance officer) 
will be written as BMO-1; Mrs. XY (consumer respondent) will be written as C-1; and 
so on. 
Confidentiality and privacy of the participants will be protected in every stage of the 
research, i.e. collection stage, processing stage, and use stage. Processed information 
data will be stored in digital format on a password protected computer. The data will be 
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held securely for five years after the research is completed. Only the researcher and 
supervisor will have access to this information. Appended to this thesis is the required 
ethics permission as well as an example of the open-ended interview questions used 
with interviewees.  
The secondary sources of data are gathered from various law resources available in 
various libraries or online and consist of two sources of law, which are primary sources 
of law and secondary sources of law. The primary sources of law are those authoritative 
records of law made by law-making bodies.
171
 These records are the legislation made by 
parliament, the rules, regulations, orders and by-laws (known as delegated legislation of 
those bodies to whom legislatures have delegated their authority to make laws), and the 
formal reports containing authoritative judicial decisions, mainly from common law 
jurisdictions and referred to as judge-made law, case law or precedential law. 
In this regard, primary data refers to any legislation in respect of e-banking activities, 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions, and consumer protection; rules, regulations, 
orders and by-laws from Bank Indonesia, consumer protection agency, and judicial 
decisions on cases involving e-banking frauds. All other sources not being primary 
materials are regarded as secondary sources of law, which generally include legal 
commentaries, legal textbooks, encyclopaedias, dictionaries, digests, journals, and the 
like. This data can be collected by using library facilities at universities, public and 
private libraries, manual and electronic journals, newspapers, magazines, official 
websites, and so on. 
The secondary sources will be principally based on the following documents: journal 
articles, reports, convention commentaries, convention official records and synopses, 
records of cooperation programmes, and other documents both from domestic and 
international institutions concerning e-banking activities and e-banking fraud — such as 
those from Bank Indonesia, commercial banks (such as Bank Central Asia (BCA), Bank 
Mandiri, Bank Permata, Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI) Citibank, and Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia (BRI)), yayasan lembaga konsumen Indonesia (YLKI) (Indonesia’s 
Consumer Organisation), switching company, the Bank for International Settlement 
(BIS), the United Nations (for example, the United Nation Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law), the South East Asia Central Bank (SEACEN), 
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the European Union (for example, the EU Convention on Cyber-Crime and the Payment 
Services Directive), the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), and 
Australia’s Banking Ombudsman.  
1.6.3. Data Analysis 
The author collected, examined and critically analysed the relevant data systematically 
and in accordance with to the adopted research framework so as to be able to reach the 
most appropriate conclusions and ensure the submission of useful and feasible 
recommendations and reform proposals for the regulation of e-banking activities in 
Indonesia.  
1.7. Outline of the Thesis 
The balance of this thesis is organised as follows. 
In Chapter 1, there is an examination of the reasons for the research being conducted, 
the background and research questions necessary to undertake this research, including 
the legal ramifications of unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions in Indonesia. 
Various opinions of scholars, experts and prominent institutions concerning 
unauthorised EFTs and losses allocation rules have also been revealed to be a stepping-
stone for discussion within the thesis, along with the methodology used in collecting 
and processing data.  
In Chapter 2, there is consideration of the fact that Indonesian laws regarding payment 
systems are still relatively unknown although electronic payment systems have been 
widely adopted in public transactions. The various conceptions of payment systems that 
are related to the scope of the thesis are therefore explored. This includes the 
explanation of retail payment system, bank and payment cards, ATM and debit card 
flow, their security and technological features such as the PIN magnetic stripe, and so 
on. Such material is needed as a gateway to understanding the overall context of this 
thesis. It also forms an introduction to the various risks and legal liability issues that 
might arise due to the fraud involving one or more specific technologies employed by 
one or more parties in the ATM/debit card system.  
In Chapter 3, there is an examination of the risks that normally occur as a result of the 
inherent vulnerabilities in the ATM/debit card systems. The different terminology 
relating to identity theft and identity fraud in the payment card environment is also 
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explained, along with the motives, incentives and typology of fraudsters. The problems 
that nurture the proliferation of fraudulent activities are also revealed. Last but not least, 
the real victim and the significance of the cost exposure of unauthorised ATM/debit 
card transactions are also canvassed, so that the problems of fraud in the payment card 
system can be understood comprehensively.  
In Chapter 4, there is an exploration of the rapid development of ATM/debit card 
transactions in Indonesia. There is also in-depth discussion of the general typologies of 
fraudulent methods employed by the fraudsters to perpetrate identity theft and identity 
fraud on consumer ATM/debit card data, including popular fraudulent methods 
employed by the fraudsters in Indonesia. Fraudster activities involving ATM/debit card 
data are divided according to the point of compromise and the degree of involvement of 
the bank and/or consumer. By understanding the technical methods involved in such 
frauds, including the possibility of consumer/bank negligence and/or fault in failing to 
secure the ATM/debit card transactions, it is expected that the party that should be 
responsible and liable for the fraud can be determined.  
In Chapter 5, there is a discussion of the legal and regulatory framework regarding 
operational, technological, and security aspects related to the implementation of the 
payment card system in Indonesia. Last but not least, consumer protection regulation 
and issues related to weak consumer protection practices, fraud liability, and dispute 
resolution over unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions in Indonesia are also 
canvassed. To enhance the discussion and in order to have different illustrations of 
benchmarks on liabilities, liabilities regulation regarding unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions from several selected developed countries (such as the United States and 
Australia) will be examined for the purposes of a comparative study.  
In Chapter 6, the theory and practice of liability and consumer protection law on dispute 
resolution between consumer and bank concerning unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions in Indonesia is drawn quite exhaustively. Tortious liability as the main 
principle in the law that is utilised by most in their claims for redress for such 
transactions in Indonesia is also discussed quite deeply along with its relevant liabilities 
rules such as occupiers’ and vicarious liability. The defence that is commonly raised by 
banks in regard to a consumer’s tortious liability claim is also discussed, including the 
defence’s development and the latest CDSB and court decisions on these matters. 
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Therefore, this chapter clearly depicts to what degree or level the consumer protection 
principles and provisions are really operating in the practice of consumer payment card 
transactions in Indonesia.  
In Chapter 7, there is a synthesis of the findings and data collected from archival 
research and interviews in respect of liabilities regulation and practice from the 
previously mentioned selected countries. To establish law reform for better liabilities 
regulation and practice in the banking industry in Indonesia, integrated analysis 
involving economic, technological and legal aspects will be undertaken in order to 
create clear, fair, detailed, and decisive liability regulation for unauthorised ATM/debit 
card transactions. Such law reform aims to create fair and just loss allocation regulation 
which will give the responsible party/parties the incentive to improve efficiency and 
security in card-based payment transactions. 
In Chapter 8, there are conclusions and recommendations for better fraud liabilities 
regulation pertaining to unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions in Indonesia. 
1.8. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the background and significance of the study have been canvassed. In 
Indonesia, proliferation of the payment card system was also rapidly followed by 
increasing fraudulent activities (such as skimming and card trapping) being used to 
drain consumer funds from consumer bank accounts. Unlike credit cards that have more 
protection for consumers in term of technology employed (chip with EMV standard) 
and legal protection (‘zero liability rules’ for fraudulent use of the card), proprietary 
ATM/debit card consumers have less protection in both senses.  
Unfortunately, many consumer efforts to seek recourse for their losses due to 
unauthorised payment card transactions are rejected by banks on the ground that the 
disputed transactions were deemed valid because they had been made using the right 
card (data) and PIN. This decision by the banks has been frequently criticised by 
security experts and consumer advocacy groups as unfair. To complicate the matter, 
most court verdicts regarding the matter also favour the banks. Consequently, many of 
the fraudulent ATM/debit card victims then air their negative experience in the mass 
media, which might also create reputational risk for banks and jeopardise trust between 
consumers and the banks.  
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Research questions, objectives, scope and research methods have been presented in 
sufficient depth, particularly with respect to civil liability that arises as a result of 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions in Indonesia. Since Indonesian law still does 
not have clear and enumerated regulations concerning fraud liability, proposals for law 
reform methodology can be put forward in regard to creating fair, just and decisive loss 
allocation rules for when consumers sustain monetary losses in the bank accounts 
because of unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions.  
By contrast, many other countries already have relatively comprehensive regulations 
regarding fraud liabilities in electronic banking transactions. These include the EFTA 
and Regulation E (US) and the ePayments Code (Australia). In these regulations, the 
party or parties liable for damages if unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions occur 
have been clearly defined as have the conditions under which liability applies and the 
extent to which it applies. Hence, these regulations can be used as a common guidance 
to resolve disputes between banks and their consumers, regardless of which dispute 
resolution venue is chosen by the victims.  
Therefore, detailed, comprehensive and just loss allocation rules (civil liability) for 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions in Indonesia are required to provide clear 
guidance, to avoid prolonged disputes between banks and consumers, and to provide 
incentives for parties appointed to improve duty of care and security in their own right. 
Considering that ATM/debit card transactions involve business value and the 
dominance of technological aspects, both in terms of the operational aspects of the 
banking process and in the methods employed by fraudsters, it is argued that to build 
detailed, comprehensive and just loss allocation rules, the regulations prescribed need 
not only take into consideration legal aspects, but also economic and technological 
ones. 
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CHAPTER 2   OVERVIEW OF TECHNOLOGY, SECURITY, AND 
PROCEDURES EMPLOYED IN BANKS’ ATM/DEBIT CARD 
SYSTEMS 
2.1. Introduction  
The use of payment cards as part of the retail payment system
 
has grown exponentially 
over the years and become one of the most attractive examples of the development and 
success of electronic banking throughout the world. Banks are keen to be involved in 
the payment card business because it gives significant fee based income and attracts 
consumer loyalty. One of the success factors for the proliferation of payment cards is 
the advance of technology, its standardisation and security features employed. 
Technology enables payment card transactions to be implemented in a relatively fast, 
secure, and efficient way compared to traditional banking business methods.  
This chapter generally delivers information about how basically payment cards, in 
particular ATM/debit card transactions, work. The institutions involved in payment card 
infrastructure from one end to the other end are also described briefly. Besides covering 
the mechanisms involved and the flow of transactions, this chapter also covers the 
technological features of consumer activated terminals, such as ATM and EFTPOS 
devices, and the ATM/debit card with its magnetic stripe as an access device that is 
commonly used in the payment card system. In regard to ensuring that banks identify 
their consumers correctly in on-line transactions, the security aspect in general and the 
steps related to identification, authentication and authorisation methods in ATM/debit 
card transactions are also described. 
2.2. Banks and Payment Cards172 
The ability of a bank to provide its products and services in the most effective and 
efficient way to its consumer/customers in forms that are (among other characteristics) 
more diverse, user friendly and easily accessible will provide a competitive advantage 
in comparison to other banks in the competition to attract more customers.
173
  
                                                          
172
 ‘Payment card system’ also known by different names such as ‘Card-Based Payment System’ or 
‘plastic card payment’. 
173
 Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Electronic Payment in Malaysia (2003) Bank for International Settlement, 
<http://www.bis.org/review/r030516e.pdf>. 
 
44 
 
  
The payment system as one of the major bank services is very important for commercial 
banks because the payment system’s products and services provided to its 
consumers/customers prove to be a very important source of income for banks.
174
 
Further, Stewart highlights the importance of the payment system as an entry window 
for a bank’s other services that will suit the consumer’s needs and enable the 
development of a profitable and loyal consumer relationship.
175
 
Banks as financial intermediaries provide consumers with a variety of payment 
instruments in either debit or credit, for moving deposit balances held in banks. 
Payment orders can involve the transfers of balances between accounts held at the same 
bank (referred to as an ‘on us’ transaction or a ‘book transfer’) or more complicated 
transfer of balances where accounts are held at different banks.
176
 Pingitzer and 
Summers further revealed that the increasing use of bank accounts in banks (and e-
banking) marks a continuing trend for individual and business consumers to switch 
from using cash toward using an e-payment or cashless instrument by which current 
account balances held with banks are transferred.
 177
  
The inception of payment cards as a replacement for money (cash) in trade has become 
one of the most important payment system innovations.
178
 It is believed that payment 
card transactions and automated payments will become the primary cashless payment 
instruments in the future.
179
 Recent research has concluded that there is a significant 
increase in the use of electronic payment by consumers, and debit and credit cards are 
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key factors in this development.
 180
 In addition, Rambure and Nacamuli claim that 
processing costs for payment cards are relatively low and driven by economies of scale. 
Consumers, merchants, and banks are keen to be involved in payment card transactions 
because it gives them many benefits.
181
 
Banks can be involved in a payment cards system either as card issuers or as acquiring 
banks. Banks as the card issuer offer payment cards to consumers and, based on the 
contract with the consumer, will determine what type and the relative charges will be 
imposed on the consumer, and also determine and supply any other financial 
information pertaining to card usage. Banks that have an account relationship with 
merchants regarding any purchase using payment cards are called ‘acquiring banks’ or 
‘acquirers’. Acquiring banks process consumer payment cards on their behalf; and for 
these services, merchants pay them by accepting a merchant ‘discount’ (in effect a 
charge against them as they receive an amount in their account that is slightly lower 
than the total charged for their products or services).
182
  
2.3. ATM and Debit Cards 
From the inception of the card payment system until now, there have been two 
generations of cards that have emerged in the finance industry. Hayashi and Wang 
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 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), 'Retail Payment Systems' (Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council, 2004) 4. See also OECD Competition Committee, above n 
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define these as follows: ‘[T]he first one is an ATM-only card, which allows card users 
to withdraw cash from ATMs. The second generation is the ATM/debit card, which 
allows card users to withdraw cash from ATMs as well as pay at the point of sale 
(POS)’.
183
  
The innovation that extends the ATM card function from just cash withdrawal to 
payment instruments in various retail locations changes ‘the industry from a one-sided 
market of ATM services into a two-sided market serving both consumers and merchants 
at the point of sale (POS)’.
184
 
Regarding the debit card, Mann posits the view that, in general, there are two basic uses 
of a debit card. First, debit cards enable a bank consumer at any time to deposit money 
in and withdraw money from their bank account using an ATM, instead of going to the 
bank branch during banking hours. At the ATM, consumers can carry out any 
transactions that normally can only be performed with a bank teller’s help, such as 
withdrawals, deposits, balance inquiries, or funds transfers.
185
 The second function of a 
debit card — and one that boosts its use — is its use more as a payment instrument at a 
merchant.
186
  
Debit cards can be used as a substitute means of payment (for transactions otherwise 
conducted in cash or by cheque) for goods and services at the point of sale by 
authorising a withdrawal from their cheque or savings account, routed via an electronic 
funds transfer (EFT) network.
187
 Hunt describes in his work the debit type of card 
transactions that utilise EFT network as ‘(on-line) PIN debit transactions because the 
cardholder must enter a four-digit personal identification number (PIN) to authorise the 
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transaction. Funds are then immediately withdrawn from the associated bank 
account’.
188
  
2.3.1. Consumer Activated Terminals: ATM and EFTPOS 
An alternative technology that has become more popular recently is electronic funds 
transfers that are initiated on a consumer-activated terminal. According to UNCITRAL, 
a consumer activated terminal is the EFT method where the instructions can be 
communicated directly to the bank’s computer using a public access terminal such as an 
ATM and a POS terminal at merchants, or using an exclusive-access terminal such as a 
computer (home banking terminal), telephone, or mobile phone used solely by payer or 
payee and located at the payer’s/payee’s place of business or home.
189
  
Technological development and change has altered the way in which consumers interact 
with banks, reducing the significance of a bank’s physical location and face-to-face 
interactions. Consumer activated terminals enable the automation of the EFT process 
without human intervention where authentication and authorisation of transaction is 
fully represented by a consumer’s access device that has been provided by the financial 
institution.  
Consumer activated terminals allow consumers to take advantage of banking products 
and services independently, optimally, efficiently and conveniently without being 
limited by geographic factors or restricted business hours as in conventional banking. 
                                                          
188
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security against fraud. These concerns have been highlighted by the fact that the vast majority of 
magnetic stripe cards are used for the initiation of consumer funds transfers, giving rise to 
concerns for consumer protection. 
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Consumers can make payments from their accounts by using various electronic 
instruments such as a credit card, a debit card or an automatic payment or telephone 
transfer feature. Consumers can also use ATMs to obtain cash and conduct other 
financial transactions (such as interbank funds transfers and account inquiries) at any 
time and anywhere.
190
 
ATM and Debit cardholders require consumer activated terminals to effect payment. 
Consumer activated terminal or card-accepting devices have many forms of independent 
terminals that connect to a bank’s network by wire or wireless. These terminals may 
take several forms, such as PC card readers, PIN pads, EFTPOS terminals, ATMs, 
vending machines, and access control terminals.
191
  
Nowadays, the proliferation of card-based payment is evident in almost every economy 
in their cashless transactions. Payment cards have boosted commerce in the bricks-and-
mortar world as well as in an e-commerce environment. Payment cards have 
significantly changed the way consumers shop and merchants sell goods and services. 
As Carbo-Valverde and Fernandez observe: ‘A common feature in banking systems all 
over the world is the deployment, in parallel, of both ATM and EFTPOS devices.’
192
 
Payment cards facilitate access to funds in a cardholder’s bank account either at an 
EFTPOS terminal or ATM. At an EFTPOS terminal, payment cards are commonly used 
for making payments to merchants for goods or for purchasing services, At ATMs, 
payment cards are mainly used for cash withdrawal; however, some other bank features 
such as inter-account transfers, balance query and bill payments can also be performed 
at ATMs.
 193
  
2.3.1.1. Automated Teller Machines 
ATMs are one of the obvious electronic banking forms that has enjoyed great 
acceptance by consumers since their inception for commercial business in 1968.
194
 
Basically, an ATM is a computerised device that enables banking consumers to perform 
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financial transactions independently without assistance from bank officers or tellers.
195
 
According to Claessens et al, ‘The ATM is the first well-known system that was 
introduced to facilitate the access of the user to his banking activities.’
196
  
The main purpose of the first ATMs was cash withdrawal. By the early 1970s, ATM 
technology had developed many additional features, so that today they are able to take 
deposits, transfer money, provide cash advances from credit cards, and provide answers 
to balance enquiries, even produce ‘mini-statements’ for recent transactions. 
Interoperability of ATMs of multiple banking and other financial institutions or shared 
ATM networks began to emerge in the early 1970s.
197
 However, until recently cash 
withdrawals were still the most frequent transactions at ATMs.
198
 The probable 
rationale for this is that ATMs are more convenient and less expensive for the customer 
for cash withdrawal compared to accessing the bricks-and-mortar bank branch.
199
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In terms of location, at the inception of ATMs, bank branches were the most common 
place for the installation of ATMs (also known as on-premises ATMs). However, later 
(as commonly seen today), ATMs are also deployed at off-premises locations, generally 
where people tend to gather or come frequently, such as malls, airports, restaurants, 
petrol stations, and grocery and convenience stores. From the business viewpoint, the 
proximity of ATMs as sources of cash for customers can build customer traffic as well 
as the value and volume of transactions per customer.
200
  
2.3.1.2. EFTPOS Terminals 
The EFTPOS network has emerged as a further development of on-line financial 
services provided by the banking industry that facilitate bank consumer access to their 
funds at point-of-sale retailers for the purchase of goods and services. Some retailers 
also allow the cardholder to withdraw cash from EFTPOS, which made EFTPOS (as 
well as ATMs) an alternative device that can operate as a facility for banking consumers 
to source cash from their accounts. Arora defines EFTPOS as ‘a payment system which 
enables goods or services to be paid for by transmitting over a communications network 
details of the transaction to both the customer’s and retailer’s bank without the use of 
paper vouchers’.
 201
  
2.3.2. Card Technology 
Payment cards have been recognised as a payment instrument and for identification 
purposes for quite some time. Hendry notes that ‘Diners Club issued the first plastic 
cards (what we would now call a “travel and entertainment card”) in 1950; the first 
plastic credit cards were issued by Bank of America in 1960’.
 
 
Basically, the payment card system employs what is called a ‘token’ in their operation. 
The token systems typically authenticate the token or payment card (such as ATM card 
or debit card) as an access card and assume that the user who was issued the token is the 
one who is requesting access to the system.
202
 According to Hendry, the ‘payment card 
is one element in a distributed computer system. In some cases, it is providing data to 
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the system; in other cases, it allows access to a program or to data on the host 
system.’
203
 
The most striking occurrence of the payment card in the banking industry has been the 
development of the credit card, debit card and ATM card. Prepaid cards or ‘electronic 
money’ is the latest development of payment card in payment system industries around 
the world.
204
 ATM and debit cards allow consumers to access their bank accounts using 
consumer-activated terminals in a direct debit mode. Besides the data recorded in the 
magnetic stripe of the payment card (or inside the chip for payment cards that have 
already embraced chip card technology), the security of the payment card transaction is 
mainly protected through the use of a PIN which functions as a password for the 
system.
205
 
2.3.2.1. Plastic Card and the Magnetic Stripe 
The magnetic stripe card was first invented by IBM in 1960 and used for the first time 
in the United States for security purposes. In terms of the technology employed, the 
security of the magnetic stripe technology used today has been improved but basically 
still uses the same technology that was developed in 1960. A 12.7mm (or half inch) 
wide strip of magnetic stripe tape that is bonded to the physical card remains the most 
popular form of card technology for the automatic reading process.
206
 According to 
Greenstein and Feinman, ‘a magnetic stripe card is a small plastic card that has some 
form of magnetically encoded strip or strips on its exterior’.
207
 They note that generally 
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magnetic stripe cards have three types: on-line strip, off-line strip or a smart-card 
hybrid.
208 
 
In the banking industry, the main purpose of the plastic card’s magnetic stripe is to 
supply cardholder identity and account information rapidly and accurately when the 
card is used at a consumer activated terminal, such as ATM or EFTPOS.
209
 As Radu 
further states: ‘[T]he tracks contain extensive financial data about the cardholder, the 
issuer, as well as the financial parameters that serve in the process of terminal risk 
management’.
210
 There are three data tracks within a magnetic stripe.
211
 However, bank 
payment cards such as the credit card, debit card and ATM card, typically use only track 
1 and 2 as shown at Figure 2 below. 
Figure 2: Example of ATM/Debit Card Data on the Magnetic Stripe
212
 
 
2.3.2.2. Integrated Circuit Card (ICC)/Chip Card 
Most card payments are conducted using ATMs and debit cards equipped with a 
magnetic strip or stripe. The magnetic stripe is a technological device facilitating a 
faster authorisation process using the pre-recorded information stored on a card. Due to 
fraud issues, many new payment cards (especially credit cards) have more recently been 
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equipped with a memory chip — such cards are also known as ‘smart’ cards.
213
 This is a 
card with a built-in microchip that carries a wider range of information than a card with 
a magnetic stripe alone. The stored data is far more protected from physical damage and 
it is not susceptible to damage from magnetic fields. Furthermore, smart cards can store 
at least 100 times more data than magnetic stripe cards. 
Payment cards have traditionally employed magnetic stripe technology on the back of 
the card. This records the cardholder’s essential financial information in connection 
with an account at the bank, and enables this information to be automatically captured at 
ATMs or EFTPOS terminals. Chip cards, a newer and more advanced and secure 
technology compared to magnetic stripe technology has been introduced in card-based 
payments. However, the implementation of this new technology has been very slow, as 
the technology is still relatively expensive,
214
 and banks have to withdraw and re-issue 
payment cards for their entire consumer base and also enhance or replace EFTPOS 
terminals.
215
  
Many commentators have said that a smart card is far more secure than a magnetic card. 
As Master and Turner suggest, it overcomes many frauds that target magnetic stripe 
cards especially skimming fraud, and is being introduced to accompany magnetic stripe 
card technology. They argue that a chip card offers greater protection for cardholder 
data on the card, because it provides a better method of storing data and includes a 
control microprocessor, an encryption/decryption engine, a read-only memory 
containing an operating program, and a small amount of reusable memory.
216
 The 
adoption of chip technology is being driven worldwide by Visa and Mastercard under 
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the EMV (Europay, MasterCard, Visa) standard and has proven to be quite a success in 
combating and reducing fraud.
217
  
However, due to a business approach to ensure that the chip card can be accepted in the 
foreign countries that still have not implemented chip card technology, the ATM/debit 
card with chip technology is always still coupled with a magnetic stripe. Hence, the 
issue of skimming cardholder data within the magnetic stripe on the chip card still 
exists. In addition, the chip card has some similar vulnerabilities to the magnetic stripe 
card, including some conventional fraud methods such as lost or stolen card, card 
trapping, malware, packet sniffing or data breach.
218
 However, the chip card will not be 
discussed in this thesis, because until recently ATM/debit cards transactions in 
Indonesia were still using magnetic stripe cards.
219
  
 
2.4. The Importance of Security Procedures in ATM and Debit Card 
Transactions 
The payment card, as one of the most popular and pervasive payment instruments in the 
21
st
 century, can increase economic efficiency as a result of the employment of 
advanced computer technology and help transform the modern payment system. 
Advancements in computer technology enable banks to continue to expand the variety 
of retail payment services to their customers and obtain better profits for shareholders at 
a relatively lower cost.  
As more bank payment system instruments such as the payment card system 
increasingly rely on information and network technology, there remains a need for 
banks to have proper technological standards and adequate security levels in order to 
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reap the potential benefits from electronic payments without undermining the security 
and confidence of the bank consumers.  
2.4.1. The Concepts of Identification, Authentication and Authorisation 
2.4.1.1. Identification and Authentication 
Generally, all computer systems are concerned with access control. Access control 
establishes restriction on access and on the ability to grant only authorised transactions 
access. An access control mechanism plays an important role in defending the system 
from unauthorised access. Typically, an access control becomes a point in between a 
user that tries to engage the system and the system resources as a target of engagement 
(such as applications, operating systems, firewalls, routers, files and database).
220
 
Stallings and Brown briefly address how the access control works: 
The systems first authenticate an entity seeking access. Typically, the authentication 
function determines whether the user is permitted to access the system at all. Then the 
access control function determines if the specific requested access by this user is 
permitted. A security administrator maintains an authorization database that specifies 
what type of access to which resources is allowed for this users. The access control 
functions consult this database to determine whether to grant access. An auditing 
function monitors and keeps a record of user accesses to system resources.
221
  
In banking activities, verifying consumer identity and acknowledging their authority 
before conducting any payment systems transactions is considered a basic security 
requirement. The idea of these procedures is to avoid or minimise the possibility of the 
occurrence of unauthorised banking transactions.  
In traditional bricks-and-mortar banking transactions where face-to-face transactions 
were the only means to make paper-based transactions, generally the bank teller 
authenticated consumers by several means, among them by checking: 
 the appropriateness and/or consistency of a consumer’s name in her/his pass book 
against his/her identification card; 
 consumer’s identification card photo against his/her actual face; and  
                                                          
220
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221
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 consumer’s signature against his/her specimen signature that is normally recorded 
by the bank when a consumer initially opens an account. 
However, since the inception and further advanced development of electronic banking 
in banking industries worldwide, the traditional identification and authentication 
methods are no longer feasible. Identity-related information consequently became more 
important for recognising consumers in non face-to-face transactions. 
With the pervasive deployment of consumer-activated terminals by banks and their 
broad acceptance by bank consumers, there is frequently no face-to-face contact 
between banks and their consumers. Hence, banks have to adopt a substitute 
identification and authentication method based on consumers’ identity-related 
information that is adequate and appropriate for implementation in terms of both 
banking technology and bank security policies. 
Glaessner, Kellermann and McNevin argue that in order to be reliable, e-banking that 
involves financial transactions should be properly authenticated, verified and 
authorised.
222
 Likewise, Kondabagil asserts that before a financial transaction takes 
place, the node or the user of the system should be tested in advance by identification,  
and authorisation processes.
223
  
Although the term ‘authentication’ is used widely in the security system industries, its 
definition varies. The FFIEC states: ‘Authentication is the verification of identity by a 
system based on the presentation of unique credentials to that system.’
224
 Meyer and 
Matyas define it as ‘a process which proves that someone or something is valid or 
genuine’.
225
 Pipkin on the other hand depicts authentication as a ‘verification of identity 
                                                          
222
 Glaessner, Kellermann and McNevin, above n 51, 125. According to them:  
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to prevent impersonation and provide the level of trust necessary to utilise 
authorisations’.
226
  
However, despite variations in the definition, the importance of authentication in the 
security system is not doubted by all players in the banking industries. A strong 
authentication method is important to ensure that the system has the ability to determine 
that the user who is gaining access is really who they are meant to be.
227
 An 
authentication method typically consists of unique credential factors. The factors must 
be acknowledged by both the entity being authenticated and the process authenticating 
the entity, which are user and the system itself.
 228
 
2.4.1.2. Authorisation 
In e-banking, authorisation procedures are employed by banks to govern access and 
utilised in electronic payment system resources accordingly by authenticated users or 
consumers.
229
 Pipkin notes: ‘Authorization defines what attributes of which resource an 
authenticated user is allowed to utilise. They are what provide an entity’s privileges.’
230
  
The importance of authorisation in payment transactions is twofold. For payers in 
payment transactions, it gives some kind of assurance that their resources in the bank 
will be safe because no one else could access them using their payment instrument. For 
merchants, authorisation gives them confidence that they will receive payment 
associated with the use of a valid payment instrument by the authenticated payer. As a 
result, payment instruments with strong authentication and authorisation procedures will 
most likely be well accepted by both bank consumers and merchants.
231
 
According to Sullivan, there are three requirements to authorise a transaction 
successfully: ‘First, the payment instrument and other hardware are authenticated. 
                                                          
226
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Second, the identity of the payer is verified. Third, details of the transaction must satisfy 
risk parameters set by the merchant and the card issuer.’
232
  
2.4.2. Identification, Authentication and Authorisation in ATM/Debit Card 
Transactions: ATM/Debit Magnetic Stripe Card and PIN 
In information security today, information security management has become one of the 
most important features to be established by institutions. Authentication as part of 
information security is probably one of the most essential processes to set up at the first 
stage since it typically poses the first line of defence against the possibility of fraudulent 
activities.
233
 
In the payment card industry, the need to secure the system has been recognised from its 
inception. The security of card payment transactions is deemed a basic requirement as 
this will give confidence to institutions and customers. Consumer authentication is 
required to ensure the authenticity and integrity of a transaction.
234
 
Because of the increasing incidence of frauds in e-banking environments, banks have 
developed improved security measures as demanded by legal and regulatory 
requirements to enhance the consumer authentication methods used to combat fraud in 
e-banking transactions. Because of this requirement, along with handwritten signatures, 
the PIN has become a primary choice by many institutions, including banks, to secure 
their transactions. From legal perspective, the recognition of electronic signature such as 
PIN as an equivalent to the signature of a person on a written document has long been 
known recognized as the adoption of the “functional-equivalence approach” doctrin.
235
 
The PIN is a secret number created by banks or other card issuers as selected by 
individual cardholders and serves as an authentication method in electronic funds 
transfer transactions (EFT). Further, as Meyer and Matyas explain, ‘[a] PIN is a simple 
form of passwords, consisting usually of four to six digits, which can be used with a 
numeric keypad rather than a full keyboard.’
236
 They further assert that ‘the PIN is 
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basically the cardholder’s electronic signature, and serves the same role in an EFT 
transaction as a written signature serves in a conventional financial transaction’.
237
 
Therefore, in consumer transactions, a PIN is not used to identify the customer, instead 
its function is as a signal for the legitimacy of the payment authorisation.
238
 Given its 
crucial role in payment card transactions, it is important to understand how a PIN really 
works.
239
  
However, Mohammed has argued that for payment card authentication, such as for use 
at an ATM, there has been no significant improvement since its inception in the 
1960s.
240
 He states that the authentication method typically involves an ATM card or 
token and the cardholder’s PIN as a password.
241
 In other words, consumers are 
identified by something that the consumer has (a banking card with a magnetic stripe) 
and something the consumer knows (their PIN).
242
 The use of a PIN is also described by 
Pipkin as an old authentication method. He says that, ‘using a password to authenticate 
an identity is as old as [using] a sentry [to guard] … the gate of an ancient city‘.
243
 
Nevertheless, Hendry argues that ‘PINs should only be regarded as a secondary identity 
check; the card is the primary identification‘.
244
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 Meyer and Matyas, above n 72, 430–1. See also Madan and Reid, above n 205, 48. 
238
 Marco Gercke, 'Legal Approaches to Criminalize Identity Theft' in United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (ed), Handbook on Identity-related Crime (United Nations, 2011) 12. See also Australian 
Payments Clearing Association, above n 195. One of the clearest definitions regarding the PIN as an 
authentication method in payment transactions can be found in the regulations for Consumer Electronic 
Clearing System (CECS)-Australia. In this regulation, a PIN is described as follows: ‘“PIN” means a 
personal identification number which is either issued by an Issuer or selected by a Cardholder for the 
purposes of authenticating the Cardholder by the Issuer of the Card’. 
239
 It is important to understand the detailed flow of PIN in payment card transactions since a PIN might 
be captured during transmission from a consumer activated terminal, node, or switching point to host 
terminal, in particular when a PIN in an unencrypted form when being re-formatted at switch points. See 
Omer Berkman and Odelia Moshe Ostrovsky, 'The Unbearable Lightness of PIN Cracking' (2007) 4886 
Lecturer Notes in Computer Science 224, 224–5. The material comprises part of a collection of 2007 
conference and workshop proceedings: Sven Dietrich and Rachna Dhamija (eds), Financial 
Cryptography and Data Security, 11
th
 International Conference (IFCA 2007) Scarborough, Trinidad and 
Tobago, 12–15 February 2007, and 1
st
 International Workshop on Usable Security (USEC 2007) 
Scarborough, Trinidad and Tobago, 16 February 2007. Text of this document at: 
<http://cs5128.userapi.com/u11728334/docs/5ad84be07c9d/Sven_Dietrich_Financial_Cryptography_and
_Data_S.pdf#page=243>. 
240
 Credit card or debit card schemes under the Visa and Mastercard brands have implemented new chip 
card technology to store cardholder information (smart card) under their EMV programme. This new chip 
card has proven to be more secure and has greater capabilities compared to magnetic stripe cards; 
however, most proprietary cards issued by banks typically still rely on magnetic stripe cards.  
241
 Mohammed, above n 195, 214. See Hendry, above n 203, 37. See also: Meyer and Matyas, above n 
72, 475. See also Radu, above n 210, 388. 
242
 Meyer and Matyas, above n 72, 481. See also Mohammed, above n 195, 214. 
243
 Pipkin, above n 226, 130. 
244
 Hendry, above n 203, 76. 
 
60 
 
  
In on-line ATM/debit transactions with a PIN as a means of identification, 
authentication and authorisation happen automatically in a consecutive manner, through 
a bank network or via a switch that links the EFTPOS/ATM terminal of the acquiring 
bank (payee) with the issuer card institution (payer). This process relies upon a 
telecommunication network (line or wireless) as a bridge and computer devices routing 
the card and account information between computer activated terminals and the 
cardholder’s financial institution or its substitute if the processed has been outsourced to 
third party institutions.
245
 
From the work of Radu,
246
 and Meyer and Matyas,
247
 we can define in brief payment 
card identification, authentication and authorisation, as follows:  
1. Identification: 
a.   Cardholder at consumer activated terminal, such as an ATM or EFT-POS 
terminal, dips or swipes their magnetic stripe card into the machines. 
b.   The machines then read the cardholder’s information from the magnetic stripe 
card. 
2. Authentication: 
a.   Cardholder types PIN into the PIN pad of an ATM or POS terminal. 
b.   Magnetic stripe card and PIN data are transmitted from the consumer-activated 
terminal to the issuer host system. 
3. Authorisation:  
If cardholder enters the correct PIN, the funds in the cardholder’s account are still 
adequate to cover the amount of transactions, and the type of transaction is 
permitted, then the system will authorise the electronic funds transfer.
248
  
Continued innovation in authentication technology has recently resulted in the 
development of improved authentication methods, which in general, can now be 
classified into ‘shared secrets such as smart cards or tokens, digital certificates, and 
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biometric identifiers’.
249
 However, the PIN as a fixed password is still widely used 
because of its ease of implementation and use with relatively low investment, even 
though it has many drawbacks (such as password guessing, dictionary attacks and being 
subject to social engineering).
250
  
2.5. Conclusion 
The development of the payment system and the proliferation of electronic funds 
transfer in the banking industry benefited from advances in information technology and 
communications networking. The payment card system as one of the most prolific 
features of the electronic retail payment system offers many benefits to consumers, such 
as, relatively unlimited access to banking services outside office hours, greater 
convenience and easy access to pervasive consumer activated terminals. For the banks, 
the benefit of payment card products comes from greater consumer-generated fee based 
income, deposits and loyalty. 
What appears to be a seamless and simple transaction in payment cards transactions 
actually involves many complex technical infrastructures (such as ATM, electronic data 
capture (EDC), networks, host computers, switch networks, storage and so on) and the 
involvement of many parties (such as issuer and acquirer banks, third party processors, 
ISOs, switching companies, network vendors, consumers, and so on). However, the 
nature of consumer activated terminals such as the ATM and EFT-POS terminals that 
are located mostly outside of bank premises, empirically create a security issue for 
consumer due to lack of supervision. 
Magnetic stripe cards and PINs are still heavily used in most ATM/debit card 
transactions. Unlike scheme credit cards that have moved to chip technology with EMV 
standards driven by Visa and MasterCard, scheme debit cards and proprietary 
ATM/debit card systems mostly still rely on old and relatively weak magnetic stripe 
technology as a means of identification, and PINs as a means of authentication and 
authorisation — and hence are relatively vulnerable to fraudulent activities. 
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CHAPTER 3   TYPOLOGY OF THE INHERENT RISK AND 
VULNERABILITIES THAT MAKE ATM/DEBIT CARD FRAUD 
FAVOURED BY FRAUDSTERS 
 
3.1. Introduction  
The development of ATM/debit card payments as an example of electronic payment in 
e-banking activities has given greater efficiency and many benefits to the banking 
industry and its consumers. This did not create new risks; however, e-banking 
transactions that heavily depend on information technology and computer networks 
have amplified existing risks in traditional banking activities.  
Specific risks that commonly intertwine with ATM/debit card operations other than 
operational risk are fraud risk, reputation risk and legal risk. These inherent risks have 
occurred because of the nature of retail payment system operations that generally only 
employ moderate security features to balance their security costs, the use of inherited 
computers/software, and consumer convenience. The relatively open and un-guarded 
environment of consumer-activated terminals is a great incentive for fraudsters to 
perpetrate identity theft and/or fraud. As a result, the payment system industry and the 
regulator are keen to contain payment system risk, especially payment card fraud, in 
order to maintain a robust and trusted payment system, as consumer trust and 
confidence are paramount in the payment system. 
This chapter generally explains the inherent risk and vulnerability of the payment card 
to fraud, and factors that affect it; and the typology of fraudsters in regard to payment 
cards, and their application in payment card fraud. The costs and the real victims of the 
ATM/debit card fraud are also described, so that the provider of the ATM/debit card 
system and payment system authority can give more attention to and show greater 
responsibility in protecting the consumer from fraudulent activities. 
3.2. General Overview of Risk in Retail Payment System 
The development of e-banking may contribute to improved efficiencies in the banking 
and payment system. E-banking could give banks greater capability to offer a new and 
wider range of products and services such as electronic payment systems with lower 
operating costs, expand their market for traditional deposit-taking and credit extension 
 
63 
 
  
activities, and strengthen their competitive position in offering existing payment 
services.
251
 Schaechter noted that e-banking enables new and existing customers to no 
longer be subject to time and geographic limits.
252
  
Along with opportunities, e-banking generates expanded risks for financial 
institutions.253 It increases the bank’s dependence on information technology and the 
computer-networked environment.
254
 All of these factors increase the technical 
complexity of many operational and security issues, and greatly magnify the importance 
of security controls, customer authentication techniques, data protection, and customer 
privacy standards.
255
 Not to mention that the ramifications include effects on various 
legal aspects, such as the rights and liabilities of the parties involved in e-banking 
transactions. 
With the pervasive development of electronic payment system technology, the 
dimension and scale of payments fraud has grown accordingly. Electronic 
communication and technology that support electronic payment system and e-commerce 
have been utilised in recent years exhaustively by fraudsters to commit fraud.
256
 The 
natural advantages of electronic payment systems, where computer data is easily stored, 
copied and manipulated, can also be a disadvantage when it comes to fraud.
257
 Gates 
and Jacob argued that this specific condition along with the swiftness of electronic 
payments, modern databases, online information sharing, and the number of bank 
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access points increased by bank, non-banks and third-party service providers have 
caused the scope of fraud to become more extensive.
258
  
Glaessner, Kellermann and McNevin discovered that fraudsters now have more efficient 
and quicker ways to perpetrate old crimes such as fraud and theft, facilitated by an on-
line environment, remote access, high-quality graphics and printing, and new 
multipurpose tools and platforms that are easily obtained.
259
 Furthermore, they state that 
the most distressing aspect of this fraud is that fewer skills are required to commit 
electronic payment crimes. This can occur because underground hacker websites 
provide multifaceted tools necessary to break into financial platforms.
260
  
System efficiency in e-banking depends on public confidence and trust.
261
 Confidence 
in the safety of payments is particularly important.
262
 CPSS-BIS further emphasises that 
safety in retail payment systems is very important because it attracts public interest and 
affects consumer confidence and the functioning of commerce.
263
 Hence, any actual and 
reported risks could shake consumer confidence in retail payments systems.
264
 
However, to maintain safety in retail payment systems is not an easy task. The regulator 
and the payment system industry have to be able to identify and understand what sort of 
risks may be involved in payment system transactions from time to time. Some 
questions — such as how they occur and are transmitted within the system, by whom 
they are borne, who are the perpetrators — are very important to know, before trying to 
find the right risk mitigation answer.  
The retail payment system generally does not take elaborate and costly security 
measures, such as in the wholesale payment system. It would be far too expensive, 
involve longer processing times, or otherwise not be suitable for the retail payment 
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system.
265
 Conversely, the retail payment system with a larger numbers of participants 
generally employs a more moderate security system (having to adapt to the technology 
owned by the participants who are very diverse with not only domestic but also 
international participants).  
While e-banking does not generate new types of risk compared to traditional banking 
products and services, nevertheless, because of the mixture of advanced and swift 
technology changes, third party service provider involvement in delivering e-banking 
products and services, lack knowledge in technology and e-banking risk issues among 
bank management and staff, and legal and regulatory ambiguity and uncertainty of the 
existing law on e-banking, and so on, e-banking has altered and sometimes amplified 
banking’s traditional risks.
266
  
Following the abundance of online fraud/crime, the United Nations
267
 concluded that 
fraud development could be attributed to several factors such as technological 
advances,
268
 lack of education,
269
 shortcomings in technology related laws,
270
 and fear 
of adverse publicity.271 
Many institutions and experts such as the Federal Financial Institution Examinations 
Council (FFIEC),
272
 the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL),
273
 Roberds,
274
 Rusch,
275
 Pennathur,
276
 and Gates and Jacobs,
277
 concur 
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on natural risks and vulnerabilities inherent in the operation of retail payment systems. 
As the CPSS asserts in its report: 
From the moment of initiation of a non-cash payment until its settlement with finality, 
the participants in a transaction (payer, payee and one or more financial institutions) 
may be exposed to certain risks. These risks arise at the level of the individual payment, 
and where payments are netted at the aggregate level as well.
278
 
The CPSS states in its report on ‘Clearing and Settlement Arrangements for Retail 
Payments in Selected Countries’, that (in general) risk in the retail payment system is 
comprised of fraud risk, operational risk, legal risk, and settlement risk (including 
liquidity and credit risks),
279
 and systemic risk. This view is consistent with that of the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
280
 Akindemowo,
281
 Pennathur,
282
 and Nsouli 
and Schaechter,
283
 who found in their studies that for e-banking activities, besides 
standard risks for traditional banking activities, particular risks are also applicable, 
namely operational risk, reputational risk,
284
 and legal risk. 
Regarding concerns about security and fraud, Vrîncianu and Popa point out that 
‘security is considered the central operational risk of e-Banking’, therefore security 
problems such as fraud risk cut across risk categories and can be classified not only as 
an operational risk,
285
 but also as a risk that would expose the bank to legal risk
286
and 
reputational risk.
287
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Kondabagil echoes Vrîncianu and Popa’s view by stating that any kind of unauthorised 
disclosure or exploitation of consumer data will expose banks to both reputational and 
legal risks.
288
 Braun et al further highlight that it becomes more important to raise the 
question of legal risk if case law is less well developed or simply that the drafters of 
established laws may not have foreseen some of the ways in which payments are 
initiated, processed, and settled.
289
  
3.3. Payment Card Fraud  
When Willie Sutton,
290
 a prolific 19
th
 Century bank robber was asked why he had 
robbed banks, he famously answered ‘because that’s where the money is’.
291
 As 
banking products and services changed following the development of computer and 
telecommunication technology, Krebs, an information security expert, remakes the 
Sutton tale as follows: ‘I’m quite certain that if the infamous Willie Sutton had his 
heyday in the present culture, Sutton’s fabled answer to the question of why he robbed 
online banks would have been, “Because that’s where the *easy* money is”.’
292
  
Nowadays, payment cards have become an indispensable part of modern life and have 
spoiled their users with the broad range of services and capabilities that are used to 
support e-commerce and meet the need to have a fast and convenient way of payment. 
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Unfortunately, payment cards like other type of payment instruments, are susceptible to 
fraud.
293
  
A payment card itself as a means for authentication and authorisation of payment and 
held by the consumer is vulnerable to cardholder abuse or attack from external parties 
(such as those who use skimming, card trapping, and/or social engineering to access the 
card) as well as to the risk of simply being lost by the cardholder or stolen from them.
294
  
Financial crime and fraud have occurred since the inception of trade.
295
 Gates and Jacob 
defined payment fraud broadly as ‘any activity that uses information from any type of 
payments transaction for unlawful gain. Such fraud can be perpetrated on any type of 
payments device, including credit and debit cards, cash, checks, online or mobile 
payments, and automated clearing house (ACH) transactions’.
296
 
Pertaining to payment cards, Saville and Loomis noted that since the dawn of the use of 
credit and ATM/debit cards, the payment card industry has been subjected to fraud 
losses.
297
 All organisations regardless of their type and size are affected by the global 
problem of fraud.
298
 In spite of being one of the most accepted means of payment, the 
modern payment card has also been haunted in a manner similar to conventional fraud 
that commonly attacks cash payment, namely through the use of counterfeit or lost or 
stolen documentation (in this instance payment cards and PIN rather than cheque book 
and signature, and electronic theft rather than an armed robbery).
299
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There are many different definitions of payment fraud. In her 2010 article, Krivko 
defined plastic card fraud as ‘an unauthorized account activity committed by means of 
the debit/credit facilities of a legitimate account’.
300
 Sullivan asserts that ‘payment fraud 
occurs when someone gains financial or material advantage by using a payment 
instrument or information from a payment instrument, to complete a transaction that is 
not authorized by the legitimate account holder’.
301
 Meanwhile, Mohamad canvasses 
plastic cards as fraud targets in payment card transactions. In this case, fraudsters using 
‘plastic payment cards, such as ATM, debit, credit or store cards to take money without 
permission or prior to knowledge from a bank, building society or credit card account 
(or to charge money to credit/debit cards)’.
302
 He further argues that the illegal gaining 
and/or use of payment card data and the PIN is the primary cause of payment/plastic 
card fraud.
303
 In addition, the lack of an account holder’s authorisation is the most 
important distinctive feature of payment card fraud. 
Card issuing companies, merchants and customers worldwide have experienced great 
losses and inconvenience caused by plastic card fraud. The increasing volume of 
payment traffic, the advancement and expansion of modern technology, and the 
evolution of fraudulent tactics have increased plastic card fraud development.
304
 The 
payment system industry and regulators are keen to reduce and contain fraud incidents 
so that a robust, efficient and trusted payment system can be maintained.  
According to the CPSS, risks such as fraud, operational and other risks ‘are generally 
addressed through technical features of various payment instruments and system 
control’.
305
 Roberds argues that it is possible with the use of technical feature or 
technology to eradicate fraud in electronic payments, as confirmed by the experience 
where costly security measures are used in wholesale funds transfer systems. However, 
this approach could not be applied to retail payment systems, since it would be too 
costly for banks and consumers alike, prolong consumers transactions (time 
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consuming), and is not appropriate for the retail payment system which is mostly used 
for high volumes of low value transfers.
306
 
3.3.1. Why Are Payment Cards Always Vulnerable to Fraud? 
Since its inception, the payment card industry has been targeted by fraudsters as an 
object for their activities.
307
 Unlike wholesale payment systems, a retail payment system 
(such as in a payment card system) is located in a more open environment, with 
relatively less comprehensive security features, and provides direct access to its end-
users through its consumer activated terminals or electronic agents (such as ATMs and 
EFTPOS terminals). As a consequence, the payment card system is more exposed to 
fraud risk.  
Pertaining to this, the Smart Card Alliance argues that ‘payments networks are 
vulnerable to fraud at any point in a payments chain, and fraudsters often attempt to 
exploit the weakest link in that chain’.
308
 Due to this fact, it is worth knowing what 
factors contribute to the proliferation of fraud in the payment card system (as shown 
below). 
3.3.1.1.   The Trade-off between Cost, Security and Consumer Convenience   
 
Payment card systems require relatively huge investment to establish a viable electronic 
payment system. Most of the funds are spent on providing communications and 
computing facilities to optimise efficiency and convenience in consumer and merchant 
card transactions, and also to reduce fraud.
309
 In order to reduce fraud risk that always 
haunts payment card transactions, the creation and maintenance of a payment card 
system entails the introduction of costly infrastructure for consumer identification, 
authentication and authorisation.
310
  
In the development of an electronic banking system, banks always have concerns 
regarding processing costs and security. Commercial banks typically are very 
susceptible to the need for profitability in their payment products and services.311 The 
cost-effectiveness and technical efficiency of the electronic payment system cannot be 
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separated from the choice by the financial institution’s management of payment system 
design and its associated risks.
312
 For the providers of the systems, technical or 
productive efficiency of the system refers to the ability to deliver a certain amount and 
quality of payment products and services at the minimum possible cost.
313
 Banks are 
always eager to press processing costs of generic payment services to the lowest level 
so as to dedicate funds and other resources to value-added services, customer relations 
and profit.
314
 
Generally, banks are quite satisfied with the status quo because it serves banks 
relatively well, without any further investment involved and typically, consumers have 
no choice other than to use the offered services.
315
 
As Roberds argues,
316
 from a technical and information security viewpoint, it is indeed 
possible to eradicate fraud in electronic payments by using state-of-the art encryption, 
private networks, public key infrastructure for authentication, smart cards (cards based 
on chips) and so on. However, some choices that are used in the wholesale payments 
system where the transactions normally involve relatively large amounts of money and 
greater transaction costs probably will not be appropriate for retail payment systems 
such as the payment card system.
  
If extensive safety features were applied in retail payment systems, this approach would 
be deemed very good from a fraud containment point of view. However, banks would 
have to allocate a high level of resources to achieve such a goal in this manner, and that 
would lessen the benefit to the bank in terms of profitability. Consumers might also find 
it difficult, complex, slow (as result of more complex authentication procedures) and 
too costly to use in their payment transactions, and that in turn could hinder its use and 
further development.
317
 Conversely, a reduction in allocation of payment resources 
beyond a certain point in order to lower the cost of transactions may result in less 
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accurate services and increase the possibility that risks will rise and feared frauds and 
other crimes occur.
318
 
The inter-connection with other bank and/or switching institution systems both in 
domestic and international networks also complicates the matter. Unlike network 
schemes such as Visa and MasterCard that have agreements, rules and administrative 
powers to enforce some level of technical standards among their members,
319
 switching 
companies that connect ATMs/EFTPOS machines owned by proprietary banks are 
generally lax in terms of these capabilities. As Sullivan argues, security in network 
connections is not optimal because ‘one member of the network has no incentive to take 
account of the external benefits or costs of others’.
320
 As a result, this often makes one 
or more members reluctant to enhance their security features, leaving these members’ e-
banking devices as the weakest link in the entire network.
321
  
In most cases, the need for higher security for e-banking products will always have a 
trade-off in terms of investment required and consumer convenience.
322
 Besides that, 
the desire to improve security for one bank is sometimes difficult to achieve because of 
legacy infrastructure that is not easy to enhance. If it is able to be enhanced, it requires 
relatively large investment, administrative difficulties, and/or is time consuming to 
change.
323
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Hence, cost constraints will always affect payment system design, which will have 
consequences for the payments system’s viability and safety.
324
 In regard to this, 
Claessens et al argue that there should be a proper balance between security and cost.
325
 
Further, they argue that in reality, ‘banks try to have a minimal level of security 
alleviating most of the risks, with maximum level of convenience‘.
326
 Therefore, banks 
in a retail payments system typically only try to minimise fraud to an acceptable level, 
since it is impossible to make the retail payments system infallible in terms of fraud.
327
  
Nonetheless, often this paradigm is transformed inadequately by management into bank 
security features.
328
 Gates and Jacob contend that as a consequence of those cost 
constraints mentioned above, the payment industry traditionally has been slow to update 
technology (‘while fraudsters have quickly adapted to the new channels available’).
329
 
Hence, in practice reports regarding fraud in retail payment systems and its 
ramifications continue to occur and will always do so. Similar problems have actually 
also occurred in Indonesia, since Indonesia’s retail payment system basically have no 
policy and development  concept regarding the retail payment system that is any 
different to those of other countries (as earlier explained). 
3.3.1.2. Incentives for Payment Card Fraud 
Vulnerable environments will attract potential perpetrators to commit crime, as they 
will see these environments as potentially rewarding situations with little apparent risk 
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of being caught or punished.
330
 There are also security issues regarding the proliferation 
nonbank and third party service providers in the payment system industry.331 
Generally, a payment card system is a massive and complex system and involves many 
linked counterparts. Hence, any immediate upgrade of its security features could be a 
very difficult task. Banks’ standardised infrastructure, their interoperability connection 
with other institutions, and cost constraints, are several factors that hinder banks from 
frequently and immediately upgrading their payment card systems, and are factors why 
any requirement for immediate action is somewhat unrealistic. In contrast, criminals 
have little or no difficulty in employing the latest technology to defraud the system and 
commit identity theft/fraud.
332
 
Despite banks continually enhancing their security features, fraudsters are constantly 
adapting and developing new ways to collect and use identity information, and bank 
account and credit card details.
333
 As Casey observes, ‘A criminal modus operandi is 
comprised of learned behaviours that can evolve and develop over time. It can be 
refined, as an offender becomes more experienced, sophisticated, and confident’ and 
ultimately perpetrate fraud on a bigger scale and one that is more destructive in its 
extent.
334
  
Litan, an analyst specialising in fraud detection and prevention at Gartner Research, has 
formulated a theory on the proliferation of ATM/debit card fraud that has become a 
concern for banks all over the world. According to him, ATM/debit card fraud is 
facilitated by the different nature of ATM/debit card transactions compared to those of a 
credit card.
335
 Other than that, Iannacci and Morris note that it is now very easy for 
criminals to commit payment card fraud, since anyone can procure the same technology 
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and equipment to make counterfeit documents, because the same technology and 
equipment are used to prepare/make documents for legitimate purposes.
336
 As stated in 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, the original of a message is 
indistinguishable from a copy in an electronic environment. Hence, most probably 
unauthorised transactions conducted by fraudsters will be treated by the payment card 
system or its management as genuine or valid transactions. The potential for fraud is 
therefore substantial due to the ease of intercepting and altering information in 
electronic form without detection, and the speed of processing multiple transactions.
337
  
The proliferation of the means of information sharing, such as chat rooms on the 
Internet and other electronic forums, has also facilitated e-banking and greater 
organisation on the part of payment card fraudsters. In these forums, criminals can trade 
stolen card and bank account data, hacking tools and other services anonymously; hence 
there is minimum risk of being detected by law enforcement agencies.
338
 The Internet 
also enables fraudsters around the world to exchange information regarding successful 
fraudulent schemes, thus new fraud techniques can move quickly to various fraudsters 
globally.
339
 For instance, to cite Symantec, the price of stolen credit card information is 
between USD0.85 and USD30 per card number, while bank account information is 
available on the ‘underground’ Internet market at a cost of USD15 to USD850 per 
account number. Disturbingly, there are also other data available for sale such as full 
identities, email accounts and passwords.
340
 
Given the multiplicity of types of online fraud/crime and their frequency and existing 
evidence, the UN attributed ongoing fraud development to a combination of 
technological advances, a lack of consumer and industry education, inadequacies in the 
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relevant legislation and fear of adverse publicity (due to its economic implications).
341
 
This, together with a lack of resources, or the willingness to allocate resources to the 
task, appears to have impeded an adequate timely response and perversely acted as an 
incentive for fraud. 
3.3.1.3.  The ‘Balloon Effect’ in Payment Card Fraud 
The regulator and the payment system industry go ‘hand in hand’ in combating fraud 
for the creation of a secure and efficient payment system. Regulations and various fraud 
prevention and detection tools continue to be implemented in the retail payment system 
in order to maintain public confidence and reduce fraud.  
However, fraudsters have quickly adapted to the new channels available, and there is 
also a tendency to displace effort to the most vulnerable operators. As the Smart Card 
Alliance asserts: 
Criminals are known to exploit the weakest link, moving from locations where stronger 
authentication is present to those where it is not, or from financial institutions and 
merchants who have more sophisticated fraud detection and prevention tools to those 
with less.
342
  
Greene refers to this phenomenon as the ‘balloon effect’, that is, squeeze fraudsters in 
one area of operation and they move to another, or in terms of where ‘fraudsters are 
moving from one channel and technology to the next’. Thus, if banks have applied one 
particular fraud prevention method in their payment system services that begins to 
decrease the success rate of a particular fraud approach, fraudsters then naturally will 
divert their activities to focus on another part of payment system that is still vulnerable 
to exploitation.
343
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As a payment card system consists of a wide range of activities and involves many 
institutions in its transactions, the weakest link can be anything along the pathway of 
card transactions. Among other things, this can be the consumers themselves, 
ATM/EFTPOS terminals, network connections, bank computers, switching company 
computers, as well as employees of merchants, switching companies, and banks.  
The most obvious example of the balloon effect in payment card fraud is related to the 
implementation of the global EMV standard to the credit/debit card issued by banks that 
carry a scheme network brand such as Visa and MasterCard. The EMV standard 
increases security of payment cards by utilising chip technology for storing and 
executing payment card transactions.
344
  
However, since all EMV standard cards still carry magnetic stripe technology to enable 
them to be used in countries where ATMs or EFTPOS terminals still are not EMV 
compliant (a ‘fallback’ policy), then the EMV card as a whole is not infallible from 
identity theft attack targeting consumer data inside the magnetic stripe.
345
 Today, many 
experts and institutions in payment card industries concur about the vulnerability of 
magnetic stripe technology in payment cards.
346
  
As a result, the balloon effect in payments card fraud works in at least two directions 
regarding global implementation of EMV standards. First of all, criminals tend to attack 
the countries where their payment card technology still relies on the magnetic stripe 
alone. Typically, all ATM and EFTPOS terminals in these countries are only able to 
read magnetic stripe cards.
347
 Hence fraudsters can still easily target domestic banks’ 
                                                          
344
 See European Central Bank, 'Report on Card Fraud' (2012) 10–11. In the report, data for 2010 showed 
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Tamper Proofing' (Paper presented at the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA, 2008) 
<http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.ezproxy.uow.edu.au/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=4531159&tag=1>, 282. 
346
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Nature of US Card Payment Fraud’, above n 262, 115; Financial Fraud Action UK, Fraud The Fact 2012: 
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payment cards and/or others’ payment cards issued by international financial 
organisations that conduct local transactions in these countries. The United States
348
 and 
Indonesia are notorious examples of this balloon effect in payment card fraud, since US 
payment cards and Indonesia’s ATM/debit cards have until the present day continued to 
rely on magnetic stripe technology.  
Secondly, criminals can still attack consumer data found inside the magnetic stripe in 
the countries that have implemented EMV standards, but then use it to withdraw money 
or conduct others transactions in the non-EMV standard countries (in cross-border 
fraud). An example of this concerns cross-border fraud that attacked EMV-compliant 
European countries. According to EAST’s data, while overall ATM fraud losses 
dropped 14 per cent across 22 European states, 82 per cent of the losses sustained 
actually came from outside European borders where the magnetic stripe is still widely 
utilised.
349
 
Evidence of these matters can be seen in the effect of EMV implementation in a number 
of European countries, where the incidence of skimming attacks is decreasing but the 
number of cash trapping attacks is on the rise.
350
 From a study undertaken by Diebold 
Incorporated, the increasing number of cash trapping frauds in Europe is quite 
staggering. During the first half of 2011, there were 6,756 incidents of cash trapping 
reported in Europe, up from just 150 incidents for the same time in 2010. Cash trapping 
resulted in reported losses of EUR495,782 for the period from January to June 2011.
351
 
Similar evidence of these phenomena has also been found in Indonesia. Following a 
deluge of ATM fraud using skimmers that rocked the country in the 2010, Bank 
Indonesia (the central bank) encouraged banks to toughen their security features in order 
to combat skimming attack. As result, banks have utilised various anti skimmer devices 
                                                          
348
 See Smart Card Alliance, ‘Fraud in the US Payments Industry’, above n 297, 18; Drimer, Murdoch 
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350
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and ensured more diligent supervision of ATM booths.
352
 Fraudsters consequently have 
difficulty in attaching their skimming devices without having first customised them. 
Thus, while the incidence of skimming fraud has tended to reduce, the incidence of card 
trapping has tended to rise, both in numbers and in the variation of the fraud devices 
used.
353
   
Fraud tools are also affected by this balloon effect. Before banks enhanced their ATM 
security with anti ATM skimmer technologies,
354
 card-trapping fraudsters typically used 
fraud tools such as ribbon or camera film negative film and attached these with glue to 
the ATM mouth for trapping consumer’s card. However, since banks have outfitted 
anti-skimming devices to the front of ATM card reader slot, which also makes 
traditional card-trapping methods such as the ‘Lebanese Loop’ difficult to apply, many 
fraudsters have utilised a matchstick to trap the card instead (which was unaffected by 
the instalment of anti-skimmer devices) and achieved a high rate of success.
355
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 Stefanus Arief Setiaji, Kejahatan Bank: Pembobolan Kartu ATM Naik Pada 2012 [Banking Fraud: 
ATM Card Theft Increased in 2012] (2013) Bisnis.com <http://en.bisnis.com/articles/kejahatan-bank-
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[Technique and Modus of Card Trapping] (2011) Mafia Kartu Kredit 
<http://www.mafiakartukredit.com/2012/03/teknik-modus-card-trapping.html>; ‘Kejahatan Perbankan 
Kembali ke Tradisional [Banking Fraud Returns to Traditional Way]’, Kompas  (online), 26 September 
2011 
<http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2011/09/26/07422898/Kejahatan.Perbankan.Kembali.ke.Tradisional>.  
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 See Brian Krebs, Green Skimmers Skimming Green (2011)  
<http://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/03/green-skimmers-skimming-green/>. In many cases, the anti-
skimming tools take the shape of green or blue semi-transparent plastic casings that protrude from the 
card acceptance slot to prevent would-be thieves from easily attaching skimmers. In Indonesia, this anti-
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Trapping Crime Jammed ATM Machine to Drain ATM Cash (Warning)] (15 October 2012) Direktorat 
Reserse Kriminal Umum, Polda Metropolitan Jakarta Raya, 
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Figure 3: The Balloon Effect in Payment Card Fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2. Inherent and Known Vulnerabilities in the Payment Card System  
In information security, infrastructure and networks are generally huge systems that are 
not easy to manage and control due to their size. According to Pipkin, ‘upgrades are 
very expensive, so old systems stay in operation long after the security flaws are 
known’. Furthermore, he contends that misinterpretation of security policy and/or its 
implementation, and/or failure to address new issues created by new technology or new 
business processes, have become a source of security vulnerabilities and created many 
points of compromise.
356
  
Payment cards are susceptible and vulnerable to fraud. Sullivan argues that 
‘vulnerabilities exist in the card payment approval process, however, that enable 
criminals to make fraudulent card payments. These vulnerabilities are related to an 
information-intensive payment approval process’.
357
 Meyer and Matyas even suggest 
that, ‘it appears impossible to develop any type of payment system which completely 
eliminates all fraud risks’.
358
  
                                                          
356
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All in all, the FFIEC asserts that vulnerabilities can be depicted as ‘weaknesses in a 
system, or control gaps that, if exploited, could result in the unauthorized disclosure, 
misuse, alteration, destruction of information or information systems’.
359
 However, 
Pipkin has argued that vulnerabilities are difficult to foresee and most of them are not 
exposed until they are misused.360 Furthermore, the FFIEC observes that there are 
commonly two types of vulnerabilities, ‘known’ and ‘expected’.361  
Regarding known vulnerabilities, Pipkin argues that these ‘account for the largest part 
of successful attack’. He further asserts that known vulnerabilities must be addressed, 
since by the time knowledge of a vulnerability has become widespread, malicious 
programs that could exploit that vulnerability are generally available for distribution and 
integration into larger, user-friendly toolkits. Hence, any fraudsters — even those 
without special skills — still have the ability to exploit all known vulnerabilities.
362
  
It is argued that most payment card fraud methods such as skimming, card trapping, 
shoulder surfing, malware and so on, are known to exploit vulnerabilities in bank 
systems. Most of all, those who deal with identity theft methods have known that such 
methods have been around for years. Banks can be assumed to have known about all 
these identity theft methods for some time from the many avenues for information 
exchange, such as at banking forums and seminars, or from their own daily experiences.  
Even though banks always claim that the authentication process between client 
(consumer-activated terminal) and the authenticated banks (host) is secure, Claessens 
contends that such claims are mostly not true in reality. According to him, client 
platforms are generally very vulnerable. Malicious programs, such as viruses, Trojan 
horses, worms, and other malicious programs can tamper with the installed root 
                                                          
359
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certificates, and among other things can intercept and steal communication information 
before it is ‘securely’ sent to the bank.
363
  
Claeesens’s assertion is apparently absolutely right in terms of the reality of e-banking 
practices in Indonesia. Banks tend to declare repeatedly to the public that their systems 
are always secure and ‘infallible’. For instance, even in the massive ATM cards 
skimming fraud that affected more than ten banks in Indonesia in early 2010, there was 
one affected bank that had proclaimed (and was quoted by the news media) that their 
bank was secure and had not been affected by the skimming fraud scheme that was 
sweeping the country.
364
 On the contrary, according to Bank Indonesia and Indonesia’s 
Police report,
365
 the bank actually had also suffered from the skimming fraud. This 
misleading information also tends to be unfair to other banks that are fraud victims and 
that suffer damage to their reputation. It could also jeopardise the rights of consumer 
victims as this misinformation could mislead judgment for fraud liability disputes.
366
  
                                                          
363
 Claessens et al, above n 196, 2612. 
364
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yang Lapor ke Polda Bukan Korban Skimming [Mandiri Bank: 4 Consumers That Report to Police 
Station were not Skimming Victim] (25 January 2010) Detik.com 
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diminta-perbaiki-sistem-pengamanan>. See also Pembobolan ATM: BI Instruksikan Bank Evaluasi 
System IT [ATM Theft: BI Instructs Banks to Evaluate Their IT System] (2010) Indosiar.com 
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to Panic, Banks Bear the Loss] (20 January 2010) Detik.com 
<http://finance.detik.com/read/2010/01/20/181324/1282733/5/>; Unpublished Bank Indonesia Internal 
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Fund Theft Cases Through ATM Machines in ATM Card Industry]. From the latter document, it was 
reported that there were 11 issuing banks that were affected by skimming fraud in Bali (these 11 banks 
reflect 13% of the total 84 issuing banks for ATM card in Indonesia). ATMs owned by these 11 banks 
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It is argued that most payment system fraud in Indonesia can be depicted as exploiting 
known bank vulnerabilities. Banks generally have a fraud department or section that is 
responsible for fraud prevention and detection and the implementation of security 
features to circumvent fraud. They commonly update their identity theft and fraud 
information through several avenues. These include internal security audits, which may 
reveal several long existing key vulnerabilities. 
 According to one bank’s internal audit review, consumers debit/credit card data for 
end-to-end internal card processing passed through the personal computers of several 
employees without encryption (even if some employees were able to access the data 
without any actual authorisation right to access the card data). There were also no 
controls or procedures for the management of data that was stored on the employees’ 
PCs. To make things even worse, there was no audit trail in place regarding who had 
access to the data and for what purposes. Even more distressing, the vendor that 
maintained the card processing hardware/software could also access the data. 
Meanwhile, the bank’s review of the bank’s EFTPOS system revealed that consumer 
card data transactions which travel from an EFTPOS machine to the bank’s host system 
were in the plain text form (unencrypted).  
Similarly, in the switching or interoperability context where switching companies are 
involved in card transactions, every switching system activates their ‘trace message’ 
system and stores every consumer’s card data that travels through their system (in the 
plain text format). By recording consumer card data, switching companies can easily 
resolve any disputes regarding consumer transactions that travel through their system. 
On the other hand, this practice also makes a switching company’s data base 
server/computer a potential target for identity theft either from internal or external 
fraudsters.
367
  
Avenues (other than internal audits) for banks to update their identity theft and fraud 
information also include bank information exchange forums, fraud conferences, or 
international organisations that focus on payment system fraud information (as banks 
normally are members or subscribers).  
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Generally, all these vulnerabilities were not deliberately exposed by banks or even by 
the bank authority. To win consumer trust, banks commonly only picture their strengths 
and bury their weakness. Bank jargon such as ‘we use firewalls, encryption, anti 
skimmer, and so on’ always depict their security features information as ‘the best’. 
However, as to how good or how comprehensive all these features are or whether or not 
all of these features are ‘commercially reasonable’ to protect their system from identity 
fraud, it is difficult to gauge without having an acceptable benchmark as a standard, and 
without any professional and comprehensive ‘hands on’ audit. This unfortunate 
situation often leaves the consumer as the easiest and weakest target to be blamed both 
in technological and legal aspects if unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions do occur. 
Hence, it is submitted that in fraud liability disputes between banks and consumers over 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions, the bank’s information security features and 
how they are implemented in practice become one of the important factors to be 
considered and assessed exhaustively as well as the consumer’s behaviour and a 
country’s liability regulations.  
3.4. The Fraudsters 
One of the most important factors in understanding fraud is related to the persons who 
perpetrate the fraud. In payment card fraud, anyone can commit the fraud. Payment card 
fraudsters typically are no different to most people in society, in terms of their 
demography and psychological characteristics.
368
 The perpetrators in payment cards 
fraud range from individual novices to major organised crime syndicate members.
369
 
Cvrcek, Krhovjak and Matyas noted that the former class were largely comprised of an 
‘individual or small group of loosely organised individuals that do not have any special 
hardware for card analysis, cloning, …etc’; these were characteristically termed 
‘opportunistic thieves’.
370
  
In terms of the source of the threat, Adams argues that payment card fraudsters can 
come from external parties such as first-party, second party (‘friendly’ party), third-
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party, and be essentially opportunistic in nature, or be part of an organised group of 
criminals; or originate from insiders
371
 or be an internal threat posed by persons such as 
a bank’s own staff, such as dishonest bank employees at a call centre collecting 
password data for use by an accomplice.
372
  
Iannacci and Morris stated that organised criminal groups have no concerns about 
borders in committing their crimes. Such groups of criminals travel from state to state 
and country to country looking for fraud prospects. As Iannacci and Morris observe, 
‘They do this in an often futile attempt to evade detection and/or prosecution’.
373
 The 
mobility of these international criminal organisations, also known as transnational 
criminal organisations, has become a major problem for law enforcement agencies at a 
local, national and international level.
374
  
Nonetheless, Facciolo noted in his study that there has been a trend in identity theft 
where organised crime is more prevalent than individuals as the party responsible for 
unauthorised transactions in payment systems.
375
 A growing global economy and 
increasing interoperability between payment system infrastructures in different 
countries in systems such as the payment card system has provided opportunities for 
criminal behaviour and created a fertile environment for fraud that is more complex, 
organised and common than ever before, such as in cross-border fraud.
376
 More 
criminals engaged in card fraud now can be linked to serious organised crime, such as 
large scale organised theft, money laundering and tax evasion, and cybercrime and 
terrorism.
377
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Interestingly, there is also the possibility of organised crime working in concert with 
individuals in payment card fraud. For instance, as revealed by Mohamad in her paper, 
there were occasions where organised crime groups also recruit financially vulnerable 
individuals to participate in ‘shopping holidays’ to Australia to use fraudulent or stolen 
credit cards.
378
  
In Indonesia, information about who the fraudsters in the payment card system are is 
also far from clear. The ‘dark number/figure’ phenomenon (encompassing both 
unreported and, more obviously, undetected incidents of criminal activity) has occurred 
in Indonesia as elsewhere. Banks and other payment system providers tend to ‘bury’ 
fraud incidents for the sake of a company’s reputation and to avoid further ‘hassles’ in 
terms of a police investigation.  
Unless the fraudsters were successfully apprehended or could be identified through 
CCTV footage, efforts to determine their identity in relation to proceeds of crime are 
very difficult.
379
 Nevertheless, many ATMs in Indonesia are still not equipped with 
CCTV cameras.
380
 Where they do exist at compromised ATMs, their evidence is often 
unreliable because the footage is blurred, or the record has been deleted, or sometimes 
the camera simply does not work. In many cases, even if the CCTV is working well, the 
fraudsters are still difficult to identify because they were wearing baseball caps or even 
full-face helmets to avoid facial recognition. The apprehension of payment card 
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fraudsters also remains very difficult (especially for ATM fraud) since the gap between 
the identity theft/identity fraud and fraud reports from consumers are relatively long and 
records may be taped over. Nevertheless, the Indonesian police have successfully 
apprehended some fraudsters. Some were local,
381
 while others came from overseas.
382
 
There was also an instance where overseas fraudsters became fraud masterminds in 
Indonesia and were working in concert with Indonesian culprits who executed 
ATM/debit card fraud in the field.
383
  
3.5. Conclusion 
The general nature of ATM/debit card payments as a part of a retail payment system 
with its large number of participants, less exhaustive security features, its more open 
and increased access points including the all-pervasive unattended consumer activated 
terminals, and greater bank interoperability and the increased involvement of third party 
service providers — has magnified and complicated some of banking’s traditional risks. 
Security problems associated with ATM/debit card transactions exist from the moment 
of initiation of an ATM/debit card transaction until its settlement — namely fraud risk 
— cut across risk categories and expose banks to legal and reputational risk.  
Nowadays, fraudsters that target ATM/debit cards have more efficient and quicker ways 
to perpetrate identity theft that could lead to identity fraud, such as by unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions. They are also more motivated to target banks and their 
consumers as the opportunities and incentives to commit ATM/debit card fraud have 
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 See, eg, Gede Suardana, Pembobol ATM Diancam 15 Tahun Penjara [ATM Fraudsters Threatened 15 
Years in Prison] (23 June 2010) Detik.com 
<http://news.detik.com/read/2010/06/23/180654/1385062/10/pembobol-atm-diancam-15-tahun-penjara>. 
382
 Gede Suardana, WN Malaysia Pembobol ATM di Kuta Dibekuk [Malaysian Citizen ATM Theft in 
Kuta was Arrested] (2 August 2011) Detik.com 
<http://news.detik.com/read/2011/08/02/123639/1694686/10/wn-malaysia-pembobol-atm-di-kuta-
dibekuk>. See also: Pembobol ATM Asal Srilanka Diciduk [ATM Thief from Sri Lanka Apprehended] 
(24 June 2012) Kompas.com <http://lipsus.kompas.com/topikpilihanlist/2133/1/100.hari.jokowi-
basuki/read/xml/2008/06/24/11101760/Pembobol.ATM.Asal.Sri.Lanka.Diciduk>; 'Napi Asal Malaysia 
Otak Pembobol ATM [Recidivist From Malaysia Became Mastermind of ATM Theft]', Kompas (online), 
19 September 2008 
<http://health.kompas.com/read/2008/09/19/03593524/Napi.Asal.Malaysia.Otak.Pembobol.ATM>. 
383
 Rachman and Fitri, above n 36. See also Didi Tri Kertapati, Pembobolan Dana Nasabah: Pelaku 
Diduga Masuk Sindikat Internasional [Consumers' Fund Theft: Alleged Perpetrators' Suspected as a 
Member of International Syndicate] (26 January 2010) Detik.com < 
http://news.detik.com/read/2010/01/26/173650/1286539/10/pelaku-diduga-masuk-sindikat-
internasional>; Wahyu Satriani Ari Wulan, 'BCA Blokir Penarikan dari Toronto dan Australia [BCA 
Blocked Withdrawal from Toronto and Australia]', Kompas (online), 26 January 2010 
<http://news.detik.com/read/2010/01/26/173650/1286539/10/pelaku-diduga-masuk-sindikat-
internasional>. 
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increased, due to the increased uptake of the online methods for transactions and 
communication of ATM/EFTPOS transactions, the proliferation of information 
available in the online environment in terms of an abundance fraudulent methods and 
tools shared on the Internet, remote and anonymous access, high-quality graphics and 
printing, and multipurpose fraudulent tools that can be obtained more easily and less 
expensively than previously. The banks’ inability to prevent and/or detect payment 
fraud, or take action if they do, makes payment card fraud all the more appealing. 
Apprehension of risk of detection and prosecution by law enforcement agencies is also 
very minimal, while the rewards for fraud can be highly significant. Fraudsters 
themselves can be anyone, from individual beginners to the transnational crime 
organisations, insiders, or outsiders. 
Regarding the nature of the payment card system along with fraudsters’ motives and the 
incentives to commit ATM/debit card fraud, payment system stakeholders should 
understand that payment card transactions would always be susceptible to fraud. 
Fraudsters view payment card fraud as victimless, easy and most rewarding, since the 
gains in terms of illicit money and the opportunity to elude identification in relation to 
the fraud are great. The possibility of easy money almost always is a driver for the 
fraud.  
Hence, in order to minimise ATM/debit card risks, banking industries (including 
consumers), law enforcement agencies and the regulator must work together to improve 
security awareness and develop fraud prevention and detection methods to circumvent 
fraud. Payment card regulation should also be established comprehensively, including 
fraud liability rules. The regulations could be expected to create incentives for every 
party involved in the banking industry to increase their vigilance and ensure best 
security standard practice. Severe and effective punishment of fraudsters is also needed 
to create a deterrent effect and prevent payment card fraud. 
 
 
 
 
 
89 
 
  
CHAPTER 4  – IDENTITY THEFT/IDENTITY FRAUD METHODS 
IN ATM/DEBIT CARD TRANSACTIONS IN INDONESIA: 
OPPORTUNITIES AND INCENTIVES 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The payment card system  just like other electronic payment systems — relies on 
identification, authentication and authorisation processes to ensure that the system will 
only process authorised transactions. In Indonesia, the ATM/debit card systems still 
utilise a magnetic stripe as a means of recording and storing consumer data. All those 
processes still rely on the existence of correct comparative data between magnetic stripe 
card data and its associated PIN recorded in the bank’s system.  
Unfortunately, identification, authorisation and authentication technology using 
magnetic stripe data and PIN are notoriously vulnerable and susceptible to various fraud 
attacks. Identity theft that later can be transformed into identity fraud can be conducted 
actively or passively. The fraud perpetrator can be anyone from inside a bank and/or its 
agent, an outsider/third party, and/or consumers themselves. 
Therefore, it is argued that one way to understand more about identity theft/fraud attack 
and its prevention/mitigation is to determine the point where the attack was committed 
(the point of compromise). If the point of compromise can be determined, then the party 
that should be responsible for safeguarding the payment transaction and therefore any 
consequent fraud liability where such a breach occurs can be more easily drawn. Hence, 
even though not exhaustive, this chapter tries to enumerate all types of fraudulent 
activities along with the points of compromise and their associated fraud 
methods/devices that target consumers and/or banks.  
4.2. Concept of Identity Theft and Identity Fraud in Payment Cards 
In this thesis, ‘identity’ refers to ‘the distinguishing character or personality of an 
individual’. In accordance with this definition, ‘identity theft’ can be described as a 
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conduct that ‘involves the theft of elements of a person’s identifying characteristics 
(items in the list such as name, address, credit card number).
384
 
In addition to defining identity theft, it is also common to define another form of theft, 
which is identity fraud. Identity theft and identity fraud are two terminologies that are 
sometimes used interchangeably in the various literature resources. However, it is 
argued that identity theft and identity fraud should be distinguished. They are different 
terms with different implementation phases in practice. Schreft argues that a precise 
definition of identity theft is important, in regard to efforts to measure and combat 
identity theft.
385
 
Although some define identity theft as occuring ‘when one individual misuses another 
individual’s personal information to commit fraud’,
386
 others, such as Rachel Kim of 
Javelin Strategy & Research, argue that ‘identity theft occurs when someone gains your 
personal data without your permission’, while identity fraud occurs when ‘the criminal 
takes that personal information and misuses it for financial gain’.
387
 Therefore, often 
identity fraud is the subsequent action of identity theft.
388
 Fraud is generally the end 
goal of identity theft.
389
  
In payment card fraud, identity theft that leads to payment fraud starts with the 
fraudsters having successfully gained either a genuine consumer’s ATM/debit cards 
(lost/stolen cards) or a consumer’s payment card information, and their PIN. Payment 
card fraud then occurs when fraudsters conduct unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions to obtain cash or goods using consumers’ lost/stolen cards or counterfeit 
cards that have been manufactured using that stolen information.
390
  
                                                          
384
 Stacey L Schreft, 'Risks of Identity Theft: Can the Market Protect the Payment System?' (2007) 92(4) 
Economic Review - Federal Bank of Kansas 5, 7.`See also Rachel Kim, '2007 Identity Fraud Report - 
Consumer Version: How Consumers Can Protect Themselves' (Javelin Strategy & Research, 2007) 2. 
385
 Kim, above n 384. 
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 Sullivan, ‘Can Smart Cards Reduce Payments Fraud and Identity Theft?’, above n 33, 39 [emphasis 
added], citing President’s Task Force on Identity Theft, ‘Combating Identity Theft: A Strategic Plan’.  
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 Kim, above n 384, 2. See also Malphrus, above n 338, 32; Douglass, above n 122, 434. 
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 Sullivan, ‘Can Smart Cards Reduce Payments Fraud and Identity Theft?’, above n 33, 36. 
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 Kim, above n 384, 6. 
390
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4.2.1. Identity Theft: Types of ATM/Debit Card Attack  
In the payment card system, the objective of payment card security is to guarantee that 
only payments transactions authorised by cardholder are permitted.
391
 To filter out the 
occurrence of fraud in the payment card transactions, ‘a card payment approval system 
authenticates the card, identifies the cardholder, and determines whether the transaction 
satisfies certain limits set by the card issuer or merchant’.
392
 
Unfortunately, as the FFIEC admits, all authentication methodologies have weaknesses, 
both of a technical and non-technical nature.
393
 The payment card data and PIN 
information is relatively vulnerable and easy to attack using various fraud methods.
394
 
Fraudsters know that if they obtain both data (card number data and PIN) (identity 
theft), then they can undertake unauthorised payment card transactions and drain a 
consumer’s account (identity fraud).
395
 In all payment card fraud, unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions always cause a latent risk of loss.
396
  
Rachel Kim of Javelin Strategy & Research explains various ways in which consumers’ 
financial information can be stolen: 
 Through a lost or stolen wallet, check book or credit card 
 From a criminal changing the address on an account  
 Through information stolen in your own home, including by friends, relatives, and 
in-home employees 
 By someone who e-mails, calls, or text messages you, pretending to be a bank or 
other trusted source to get you to divulge private information  
 By hacking, viruses, and spyware on a computer or ATM machine  
 By a data breach at a retailer, school, bank, hospital or any agency that maintains 
access to your private information  
 By a corrupt business employee who has access to your records  
 Through eavesdropping by a criminal while you conduct a public transaction 
(“shoulder surfing”) 
 Through mail theft from an unlocked mailbox 
 From a trash can, a method known as “dumpster diving”  
 Through new and different methods those criminals are continually developing.397  
In addition, many organisations and experts have identified frequent types of payment 
card fraud,
398
 as follows: account application fraud;
399
 account takeover;
400
 use of lost/ 
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392
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393
 FFIEC, Information Security, above n 202, 33. 
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stolen,
401
altered
402
 or counterfeit cards;
403
 or criminal activity involving ‘card not 
present’ (CNP) transactions,
404
 merchant collusion,
405
 and cardholder fraud.
406
  
Based on the attack method or technique, two types of attacks on the payment card 
system can be distinguished: first, the ‘active attack: an attempt to alter system 
resources or affect their operation’; and secondly, the ‘passive attack: an attempt to 
learn or make use of information from the system that does not affect system 
resources’.
407
 Meyer and Matyas argue that the ‘passive attack is most probably to 
enable the subsequent use of lost or stolen cards, or the production and use of 
counterfeit cards’.
408
 
Furthermore, attacks can be distinguished according the origin of the attack: first, ‘the 
‘inside attack: initiated by an entity inside the security perimeter (an “insider”). The 
insider is authorized to access system resources but uses them in a way not approved by 
those who granted the authorization’. Therefore, e-banking systems should also be 
protected against unauthorised activities by current and former employees.409 Secondly, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
398
 See INTERPOL, Payment Cards, above n 21; Iannacci and Morris, above n 20, 30; Devos and Pipan, 
above n 297, 67; Oracle Corporation, US Card Fraud (2010) Bank Gateway.com <http://www.banking-
gateway.com/microsites/oracle/US%20Card%20Fraud.pdf>, 35; Financial Fraud Action UK, above n 
346, 7. 
399
 A type of ID theft crime in which payment cards are obtained through a fraudulent application process 
using stolen or counterfeit documents. 
400
 Another type of ID theft crime, usually involving deception of a financial institution, re-issue of a 
payment card and its redirection to a different address. 
401
 This type of fraud involves misuse of actual cards that have been either lost by or stolen from the 
genuine cardholder. 
402
 Any access device that is changed in any way to change the appearance or electronic information 
contained within the device is said to be ‘altered’. Criminals often use stolen, valid card numbers on 
stolen devices to create the appearance of a valid card.  
403
 Fraud undertaken using plastic cards that have been specifically produced or existing cards that have 
been altered. These cards are encoded with illegally obtained payment card account data in order to pay 
for goods and services or to withdraw cash. 
404
 Fraud committed using payment card account data to undertake transactions where there is no face-to-
face contact between the seller and purchaser. Typically, this type of fraud is committed over the Internet, 
by mail order or telephone. CNP fraud is currently the fastest growing payment card related type of fraud 
in many areas of the world. However, since this thesis only focuses on ATM/debit card fraud where the 
transactions require the physical presence of a payment card, the fraud method discussion will not include 
CNP fraud such as account application fraud, account take over, and the like. 
405
 Sometimes a merchant will work in concert with the criminal to perpetrate the fraud. Not only do 
employees working for merchants get involved in these schemes, but the company owners do as well, and 
this happens in greater numbers.  
406
 Cardholder fraud occurs when a credit card customer receives a credit card under his own identity but 
with the intent to defraud the issuer. 
407
 Stallings and Brown, above n 221, 17. See also Meyer and Matyas, above n 72, 4456. 
408
 Meyer and Matyas, above n 72, 4456. 
409
 Kondabagil, above n 194, 95.  
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the ‘outside attack: initiated from outside the perimeter, by an unauthorized or 
illegitimate user of the bank’s system (an “outsider”)’.
410
  
However, for the purpose of this thesis, attacks will be distinguished according to where 
the point of compromise exists (that is, the point where the fraudster attacked the 
payment card system). This information security approach will be deemed very 
important, because by knowing the location of the point of compromise, the typology of 
the fraud method and the fraudsters can be more easily depicted. The party that is 
supposed to be in the best position to safeguard the payment card system at the point of 
compromise can also be determined and should most likely also be responsible for the 
loss of money from the consumer account (fraud liability).  
In accordance with this idea, it is deemed necessary that in order to accurately appoint 
the party that should be responsible for fraud liability, the point of compromise should 
be demarcated into three target areas of crime/fraud: (1) attack on consumers/cardholder 
(outside consumer activated terminal perimeter/bank system); (2) attack on consumers 
and banks (mixed perimeter); or (3) attack on bank/bank’s third party system (inside 
bank system perimeter, including banks’ counterpart/third party provider/network).
411
  
4.2.1.1. Cardholder as Point of Compromise 
4.2.1.1.1.  Third Party Fraud 
Some fraudsters, usually low skill fraudsters, prefer to steal the ATM/debit card and/or 
its PIN directly from the cardholders. They use various methods, such as:  
1. Lost and Stolen Card Fraud  
The most common and conventional card fraud is theft. Lost/stolen card fraud is where 
the card is lost or stolen and then attempts are made by an unauthorised individual to 
use it.
412
  
                                                          
410
 Stallings and Brown, above n 221, 17. 
411
 The fraud classification is similar to those of Devos and Pipan. In their work, they split the fraud 
method according to the target of the data theft: 1) theft of original card and cardholder information 
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these three classifications can be intermingled so it would complicate the analysis of related parties 
regarding who should be responsible for losses incurred. See Devos and Pipan, above n 297. 
412
 Devos and Pipan, above n 297, 67. See also Financial Fraud Action UK, above n 346, 28. 
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When an ATM/Debit card is stolen, the fraudster, who currently holds the card, could 
use it at a merchant where a PIN or signature is not required. However, if the fraudster 
could retrieve the PIN of the lost or stolen card, greater damage can be expected to 
occur because now the card can be used to withdraw money at an ATM or used as a 
means of payment at PIN-enabled merchants.
413
  
Lost and stolen card fraud covers fraud that is derived from consumers’ genuine 
payment cards being abused where such cards have been reported as lost or stolen by 
the original cardholder.
414
 In accordance with this definition, Oracle Corporation argues 
that this fraud may not apparently be the work of ‘card gangs’.
415
 By contrast, Hole et al 
assert that a card gang might be behind card stolen fraud, where it is believed that the 
encrypted PIN value inside the magnetic stripe card can be cracked using a ‘two-step 
attack strategy’. However, Hole et al’s assertion could not be generalised to every 
ATM/Debit card system, since other bank systems might not include PIN information 
inside the magnetic stripe. For instance, in Indonesia, all five bank employees who have 
been interviewed in Jakarta between July and August 2012 said that in their payment 
card system, PIN information or PIN information values are not stored inside the 
magnetic stripe card.
416
  
From this above list of fraud threats that target consumers, typically the exposure to this 
type of fraud is limited, since the window of opportunity for card utilisation by 
fraudsters is quite narrow, just the time between the loss of a card and the time of the 
reporting of that loss by the cardholder.
417
 
2. Card Swapping and Social Engineering Fraud 
Some fraudsters target bank cardholders in order to get their payment card and PIN. 
Among methods that are recorded are the fraudster swapping consumers ATM/debit 
card (especially ATM/debit card without printed consumer name (anonymous card or 
also known as an ‘instant card’) with other genuine ATM/debit card by trickery, such 
                                                          
413
 Financial Fraud Action UK, above n 346. Financial Fraud Action UK is the name under which the 
financial services industry co-ordinates its activity on fraud prevention, presenting a united front against 
financial fraud and its effects. 
414
 Oracle Corporation, above n 398, 35.  
415
 Ibid. 
416
 Kjell J Hole et al, ‘Lessons from the Norwegian ATM System’ (2007) 5 IEEE Security & Privacy 
Magazine 25, 259. See also interviews: BO-1; BO-2; BO-3; BO-4; and BO-6.  
417
 Meyer and Matyas, above n 72, 4456. 
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as: swapping consumer card at the legitimate point of sale outlet (employee fraud); put a 
matchstick inside the ATM slot to block the ATM/debit card with the con-artist 
subsequently offering to help solve the problem, and swapping the card immediately; 
swapping the consumer’s card when the card has fallen from the consumer’s hand due 
to a deliberate nudge or body impact from the fraudster (normally this happens when 
consumers have just withdrawn money from an ATM); or by deceit and stories 
fabricated by the fraudster who urges consumers to agree to hand over their card for 
‘fund checking’ purposes as a prerequisite for a particular offer, such as for a cheap 
Rolex watch or fund transfer destination for other fictitious purposes. Fraudsters 
typically obtain the PIN by using the shoulder surfing method. 
To deceive bank consumers, most of the fraud methods employ ‘social engineering 
techniques’ and can be classified as an active attack. The FFIEC described social 
engineering as follows: 
Social engineering involves an attacker obtaining authenticators by simply asking for 
them. For instance, the attacker may masquerade as a legitimate user who needs a 
password reset or as a contractor who must have immediate access to correct a system 
performance problem. By using persuasion, being aggressive, or using other 
interpersonal skills, the attackers encourage a legitimate user or other authorized person 
to give them authentication credentials.
418
 
The enabling factor for the use of social engineering techniques was and is the 
asymmetry of information that exists between the banks and their consumers. It is a 
reality that in practice, especially in Indonesia, banks tend to promote only the 
advantages of electronic banking, including payment card system, and remain reluctant 
to educate consumers regarding the various risks that threaten the payment card system 
(and pose a risk to the consumer). The reason for this reluctance, as a prominent 
Indonesian banker revealed when interviewed, is that the bank is afraid that consumers 
will have a false perception that the bank has weak security if it educates consumers 
about the various existing fraud methods.
419
  
                                                          
418
 FFIEC, Information Security, above n 202, 356. See also Pipkin, above n 226, 69, 78. Pipkin argues 
that social engineering methods have many different facets, but the most frequent include ‘sympathy (I 
cannot get this to work, can you help?), empathy (I understand. Tell me your problems and maybe I can 
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me that information, you will be in big trouble!)’.  
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 Interview: Siti Sekarwati, Division Head ATM Operation, PT Bank Mandiri, Tbk (Persero) (Jakarta, 5 
August 2012); See also Interview with Wani Sabu, Division Head Halo BCA, PT Bank Central Asia, Tbk 
(Jakarta, 14 August 2012).  
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This lack of knowledge of fraud and other vulnerabilities in the system gives criminals 
an advantage so that they are able to more easily defraud the consumers who are 
uninformed about their payment cards.
420
  
4.2.1.1.2.  Second Party Fraud 
Included in this type of fraud are any fraudulent activities that are committed by the 
family, friends or acquaintances of consumers themselves. In many instances, 
consumers either deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard consumer payment cards 
and PINs, thus enabling ‘the people around them’, such as wife/husband, spouse, 
partner, colleagues, office boy, child, or the like to access the card and PIN information, 
which later can be used to conduct unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions.  
4.2.1.1.3.  First Party Fraud 
The absence of adequate non-repudiation authentication method to verify the validity of 
consumer transactions may also facilitate dishonest consumers’ misuse of the payment 
card information to repudiate transactions and make claims for restitution for 
‘damages‘.
421
 In relation to ATM/debit card, first party fraud involves cardholders who 
make fraudulent claims knowing that they themselves withdrew the disputed funds.422 
First party fraud commonly increases when there is harsh economic conditions that 
force some consumers to defraud their own bank.
423
 
4.2.1.2. Consumer-Activated Terminal and Cardholder as Point of 
Compromise: Card Trapping 
In the previous sub-section, fraudsters are seen to target cardholders alone in order to 
get their genuine ATM/debit card and PIN. Lost and stolen cards, card swapping, social 
engineering and the like have been employed to obtain a cardholder’s genuine card. In 
committing their illegal action, fraudsters do not jeopardise any payment card system 
within the bank perimeter (even though the crime itself can occur in close proximity to 
one part of the payment card system infrastructure, such as a bank ATM location). 
                                                          
420
 Sullivan, ‘The Changing Nature of US Card Payment Fraud’, above n 262, 102–104. See also 
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Nevertheless, there is also a payment card fraud method that converges consumers or 
cardholders and the payment card system infrastructure as the fraud target in order to 
get a consumer’s ATM/debit card and PIN — this is card-trapping fraud.
424
 The card-
trapping method has many variants, such as the ‘Lebanese loop’ and ‘Algerian V‘.
425
 
Card trapping constitutes a major attack on ATMs.
426
 
This method targets the ATM, where the fraudster or an associate places a malicious 
device directly onto or into the ATM card reader slot to steal the cardholder’s genuine 
card.
427
 It aims to ‘prevent the card being returned to the consumer and also stop the 
ATM from retracting it’.
428
 According to Diebold Incorporated, the card trapping or 
card theft mechanism operates as follows: 
In an effort to obtain actual cards, criminals have used a variety of card trapping devices 
comprised of slim mechanical devices, often encased in a plastic transparent film, 
inserted into the card reader throat. Hooks are attached to the probes preventing the card 
from being returned to the consumer at the end of the transaction. When the ATM 
terminal user shows concern due to the captured card, the criminal, usually in close 
proximity of the ATM, will offer support, suggesting the user enter the PIN again, so 
that he or she is able to view the entry and remember the PIN. After the consumer 
leaves the area, believing their card to have been captured by the ATM, the criminal 
will then use a probe (fishing device) to extract the card. Having viewed the customers 
PIN and now having the card in hand, the criminal can easily withdraw money from the 
unsuspecting user’s account.
429
 
From the nature of the attack, card trapping can be categorised as an active attack. 
Active attacks are more obvious than passive attacks such as skimming fraud. Unlike a 
skimming fraud that could capture hundreds of examples of magnetic stripe card data in 
just one (passive) attack, card-trapping fraud usually only causes one card to be lost in 
each attack.
430
 
A wide variety of devices have been used as in card trapping. As mentioned above, 
Diebold Incorporated asserts that criminals have utilised plastic transparent film, plates, 
                                                          
424
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425
 Mohammed, above n 195, 21617.  
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wires, probes, and hooks (among other things) as card-trapping devices.
431
 In addition, 
Mohammed explained that a loop of tape, wire, or strong thread over an ATM card 
reader is also commonly used.
432
 A few ATM maintenance officers in Indonesia (who 
refuse to be named) confirm that all these fraudulent devices are utilised in card-
trapping fraud in Indonesia. Moreover, they also add that matchbox sticks, parts of card 
payment material or even paper are often found inside the ATM slot, placed to facilitate 
card trapping. 
In conjunction with this activity, fraudsters generally will deceive cardholders into 
revealing their PIN with various social engineering techniques, such as: 
a) direct observation by the perpetrator;
433
 
b) putting an overlay device on the keypad PIN;
434
 or  
c) attaching a spurious bank call centre sticker onto the front of the ATM and 
convincing the consumer to reveal their PIN when they eventually call the person 
posing as a bank officer.
435
  
Recently, there has been an increase in the card-trapping pattern fraud globally, 
apparently as a result of the widespread installation of anti-skimming devices that 
                                                          
431
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432
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ATM-Untuk-Menguras-Uang-ATM-Warning>; Moksa Hutasoit, Awas, Penipuan Lewat ATM Marak di 
Depok! [Beware, Many ATM frauds in Depok!] (19 June 2010) Detik.com 
<http://news.detik.com/read/2010/06/19/180214/1381958/10/awas-penipuan-lewat-atm-marak-di-
depok?nd992203605>; Mohammed, above n 195, 21617; Diebold Incorporated, ‘White Paper: ATM 
Fraud and Security’, above n 348 , 47.  
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caused the skimming method becoming more difficult to use. This observation was 
shared by the European ATM Security Team and the author’s Indonesian bank 
interviewees alike.
436
 Other than that, the card-trapping method is deemed to be simpler, 
more efficient, and does not require particular skills or expensive devices (such as is the 
case with skimming or wire/computer tapping). Even though card trapping can be 
categorised as a ‘low technology’ fraud method, nonetheless it is a very effective 
method to steal consumers’ cards. Although chip card technology may be impregnable 
to skimming fraud method, it is still susceptible to this type of fraud.  
Figure 4: Card Trapping (Lebanese Loop) 
Source: ExpandMyWealth.com Source: pdoyle.co.uk 
Figure 5: Examples of Fake Bank Call Centre Details Affixed to ATMs in 
Indonesia 
  
                                                          
436
 According to the European ATM Security Team (EAST) 2011 survey, cash trapping fraud surged in 
11 European Countries and contributed to a near doubling of recorded ATM fraud attacks, from just 
6,649 attacks for the first six months in 2010 to 11,220 attacks for the same period in 2011. See Kirk, 
‘Criminals Turn to ‘Card Trapping’, above n 434. See also Interview with Wani Sabu, Division Head 
Halo BCA, PT Bank Central Asia, Tbk (Jakarta, 14 August 2012). According to her, since anti-skimmer 
devices have been mounted at most Bank BCA ATMs, skimming fraud incidents have reduced quite 
significantly. However, other types of fraud such as card-trapping and SMS incidents have significantly 
increased (balloon effect). 
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Source: mafiakartukredit.com 
Even though banks have made efforts to tighten security against fraudulent activities at 
ATMs, bank officials admit that card-trapping fraud is still a problem despite anti-ATM 
skimmer technology having been installed, a fact attested to by maintenance officers. 
Bank maintenance officer interviewees noted that they were still busy removing card-
trapping devices from various compromised ATMs in Jakarta on a daily basis. To 
mitigate card-trapping fraud, some banks in Indonesia have replaced old ATMs with 
ones that are able to send an ‘error’ message and halt services if an ATM’s slot is 
infiltrated by foreign materials. However, older ATMs are still used widely in 
Indonesia, and hence they are still highly susceptible to various fraud risks.
437
 
Fraudsters try new methods to steal consumers’ ATM/debit card data at ATMs. If they 
cannot defeat the new security technology, they come up with new ways to work around 
the technology. Sometimes, a low-tech method can be just as effective and lucrative for 
criminals as actual attacks on ATMs.
438
  
 
4.2.1.3. Consumer-Activated Terminal as a Point of Compromise 
Nowadays, there is a significant increase in the use of ATMs and EFTPOS terminals by 
banking consumers around the globe. Unlike the bank branches that are limited in terms 
of their numbers and in the hours during which they are open, the consumer activated 
terminal is available 24 hours a day at most locations, from the busy streets in central 
business districts, to transport terminals, malls, and so on, to a quiet corner in a suburb. 
                                                          
437
 Interviews: BMO-1 and BMO-2. This phenomenon has been recognised by some bank officials at a 
meeting with Bank Indonesia in the Payment System Department on 5 November 2010, where the Author 
was also involved.  
438
 Kitten, ATM Skimming Threats Evolve, above n 349. 
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However, the great benefit offered consumers by consumer activated terminals that are 
located beyond the inside of a banking institution building is accompanied by an 
increased possibility of fraud attack. The relatively unguarded consumer activated 
terminals open the door of opportunity to the commission of crime.
439
 
ATM/debit card consumers confidently conduct remote payment card transactions 
because they believe that the banks will protect their transactions. Indeed, in general 
banks are always keen to protect their systems and consumers. However, regardless of 
bank efforts to secure ATM/debit card transactions, Diebold Inc states that there are 
seven (inherent) points of compromise along the ‘chain of trust’ in the bank system that 
can be attacked by fraudsters and each attracts its own attack method/s. 
1. Access control reader — these types of skimming attacks were diminishing, but are 
on the rise again. [Author’s note: An inside camera can be used to steal PINs.
440
] 
2.  External skimmer — a camera or keypad overlay is used to capture PINs.
 
 
3. Internal skimmer — attacks have been increasing, especially at gas pumps where 
criminals open the pump and attach an internal skimmer. These attacks are 
impossible for consumers to detect and difficult for gas stations to detect. 
4.  USB “sniffing” — criminals intercept and store card information, coupled with a 
PIN camera. 
5.  Malware — placed on a PC and ATM; most criminals use a USB drive to steal data. 
6. TCP/IP theft — not all FIs have encrypted data, leaving them vulnerable to brute-
force attacks.
441
 
7.  Back-end infrastructure infiltration — theft from where card information is stored.
442
  
 
4.2.1.3.1.  Swallowed ATM/Debit Card Theft at ATM’s ‘Retain Pocket’ 
UNCITRAL has canvassed that current models cash dispensers — ATMs and EFTPOS 
terminals — ‘require the convergence of two items to authorise the transaction. i.e. a 
plastic card with magnetic stripe containing certain information and the entry by the 
bank customer of a personal identification number (PIN)’.
443
  
                                                          
439
 Diebold Incorporated, Playing Defense: Trends in ATM Attacks (2007)  
<http://www.diebold.com/atmsecurity/files/DBD_WhitePaper_Island.pdf>.  
440
 Dong-Tsan Lee, 'Re-examining the Security Issues of ATM Systems' (2004) 2004(2) Computer Fraud 
& Security 13, 13. 
441
 Note: In a definition posted by Cory Janssen, ‘[a] brute force attack is a “trial and error” method used 
to obtain information, such as a user password or personal identification number (PIN). In a brute force 
attack, automated software is used to generate a large number of consecutive guesses as to the value of 
the desired data. Brute force attacks may be used by criminals to crack encrypted data, or by security 
analysts to test an organisation’s network security’: Cory Janssen, Brute Force Attack (2013) technopedia 
<http://www.techopedia.com/definition/18091/brute-force-attack>. 
442
 Diebold Incorporated, ‘White Paper: ATM Fraud and Security’, above n 348, 5. 
443
 UNCITRAL, ‘UNCITRAL Legal Guide on Electronic Funds Transfers’, above n 189, 501. 
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The natural location of ATMs and EFTPOS machines outside the bank perimeter with 
most of them unattended (also known as ‘island ATMs’) eliminates the necessity for 
‘round the clock’ human involvement and makes ATMs a relatively easy target for 
various crimes.
444
 Unrestricted physical access to ATM components outside the safety 
of the bank — such as to a card reader and PIN pad on the front of the ATM — are 
vulnerable to compromise by fraudulent devices such as skimmers, false keypads, and 
so on.
445
 
The involvement of many different people or organisations in the establishment or life 
cycle activities related to these machines (such as cash or paper-print replenishment, 
maintenance, booth cleaning, and so on) also makes ATMs and EFTPOS machines 
more vulnerable to abuse. However, fraudsters have recently not only targeted island 
ATMs (such as standalone ATMs located in stores or other buildings) as well as 
‘through the wall’ ATMs, but also non-island ATMs (that is, ATMs that located in the 
bank branch).
446
  
There have also been many reports where besides an ATM attack to obtain a 
consumer’s personal information such as their card number and PIN (which has become 
the most prevalent and notorious ATM crime),
447
 criminals are also stealing entire 
ATMs laden with cash.
448
 Nonetheless, the latter type of activity is beyond the scope of 
                                                          
444
 See Bell, above n 44. See also Diebold Incorporated, ‘White Paper: ATM Fraud and Security’, above 
n 348, 1. 
445
  Pat Telford and Peter Kulik, Ten Immutable Laws of ATM Security (2011) ATM Industry Association 
(ATMIA) 
<https://www.atmia.com/clientuploads/directory/whitepaper/TenImmutableLawsofATMSecurity2011.pdf
>.. See also Bond and Zielinski, above n 328. 
446
 Diebold Incorporated, ‘White Paper: ATM Fraud and Security’, above n 348, 25. 
447
 Ibid. 
448
 Russell G Smith and Peter Grabosky, 'Plastic Card Fraud' (Paper presented at the Conference Crime 
against Business, Melbourne, 1998) 6. See also Diebold Incorporated, ‘White Paper: ATM Fraud and 
Security’, above n 348, 25. In the white paper, Diebold Incorporated stated that physical attacks on an 
ATM ‘include any type of assault that physically damages the components of the ATM in an attempt to 
obtain cash’. Targets include: (a) The ATM’s safe’ (by cutting/grinding/drilling/prying the locks, handles 
and hinges of the safe door, or using a blowtorch or similar device, or explosives); (b) The ATM ‘top hat’ 
in an attempt to steal ATM components such as the hard drive, or to attach an internet skimmer or 
download malware (by prying open the door or side panels of the top hat, prying open the fascia, 
damaging the lock to gain access, picking the lock in order to covertly attach an internal skimmer; (c) 
‘The ATM ’presenter and depositor’ in an effort to gain access to the ATM’s cash sources, which include 
the deposit storage area and the divert bin (by ‘cutting, prying, drilling, torching, and smashing’); (d) ‘The 
entire ATM, when attempting’ to remove it from its existing location and move it to a location where its 
safe or vault can be laboriously penetrated and its contents removed (‘by ramming or ram raid — 
attempting to ram the ATM with a car, truck or heavy machinery; pulling — placing a chain or rope 
around an ATM and attaching the other end to a vehicle to pull the ATM from its foundation[s]…; lifting 
— using a forklift or similar equipment to try to lift the ATM from its foundation[s]’).  
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this thesis since it is not fraud and the loss, if any, is not associated with any consumer 
accounts, and hence will only be borne by the bank.  
As most of the ATMs throughout the world share many similarities and standards, 
‘ATM fraud is also not confined to particular regions of the world’. Probably the most 
complex factor is that the fraudsters and victims are ‘often on different continents, and 
the problems of one region can quickly become the problems of another’.
449
 Diebold 
Incorporated concluded several factors that attract ATM fraud globally: 
ATM fraud is growing because it produces cash and is considered to be fairly low risk 
relative to other crimes. The necessary equipment for criminal activity is inexpensive, 
readily available and expendable. ATM fraud also lends itself to organized crime. The 
fraud is repeatable, profitable and does not appear likely to end.
450
 
Generally, fraudsters physically attack the ATM in an effort to get cash, whether it is in 
the safe/vault or in the cash dispenser/depositor slot.
451
 However, the safe itself is 
difficult to compromise because it is made with very strong metal with a special key 
that makes it difficult for a criminal to penetrate.
452
 Therefore, instead of targeting cash 
stored in the safe, according to bank officers interviewed, some fraudsters in Indonesia 
prefer to target consumer cards that have been ‘swallowed’ by the ATM and retained 
inside it.
453
 Apparently, this modus operandi is derived from fraudsters considering it 
far easier to access consumer cards that have been swallowed and also less likely to 
attract the attention of bystanders or passers-by. Fraudsters have noticed that there will 
always be instances where this legitimately occurs, for example, a consumer entering a 
wrong PIN entry above the bank threshold limit (the number of times the bank permits 
the consumer to attempt to access their card using an incorrect PIN — consumers 
typically are only given three consecutive trials to enter the right PIN, otherwise their 
card will be automatically swallowed by the ATM). Such experiences also make 
consumers far less likely to suspect a card’s disappearance is due to other than machine 
malfunction (or their own error), so facilitating other methods of identity theft. 
                                                          
449
 Diebold Incorporated, ‘White Paper: ATM Fraud and Security’, above n 348, 1. 
450
 Ibid 8. See also Mohamad, above n 302, 11. See also Telford and Kulik, above n 445. 
451
 Diebold Incorporated, ‘White Paper: ATM Fraud and Security’, above n 348, 25. 
452
 Attacks on safes normally require a quite a bit of effort and special tools, with methods including 
drilling, prying, pulling, or using explosive materials. These kinds of efforts — besides being time 
consuming — also involve greater risk for the fraudster in terms of increased risk of apprehension 
because of the noise and complications that occur during such operations.  
453
 Interviews: BO-1; BO-2; BO-3 and BO-4 who handle bank ATM operations.  
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In this method, however, fraudsters need to just open the ‘top hat’ of the ATM using a 
counterfeit key (many ‘top hat’ keys use a universal key, so it can be accessed by 
different vendors) or by forcing it open.
454
 As for the universal key, fraudsters can even 
purchase one on eBay.
455
 If the top hat is also equipped with an additional padlock, then 
fraudsters have to break the padlock to gain entry. Once the ATM top hat has been 
opened, the fraudsters take genuine consumer cards that have been swallowed and 
reside in a special compartment and use them for purchasing things in shops that do not 
require a consumer’s PIN.
456
 There is also a possibility that the fraudster can withdraw 
cash from an ATM, if they can guess what a card’s PIN is.
457
 
Interestingly, this type of fraud method is still not widely known. The dearth of 
information concerning this type of fraud probably indicates that this method is either 
new or less attractive to fraudsters.
458
 The usage of genuine ATM/debit cards without 
PIN information will only provide limited financial gain for fraudsters. Apprehension 
risk is also greater, since fraudsters perform face-to-face transactions at EFTPOS 
locations. Other than that, consumers also tend to inform their banks regarding their 
‘swallowed’ cards immediately, making the period in which perform unauthorised 
transactions relatively short. 
4.2.1.3.2.  Magnetic Stripe Card Data Theft at ATMs 
1.    Card Skimming 
One of the most popular ways to access a consumer’s account information is to skim the 
information from the card. ‘Card skimming’ is the most frequently used method of 
                                                          
454
 Ibid. 
455
 Robert Siciliano, Flash Attacks: Big Money for Payment Card Scammers (2011) Infosec Island 
<http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/10006-Flash-Attacks-Big-Money-for-Payment-Card-
Scammers.html>.  
456
 There are some banking practices in Indonesia where merchant transactions can be concluded without 
PIN or signature requirement. See Ramson Daniel, Low Security Kartu ATM Mandiri [Low Security of 
Mandiri's ATM] (22 March 2012) Myzone: Ruang Jurnalisme Anda 
<http://myzone.okezone.com/content/read/2012/03/22/6883/low-security-kartu-atm-mandiri>. 
457
 For PIN guessing information, see Chapter Four / section 4.2.2.1 below and accompanying text. 
458
 There are a growing number of allegations from the banking industry that this fraud method is 
perpetrated or masterminded by someone who is familiar with ATM components. However, the suspect 
list can be quite long since many different parties might be involved in the ATM life cycle, such as the 
person in charge of maintenance, replenishment, bank staff, and so on. Some ATM top hats are actually 
doors can be accessed from behind or from the side, which renders efforts to identify the perpetrators 
using CCTV cameras useless. 
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illegally obtaining card track data on the magnetic stripe.
459
 To capture the data stored 
in the card’s magnetic stripe, criminals use a device called a ‘skimmer’.
460
 Even though 
payment card fraud methods vary, ATM skimming remains one of the payment card 
industry’s greatest threat. According to one theft expert, Robert Siciliano, around 
USD350,000 was being lost worldwide daily to instances of ATM skimming in 2011, 
an amount that can only have increased.
461
 
Fraudsters still target ATMs as their primary target, simply because they offer the 
greatest monetary reward.
462
 Unrestricted physical access to ATM components 
introduces risk. The most obvious risks are related to the card reader and PIN pad on the 
front of the ATM, which can be compromised by fraudsters.
463
 With ATM skimming 
method, fraudsters set up a card reader or skimmer and attach it to the ATM on bank 
premises (or elsewhere such as at a petrol pump, restaurant or retailer). This 
electronically captures magnetic stripe information when consumers conduct 
transactions.
464
  
Diebold Incorporated asserts that ‘criminals place a hard-to-detect, small overlay device 
on top of the card slot of ATMs or POS equipment’.
465
 Because a skimmer is relatively 
small, it can be sophisticated and disguised to fit over a legitimate slot (a factory 
installed card reader) on ATMs and designed to look like a normal part of the ATM (or 
other payment terminal).
466
 Further, Diebold Incorporated explains how skimming 
process take place:  
                                                          
459
 Diebold Incorporated, ‘White Paper: ATM Fraud and Security’, above n 348, 25. In the Indonesian 
context, see Herdaru Purnomo, Pembobolan Via Alat Pembayaran Kartu Sudah Capai Rp. 12 Miliar 
[Payment Card Theft Damaged Reached Rp12 billion] (8 June 2011) Detik.com 
<http://finance.detik.com/read/2011/06/08/080958/1655426/5/pembobolan-via-alat-pembayaran-kartu-
sudah-capai-rp-12-miliar>. 
460
 Diebold Incorporated, ‘White Paper: ATM Fraud and Security’, above n 348, 47. See also Barwise 
and Bachfeld, above n 377.  
461
 Kitten, ATM Skimming Threats Evolve, above n 349. Note: This figure was cited in 2011. US 
commentators have noted that the rate continues to escalate, even in the US: Robin Sidel, , ‘Theft of 
Debit-Card Data from ATMS Soars: Thieves are stealing information to make counterfeit plastic”, Wall 
Street Journal, 19 May 2015, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/theft-of-debit-card-data-from-atms-soars-
1432078912>. Debit card compromises at ATMs on bank premises rose 174%, while those at non-bank 
machines rose 317%, and are not expected to fall until new technology is more widely in place. 
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 Kitten, ATM Skimming Threats Evolve, above n 349. 
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 Telford and Kulik, above n 445. 
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 ConsumerReports.org, above n 44. See also Mohammed, above n 195, 2167; Levi and Handley, 
above n 343. 
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 Diebold Incorporated, White Paper: Battling Card Fraud through Chip and PIN Technology, above n 
209, 2. See also Diebold Incorporated, ‘White Paper: ATM Fraud and Security’, above n 348, 25. 
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 Model Criminal Code Officers' Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, 'Final 
Report Model Criminal Code on Chapter 3 - Credit Card Skimming Offences' (2006) 
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When the consumer inserts his card into the card reader, the skimmer captures the card 
information before it passes into the ATMs card reader to initiate the transaction. The 
transaction continues in a normal fashion. When removed from the ATM, a skimmer 
allows the download of personal data belonging to everyone who used the ATM. An 
inexpensive, commercially available skimmer can capture and retain account numbers 
and PINs for more than 200 ATM cards. Typically, criminals design skimming devices 
to be undetectable by consumers.
467
 
 
Skimmer devices vary in size, shape and capabilities. As Masters and Turner have 
explained, they vary from ‘standalone pocket devices to devices that are incorporated 
into [the] keyboard’. Some skimmers are extensively used for legal purposes but some 
others are used for extravagant fraudulent activities. Masters and Turner further 
distinguished skimmer devices into three types, namely, basic skimmers,
468
 magnetic 
stripe card reader encoders,
469
 and re-packaged skimmers.
470
 Magnetic stripe card 
readers or skimmer devices are abundant in the marketplace, both in the brick-and-
mortar and on-line world. Originally, skimmers were marketed for legitimate business 
retail purposes; however, because of their relatively small size, mobility/portability and 
user-friendly operation, they also have become increasingly used for fraudulent 
activities.
471
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
<http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/SCAG/ll_scag.nsf/vwFiles/MCLOC_MCC_Chapter_3_Credit_
Card_Skimming_Report.pdf/$file/MCLOC_MCC_Chapter_3_Credit_Card_Skimming_Report.pdf> 3; 
See also Mohammed, above n 195, 21617.; Barwise and Bachfeld, above n 377. 
467
 Diebold Incorporated, ‘White Paper: ATM Fraud and Security’, above n 348, 2–5. According to 
Diebold Incorporated, there are three kinds of card skimming attacks that can occur: 
• External card skimming – placing a device over the card reader slot (motorized or dip) to capture 
consumer data from the magnetic stripe on the card during a transaction. This is the most common 
form of card skimming. 
• Internal card skimming – gaining access to the top hat of the ATM to modify the card reader or 
replace the original card reader with an already modified one for the purpose of obtaining 
consumer card data during a transaction.  
• Vestibule card skimming – in locations where the ATM is located within a vestibule, skimmers 
are placed on the vestibule door card access reader to capture cardholder data from the magstripe 
where the card is read so an unwary consumer inserts their card into the vestibule instead of on the 
ATM.  
468
 These basic skimmers are normally used by fraudsters to secretly capture consumer cards in 
restaurants or shops, by hiding them behind the desk or inside a pocket. When a consumer is distracted, 
the fraudster swiftly swipes the card in the skimmer. This mini skimmer generally only has the capability 
to capture and store magnetic card information. It does not have capability to encode or write the data 
onto a magnetic stripe card.  
469
 Unlike the basic skimmer that is normally only capable of reading and storing magnetic stripe 
information, magnetic swipe card encoders generally have greater capabilities, such as being able to read 
and write magnetic stripe data. 
470
 Masters and Turner, above n 216, 18.  
471
 Ibid. 
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Figure 6: Mini Magnetic Stripe Card Reader 
 
MSR-500M (Mini-123).
472
 This device can store 
up to 2048 records of data. 
Source: Masters & Turner 
 
Mini DX4 Portable Mag-Stripe Swipe PVC 
Card Reader.
473
 This device can store 3000 
data records.  
Source: ebay.com.au 
Magnetic swipe card encoders — besides being used to create magnetic stripe card for 
legitimate businesses, such as for hotel cards, retail shops and so on — are also usually 
used to create clone cards for unauthorised payment card transactions. This type of 
skimmer is able to write card skimming information onto new or used magnetic stripe 
card. Many variants of this kind of skimmer are available on the market.
474
 
Figure 7: MSR206 Magnetic Swipe Encoder 
   
Source: Masters and Turner
475
 
 
Masters and Turner explain that repackaged skimmers are where fraudsters typically 
dismantle the skimmers from their standard manufactured packages and incorporate 
them into false ATM fascias and ATM slot adaptors.
476
 Further, they note that usually 
the fake fascias are of such quality that they exactly resemble a genuine part of the 
ATMs (especially on the user interface side). Only the reverse side of the fascias shows 
‘the haphazard build quality’ (see Figures 8 and 9 below)).
477
  
 
                                                          
472
 Ibid. 
473
  Mini00 DX4 Portable Magnetic Stripe Swipe PVC Card Reader (23 February 2013) ebay 
<http://www.ebay.com.au/itm/Mini00-DX4-Portable-Magnetic-Stripe-Swipe-PVC-Card-Reader-
/251003524960?pt=AU_CashRegisterAccessories&hash=item3a70f9d760>. This mini DX4 can be 
bought online for around AUD200.00. 
474
 Ibid. 
475
 Masters and Turner, above n 216, 18. 
476
 Ibid. 
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Figure 8: The Extracted Components of a Mini-123 Card Reader Removed from 
its Manufactured Packaging and Repackaged for Use in a Fake ATM Fascia 
 
Source: Masters & Turner
478
 
Figure 9: Imitation ATM Fascia – Front and Rear View 
 
Source: Masters & Turner
479
 
 
Figure 10: Various ATM Skimmers on the ATM 
 
An ATM skimmer that fits over the card insert 
slot. 
 
An ATM skimmer panel that fits directly on 
top of the real ATM 
Source: Brian Krebs
480
 
Some skimmers are so advanced that they incorporate features such as the ability to 
send an SMS text message to the fraudster’s mobile phone whenever a new card is 
                                                          
478
 Ibid. 
479
 Ibid. 
480
  Brian Krebs, ATM Skimmers, Part II (2 February 2010) www.krebsonsecurity.com 
<http://krebsonsecurity.com/2010/02/atm-skimmers-part-ii/>. See also Thieves Create More 
Sophisticated ATM Card Skimmers (27 April 2012) Mashable <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_2H-
_zAudn8>. 
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swiped,
481
 so the fraudsters do not even have to dismantle the skimmer from the ATM 
in order to download the stolen data. Even now, many sellers offer tiny card readers (for 
example, the MSCR710) for purchase online. This tiny card reader, if used by fraudsters 
as a skimmer, will be of great benefit to them. Due to its tiny shape, it is easy to fit to 
any kind of case, has low power consumption, and greatly increased storage capability 
(data for up to 32,000 cards).
482
 Even the seller acknowledges that the device can be 
used for illegal purposes and warns the potential buyers in its disclaimer (in red font) 
that the card reader is sold only for legal purposes and not for use as a card payment 
skimmer. 483 
Figure 11: Rear of an ATM Skimmer with SMS Capability 
 
Source: Brian Krebs
484
 
 
When the skimmer is installed in an ATM, the device then records and stores the 
electronic information from the magnetic stripe of the authentic payment cards as they 
                                                          
481
 Brian Krebs, Would You Have Spotted the Fraud? (15 January 2010) www.krebsonsecurity.com 
<http://krebsonsecurity.com/2010/01/would-you-have-spotted-the-fraud/>. 
482
 For instance, mycardreader.com sells magnetic stripe card reader with interrupted swiping support 
with the size just width: 2mm, length: 6mm and height: 11mm, and costs ‘only’ USD1,500 each. See 
MSCR710 (MyCardReader.com <http://mycardreader.com/18-mscr710.html>.   
483
 Ibid. See the disclaimer wording:  
Disclaimer: Our magnetic card readers are intended for legal use only. Even though our magnetic 
card readers can be used as a debit or credit card reader and can read any type of magnetic stripe 
bank cards, we will not sell them to be used for skimming as debit or credit card skimmers. 
The buyer understands that the magstripe card reader being purchased is not for illegal use. That 
he/she will safeguard the use and distribution of this device and make an effort to prevent illegal 
use from occurring. 
We are not and will not commercialise this product if we know or suspect that it will be used for 
unlawful purposes. 
484
 Krebs, ‘Would You Have Spotted the Fraud?’, above n 481.  
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are inserted into the ATM slot.
485
 The data skimmed from a number of swiped cards is 
then stored in the skimmer device to be accessed or reproduced on a counterfeit card 
later.
486
 This data is then downloaded to a computer when the skimmer is dismantled, or 
the data can be sent to the fraudsters that reside near the ATM via a wireless network.
487
 
Skimming of magnetic stripe information is a significant problem because it provides 
criminals with so much readily usable information for conducting unauthorised 
transactions.
488
  
To combat the proliferation of ATM fraud using skimmer devices, most banks 
throughout the world (including in Indonesia at the encouragement of its central 
bank)
489
 choose to equip their ATMs’ card reader slot with an anti-skimmer device. 
Generally, ATM anti-skimming devices take the shape of ‘green or blue semi-
transparent plastic casings that protrude from the card acceptance slot to prevent would-
be thieves from easily attaching skimmers’.
490
  
Figure 12: Anti-Skimming/‘Duck Snout’ at a Bank ATM in Sumatra (Indonesia) 
 
Source: Sriwijaya Post/Syahrul Hidayat
491
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of anti-skimmer and ‘jitter’, as well as fitting CCTV cameras to ATM booths that did not already have 
CCTV in place.  
490
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However, the implementation of anti-skimming devices has not been without 
controversy. When banks first introduced anti-skimmer devices, the implementation 
was not accompanied by any consumer education. To make things even worse, a bank 
can have multiple brands of ATMs. As a result, the shape and colour of anti-ATM 
skimmers on the ATMs also vary. 
Bank consumers are finally learning from the mass media or by ‘word of mouth’ that 
the ‘coloured plastic thing’ installed at an ATM card reader slot is actually an anti-
skimmer device. However, fraudsters continually improve and modify their fraud 
techniques. In the case of ATM anti-skimming devices fraudsters have in no time 
circumvented them by devising ‘anti-skimmer skimmer’ devices (see Figure 13 below).  
Now many fraudsters ‘simply [craft] their skimmers to look exactly like the anti-
skimming devices’.
492
 A skimmer found in a Chase Bank branch in West Hills 
(California), for example, was an ‘all in one’ skimmer (a skimmer that includes a 
magnetic stripe skimmer and also a pinhole camera device) designed to fit over the card 
acceptance slot. Authorities believe that this type of sophisticated, professional-grade 
ATM skimmer was made with the help of a 3D printer.
493
 Therefore, more consumers 
might be deceived by this new skimmer fraud since they believe that they have 
deliberately performed their ATM transactions at a secure ATM, just as was being 
encouraged by banks.  
Figure 13: ATM Anti-Skimmer Skimmer and Skimmer 
 
Anti-skimmer skimmer 
 
Anti-skimmer skimmer device removed from 
ATM anti-skimmer device. 
                                                          
492
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<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/12/pro-grade-3d-printer-made-atm-
skimmer/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+KrebsOnSecurity+%
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Skimmer that looks like anti-skimmer device 
 
The bottom of the skimmer with PIN hole 
camera 
 
Device to wirelessly send stolen PIN and Card 
data via SMS or Bluetooth 
 
Skimmer panel from behind with flash storage 
device. Double-sided tape used to stick 
skimmer to ATM. 
Source: Brian Krebs
494 
In most cases, cardholders are frequently unaware that there is a skimming device on 
the consumer-activated terminal and their data has been stolen at the time of transaction. 
If a cardholder victim fails to check their bank statements frequently, a criminal can 
repeatedly withdraw money to the maximum limit every day until the account is drained 
or cancelled.
495
 When the consumer finally becomes aware, they have difficulty in 
pinpointing the timing and location of this skimming attack.
496
  
Even though some banks have urged consumers to take precautions when conducting 
ATM transactions, nonetheless ‘customers are not sure what they are looking for when 
it comes to compromised machines, and a lot of the externally attached equipment is 
high quality and extremely subtle’.
497
 
Furthermore, consumer vigilance is ineffective because there is also a wide variety of 
ATMs and anti-skimmer models, which make it impossible for consumers either to 
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memorise the details for every ATM model or to immediately notice when there is a 
fraudster’s device attached. As Barwise and Bachfeld argued, ‘the untrained eye will 
hardly notice this mini-scanner, which is adapted to the ATM’s design. Sometimes, the 
criminals even put a completely new front panel on the ATM.’
498
  
2.    Malware 
An ATM basically is just an ordinary computer inside a custom-built case.
499
 Therefore, 
any attack that happens to an ordinary computer might also occur to an ATM computer. 
Unrestricted physical access to ATMs makes every ATM component — both outside 
and inside the ATM case — vulnerable to attack. Specifically about the vulnerabilities 
of ATM components inside the ATM cabinet, Telford and Kulik observe that:  
The components inside the locked ATM cabinet, but outside the safe, are also 
vulnerable to compromise from both hardware and software attacks such as plugging in 
a USB or even a DVD drive, replacing components inside the ATM – even removing 
the ATM computer and replacing it with an attacker’s computer. Physical access allows 
any software or hardware component to be replaced; protecting physical access to 
ATMs starts with security of the site and use of unique keys for ATM cabinets.
500
 
Fraudsters now have infected ATMs with malware in an attempt to steal consumer 
payment card data and PIN.
501
 For some fraudsters, planting malware in the ATMs 
seems to be more rewarding with less risk compared to ATM skimming that has been 
very popular among fraudsters.
502
 An instance of ATM malware was found on 20 
machines in Russia and the Ukraine that were all running Microsoft Windows XP 
operating system.
503
  
Trustwave’s SpiderLabs that was ordered to analyse malware found in Eastern 
European ATMs, revealed that: 
                                                          
498
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The malware captures magnetic stripe data and PIN codes from the private memory 
space of transaction-processing applications installed on a compromised ATM. The 
malware contains advanced management functionality allowing the attacker to fully 
control the compromised ATM through a customized user interface built into the 
malware. This interface is accessible by inserting controller cards into the ATM’s card 
reader. SpiderLabs analysts do not believe the malware includes networking 
functionality that would allow it to send harvested data to other, remote locations via the 
Internet. The malware does, however, allow for the output of harvested card data via the 
ATM’s receipt printer or by writing the data to an electronic storage device (possibly 
using the ATM’s card reader). Analysts also discovered a code indicating that the 
malware could eject the cash-dispensing cassette.
504
  
Recently, ATMs have often used publicly available operating systems such as Microsoft 
Windows XP operating system and ‘off the shelf’ hardware. As a consequence, besides 
their benefits of efficiency and interoperability, ATM computers are susceptible to 
being infected with malware. The malware can be injected into an ATM via network or 
though other infected devices (such as a USB attack). Once installed on the ATM, the 
malware can collect card information and PINs.
505
  
According to the FFIEC, malicious codes or programs (malware) are ‘any program that 
acts in unexpected and potentially damaging ways’. Common types of malware are 
‘viruses, worms, Trojan horses, monitoring programs such as spyware, and cross-site 
scripts’.
506
 Malware has constantly been ranked as one of the key cyber risks to 
business, governments and individuals.
507
 Evidence of the increasing malware threat are 
statistics cited by Symantec, which reported that malware numbers skyrocketed from 
just under 2.9 million in 2009 (a 71 per cent increase over 2008) to 286 million new 
malware variants detected by Symantec in 2010.
508
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Malware (such as root kits) is software that is able to access a computer without being 
noticed by the computer administrator by subverting the computer’s standard operating 
system functionality. Malicious code attacks are a growing problem because they are 
deeply hidden and thus very difficult to detect and remove. Malware can steal and 
collect personal information about users without their consent.
509
 Banks, as electronic 
banking providers, can prevent or detect and remove malicious codes on their computer 
(at host and network level) only by implementing appropriate centralised anti-virus 
software.
510
 
The perpetrator that uses malware to infect systems can be anyone, ranging from outside 
intruders that have forced access to the computer, or authorised users.
511
 Zetter argues 
that typically a malware attack needs a collaborator from among authorised ATM 
personnel, such as an ATM technician or anyone else with an access key to the ATM, 
so that fraudsters are able to place the malware on the ATM.
512
 In terms of where the 
malware are installed, Bradbury contends that the installation of such malware could 
happen at the factory when the device was programmed, or at the premises where it is 
used. There is also the possibility that malware could also be installed remotely.
513
 
Further, Telford and Kulik note that every ATM has an administrator.
514
 Often, the 
ATM administrator’s job is accomplished either by physical service interface at the 
ATM, or, as is the most recent development, through remote management tools. Aside 
from this, the developers of the ATM software itself also have a big opportunity to 
‘control the operation of an ATM, and could write software to change screen flow or 
                                                          
509
  Symantec, 'Internet Security Threat Report : 2011 Trend' (www.symantec.com, 2012) 
<http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_resources/b-
istr_main_report_2011_21239364.en-us.pdf> 32. According to Symantec, the current front runners in the 
rootkit arena are Tidserv, Mebratix, and Mebroot. These all modify the master boot record (MBR) on 
Windows computers in order to gain control of the computer before the operating system is loaded. 
Variants of Downadup (aka Conficker), Zbot (aka ZeuS), as well as Stuxnet all use rootkit techniques to 
varying degrees. 
510
 Kondabagil, above n 194, 11011. See also Anderson et al, above n 338, 911. According to 
Anderson et al, ‘most malware tools are not initially detected by the common antivirus products, as their 
authors test them against these products; and when the antivirus vendors do catch up, the crimeware 
authors issue updates’. 
511
 Kondabagil, above n 194, 11011. See also Anderson et al, above n 338, 9–11. 
512
 Zetter, above n 371. See also Bradbury, above n 501, 13; Choo, above n 502, 723. 
513
 Bradbury, above n 501, 13. 
514
 Administrators are trusted people who can install software, configure devices, manage accounts and 
establish security policies, and handle the other management tasks associated with keeping the ATM 
operational. See Telford and Kulik, above n 445. 
 
116 
 
  
content, capture PINs, or access other confidential information’.
515
 As a result, 
fraudulent ATM administrators or developers of ATM software can circumvent every 
security measure aimed to prevent uploading of malicious code/software, or could 
compromise encryption processes and introduce a ‘back door’ for remote access to 
ATM system files.
516
 
Concerning the huge impact of malware on ATMs, Trustwave strongly recommends 
that all financial institutions with ATMs perform an analysis of their ATMs to identify 
whether or not malware is present.
517
 The finding that the malware was moving to 
machines in the United States and elsewhere also triggered this recommendation. They 
also believed that fraudsters tend to use a fraud method in one country as a trial. If it is 
successful and the perpetrators realise that it can also executed in other countries, it will 
spread quickly.
518
  
However, despite massive reports of malware on ATMs, many financial institutions and 
banks in many countries have been reluctant to invest in proper actions to cope with this 
threat. There is even an allegation that some financial institutions and banks have a 
tendency to install illegal and insecure software, which might further increase security 
risk.
519
 
In a recent development, malware not only was used to attack ATMs but also EFTPOS 
terminals. Fraudsters are attacking payment processors and merchants with enhanced 
malware to compromise payment card data. Much of the latest malware has the 
capability to evade anti-virus systems. An example of this malware is ‘Dexter’, a 2012 
Trojan that infected hundreds of POS systems, mainly in the United States and United 
Kingdom. This malware looked for card data while lying in the memory of the EFTPOS 
terminals.
520
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Based on interviews with some of Indonesia’s bank officials responsible for the 
development of ATMs,banks so far have no anti-malware software, As a result, they 
lack the ability to prevent the installation of or detect malware on ATMs. It was quite 
surprising that some officers admitted that they ‘did not even know’ about the 
possibility of malware attack on ATMs. If these interview results are accurate, it reflects 
the banks’ poor risk management efforts in relation to keeping abreast with fraud risk 
developments. As a result, banks may fail to realise that there are many possibilities of 
phantom withdrawals caused by malware on ATMs, and blame consumers whenever 
phantom withdrawals occur. 
521
 The Body Shop case fraud that occurred in 2013 is 
evidence that malware attack on ATM/debit card operations has arrived in Indonesia.
522
 
4.2.1.3.3.  Magnetic Stripe Card Data Theft at EFTPOS Terminals 
1. Card Skimming and EFTPOS Terminal Tampering  
Consumer data breach at merchants comprises a huge problem for financial institutions, 
because merchants or their employees are outside the bank’s ‘perimeter’ and relatively 
unsupervised by banks (that is, the banks do not directly monitor them). Hence, 
according to Grabosky, Smith and Dempsey, ‘merchants or their employees are ideally 
placed to permit access to computer networks and to alter transaction details’.
523
 
EFTPOS terminals at merchants are relatively protected from outsiders who are not 
authorised to have access (protected by the building, locked doors, and oversight by 
employees of the merchant). However, recently, skimmers have been found to break 
into shops more frequently and add skimming devices to legitimate EFTPOS 
terminals.524 Although relatively insulated from outside attack, EFTPOS terminals do 
not have protection from insiders (such as the retailers themselves, clerks, cashiers, 
sales personnel, and so on) who are authorised to have access to the terminals but have 
turned into fraudsters. 
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However, there are also many reports where an outsider could compromise merchants’ 
EFTPOS terminals by covertly replacing the merchants’ EFTPOS terminals with ones 
that have been tampered with either by ‘break and entry’ when the business is closed, or 
by fraudsters tricking the owner or staff into allowing the installation of the fraudsters’ 
bogus ‘replacement’ or ‘upgraded terminal’ by pretending to be a bank’s or relevant 
third party’s maintenance service officers.
525
  
In recent years, merchants and acquirers/processors have become a point of compromise 
for hundreds of millions of payment card accounts.
526
 According to Javelin Strategy and 
Research, counterfeit payment cards have become one of the fastest growing card 
frauds. Fraudsters are breaking into payment card information from insecure and 
compromised merchant terminals (hacking into terminals at hotels, restaurants, petrol 
stations and other merchants, and obtaining consumer data).
527
  
Merchants often become the perfect place to commit a crime such as accessing 
computer networks, altering transaction details,
528
 and skimming or intercepting 
payment card details from EFTPOS terminals.529 EFTPOS terminals are frequently 
abused in this manner, with or without the involvement of the merchant owner. In 
general, cardholders also do not realise when their cards are being attacked.
530
 
In order to obtain consumer payment card information, fraudsters can install fake 
equipment to steal card information from the entry process. For instance, fraudsters can 
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replace the PIN pad and terminal with devices that will display, print and/or record the 
entered values.
531
 An example of this EFTPOS device-tampering scheme befell 
Michaels Stores Inc in Chicago (United States).
532
 In this fraud incident, the fraudsters 
replaced legitimate EFTPOS PIN pads with ones that had been tampered with. The 
breach affected 90 Michaels stores in 20 states, stretching from Rhode Island to 
Washington, and opened the debate about which party should be liable for the fraud 
loss.
533
 As a precautionary measure, Michaels have removed some 7,200 PIN pads from 
most of its 964 US stores.
534
 
Another interesting example, still in the United States, was an EFTPOS skimming 
attack on Save Mart, the Modesto (California) based grocery chain. Save Mart admitted 
that the skimming attacks that targeted the self-service checkout terminals at 24 Save 
Mart and Lucky Supermarkets in the San Francisco Bay area were believed to have 
exposed hundreds of consumer accounts to debit and credit card fraud. For security 
purposes, Save Mart has replaced or inspected all of its 2,557 EFTPOS terminals, which 
include self-checkout and staffed checkout lanes.
535
 
However, unlike the Michaels EFTPOS breaches, which were detected by card issuer 
neural networks systems, the Save Mart breach was uncovered during a routine 
maintenance check.
536
 This demonstrates the important fact that only trained 
maintenance officers are able to distinguish a ‘good’ EFTPOS terminal from one that 
has been tampered with. Neither staff nor consumers could do so; the terminals were 
indistinguishable. Hence, it can be assumed that even the most vigilant consumers will 
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not be able to notice the possibility of fraud, since the passive skimming attack at 
EFTPOS terminals will not compromise the smooth operation of EFTPOS transactions.  
Interestingly, even for countries that have already migrated to EMV chip and a PIN 
standard, this does not mean that the EFTPOS terminals will be free from fraud. Using 
PIN pad swap or POS swipe schemes, fraudsters can disable the part of the EFTPOS 
terminals that read the chip on consumer cards, so the consumer is then forced to swipe 
the magnetic stripe into the EFTPOS terminal to make a transaction. This is where the 
consumer’s card data is then stolen by the tampered with EFTPOS terminal.
537
 In some 
cases, magnetic stripe data is transmitted wirelessly to criminals who are waiting 
nearby.
538
 
In ATM/debit card fraud, a merchant owner can independently operate as a point of 
compromise, or conspire with criminal organisations to orchestrate a fraud attack. If 
they operate independently, merchants can mount ‘waiter attacks’ in face-to-face 
transactions or abuse consumer magnetic stripe data during merchant transactions.
539
 
Mobile handheld skimmers can be hidden inside a waiter’s pocket, or mounted 
underneath a cashier’s desk.
540
 This fraud method is also called ‘wedge skimming’.
541
 If 
colluding with strong criminal organisations, merchants can facilitate attacks using fake 
or modified EFTPOS terminals and tapping both cardholder magnetic stripe card data 
and PIN.
542
  
There are also many occasions where a merchant’s cashiers are involved in the 
fraudulent skimming process. Generally, cashiers (who get paid for working with the 
skimmers) first swipe the consumer’s card into the EFTPOS terminal, and while the 
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consumer is distracted and not paying attention to the cashier or their card, the cashier 
swipes the card for a second time but on the fraudsters’ skimmer.
543
 The cashier also 
registers the consumer’s PIN, for example by asking the consumers to repeat the entry 
on the skimming device.
544
 Another method is simply one where cashiers just observe 
the consumer entering their PIN at the PIN pad (‘shoulder surfing’).  
2. Card ‘Double Swiping’: Merchant’s Cash Register/Computer Abuse 
In Indonesia, most EFTPOS terminals do not have a PIN pad shield. Instead of being 
mounted on the bar and facing the consumer’s side in front of cashier’s desk, EFTPOS 
terminals generally are lying on the counter and the persons who swipe the card into the 
EFTPOS terminal are the cashiers themselves instead of the consumers. Even worse, 
sometimes an EFTPOS terminal is located under the cashier’s table, hence, out of sight 
of consumers. These practices are very different to those of other countries such as 
Australia.
545
 
The practices in Indonesia (as mentioned above) are particularly vulnerable to fraud 
committed by merchant cashiers. By holding the consumer’s card for some time, rogue 
employees can use a covert and mini hand-held skimmer hidden behind the counter to 
steal the consumer’s card data (‘wedge skimming’). The unshielded PIN pad and the 
positioning of the EFTPOS terminal on the counter make it easy for a rogue employee 
or cashier to steal customer PINs by shoulder surfing. This unfortunate situation is also 
exacerbated by consumers’ behaviour as they often do not even attempt to cover the 
PIN pad when they enter their PIN.
546
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 See Bobol Data ATM, Dua Kasir Mall Ditangkap [ATM Data Theft, Two Mall Cashiers Busted] (24 
November 2011) Beritadewata.com 
<http://beritadewata.com/Hukum_dan_Kriminal/Kriminal/Bobol_Data_ATM,_Dua_Kasir_Mall_Ditangk
ap.html>. 
544
 Barwise and Bachfeld, above n 377. See also Albrecht et al, above n 368, 5356;  
545
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swipe or insert their payment card into the merchant’s EFTPOS terminal to enable a payment transaction 
to occur. Most of the EFTPOS terminals are equipped with a PIN pad shield and mounted on a stick or 
pole facing the consumers almost vertically, making it nigh impossible for the cashier to ‘shoulder surf’ to 
obtain the consumer’s PIN. Double swiping the consumer’s card into a cash register computer is not 
common in these countries. From the information security viewpoint, these practices are highly regarded 
because they can reduce the likelihood of the occurrence of waiter or cashier attack using a hand-held 
skimmer (because card has never left consumer’s hand in the Australian scenario above), and of PIN theft 
using the shoulder surfing method or a pinhole camera (due to the orientation and protection of the key 
pad from the cashier’s line of sight). 
546
 See Smart Card Alliance, ‘Fraud in the US Payments Industry’, above n 297, 14. 
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To further complicate matters, after swiping a consumer’s card in the merchant’s 
EFTPOS terminal, most merchant cashiers in Indonesia ‘double-swipe’ the payment 
card into merchant’s card reader in their cash register computer.
 547
 One of the reasons 
for this insecure but ‘legitimate’ practice is to speed up reconciliation between payment 
transaction data in EFTPOS and the merchant record in their cash register system.
548
  
From the information security perspective, swiping consumer cards into merchant cash 
register computers is very dangerous.
549
 Consumer debit card data stored in the 
merchant computer is vulnerable to data breach, especially due to internal fraud. Devos 
and Pipan note that in relation to administration, fund transfer information and further 
reference, most of the parties involved in the payment card system keep track of and 
store the cardholder transaction data. Indeed, according to them, ‘this data is vulnerable 
and if stolen the data can be used to conduct fraudulent transactions or to produce fake 
cards’.
550
 There have been cases in big cafes in Bali where clerks or cashiers, using a 
mobile phone camera ‘snap’ an image of the consumer’s card data as it appeared on the 
cash register’s monitor when the card was swiped at the merchant’s cash register 
computer.
551
  
Based on an interview with Sabu (Halo BCA Division Head, Bank Central Asia, who 
was also involved in the investigation and apprehension of fraudsters), one manner in 
which fraudsters capture consumer ATM/debit card information from a merchant’s cash 
register monitor is as follows: when a consumer’s card is swiped in a merchant’s cash 
register computer, the magnetic stripe information (in all tracks) that appear in cash 
                                                          
547
 ‘Double swiping’ here does not refer to the conduct of merchant cashiers that swipe consumers 
payment card twice in the EFTPOS machine for one transaction. Instead, ‘double’ in this sub-section 
refers to the common practice in almost all merchants in Indonesia where merchant cashiers after dipping 
or swiping a consumer’s card in the EFTPOS machine to enable payment transactions, also then swipe it 
again to the merchant’s cash registers to deliberately capture consumers’ payment card magnetic stripe 
data for merchant reconciliation purposes 
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Safeguard Credit Card Transactions in Indonesia] (24 May 2013) Okezone.com 
<http://economy.okezone.com/read/2013/04/03/457/785755/visa-siap-amankan-transaksi-kartu-kredit-di-
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BANKINFOSECURITY: SEC_RITY is not complete without ‘U’ 
<http://bankinfosecurity.wordpress.com/2012/06/23/wasapadai-data-skimming-pada-cash-register/>. 
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Involved in ATM Fraudster's Network] (24 September 2011) detiknews 
<http://news.detik.com/read/2011/11/24/172907/1775045/10/kasir-mall-di-bali-terlibat-jaringan-
pembobol-atm>; Empat Pembobol ATM Diadili [Four ATM Thieves Prosecuted] (27 Agustus 2012) 
Natanews: Dimensi Baru Informasi <http://www.natanews.com/521/empat-pembobol-atm-diadili/>. 
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register monitor are captured by a fraudster cashier using a mobile phone camera. The 
consumer’s PIN is obtained by the corrupt cashier ‘shoulder surfing’ and memorising 
the number entered when the consumer enters their PIN in the EDC PIN pad located at 
the cashier’s desk. Later, fraudsters use this data to create a counterfeit card and 
withdraw consumer’s money from ATMs.
552
 
A more sophisticated and massive payment card fraud involving a merchant’s cash 
register has more recently occurred in Indonesia. In early March 2013, payment card 
data theft (identity theft) occurred at several Body Shop merchants in Jakarta and 
Padang (Indonesia) and compromised hundreds of bank consumers’ payment cards 
(such as credit cards and debit cards) from Mandiri Bank and BCA. Most probably, this 
breach happened because Body Shop merchants implemented the common practice of 
‘double swiping’ for payment card transactions — one swipe to the EFTPOS machine, 
and another swipe to the merchant’s cash register.
553
  
According to the Indonesian Credit Card Association, around 200 payment cards were 
counterfeited and more than 10,000 cards blocked and replaced by the affected banks 
due to this breach.
554
 The subsequent identity fraud in the form of unauthorised 
transactions occurred in foreign countries such as the United States, Mexico, the 
Philippines, Turkey and Malaysia.
555
 Again, this shows that international actors were 
also involved in the Indonesian Body Shop case.  
However, it is believed that fraud like the Body Shop case has not only happened 
recently. Many fraud incidents have been left unsettled, or settled privately between the 
parties involved, where the incident was never reported to the authorities or in the 
media. 
Long before the Body Shop case occurred, in 2007, the author raised this concern 
informally with several high ranking officers at Bank Indonesia and at the author’s 
issuing bank (which is also an acquiring bank), and via one fraud discussion group 
                                                          
552
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Privacy Regulation is Urgent]', Koran Tempo 5 April 2013, B2.  
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mailing list.
556
 However, no attention was paid to this by either the regulator or the 
bank. Specific reasons for this inaction came from the bank when the author inquired: 
firstly, the bank needed merchants for their business; and secondly, to some extent, the 
merchants (especially big merchants) have more bargaining power than the bank in 
determining the terms and conditions of their relationship.  
Even though double swipe to the merchant’s cash register has occurred for quite some 
time in Indonesia, so far there has been no regulation by the payment system authority 
in Indonesia to ban merchants from double swiping consumer cards in their cash 
register computers. The Body Shop case was ‘a blessing in disguise’ because it opened 
the eyes of many policy makers in the Indonesian payment industry to the need to 
eliminate the ‘clear and present danger’ of double swiping practices.  
The Indonesian Credit Card Association (AKKI) has proposed that Bank Indonesia as 
the payment system regulator should enact regulation in regard to the practice.
557
 
Although the legal relationship between the store and the acquirer bank is created in the 
merchant agreement, there is no clause in the agreement that prohibits this practice. In 
general, even the bank does not perform an audit of the store’s computer system nor are 
there any requirements regarding the merchant’s treatment of bank consumers’ data, 
leaving the consumers’ data and their funds in jeopardy. 
However, following the Body Shop case, Bank Indonesia as Indonesia’s payment 
system authority, sent a letter on 8 April 2013 to all credit card and ATM/debit card 
issuers and acquirers entitled ‘Security Enhancement on Credit Card/Debit Card 
Transactions’. The thrust of the letter was to urge banks and other financial institutions 
to improve their supervision of merchants by forbidding them to practise double 
swiping. Merchants who infringe such a ruling would be put on a black list of 
merchants.
558
  
                                                          
556
 See evidence of the author’s concern regarding ‘double swiping’ in email messages that can be 
retrieved from: Iwan Setiawan, Data Fraud Kartu Pembayaran Perbankan [Banking Payment Card Fraud 
Data] (2007) Yahoo!Groups <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/BI-Cyclist/message/235>. 
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<http://economy.okezone.com/read/2013/03/25/457/780892/salahi-aturan-pencurian-data-di-body-shop-
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regulations that have ‘enforcing power’ especially on the bank, in contrast, Bank Indonesia ‘letters’ only 
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Bank Indonesia’s letter was not a regulatory measure. It was meant only to have the 
force of moral persuasion from the payment system authority to the banking industry. 
Therefore, there was to be no legal sanction to be imposed on banks or merchants who 
did not comply with the ruling contained in the letter. Steve Martha, AKKI General 
Manager, was a little sceptical about Bank Indonesia’s letter on double swiping. There 
have also been concerns in the industry, that if the central bank’s ruling is implemented, 
the stores/merchants may be unwilling to accept card payments.
559
 Thus, even though 
there is bank support for Bank Indonesia’s policy on double swiping, in practice both 
banks and merchants are reluctant to adhere to it. This is an example of a trade-off 
between security and business policy, which would ultimately improve the residual risk 
for consumers, who are the weakest party in the payment system link. 
As evidence of the lack of change on the practice of double swiping, the author still sees 
a great deal of double swiping while merchants are conducting card payment 
transactions in Indonesia. One such transaction, which had been successfully recorded 
with the approval of the restaurant cashiers, is depicted below:  
Figure 14: Bank EFTPOS Machine (blue) and                                             
Merchant’s Card Skimmer (in Red Circle) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Merchant Black List is a list of the names of merchants proven not to have abided by bank or Bank 
Indonesia regulation, or involved in fraudulent activity. 
559
 Thertina and T W, above n 554. 
 
126 
 
  
Figure 15: Author Payment Card Tracks 1 and 2 Data 
on Merchant Cashier’s Monitor (inside Red Circle) 
 
From a technical point of view, any person who can obtain consumer payment card data 
(tracks 1 and 2) as shown in the Figure 15 — by writing down the data manually, 
capturing it with mobile phone camera, hacking computer storage, tapping it in the 
communication line, or using other fraudulent methods — can then easily and perfectly 
create counterfeit cards by encoding the data using a card writer encoder onto another 
magnetic stripe card. If the fraudsters also have obtained the consumer PIN, by means 
of shoulder surfing, spy camera, or key logging techniques, they would have the two 
authentication factors required by the system (that is, card data and PIN) to satisfy the 
identification and authentication requirements. In terms of the payment card information 
system, unauthorised transactions conducted by the fraudsters will be deemed valid, 
since it is now difficult for the payment system to distinguish between the data from a 
genuine card and that from a counterfeit card.  
Therefore, in order to create sensible bank payment card practice using ATM/debit card 
and to protect a consumer’s payment card credentials from identity theft, the author 
strongly recommends that Bank Indonesia enact a regulation that urges the merchant’s 
acquirer bank to forbid its merchants conducting double swiping practice. Any 
violation of this regulation by a merchant will cause its acquiring bank to incur severe 
administrative sanctions from Bank Indonesia and/or bear full liability for consumer 
losses due to the double swiping practices. 
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4.2.1.4. ATM/EFTPOS Communication Network as Point of Compromise 
Another venue that provides an opportunity for payment card fraud is skimming data 
from card use that is processed through the telephone or data cables connecting 
financial institutions and large commercial customers or ATM/EFTPOS terminals 
themselves. Payment card data such as credit card and debit card details including PINs 
that flow from merchant EFTPOS terminals to their bank, can be intercepted, copied, 
and sent to the skimmer for downloading onto counterfeit cards.
560
 
Meyer and Matyas have argued that ‘communication links are highly vulnerable to the 
interception of message by a number of techniques which permit passive (listening), 
and/or active (data alteration/substitution) attacks’.
561
 In this regard, Stallings and 
Brown note that ‘a passive attack attempts to learn or make use of information from the 
system but does not affect system resources. An active attack attempts to alter system 
resources or affect their operation.’
562
  
A most prominent example of passive attack is ‘eavesdropping’. Eavesdropping aims to 
obtain information that is being transmitted, and does not entail any modification of the 
data. Hence it is very hard to detect, because the message traffic is sent and received 
without any obstruction, delay and alteration. Every transmission process is done in the 
perfectly normal manner.
563
 In the payment card system, an example of this passive 
attack is the use of a malicious code for bugging or tapping consumers’ ATM/debit card 
data and PINs that are transmitted from consumer activated terminals to the host 
system. 
Wiretapping by ‘bugging’ an ATM or EFTPOS terminal or by tapping or intercepting 
the flow of data via a communication network is very hard to detect as a skimming 
device is planted inside the terminals and the entire skimming process is intangible, 
happening during legitimate transactions and without irregularities in the use of the 
card. Even the most observant consumer as a sender of information will not detect the 
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skimmer in this instance.
564
 Interestingly, most issuer/acquiring banks as a receiver of 
the transmission data are neither equipped with appropriate tools such as anti malware 
software, nor aware of the existence of malware within their system.
565
 
An example of network hacking of EFTPOS systems is ‘war driving’, a hacking method 
that involves remotely scanning for open or vulnerable Internet connections to EFTPOS 
systems. Once a weak system is detected, a hacker hacks internal computers and installs 
key logging software onto the EFTPOS system. Hackers also install Trojans, which 
allow them ongoing access to the system, giving them the ability to install and re-install 
malware over time.
566
 Siciliano argues that remote hacking is not difficult since many 
people such as coders, programmers and criminal hackers have the ‘know-how’ to 
utilise tools to crack a Windows remote desktop and access dedicated ports used for 
remote servicing.
567
  
In regard to this problem, Stallings and Brown contend that prevention in the form of 
data encryption is better than detection in dealing with eavesdropping attacks. 
Nonetheless, it is very unfortunate that ATM/debit card systems do not employ the most 
sophisticated encryption technology, such as is present in electronic money/stored-value 
cards technology.
568
 Mann argues that the maintenance of the status quo in ATM/debit 
card technology is caused by merchant and bank reluctance to upgrade their systems 
due to their consideration of the cost of such an investment. 
569
 
All forms of data communication can be intercepted regardless of whether that 
information is transmitted via communication lines, radio, or microwave.
570
 If fraudsters 
attack information transmitted through fixed lines, they have to place eavesdropping 
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tools (either hardware or software) within the system infrastructure, such as inside an 
ATM computer, EFTPOS terminal or communication line hub.  
However, in recent years, wireless computing has been widely adopted due to its 
flexibility and cost saving efficiency. With satellite or microwave transmission, a 
physical connection is not required.
571
 Unfortunately, a wireless communication 
protocol also has become a target for fraudulent exploitation.
572
 Sensitive data 
communicated via wireless networks can be ‘sniffed’ by hackers with various tools. 
With interception tools and technology that is becoming more common and 
inexpensive, fraudsters can have the same level of access to information by 
eavesdropping on wireless communication without the need to physically tap into the 
communication line.
573
 Gifford further canvasses that wireless communication is 
vulnerable to straightforward attacks, unless system providers equip the communication 
data with appropriate security measures.
574
 
The Heartland Case in the United States is one of several landmark decisions examples 
of how dangerous eavesdropping attacks on consumer payment data can be. This case 
involved identity theft from more than 130 million consumers’ credit and debit card 
records.
575
 In the other case, the TJX case caused US150–200 million in fraud losses, 
and most of that was debited directly from consumers’ bank accounts and in this 
instance the writer of the program used was issued restitution orders for USD171.5 
million.
576
 This case called attention to the importance of security in payment card 
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communication transmissions and to the question of what party or parties should be 
deemed legally responsible for fraud loss.
577
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
<http://www.wired.com/2010/03/tjx-sentencing/> . He had already been fined of USD25,000, forfeited 
over USD2.7 million, surrendered his apartment, car and other items: Grant Gross, Hacker Gonzalez 
Pleads Guilty to 20 Charges, CSO, 11 September 2009  
<http://www.csoonline.com/article/2124329/identity-theft-prevention/hacker-gonzalez-pleads-guilty-to-
20-charges.html> . Neither could fully compensate the losses sustained. The involvement of overseas-
based co-conspirators (Turkey, Russia) further complicated the case as it does in many instances. 
577
 See also Gifford, above n 17, 647; Morse and Raval, above n 44, 544; Richard J Sullivan, 'Risk 
Management and Nonbank Participation in the US Retail Payments System' (2008) 92 Economic Review-
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 5, 13; Schreft, above n 384, 1415; Epstein and Brown, above n 
325, 216–18; Morse and Raval, above n 44, 547. Gifford summarised the processes involved in the TJX 
attack and its ramifications as follows: 
TJDX is a major North American retail chain with more than 3,500 stores. In December 2006, 
TJX disclosed that hackers had gained unauthorised access to its computer system and that 
numerous customer credit and debit card records had been compromised. The full scale of the 
incident then emerged. … [H]ackers had first gained access to TJX’s systems in July 2005, and 
that the intrusions had been going undetected for close on 18 months. During that period, … a 
minimum of 45 million credit and debit card records had been stolen (some estimates put the 
true figure closer to 200 million). The initial attack exploited a weak wireless security protocol 
that was being used to transfer data between hand-held price checking devices, cash registers and 
the company’s main computer system. Sitting in a car park close to a TJX store in St. Paul 
Minnesota and armed with a readily available wireless antenna, the hackers “eavesdropped” on 
wireless transmissions, downloaded them to a laptop and rapidly cracked the weak encryption 
protocol in use.  
Having cracked the encryption protocol, the hackers were then able to eavesdrop on further 
email traffic and gather log on credentials for legitimate users. … [They] used this access to set 
up their own user account on the TJX corporate computing systems in Framlingham, 
Massachusetts and used these to copy files and folders containing customer credit and debit card 
information.  
Their ability to access confidential customer data was also reportedly compound by weak 
firewall rules and a failure by TJX IT staff to properly implement additional security software 
already purchased.  
The hackers then sold the stolen information on the internet. …[T]he stolen credit card and debit 
card details were purchased and used by online fraudsters from around the world, in countries 
including Sweden, Ukraine, Turkey, Australia, Hong Kong and Mexico.  
Within days of the [TJX] disclosure …, a number of lawsuits were filed. These were eventually 
consolidated into two class actions. One was a class action brought by consumers whose cards 
(and in some cases, identities) had been compromised…. The other was a class action brought by 
a number of “issuing banks” who had issued the cards that had been compromised.  
Following the TJX intrusion, numerous fraudulent transactions were committed by fraudsters 
who had acquired the stolen credit and debit card details. The issuing banks (who … had no idea 
that they were fraudulent transactions) paid out on these transactions but were then unable to 
recover the funds in the normal way from their cardholding customers because their customers 
had not made the purchases.  
In addition to … the losses associated with the fraudulent transactions, the issuing banks also 
collectively incurred millions of dollars of administration costs in replacing the compromised 
cards and in providing enhanced security monitoring of the compromised customer accounts. 
…[T]he issuing banks looked for a means to recover these losses. There was little or no realistic 
possibility of targeting the fraudster himself or herself. There were thousands of them, … 
scattered all over the world, … difficult to identify, and even if … traced, were likely to prove 
impecunious. Similarly, the original hackers were never found and, if they had been, it would 
have been highly unlikely that they would have had the financial wherewithal to compensate the 
issuing banks.  
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4.2.1.5. Bank and/or Its Counterpart’s Data Centre Computer as Point of 
Compromise 
While low-skilled criminals busily set physical-type traps (such as skimmers at ATMs) 
or virtual (online) traps for customers who are less cautious and lack information 
regarding fraud, a minority of criminals with a relatively good computer knowledge, 
choose to hack directly into the bank data centres, either within the bank’s computer 
system, or in a bank’s counterpart data processing system and/or its network. Such 
criminal activities are generally not preferred by criminals, as they require specific 
knowledge to overcome the bank’s or its counterpart’s security system. However, if 
they are successful, the data obtained is huge, so it is potentially very profitable. They 
can either use the data directly to perpetrate identity fraud, or sell it on the underground 
market for bank consumer data. 
Sullivan’s study on data breach in the United States revealed that, with the arrival of the 
Internet, the majority of data breaches are perpetrated by outsider fraudsters rather than 
insider fraudsters. Most data breach incidents result from the use of a stolen bank laptop 
or desktop, followed by bank information leaking through Internet, email or by 
hacking.
578
  
One landmark example of data breach by hackers in the US payment card system 
occurred in November 2008, when computer hackers infiltrated RBS Worldpay, a US 
payment-processing subsidiary of the Royal Bank of Scotland, and gained access to data 
on 1.5 million cardholders. The hackers then extracted PIN numbers associated with 
some payment cards, created counterfeit payment cards, and modified computer system 
at RBS Worldpay to increase the available funds on the cards and the limits on the cash 
that could be withdrawn at ATMs. All this information was distributed to a global 
network of confederates. As result, over the course of just 12 hours, the fraudsters went 
on a cash withdrawal spree, obtaining USD9 million from 2100 ATMs in some 280 
cities.
579
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
For fraud liability issues between financial institution and consumer in U.S., see chapter 5.5.1. of 
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4.2.2. Methods of PIN Theft 
If criminals can obtain skimmed information from the magnetic stripe of a bank 
customer’s card,
580
 they have enough information to access an account. However, if the 
use of the card requires a PIN, they will have to get that number from a different source. 
The actual PIN number is not encoded on the card magnetic stripe since the stripe can 
be easily read with a very cheap device.
581
  
In ATM or debit card transactions at EFTPOS terminals, a PIN is indeed necessary.
582
 
The ATM/debit card system requires cardholders to enter a PIN in order to verify their 
identity. Therefore, after the criminals have successfully retrieved a consumer’s 
magnetic stripe data from their ATM/debit cards, the next step is to get the consumer’s 
PIN.
583
 The PIN is one of the most significant factors required to steal bank consumers’ 
money. Even though probably not exhaustive, listed below are the most common 
methods for consumer PIN theft (related to consumer ATM/debit cards) that have also 
been identified in Indonesia.
584
 
4.2.2.1. PIN Guessing 
Nowadays, payment card systems world-wide have employed a ‘two factor’ 
authentication method. This method of authenticating the validity of the system user is 
based on ‘something you have’, which is ATM/debit card in the consumer’s hand, and 
‘something you know’, which is a PIN that should be remembered by the consumer.
585
 
Consumers with an ATM/debit card basically have to memorise its PIN and are required 
not to record it in a manner that another person could ascertain what it is. The purpose 
of this is so that, if the ATM/debit card is lost or stolen, trapped in an ATM, or 
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skimmed, whoever finds the card would be unable to use the card, because they do not 
know the associated PIN. 
However, passwords or PINs, as a knowledge-based authentication mechanism, depend 
on human memory. With the increasing complexity and quantity of passwords, it is very 
difficult for all users to remember all of their passwords/PINs.
586
 Many people even 
forget their four-digit PIN, particularly if they have numerous cards with diverse 
PINs.
587
 
Hence, some banks consumers inadvertently write the password or PIN down because 
the PIN may be too complex,
588
 or they have many cards so that ‘remembering many 
PINs may prove to be a problem’.
589
 As result, ‘many bank customers feel the need to 
carry the number with them whenever they intend to use their plastic card, thereby 
seriously compromising the security of the PIN’.
590
 Besides consumers’ writing their 
password/PIN down, Zhang et al argue that consumer malpractice regarding PIN also 
relates to their choice of weak rather than strong passwords, and using a common 
password for multiple accounts.
591
  
Concerning consumer choice of PIN, banks tend to give consumers flexibility in 
determining their own PIN. Generally, consumers frequently will choose a number for a 
PIN based on their own birthday or birthday of their closest person (such as their 
spouse), street address, telephone number or another number that is familiar to them.  
While this gives consumers the opportunity not to write their PIN down, its 
disadvantage is that the practice makes it far easier for the PIN to be guessed, especially 
if the card is lost or stolen.
592
 Radu asserts that the probability of ‘cracking’ the PIN is 
higher if ‘the number of digits in the PIN is small, the number of permitted wrong 
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attempts is high, and the number of wrong attempts is not stored from one ATM session 
to another’.
593
 
For a four digit PIN, fraudsters normally only have three guesses to 10,000 
probability.
594
 If the fraudsters have to guess the correct PIN and have three tries as 
normally allowed by an ATM system, they have one in 3,333 possibilities.
595
 However, 
from 3.4 million stolen passwords that have been made public over the years, 
researchers at Data Genetics come out with staggering summary of the actual 
probabilities. According to Data Genetics, the three most popular combinations are 
‘1234’ (10.713 per cent), ‘1111’ (6.016 per cent), and ‘0000’ (1.881 per cent) account 
for nearly to 20 per cent of all four-digit passwords.
596
 
In addition, the research also found that many consumers use a year of birth as their 
PIN. Although the use of this makes a PIN easy to remember, the predictability of the 
consumer’s PIN also increases. For instance, a four digit PIN starting with number 19 is 
quite popular. Month/year combinations were also found to be quite common. 
Therefore, choosing a birthday date or year as a PIN definitely makes the PIN easier to 
guess.
597
  
There is also a possibility that a fraudster guesses an easily memorable way to enter 
PIN, such as entering four numbers in the single column from top to bottom on the 
ATM keypad (for example, number 2580).
598
 Apparently, fraudsters noticed that some 
consumers do not want the worry of memorising a complex PIN entry and prefer to use 
one row of the series of ATM PIN pad numbers.  
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Figure 16: ATM PIN Pad 
  
From a criminal’s perspective, since both of these authentication components are in the 
consumer’s hands’ (the card inside the wallet/bag and written PINs somewhere inside 
the wallet, and sometimes a driver’s licence with the cardholder’s date of birth on it),
599
 
naturally that consumer might become the first listed by fraudsters as a target. It is well 
known that one of the weakest links in the payment system infrastructure is the people 
themselves.
 600
 
If a cardholder payment card along with its PIN information falls into the hands of 
fraudsters before the cardholder notices or has the chance to inform the issuing bank to 
block further transactions, most probably it will be the cause of unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions. With genuine payment card and information in the hands 
of fraudsters, they will easily withdraw money from any ATM or conduct transactions 
in any shops, both in the brick-mortar-world or on the Internet.
601
 
4.2.2.2. Shoulder Surfing 
Shoulder surfing is the criminal act of stealing a consumer PIN by the perpetrators 
positioning themselves in close but not direct proximity to the ATM (so they are 
looking over the consumer’s shoulder) to covertly observe what number a consumer 
taps into the keypad when entering the PIN.
602
 However, someone using binoculars or a 
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telephoto lens can also observe the cardholder entering a PIN on the keypad from a 
distance.
603
 
In practice, shoulder surfing is not the only way to steal a consumer’s PIN. Being next 
to or at the consumer’s side to observe the entry of the PIN (such as commonly happens 
in the ATM card-trapping method) or observing the consumer entering their PIN from 
the opposite direction (such as typically happens at EFTPOS terminals in merchant 
transactions) has also proved to be quite effective.  
Nowadays, it is easier for a fraudster merchant’s cashier to observe consumers entering 
their PINs, since PINs are used more regularly, often in overcrowded stores. From one 
experiment in a merchant-like environment regarding ‘whether PIN-entry spying is 
easier than signature falsification’, Matyas et al concluded that ‘the risk of PIN 
compromise is high’, especially in the case of merchants that do not have EFTPOS 
terminals with PIN pad security shields.
604
 
In Indonesia, based on observations at several merchants in various cities, most 
EFTPOS terminals do not have PIN pad security shields. All EFTPOS machines are 
located at the cashiers’ desks, which makes observation of consumer PIN entry very 
easy. In some cases, there were EFTPOS terminals that were even located underneath 
the cashier’s desk, hidden from the sight of consumers. The author himself even had an 
experience where a cashier at a major hospital in Jakarta had to take the card to be 
swiped to an EFTPOS machine located in a different room that was out of sight of the 
card owner. At the moment (up until early 2016), there are no regulations in Indonesia 
that regulate EFTPOS machine use at merchants (positioning and so on). 
4.2.2.3. PIN Pad Overlay 
A PIN pad is a small handheld device, the purpose of which is to allow the cardholder 
to enter a PIN secretly on consumer-activated terminals without having to reveal that 
PIN to the shop cashier or to anyone else. A fake PIN pad overlay is a fake keyboard 
that looks exactly like the ATM PIN pad and is placed on top of the genuine ATM 
keyboard. It allows the cardholder to enter the PIN normally to activate the transaction, 
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but simultaneously captures the consumer’s PIN.
605
 The consumers’ keystrokes ‘are 
logged before being passed onto the actual keypad’.
606
 
The fake overlay has memory to store any PIN data that has been captured. The fake 
overlay is then removed and the captured PIN data is downloaded.
607
 Diaz contends that 
unless an expert, the ordinary bank consumer will never notice this fraud method; it is a 
situation that persists in Indonesia among uninformed consumers who are largely 
unaware of the existence of this method in the country (such presence being attested to 
by some interviewees).
608
 However, from the author’s observations of banking security 
practice and consumer education materials, this method has never revealed to bank 
consumers and so it difficult for consumers to know to increase their vigilance in this 
regard at ATMs.  
Diebold, in its white paper further described the use of a thin fake PIN pad overlay that 
was even more difficult to detect.609  
Figure 17: PIN-Pad Overlay 
  
Source: Brian Krebs
610
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4.2.2.4. Pinhole Camera 
The fraudster typically places a covert video camera (also called a pinhole camera) in 
‘hard to detect locations’ in order to capture cardholder PIN numbers.
611
 To get a clear 
view of the keypad and record all of the ATM PIN entry, a camera is secretly positioned 
near the ATM.
612
 The camera can be positioned directly above the keypad, but 
sometimes also to the side — such as on the wall inside a pamphlet box. There is also a 
case in Indonesia where an ATM maintenance officer interviewee reported having 
detected a pinhole camera positioned underneath the PIN pad cover case in an ATM 
booth and pointed directly at the PIN pad area.
613
 The date entry video of consumer 
PINs is then stored.
614
 Apparently, this is the most popular method for fraudsters to steal 
consumers PIN and used in conjunction with magnetic stripe skimming.  
Figure 18: Hidden Camera in False Panel above PIN Pad 
 
Source: Krebs
615
 
Figure 19: Pinhole Camera in Brochure Holder 
 
Source: Mike Barwise and Daniel Bachfeld
616
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Most customers usually do not cover the PIN pad sufficiently to completely obscure it 
from a camera.
617
 Hence, banks often encourage consumers to cover the keypad with 
their hand when performing a PIN entry. However, even though consumers probably 
sufficiently cover the PIN pad to avoid monitoring from a pinhole camera (if one is in 
place), this effort will be meaningless if the fraudsters actually use a fake PIN pad 
overlay or have installed malware, or are tapping the communication line to obtain 
consumer PINs. 
4.2.2.5. PIN Interception/‘Cracking’ 
In ATM/debit card transactions, a PIN is the only consumer authentication method. PIN 
acquisition by fraudsters is probably the most important and difficult process in the 
identity theft, even when compared to acquisition of consumer magnetic stripe data.
618
 
Banking and security researchers have noticed for years that fraudsters are successfully 
attacking financial PIN processing application program interfaces (APIs) to obtain 
consumer PINs.
619
 Banks generally secure consumer PINs by utilising a tamper resistant 
‘Hardware Security Module’ (HSM). When consumers enter a PIN at consumer 
activated terminals, the PIN along with magnetic stripe data are sent to the verification 
facility (the issuing bank or other authorised entities) for verification.
620
  
Hence, the PIN can be captured either inside the consumer activated terminals, or when 
the PIN is transmitted to the bank’s host computer for PIN authentication. In the 
research undertaken by Berkman and Ostrovsky, they argue that both a fraudster bank 
insider or insider of a third party switching provider could use the HSM to reveal the 
encrypted PIN codes and exploit them to make fraudulent transactions.
621
  
To give more understanding about ‘PIN cracking’, Manan and Oorschot describe the 
point where flaws are often found in widely deployed security APIs in ATMs: 
PIN transfers in banking networks rely on symmetric key cryptography where the third-
party controlled intermediate switches also possess shared keys to decrypt encrypted 
PINs (but have no access to issuer/verification keys). Although decrypted PINs (and the 
decryption key itself) are not (ideally) accessible from outside of an HSM, API flaws 
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allow attackers to realistically extract enough information from the HSM (through 
legitimate API calls) to enable PIN cracking attacks.
622
  
Fraudsters have employed many cracking techniques to reveal consumer PINs. For 
instance, Bond and Zielinski have claimed that by using adaptive decimalisation tables 
and guesses, a 30-minute attack on an HSM can discover approximately 7000 PINs 
(rather than 24 with the ‘brute force’ method).
623
 In another instance, Berkman and 
Ostrovsky have noted that an attack on the financial PIN processing API can reveal up 
to 18 million PINs in an hour. They even believed that the attack they described 
probably is the cause of many phantom withdrawals in payment card fraud.
624
  
The flawlessness of PIN entry devices in the EFTPOS terminals is also highlighted by 
Drimer, Murdoch and Anderson, researchers from the University of Cambridge. 
According to them, merchants and corrupt employees, or even consumers that have 
access to EFTPOS terminals, can tamper with them, even if the EFTPOS terminals are 
tamper resistant ones (that is, they have anti-tampering mechanisms).
625
 Further they 
assert that in order to get consumer data from anti-tampering chip ready EFTPOS 
terminals, the fraudster taps the data line of the pin entry device (PED), the smart card 
interface that is not encrypted.
626
 
4.2.3. Identity Fraud: Counterfeit Card Fraud  
Most instances of ATM/debit skimming or other types of data theft (such as using 
malware, cracking, eavesdropping method and so on) will conclude with the production 
of counterfeit ATM/debit cards to perform unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions, 
through either ATM withdrawals or ATM funds transfers, or a combination of both. 
Nowadays, it is relatively cheap to produce a payment card with a magnetic stripe.
627
 
Criminals that have successfully skimmed ATM/debit card information can then 
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perfectly write this information or download it onto a counterfeit or cloned card.
628
 In 
essence, counterfeit card fraud occurs when ‘a fake card is created by fraudsters using 
compromised details from the magnetic stripe of a genuine card’ and is presented to 
obtain funds or purchase goods or services.
629
 Consumer counterfeit cards, along with 
the consumer PIN, can be used at any ATM/EFTPOS as if it is genuine card (as it is an 
exact copy of the original).
630
  
This counterfeit card can be any form of media that has a magnetic stripe on it, either 
new (such as a blank white plastic card)
631
 or used (such as an ATM/debit/credit card or 
re-encoded expired cards),
632
 a store loyalty card, hotel access door card, library card, a 
security card, a parking ticket and the like.
633
  
If the skimmed data is written into the magnetic stripe on a used card using card writer, 
it will overwrite the old information in the magnetic stripe. Unless a bank’s system adds 
a dynamic element to the transaction record so that every transaction is unique,
634
 a 
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bank’s system can not distinguish whether the transactions are coming from the cloned 
card or the genuine one (as the cloned card is an exact replica of the original).
635
 
However, if the skimmed data is written onto a counterfeit card in a form other than 
bank’s card, it is unlikely to be able to be used to purchase goods ‘over the counter’.
636
 
Nonetheless, this counterfeit card can be used safely to perform unauthorised ATM 
transactions, such as cash withdrawals or funds transfers, since the fraudster will be 
alone inside the ATM booth and most of the ATM cameras are not actively monitored 
(or may not even have been activated). In the interviews with officers of various banks, 
it was revealed that CCTV was not installed in every ATM for the sake of ‘efficiency’ 
as there is no regulation obligating banks to install CCTV at or in ATMs.
637
 It is also 
possible to use the skimmed information (especially from a debit card) to procure goods 
over the phone or on the Internet without the need for a counterfeit card or for creating 
‘any physical record of the skimmed data’.
638
 However, the latter fraud will not be 
discussed since it is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
  
Counterfeit ATM/debit cards are one of the most prominent card-based frauds 
worldwide. It is generally achieved through a technical process called ‘skimming’.
639
 A 
skimming attack is the fraudster’s favourite violation in ATM transactions.
640
  
Meyer and Matyas have argued that counterfeit cards are one of the fraudulent activities 
that should be given special attention because of their broad presence of cards across the 
country (providing the opportunity for mass fraud). Further, they assert that if the 
national EFT system were to be flooded with thousands of counterfeit cards, it would 
not only cause monetary loss for thousands of unsuspecting bank consumers,
641
 but also 
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have the potential to trigger outright fraudulent claims of fraud,
642
 first party fraud, and 
the most serious risk, namely ‘the loss of customer good will, and customer confidence 
in the EFT system’.
643
 
Counterfeit card fraud attracts many perpetrators, even though it requires more 
resources than CNP fraud. One of the reasons is because such cards can be used for 
transactions such as cash withdrawals at ATMs or purchasing goods at all locations 
globally that accept the relevant payment card.
644
 Other than that, as many ATMs and/or 
EFTPOS terminals are unattended and located outside of the bank’s perimeter, the 
opportunities for and incentives to perpetrate card fraud are also high, with little risk of 
being caught by law enforcement entities.  
The latest ATM scam related to counterfeit ATM/debit card that leaves consumers 
vulnerable is what has been termed a ‘flash attack’. Using this method, fraudsters 
withdraw money using hundreds of cloned cards at ATMs across a wide region within a 
very short period of time. The amounts withdrawn are usually within a range that would 
not immediately ‘raise a red flag’. This type of fraud deliberately targets ATM/debit 
cards, which have less sophisticated fraud detection systems in place than credit 
cards.
645
  
4.3. Identity Theft and Fraud Figures, Challenges, and the Dearth of 
Fraud Reports in ATM/Debit Card Transactions in Indonesia 
4.3.1. ATM/Debit Card Fraud Figures (Unpublished)  
In Indonesia, the advances and exponential growth in information, communication and 
technological infrastructure have enabled the banking industry to provide modern 
payment systems to its consumers, including payment card system services. However, 
similar to what is happening in other jurisdictions, the greater financial system 
dependence on information technology, such as through the pervasive use of ATM/debit 
card in e-commerce and banking transactions, has been shown to increase the risks 
associated with payment card transactions.  
                                                          
642
 Card holders who claim fraud because of transactions they have honestly forgotten. See Meyer and 
Matyas, above n 72, 4456.  
643
 Ibid. 
644
 Oracle Corporation, above n 398, 35. See also Hendry, above n 203, 379. 
645
  Jeremy Kirk, Fraudsters Find Holes in Debit Card Fraud Detection (2010) Computerworld 
<http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9193378/Fraudsters_find_holes_in_debit_card_fraud_detectio
n?taxonomyId=17&pageNumber=1>. See also Siciliano, above n 455. 
 
144 
 
  
Concerns about e-banking or e-commerce transaction trustworthiness indeed exist in 
Indonesia. In their assessment of Information and Communication Technologies in 
Indonesia, Owen et al concluded that there is a widespread lack of trust and confidence 
in the security, integrity, reliability, and enforceability of electronic transactions.
646
 The 
biggest concern for bank depositors is whether their funds will be lost through 
unauthorised transactions, which utilise electronic banking system weaknesses.  
Banks are most vulnerable to and apparent targets of several methods of fraud. Despite 
each individual transaction being of relatively small value, the total number (and thus 
value) of unauthorised transactions that steal consumers funds from banks are believed 
to be very high. This can be seen from Bank Indonesia’s consumer complaint records 
concerning ATM/debit card fraud, which has increased quite significantly. In 2012, 
consumer complaints regarding ATM/debit card transactions numbered 24,400 
complaints, an increase 28.42% compared to the previous year’s complaint volume.
647
  
Apart from this report, the number of consumer complaints about unauthorised 
ATM/debit transactions appearing in various mass media (both paper-based or on-line) 
are relatively high and sufficient to draw attention to the problem. Consumer complaints 
were not only about pervasive fraud in ATM/debit operations, but also highlighted the 
failure of bankconsumer dispute resolution processes within the banking industry. 
Most of the complaints were about the occurrence of payment card fraud and the 
objections of the banks to redressing consumer losses.
648
  
In Indonesia, all payment card institutions have an obligation to report fraud in their 
payment card system to Bank Indonesia on monthly basis. The importance of accurate 
statistical data is recognising by Bank Indonesia.
649
 Bank Indonesia’s policy on how 
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2008) 96. According to them, providing accurate statistical data of e-payment industry and ensuring that 
operators comply with Bank Indonesia regulation, including the customer protection principle, is ‘of great 
importance’: at 96. Accurate statistical data will help the regulator in making the right policies in 
developing a healthy e-payment industry. Operators’ compliance with regulation, especially to consumer 
protection principles, is of a great importance since public trust is one of the main factors to develop the 
industry’: id. 
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banks should treat payment card reports is very clear. Bank Indonesia has urged that 
every report, all information and/or data submitted by the principal, issuer, acquirer, and 
other institutions to Bank Indonesia, must be submitted in full, and be correct and 
accurate.
650
 Nevertheless, comprehensive, easy to access, correct and accurate fraud 
data on e-banking transaction in Indonesia is still not available to the public.  
Data obtained from an unpublished report from the Electronic Data Warehouse in Bank 
Indonesia reveal that there is an increasing volume and value of an ATM/debit card 
fraud in Indonesia, as is shown below: 
Table 1: Type of ATM/Debit Card Fraud and Data 
 
Type of Fraud 
                           Bank’s ATM/Debit Card Fraud Data 
                      2011                       2012  
      Volume       Value*       Volume       Value* 
 
Counterfeit Card 
 
96 
 
945.15 
 
101 
 
1,139.92 
Lost/Stolen Card 10,059 225.14 10,498 234.17 
Damage Card 377 42.97 381 42.45 
Card Not Received 2 0 2 1.98 
Application Fraud 0 0 0 0 
Card Not Present 
Transaction 
0 0 0 0 
Miscellaneous 951 0.60 443 0.20 
                           Total: 11,485 1,213.86 11,425 1,418.72 
*Value in million Indonesian Rupiah. 
Sources: Bank Fraud Monthly Report  Electronic Data Warehouse (unpublished) 
The increasing incidence of fraud has also been identified by the central bank. The 
magnitude of the problem can be gauged from the number of incidents of fraud that 
have come to light in the recent past. The escalating number and volume of transactions 
has been matched by a significant rise in card-based payment instrument crimes.
651
 The 
fact that such incidents are not only increasing in number but also are more varied in 
terms of fraud methods has forced Bank Indonesia (as the central bank of the Republic 
of Indonesia) to enact more detailed Bank Indonesia regulations concerning the security 
aspect and reliability of the system.
652
 
                                                          
650
 BIR-CBPI art 34. 
651
 See ‘General Review’ in the elucidation of Peraturan Bank Indonesia Nomor 6/30/PBI/2004 Tentang 
Penyelenggaraan Kegiatan Alat Pembayaran Dengan Menggunakan kartu [Bank Indonesia Regulation 
Number 6/30/2004 Concerning Operation of Card-Based Payment Instrument Activities]. 
652
 See the consideration section of Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 14/2/PBI/2012 Concerning 
Amendment of Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 11/11/PBI/2009 Concerning Operation of Card-
Based Payment Instrument Activities] (‘BIR-CBPI’). 
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4.3.2. ATM/Debit Card Identity Theft/Fraud Methods in Indonesia 
Apart from those fraud reports, the sporadic incidents of fraud in the ATM/debit card 
industry in Indonesia has long been acknowledged and reported to the central bank on a 
case-by-case basis.
653
 These incidents mostly were never revealed to the public. Hence 
the public and payment system authority always have difficulty in gauging the real level 
of payment system risk exposure, either on a national basis or for a specific bank. 
The rash of ATM/debit card skimming that occurred across several cities at the end of 
2010 in Indonesia (and widely covered by national mass media) was a revelation as to 
the pervasiveness and serious impact of identity theft that had facilitated fraud to be 
perpetrated across the payment system industry in Indonesia. To overcome the problem, 
Bank Indonesia as payment system authority in Indonesia, has a clear policy that urges 
banks to tighten their ATM security. Bank Indonesia has enacted several regulations to 
improve bank security systems. It has instructed banks to take several actions to reduce 
ATM and debit card fraud. These include forming a task force to exchange information 
about fraud and find the way to circumvent it. Bank Indonesia also encourages banks to 
increase surveillance in public access terminal more frequently, install anti-skimmer 
devices, add ATM pin-pad shield and continue to roll out consumer education 
programme about the importance of keeping ATM/debit card PINs secret. 654 
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 Indonesia, ATM skimmer fraud has long been acknowledged. In 2003, John Petrus, an Indonesian 
citizen, and Eng Kim Hook, a Malaysian citizen, both ATM fraudsters, were convicted of a criminal 
offence by Jakarta District Court and sentenced to imprisonment of six and three years respectively 
(verdict No. 532/PID.B/2003/PH.JKT.PST dated 4 June 2003 and No. 427/PID.B/2003/PN.JKT.PST 
dated 12 June 2003). Both fraudsters were prosecuted according to articles 263(2) (forgery in writings), 
65(1) (conjunction) or 362 (theft) and 65(1) of Indonesia’s Penal Code (KUHP).  
654
 Financial System Stability Bureau Directorate of Banking Research and Regulation, 'Financial 
Stability Review No. 14, March 2010' (Bank Indonesia, 2010) 
<http://www.bi.go.id/NR/rdonlyres/9379845A-3B22-488D-A5BA-
6D08321BAD03/20251/FSR14March2010.pdf>, 57. In this report, Bank Indonesia’s policy to reduce 
fraud in ATM/debit card transactions can be seen from Box 3.2: ATM and Debit Card Fraud, as follows:  
Realizing the importance of security in the card based payment industry, Bank Indonesia has 
introduced a number of acquirer and principal requirements in order to improve security 
technology, manage operational risk and regulate reporting. These aspects are legislated by Bank 
Indonesia Regulation No. 11/ 11/PBI/2009 and Bank Indonesia Circular No.11/10/ DASP dated 13 
April 2009 regarding Card Based Payment Instruments. 
At the outset of 2010 Bank Indonesia implemented a number of measures to help prevent the 
spread of fraudulent ATM and ATM/Debit card activity including, among others, forming a task 
force made up of banks that had been affected by skimming cases as well as switching companies. 
The task force is mandated with facilitating the banking industry in terms of simplifying the 
identification and introduction of preventative measures against fraudulent activities. In addition, a 
technical forum will be established involving the Police Department, Bank Indonesia and other 
related parties. The technical forum will facilitate an exchange of information pertaining to 
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While the 2010 ATM skimming cited above employed a ‘conventional identity 
theft/fraud method, in contrast,’ the Body Shop fraud of 2013 (also widely covered by 
the media) employed one of the most sophisticated and advanced identity theft methods, 
that is, malicious software (malware). Before the Body Shop fraud, none of the bank 
management staff in Indonesia who became the author’s respondents had been aware of 
the possibility of malware attack either in ATMs or EFTPOS machines. Many of the 
bank officers did not even know that their payment card system could actually be 
compromised by malware.
655
 Hence, it is not surprising that banks’ payment card 
systems were vulnerable to malware attack, since none of them had installed anti-
malware programs in their payment card system, including on ATMs and EFTPOS 
terminals. Therefore, similar to the 2010 skimming deluge fraud in Indonesia, the Body 
Shop fraud could also be considered ‘a key opener’ for (an indicator of) the fact that 
‘high technology’ fraud was already in existence in Indonesia. The Body Shop fraud in 
the payment card industry in Indonesia that employed malware as its mode of operation 
has opened the possibility that many unrevealed ‘phantom withdrawals’ in the 
ATM/debit card transactions may actually have been caused by malware that had been 
implanted by fraudsters in the ATM/debit card or EFTPOS systems. 
Whilst lacking reliable fraud data, it appears that the most prominent ATM/debit card 
fraud methods based on its frequency of occurrence in the mass media and occasional 
fraud incident reported to Bank Indonesia are ATM/debit card skimming in 
ATMs/EFTPOS machines and card trapping in ATMs.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
criminal activity, counterfeiting and non-cash payment system related crime, to expedite the 
treatment and prosecution of criminal activity. 
Bank Indonesia has appealed to banks to continually improve their physical surveillance of ATM 
machines, in particular those that are located outside branch offices, to ensure that no suspicious 
equipment is installed as well as monitor unusual transactions. Furthermore, Bank Indonesia has 
also reminded banks to apply risk mitigation measures against fraudulent activity including 
formulating an adequate Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), settling transactions according to 
the SOP, as well as monitoring and applying prudential principles when evaluating and accepting 
new merchants. Meanwhile, preventive, anti-fraud measures that can be introduced by banks 
include installing anti-skimmers, CCTV cameras and PIN covers, as well as monitoring the 
security and cleanliness of their ATM machines.  
Of equal importance is for banks to continue rolling out customer education programs regarding 
the importance of PIN security, regularly changing PIN numbers, and keeping PIN numbers 
private. Bank customers are also encouraged to pay attention to the physical condition of ATM 
and EDC machines and report anything suspicious immediately to their nearest branch or 
authorized personnel.  
655
 See, eg, interview with an ATM Operation Division’s team in one of the major state banks (Jakarta, 17 
August 2012) (BO-2). It is difficult to believe that employees of one of most prominent banks in 
Indonesia who are in charge in the ATM operations were unaware of the risk of malware in 
ATMs/EFTPOS machines. See also BO-1; BO-3; and BO-5. 
 
148 
 
  
Nevertheless, many of the ‘phantom withdrawals’ from consumer bank accounts were 
not revealed until now. In the absence of incentives for banks to equip themselves with 
various sophisticated devices for crime/fraud prevention, monitoring and detection, 
revealing a fraud incident is sometimes not easy for banks. Without ATM CCTV 
records or CCTV records with a good quality picture, neural network, the state-of-the-
art anti malware programs, experienced fraud auditor staff, and good will from banks to 
exhaustively investigate the possibility of the occurrence of fraud, it is very difficult for 
banks to detect and reveal a typology of any particular ATM/debit card fraud incident.  
From interviews with various banks’ officers in Jakarta in 2012, it is known that banks 
are reluctant to expand the fraud investigation to the ‘next’ level, such as involving the 
Indonesian Police Department, and/or tracing the transactions trails to reveal and catch 
the genuine perpetrators. The most popular reasons given not for not expanding the 
investigation were to limit the cost of investigation (involving the police means banks 
have to provide police with ‘operational costs’ for the investigation) and to avoid 
reputation risk and ‘hassle’ regarding court litigation. Nonetheless, with the change of 
shareholders in one of the biggest retail banks, the new management urged the fraud 
department to exhaustively investigate all occurrences of fraud and bring the 
perpetrators to justice. Even though the goal was to give the message to all the 
ATM/Debit card fraudsters ‘don’t mess with us’, the effect for consumers was also 
good. Besides some successfully apprehensions of some ATM/debit card fraudsters that 
it was claimed had reduced fraud incidents, some previously unrevealed phantom 
withdrawal cases could also finally be solved. Previous to that investigation, a bank 
officer admitted that the phantom withdrawal claimed by a consumer was rejected on 
the basis that consumer must be negligent in some way and this enabled the fraud to 
occur. The investigation then revealed that the fraudster, using skimming and pin-hole 
camera device implanted in the bank’s ATM, was the real cause of the consumer’s loss. 
As result, an arrangement was made with the affected consumer.
656
  
                                                          
656
 For reasons for bank reluctance to not expand investigations, see eg, BO-2; BO-3; BO-4 and BO-5. In 
terms of the good will of bank management being very important in contributing to their willingness to 
reveal fraud incidents, see also interview with Wani Sabu, Division Head Halo BCA, PT Bank Central 
Asia, Tbk (Jakarta, 14 August 2012).  
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4.3.3. ATM/Debit Card Identity Theft/Fraud Challanges 
With the greater implementation of anti-skimming devices at bank ATMs, it appears 
that skimming fraud has decreased, while card-trapping fraud is seemingly on the rise in 
Indonesia, as ATM maintenance officers frequently attest.
657
 The evidence of the latter 
fraud is easy to detect, since the fraudsters generally will have left the ‘tools’ used in the 
fraud (such as toothpick, ribbon, or matchstick) inside the ATM slot. On some 
occasions (depending on the ATMs level of sophistication and specific programming 
menu), the ATM will switch to malfunction mode and notify bank management as soon 
as someone puts a foreign device in the ATM slot.  
In regard to a skimming attack allegation, a bank can start its investigations by sorting 
all unauthorised ATM/debit card reports from victimised consumers. Commonly, the 
bank then can identify ‘the common purchase/transaction point’ either in the ATM or 
EFTPOS machine as the point of compromise. If the fraudulent activities occurred at 
ATMs/EFTPOS machines, the bank can confirm this by, for example, conducting direct 
or on the spot investigation to collect evidence. If the devices have already been 
removed, the CCTV recording (if any) generally will help.  
However, malware fraud generally is more difficult to detect and investigate compared 
to the other fraud method. Malware is normally programmed so as not to jeopardise 
ATM/EFTPOS operation and insidiously hidden in the computer root directory. As 
result, infected ATM/EFTPOS machines will still operate very normally, just as 
uninfected machines do.  
                                                          
657
 See Muhamad, ‘Adu Pelayanan di Tengah Ancaman,’ above n 647, 24. In the author’s office, there 
are more than ten ATMs. ATM maintenance officers admit that almost every day they receive calls to fix 
jammed ATMs in many ATM locations in Jakarta caused by card-trapping fraud: see, eg, BMO-1; and 
BMO-2. See also news about card-trapping fraudsters who were more recently apprehended by the 
Indonesian Police Department: Andri Haryanto, Wartawan 'KPK' Terlibat Pembobolan ATM Diringkus 
Polisi ['KPK' Journalist Involved in ATM Theft, Apprehended by Police] (24 April 2013) Detik.com. In 
other news, seven card-trapping fraudsters had been detained by police when police found at least 42 
‘consumers cards on them, that had been trapped in several ATMs in the cities of Jakarta and Bogor, and 
Lampung province. The total amount lost was around IDR376.3 million (AUD37.000 approximately). 
See also Indra Subagja, Tersangka Pembobol ATM itu Dibekuk Saat Bercinta di Hotel di Alam Sutera 
[ATM Theft Suspect was Apprehended While Making Love in Alam Sutera Hotel] (25 June 2013) 
Detik.com. In the last account, at least four suspects were apprehended after four months conducting 
card-trapping fraud in several cities (such as Jakarta, Tangerang, Sukabumi, Cirebon and Bogor). One of 
the card-trapping victims lost about IDR240 million (approximately AUD24,000) in this fraud. See also 
PIN, 'Empat Pembobol ATM ditangkap: Polisi, Jangan Panik Jika Kartu ATM Tertelan [Four ATM 
Thieves Busted: Police, Do Not Panic When ATM Card Get Swallowed]', Kompas 27 September 2013, 
27. In the latest card-trapping incident as reported in Kompas, four ATM card trappers have been 
apprehended by the Jakarta Soekarno-Hatta Airport’ police. When interviewed, the thieves admitted that 
they had frequently conducted the illicit activities, at least six times before being caught.  
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Attempts to detect malware on ATM/EFTPOS machines, of course, are the first step for 
banks to take. Banks should have an appropriate program to detect malware. If a bank 
does not have this, it is impossible to confirm the nature of the fraud, even if the 
malware is still inside the computer. Even if the bank has installed such a program, it is 
not easy to detect malware, because it can be located in each ATM or EFTPOS 
terminal, or in the bank’s and/or bank counterpart’s database server, such as in a 
merchant’s or switching company’s computer. This difficulty is twofold or even greater, 
if the bank does not have access to investigate its counterparts, such as merchants or 
switching companies.  
Without thorough, open and honest cooperation from banks, it is difficult for the 
payment system authority and the public to gauge how large is the risk of exposure to 
each ATM/debit card fraud method. However, without proper investigation using the 
correct tools, skill and techniques by banks as the party that issued, acquired and/or 
outsourced its payment card operations, it is also difficult to identify the fraud’s point of 
compromise and by whom and how the fraud was perpetrated. 
This complex situation could be exacerbated, if the legal and regulatory framework that 
regulate fraud (such as in relation to fraud mitigation and fraud liability) is unclear 
and/or uncertain. Unfair treatment of unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions could 
lead banks to face legal risk and/or reputation risk. For the innocent victimised 
consumer, unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions and unfair fraud liability treatment 
could ruin their life. However, the factor that poses the greatest potential damage to the 
banking and payment system industry as a whole is probably the significant decrease of 
consumer trust in banks — that could, in turn, hinder or even halt e-banking 
development in Indonesia. 
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4.3.4. The Dearth and Unreliability of ATM/Debit Card Fraud Reports  
According to the CPSS, fraud incidents in banks are also of concern to the banking 
supervisor for three reasons: 
On a large scale, it may threaten the solvency of banks and the integrity and soundness 
of the financial system. Second, it may be indicative of weak internal controls that will 
require supervisory attention. Thirdly, there are potential reputational and confidence 
implications, which may also spread from a particular institution to the system.
658
  
In accordance with these concerns, the CPSS urged banks to take greater action. In 
addition to enhancing their internal fraud mitigation, banks were urged to report 
suspicious activities and significant incidents of fraud to the banking supervisor. 
Consequently, the banking supervisor (in Indonesia, Bank Indonesia) does need to 
ensure that appropriate authorities and stakeholders have been alerted to raise awareness 
so that the spread to other banks or repetition of new and various types of fraud activity 
elsewhere can be prevented.
659
 
Anderson et al in their work have concluded that there are at least five economic 
barriers to network and information security, one of which barriers is information 
asymmetries. They note that asymmetric information ‘where one party to a transaction 
has better information than other … can be a strong impediment to effective security’. 
In general, the public has very little information about the effectiveness of many 
security products and services employed by institutions.
660
  
Included in the instances of information asymmetries that are often found in the 
information security market is a dearth of data sharing concerning vulnerabilities and 
attacks. Anderson et al believe that publishing quantitative metrics of fraudulent 
activities to the public or wider community is crucial for reducing information 
asymmetries. Further, they contend that the main justification for government agencies 
to collect and publish statistical data regarding companies’ security breaches ‘is the 
mitigation of information asymmetries by generating useful signals for economic 
decision making, whether by policymakers, firms, or individuals’.
661
 Sullivan (in his 
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 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), Bank for International Settlements, 'Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (Basel Core Principles) ' (Bank for International 
Settlements, 1997) 31. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Anderson et al, above n 338, 1824. 
661
 Ibid 18, 278. Individuals and organisations benefit from data on security properties when making 
consumption and investment decisions. Security professionals in organisations need statistical data to plan 
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work on payment fraud statistics for the United States) argues that a lack of fraud 
statistics undermines any ‘war against fraud’ because of the difficulties that authorities 
endure trying to gauge the dimension of the fraud problem. A lack of accuracy could 
lead them to target unimportant causes, lead to misdirected efforts, prevent effective 
coordination among stakeholders, and result in a failure to notice liability shift.
662
 
However, companies tend to be reluctant to expose the incidence and nature of attack 
events (which would reveal their vulnerabilities) and instead hide such events, even 
though the attacks can be mitigated more rapidly and effectively if information is shared 
in a coordinated manner with the wider community.
663
 Several companies provided 
reasons for their reluctance to share security breach data, namely: ‘loss of reputation and 
trust; risk of liability and indemnification claims; negative effects on financial markets; 
signal of weakness to adversaries; job security and individual career goals.’
664
 
Until now, there has been no comprehensive ATM/Debit Card Fraud Report or Payment 
Card Fraud Report publicly available in Indonesia to raise public awareness about 
fraudulent activities in e-banking, and smaller rather than larger banks were far more 
likely to report.
665
 Bank Indonesia, as the banking industry supervisor, has indeed 
collected fraud reports from banks, but seems reluctant to publish comprehensive data.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
and implement appropriate protection and to react to current levels of threat. Accurate statistics can 
support policy evolution to fight frauds. While consistent, comparable metrics enable greater 
transparency, better data will bring further rewards in the form of deeper understanding that will in turn 
lead to better policies in the long term. 
662
 Richard J Sullivan, The Benefits of Collecting and Reporting Payment Fraud Statistics for the United 
States (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2009) 1. 
663
 Anderson et al, above n 338, 18–24. In the USA, fraud information sharing has been tackled by 
information-sharing associations, security-breach disclosure laws and vulnerability markets. An instance 
of security-breach disclosure laws to be enacted in the United States was California’s A.B.700 in 
September 2002, which came into force as Cal Civil Code § 1798.29 in July 2003. It applies to public and 
private entities that conduct business in California, and requires them to notify affected individuals if 
personal data under their control is believed to have been acquired by an unauthorised person. A specific 
instance of the application of this law is where an ATM is fitted by criminals with a skimmer that then 
steals card details. The bank would be required to notify every customer who had used that machine 
during the period in which the skimmer could possibly have been in use, regardless of whether they were 
one of that bank’s customers or not. 
664
 Anderson et al, above n 338, 40–1.  
665
 Payment card fraud figures were never revealed on the Bank IndonesiaPayment System Department 
website <http://www.bi.go.id/web/en/Sistem+Pembayaran/> nor in any Bank Indonesia printed materials, 
such reports like the Bank Indonesia Annual Report or Bank Indonesia Payment System Report. In 
contrast, BI has published data related to counterfeiting and fraud in cheque account withdrawals. This 
can be found in many Bank Indonesia publications. The most disturbing aspect of the fraud reports that 
has been published is material concerning the presence of unreliable fraud data. An investigation of the 
raw data that has been sourced has revealed that for years such data had only been submitted by less than 
one fifth of reporting banks. Most of the banks that reported were small banks; whereas most of big ten 
banks — that contributed more than 75% of the volume of payment card transactions in Indonesia and 
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Unlike many other countries such as Australia
666
 and United States,
667
 Bank Indonesia 
does not publish a fraud report as one aspect within its official report in various Bank 
Indonesia publications concerning facts related to the country’s payment system. The 
only Bank Indonesia publications in regard to figures for payment card fraud — and 
such figures are general (that is, without detailed descriptions of the taxonomy of fraud) 
— are found in Bank Indonesia Payment System Reports or in statements issued by 
high ranking officers of the Payment System Department in payment system press 
releases or in statements made at various relevant public occasions, such as seminars on 
the payment system or for payment system institutional stakeholders such as issuing 
banks and so on. For instance, the 2011 Bank Indonesia Payment System Report 
supplied the total number of occurrences of payment card related fraud (for October 
2011), which was 1,954 cases of fraud with a total loss of IDR3.08 billion (the report 
for 2012 revealed 11,468 cases with the value of total losses reaching IDR1.4 billion); 
but although the reports segregated the data on the basis of various popular fraud modus 
operandi (methods), this tended to confuse the stakeholders since it did not properly 
follow accepted or common definitions and/or a commonly recognised fraud 
taxonomy.
668
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
commonly also are prominent targets of fraudulent activities — never sent fraud reports to Bank 
Indonesia for years. Hence the total figure for fraud that is released by Bank Indonesia (as the sole 
authority in payment system in Indonesia) definitely does not reflect the real level of fraud occurring in 
payment card operations in Indonesia. This unreliable figure is also exacerbated by the ‘dark figure’ 
phenomenon and different interpretations of fraud typology between banks and the central bank. Hence, 
the available incomplete fraud data are definitely insufficient, fragmented, incomparable and lacking a 
good metric standard that make it difficult to use as a basis for specific fraud mitigation activities. 
666
 For payment system fraud figures in Australia (most recent and historical data), see Australian 
Payments Clearing Association (APCA), Fraud Statistics <http://www.apca.com.au/payment-
statistics/fraud-statistics>. The APCA is the self-regulatory body for Australia’s payment industry. It has 
90 members, including Australia’s leading financial institutions, major retailers and other principal 
payments service providers. In regard to fraud statistics, APCA has been publishing cheque and card 
fraud statistics since November 2006 as part of the payment industry’s commitment to improve 
disclosure. APCA believes that the fraud figures help consumers and business in Australia understand 
how fraud occurs so that they can take steps to minimise the risks when using cheques and cards, and 
allows the industry to monitor fraud trends and develop targeted mitigating strategies. 
667
 See Anderson et al, above n 338, 18, 26. In the US, lack of data sharing about vulnerabilities and 
fraud attacks has been tackled by information-sharing associations, security-breach disclosure laws and 
vulnerability markets. Further Anderson et al argue that the point of security breach notification is to 
provide encouragement or supply incentives for firms to improve the protection of personal data. 
Competent firms have nothing to fear from breach notification, and should welcome a situation where 
incompetent firms who ‘cut corners’ to save money will be exposed (naming and shaming), incur costs, 
and lose customers. This levels the playing field and prevents the competent being penalised for taking 
protection seriously.  
668
 For instance, see Herdaru Purnomo, Duh! Pembobolan Transaksi Kartu Hampir Capai 16.000 Kasus 
[Ouch! Payment Card Fraud Almost Reaches 16.000 Cases] (2 January 2012) detik.com 
<http://finance.detik.com/read/2012/01/02/144723/1804731/5/duh-pembobolan-transaksi-kartu-hampir-
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One way to reduce fraud is by limiting the opportunity for fraudsters to commit fraud. 
Toughening security has become one of the most popular anti fraud methods to restrain 
or reduce fraud. However, Bank Indonesia fraud reports do not exhaustively enumerate 
the types of fraud. Hence, it is impossible to know what sorts of identity theft fraud 
methods are being employed by fraudsters in Indonesia, resulting in the use of that 
information to later create a counterfeit card for unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions. Thus the specific types of payment card system frauds that are supposed to 
be tackled with an appropriate anti fraud tools are hard to identify in the first place. It is 
difficult to ‘fight a war’ on fraud if the location, actions and nature of the enemy are 
unknown.  
As a consequence, the poor and unpublicised fraud data in Indonesia not only fails to 
give accurate (and therefore valuable) input for payment system stakeholders to act 
promptly and accurately to restrain fraud, but could also misdirect fraud policy adopted 
by the payment system authority. This is because the fraud figures compared to 
payment card transactions become very sparse and insignificant in terms of special risk 
mitigation action. From a consumer viewpoint, lack of fraud data — especially for 
individual bank fraud figures — might create more difficulties for victims of fraud who 
hope to obtain redress in the court or other alternative dispute settlement body. As 
Bolton and Hand assert, failure to provide fraud data with reliable figures always makes 
them difficult to evaluate.
669
 The lack of data sharing concerning vulnerabilities and 
attacks also creates information asymmetry in terms of the information security 
industry.
670
 This can lead to create a market failure in the payment system industries. 
Such information asymmetry can also affect not only the information security industry 
associated with the banking industry, but also government policy makers, and the 
public. 
A market failure can occur when market participants such as banks do not have 
incentives to provide a good and timely e-security that prevents or detects breaches and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
capai-16000-kasus?f9911023>. In this article, popular fraud methods enumerated are: fraudulent 
applications, account takeovers, unauthorised use of account numbers, counterfeit cards and skimming, 
ATM scams, not received items, and identity theft. Payment card fraud figures are derived from the 
Indonesia Payment System yearly reports for 2011 and 2012. 
669
 Bolton and Hand, above n 257, 236. See also Anderson et al, above n 338, 27. According to Anderson 
et al, ‘the primary value of statistical data, and the main justification for its collection by government 
agencies, is to mitigate information asymmetries by generating useful signals for economic decision 
making, whether by policymakers, firms or individuals’. 
670
 Anderson et al, above n 338, 18. 
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issues fraud reports. Reasons given for failing to disclose this kind of information is to 
avoid damage to their reputation and public confidence. Hence, it is obvious that 
regulators of the payment system can correct this market failure by requiring timely and 
accurate reporting of e-security breaches/fraud to the authority, and process them 
meticulously in order to provide valuable information to the payment system industry. 
This will also help determine appropriate fraud risk mitigation in the country. As 
Anderson et al have observed, ‘a coordinated view of attacks could prompt faster 
mitigation to everyone’s benefit’.
671
 
4.4. Conclusion  
A payment card system that uses magnetic stripe cards as a means of data storage 
combined with a PIN as an authentication tool remains as one of the most widely used 
payment card technologies today. Nonetheless, it is also notoriously vulnerable to 
identity theft and fraud. Criminals know that if they are able to obtain consumer data 
from the magnetic stripe card and its associated PIN (identity theft), they can easily 
create fake or counterfeit cards that can be used to make unauthorised ATM/debit card 
withdrawals. 
So, as in other jurisdictions, the proliferation of payment card transactions in Indonesia 
has been followed by a rise in unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions. ATMs and 
EFTPOS machines along with their networks and data storage systems have become the 
most frequently used avenues for fraudsters to compromise consumers’ card and PIN 
data. Inherent vulnerabilities in the ATM/debit card payment system are also 
exaggerated by the dearth of accurate data and unreliability of the data that is available 
in ATM/debit card fraud reports.  
Identity theft in payment card transactions can be conducted passively or actively — by 
insider or outsider perpetrator/s. Nevertheless, to identify the fraudsters involved, the 
fraud methods used and the party or parties that are responsible for fraud 
prevention/liability for damages, it is necessary to know about the point of compromise 
for the identity theft. From the type of attack (those perpetrated on ATM/debit card 
transactions), the point of compromise for identity theft can be divided into three 
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‘locations’: cardholders themselves; bank ATM/debit card activated terminals and 
cardholder; and the bank and/or its agent’s network or system.  
In situations where the cardholder alone is the point of compromise, fraudsters have 
attacked and stolen or swapped a consumer’s genuine ATM/debit card and used it to 
make unauthorised purchases or withdrawals of funds from the consumer’s account 
(active attack). Fraudsters can determine the consumer’s PIN associated with the stolen 
ATM/debit card by guessing, ‘cracking’, or extracting it from the consumer identity 
(such as date of birth), or by social engineering. In addition to situations involving 
outsider fraudsters, dishonest cardholders themselves can also defraud banks by making 
fraudulent claims or transaction reversals. This type of identity theft and fraud, 
however, is not significant in terms of number. 
Meanwhile, in situations where the bank consumer activated terminals and cardholders 
are the point of compromise, the use of skimming devices and the card-trapping fraud 
method is prominent. Identity theft using skimming devices at ATMs is probably the 
most popular method employed by fraudsters in Indonesia. Its effectiveness in 
harvesting hundreds or even thousands of numbers of ATM/debit consumer cards in 
Indonesia was demonstrated by various identity theft incidents (such as in the late 2010 
ATM fraud in Bali, or the Bank BCA and Mandiri skimming fraud of late 2013 / early 
2014). All these huge cases of identity theft and fraud in Indonesia, apparently involved 
international syndicates. Most of the unauthorised withdrawals occurred in outside of 
Indonesia, in countries such as Canada, Australia, Bulgaria, Malaysia and so on.  
Where consumer activated terminals/systems and/or communication networks are the 
point of compromise, it should be noted that the proliferation of ATMs/EFTPOS 
machines open a wide doorway for fraudulent activities (as well as benefits for 
consumers). Relatively unguarded consumer activated terminals and their 
communication networks make these more vulnerable to fraud attacks. Card skimming, 
eavesdropping, EFTPOS tampering and malware (to name a few) are some commonly 
adopted fraud methods at this point (passive attack). Meanwhile, consumer PINs remain 
able to be easily stolen by the use of installed a pinhole camera, pin-pad overlay, or 
shoulder surfing method. 
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In dealing with fraud, enhancement of prevention measures to prevent the occurrence of 
fraudulent activities — such as by the implementation of cardholder identification and 
authentication using more advanced technology (such as: ICC/chip card, better 
encryption tools, stronger PIN and so on) — is very important. However, almost all the 
(often physical) anti-fraud tools which are ultimately computer-based programs can be 
circumvented by fraudsters (who use anti jitter, fraudulent anti-skimmer devices, 
malware, card trapping, and so on). There needs to be implemented additional fraud 
mitigation methods to avoid more damage to banks and/or consumers, such as neural 
networks, ‘out of band’ alert, and so on. 
Overall, in order to succeed in reducing or neutralising fraud, every fraud prevention, 
detection and mitigating effort in payment cards (their creation, transaction processing, 
data storage and so on) should always involve a synergy between banks and their third 
party affiliates, and consumers. As a payment system owner and/or developer, banks 
should always improve and update their security features, deliver high quality education 
material to their consumers concerning payment system risks and fraud methods, and 
implement good quality neural networks and issue timely consumer transaction reports.  
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CHAPTER 5   REGULATION OF ATM/DEBIT CARD 
TRANSACTIONS, CONSUMER PROTECTION, AND LIABILITY 
RULES ON UNAUTHORISED ATM/DEBIT CARD 
TRANSACTIONS IN INDONESIA  WITH A BRIEF 
COMPARISON TO LOSS ALLOCATION RULES IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND AUSTRALIA 
 
5.1. Introduction 
A well-founded legal basis for the payment system is indisputably very important. Its 
usefulness is not only to provide a framework and legal certainty for participants and 
operators who are involved in the payment system, but also to provide a clear and 
concise statement of the rights and obligations of the payment system 
participants/operators. Hence, laws and regulations for the payment system that are 
good, detailed and fair can protect consumers’ rights and increase their confidence in 
banking products and services. In a dispute between consumers and banks over 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions, the party that failed to comply with one or 
more legal obligation could be deemed negligent or at fault, and thus liable for losses.  
This chapter describes the most relevant legislation and regulations for bank ATM/debit 
card operations in Indonesia. Legal and regulatory framework aspects of ATM/debit 
card transactions, consumer protection, and liability law in Indonesia are also 
enumerated in detail. Various BI regulations in regard to its function as the payment 
system regulator in ensuring the implementation of a robust, efficient, and secure 
payment card system and consumer protection in payment system services are also 
described quite exhaustively. It is expected that — in the event of a dispute — these 
enumerations of the legal and regulatory frameworks for ATM/debit card transactions, 
will be able to be used as a standard to gauge the extent to which the rights and 
obligations of banks and consumers have been fulfilled in regard to ATM/debit card 
transactions/operations.  
Consumer protection principles that align with international best practice have become a 
required standard in banking operations in Indonesia, as can be seen from the 
Indonesian Banking Architecture Framework enacted by Bank Indonesia. Therefore — 
even though not exhaustively — the legal frameworks of the United States and 
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Australia relating to fraud liability provisions for unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions are also presented. In most developed countries, in order to render more 
equal the position of the consumer’s and the business actor, consumer protection 
regulations tend to produce a more balanced or a pro-consumer risk allocation. The 
comparison with other countries’ regulation this area is deemed important to benchmark 
whether or not Indonesia’s legal and regulatory provision relating to the ATM/debit 
card fraud liabilities and consumer protection issues are on a similar level and/or 
comply with international best practice. 
5.2. Legal and Regulatory Framework for ATM/Debit Card Transactions 
in Indonesia 
In the operation of the market economy, the payment system is intertwined with and 
cannot be separated from the monetary and banking system. The payment system itself 
consists of ‘the set of legal frameworks, rules, institutions,
672
 and technical mechanisms 
for the transfer of money’.
673
 
Bank and payment systems are integral parts of critical economic infrastructure in every 
country. According to the Gup and Kolari, ‘banks are the core of the payments 
system’.
674
 The role of banks in the payments system takes on an important social 
dimension because an efficient payments system is vital to economic stability and 
growth.
675
 Fraud that happens in the payment system, such as illegal access and 
hacking, can have complex ramifications for a country’s entire economy.
676
  
Cesare Calari, Vice President of the Financial Sector of the World Bank, in his 
foreword to the World Bank Working Paper on Electronic Safety and Soundness, 
contends that it is essential for business to be responsible in securing their electronic 
business. Besides using technology, ‘sound business principles such as responsibility, 
accountability and trust are also essential to building infrastructure and framework that 
can support e-business’. He further argues that market participants need the right 
                                                          
672
 Nowadays, most market economies’ structure comprises of two-tiered banking where payment 
services are provided. Authorized Depository Institutions (such as banks, savings institution, credit union, 
etc) as the first tier - generally supply payment service and product to its consumers; while the central 
bank and other payment intermediaries (such as payment network institutions) provide clearing and 
settlement services to banks.  
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 Hancock and Humprey, above n 199, 1575. 
674
 Benton E Gup and James W Kolari, Commercial Banking: The Management of Risk (John Willey & 
Sons, Inc, 3
rd
 ed, 2005) 9. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Glaessner, Kellermann and McNevin, above n 51, 18. 
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incentives to ensure their best involvement in the system. Hence, an effective legal, 
regulatory, and enforcement environment is the essential driving factor in creating these 
incentives.
677
 
The proliferation of payment system transactions and the increasing use of technology 
in the delivery of financial services have attracted public interest in this area. As result, 
‘legal and regulatory practice is especially important to define’.
678
  
Sullivan argues that ‘confidence in the safety of payments is particularly important’.
679
 
Beside technological security features, legal assurance in payment system practice is 
one of the most important preconditions for banking consumer confidence. The 
Committee on Payment and Settlement System  Bank for International Settlement has 
highlighted the importance of a legal framework for payment systems: 
It is well established that the legal basis for a payment system is critical to its overall 
soundness. The legal basis typically consists of framework legislation as well as specific 
laws, regulations, and agreements governing both payments and the operation of the 
system. A sound legal basis for a payment system defines, or provides the framework 
for relevant parties to define, the rights and obligations of operators, participants and 
regulators. Most risk management mechanisms are based on assumptions about the 
rights and obligations of parties to payment transactions. Therefore, if risk management 
is to be sound and efficient, the rights and obligations relating to payment system 
operations and to risk management itself need to be established with a high degree of 
certainty.
680
  
Nakajima also highlights that the existence of well-founded legal basis is very 
important, particularly to provide a frameworks and legal certainty for participants and 
operators involved in the payment system. In contrast, even if a legal framework is 
available, but fails to provide clear and concise rights and obligations of the payment 
system participants/operators, it most likely will cause legal disputes in the future.
681
 
Aligned with Nakajima’s view, the author also concur with Idroes and Sugiarto view 
which suggest that regulation of banking related to its products and services must be 
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 CPSS, ‘Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision’, above n 658, 16. 
681
 Masashi Nakajima, Payment System Technologies and Functions: Innovations and Developments 
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161 
 
  
addressed in order to protect consumers’ rights and increase their confidence in those 
products and services.
682
  
These scholars’ views are deemed very important and it is considered important that 
they be comprehensively put into practice in Indonesia not only to introduce or restore 
confidence among banking customers, considering that electronic banking is being 
implemented on a massive scale in Indonesia, but also for several other reasons as 
follows: First, these provide the legal basis and the validity of the electronic form of 
ATM/debit card transactions. Secondly, they are guidelines for banks and consumers in 
the provision and performance of such transactions, so that ATM/debit card operations 
can be done effectively and safely. Third, the regulations essentially provide the rights 
and obligations of the bank and the customer in the transactions. Thus, in the event of 
an unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction, the parties that were negligent in their 
compliance with one or more of these regulations could be held accountable for any 
damages incurred (statutory/regulatory duty). 
5.2.1. Legal Framework for ATM/Debit Card Transactions  
In Indonesia, there is no statute that specifically governs ATM/debit card transactions. 
Instead, the legal framework for ATM/debit card transactions is fragmented in various 
laws that cover the relevant area of ATM/debit card transactions, such as the institution 
responsible for payment card regulation, recognition of ATM/debit card transactions as 
an electronic transaction and/or electronic contract, PIN as functional equivalent of 
electronic signature, the rights and obligations in funds transfer, and so on, as outlined 
below. 
5.2.1.1. Law No 7 of 1992 on Banking as Amended by Law No 10 of 1998 
(LB) 
In banking operation and practice, LB states that ‘Banks in Indonesia shall conduct their 
business according to the principle of economic democracy applying the prudential 
principle’.
683
 The prudential principle can be observed in several provisions in LB, such 
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 Ferry N Idroes and Sugiarto, Manajemen Risiko Perbankan: Dalam Konteks Kesepakatan Basel dan 
Peraturan Bank Indonesia [Risk Management in Banking: Within Basel and Bank Indonesia Regulatory 
Contex] (Graha Ilmu, 2006) 16. 
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 LB art 2. See Yusuf Shofie, Kapita Selekta Hukum Perlindungan Konsumen di Indonesia [Consumer 
Protection Law in Indonesia] (PT Citra Aditya Bakti, 2008) 15; Hermansyah, Hukum Perbankan 
Nasional Indonesia [Indonesia National Banking Law] (Kencana, 2005) 1467; Neni Sri Imaniyati, 
 
162 
 
  
as articles 29(2) and 29(4).
684
 This emphasises the importance of the prudential 
principle as it is to be applied in every banking business. Therefore, in conducting their 
business, banks should always abide by the regulations  so that all their business is 
legitimate.
685
 Fuady argues that banks as a trusted business entity should always comply 
with all banking regulation as part of their ethical requirements.
686
 
Besides observing the prudential principle, banks should also implement other inherent 
principles in the banking business, which are the fiduciary relation principle
687
 and the 
‘know your customer’ principle (‘KYC’).
688
 In order to be able to implement KYC 
effectively and efficiently, banks ‘shall establish adequate management information 
systems, which can identify, analyse, monitor and report effectively the characteristics 
of bank customers’ transactions’,
689
 including any suspicious transaction.
690
 
In relation to ATM/debit card transactions, and based on interviews conducted with 
several banks officers in Indonesia (such as PT Bank Central Asia, PT Bank Mandiri 
Tbk, PT Bank BNI Tbk, PT Bank Danamon, PT Bank Rakyat Indonesia and so on),
691
 
typically banks in practice offer consumers an ATM/debit card as an obligatory part of 
opening a savings account.
692
 However, LB does not regulate payment card operations 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Pengantar Hukum Perbankan Indonesia [Introduction to Indonesia Banking Law] (Refika Aditama, 2010) 
1617; Djumhana, above n 68, 177. 
684
 LB art 29(2): ‘A Bank shall maintain its soundness in accordance with the provisions concerning the 
adequacy of capital, quality assets, quality of management, liquidity, profitability, solvency, and other 
aspects related to the operations of a bank, and shall be required to conduct operations in accordance with 
the prudential principle.’ LB art 29(4): ‘In the interest of its Customer, a Bank shall provide information 
concerning the risk of possible losses relating to Customer transaction[s] conducted through a Bank.’  
685
 Hermansyah, above n 683, 147. 
686
 Djumhana, above n 68, 197. 
687
 See LB art 29(4). See also Djumhana, above n 68, 337; Imaniyati, above n 683, 1718. The fiduciary 
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seek funds from the public to deposit in trust, so that each bank needs to keep its bank healthy while 
maintaining public confidence. 
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[Bank Indonesia Regulation Number: 3/10/PBI/2001 Concerning Implementation of Know Your 
Customer Principles]. Know your customer principle (KYC) is the principle applied by banks to 
recognize and know the identity of customers, monitor customer transactions, including reporting any 
suspicious transactions related to customer accounts. 
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 Ibid art 9. 
690
 Ibid art 12. The meaning of ‘suspicious transaction’ is a transaction that is not consistent with a 
customer’s profile and characteristics. 
691
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[Bank Indonesia Regulation Number: 3/10/PBI/2001 Concerning Implementation of Know Your 
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in particular, apart from a provision that bank operations may encompass various 
activities, including those related to transferring money, either on its own behalf or at 
the request of the customer, and conducting credit card business.
693
  
Unfortunately, there is in no direct provision in this law that governs legal protection for 
consumers’ funds (which they have deposited in the bank) in the event of fraud. 
Protection only applies when the bank is closed by the authority or goes into 
bankruptcy.
694
  
5.2.1.2. Law Number 23 of 1999 on Bank Indonesia as Most Recently 
Amended by Law Number 6 of 2009 on the Stipulation of 
Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 2 of 2008 on the 
Second Amendment to the Law Number 23 of 1999 on Bank 
Indonesia (LBI) 
Historically, the role of Bank Indonesia in the payment system especially in regard to 
cash and non-cash payments (giro payments) circulation was first recognised under 
article 7(2) of Law No 11 of 1953 on Establishment of the Basic Law of Bank 
Indonesia.
695
 Bank Indonesia’s role in the payment system was further developed by the 
enactment of Law No 13 of 1968 on Central Bank (LCB). According to article 30(a) of 
the LCB, Bank Indonesia as a central bank is mandated to support the Indonesian 
government, among other things, by expanding, smoothing and regulating giro payment 
mechanism and providing inter-bank clearing.
696
  
Arising from the need for better objectives and focus for the independent central bank in 
Indonesia, the Government enacted Law No 23 of 1999 on Bank Indonesia to replace 
LCB 1968. Law Number 23 of 1999 was later amended by Law No 6 of 2009 on 
Stipulation of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No 2 of 2008 on the Second 
                                                                                                                                                                          
but cannot be cashed; instead, the monetary value that is contained in the instrument can only be stored in 
the beneficiary’s bank account. It has also a maturity date. This means that the value on the bilyet giro 
only can be claimed from the maturity date onward. 
693
 Ibid art 6.el. 
694
 Sentosa Sembiring, Hukum Perbankan: Edisi Revisi [Banking Law: Revision Edition] (Mandar Maju, 
2012) 181. 
695
 Undang-Undang Nomor 11 Tahun 1953 Tentang Undang-Undang Pokok Bank Indonesia [Law 
Number 11 of 1953 on Bank Indonesia Core Act] (Indonesia). Article 7(2) of this act gives Bank 
Indonesia authority to circulate money in Indonesia, including expanding a giro payment. See also Tim 
Buku Media Indonesia, Tim Penulis Universitas Islam Indonesia and Tim Buku Bank Indonesia, Era 
Baru Transformasi Bank Sentral [New Era of Central Bank Transformation] (Media Indonesia 
Publishing, 2010) 28. This act has been repealed. 
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Amendment Law No 23 of 1999 on Bank Indonesia Becomes Law (LBI).
697
 LBI not 
only guaranteed the independence of Bank Indonesia, but also highlighted its extensive 
payment system role to regulate and safeguard the smoothness of the payment system in 
Indonesia. Pertaining to this task, Bank Indonesia has various powers in the payment 
system, including power to license payment system services, oversight, power to 
determine the use of payment instruments, regulate and operate the interbank clearing 
system and the final settlement of interbank payment transactions, and to issue and 
circulate Indonesia’s currency.
698
  
In implementing the task of regulating banks, Bank Indonesia is authorised to prescribe 
banking regulations that contain the prudential principles. Typically, such banking 
regulation will be prescribed in the form of a Bank Indonesia Regulation. It is also very 
common for the Bank Indonesia Regulation to prescribe further details in a Bank 
Indonesia Circular Letter
699
 as can be seen in section 5.2.2 below. 
5.2.1.3. Law Number 11 of 2008 on Information and Electronic 
Transactions (LIET) 
LIET is Indonesia’s first comprehensive cyber-law and cyber-crime law that adopts the 
major provisions of the Model Law on E-commerce and the Model Law on Electronic 
Signatures issued by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,
700
 
and the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime 2001.
701
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One of the considerations of the Government is issuing this law was to support the fast 
development of information technology via law and regulatory infrastructure, so that the 
use of the information technology could be protected from any misuse with regard to 
Indonesian religious, social and cultural values.
702
  
The LIET is a very important piece of legislation for the development of e-banking, in 
particular the payment card system in Indonesia. Even though the Act does not directly 
regulate e-banking transactions, it is concerned with the validity or acceptability of, 
among other things, electronic information,
703
 electronic documents,
704
 electronic 
transactions,
705
 electronic systems,
706
 electronic signatures,
707
 and electronic 
contracts,
708
 for the purposes of EFTs provided that they are generated by an electronic 
system in compliance with the requirements set out in the LIET.
709
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
<http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-
1.9.34817/Branchless%20Banking%20Diagnostic%20in%20Indonesia.pdf>, 7. 
701
  The convention document can be retrieved from the Council of Europe website: 
<http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm>. See also Ahmad M Ramli, Pager 
Gunung and Indra Apriadi, Menuju Kepastian Hukum di Bidang Informasi dan Transaksi Elektronik 
[Toward Legal Certainty in Information and Electronic Transaction] (Departemen Komunikasi dan 
Informatika Republik Indonesia 2006) 6981. 
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after being processed have meaning or can be understood by anyone capable to understand it.’  
704
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705
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707
 Ibid art 1(12): ‘Electronic Signature is a signature consists of electronic information attached to, 
associated with or related to the other electronic information as an instrument of verification and 
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708
 Ibid art 1(17): ‘Electronic Contract is an agreement between the parties made through electronic 
system.’ 
709
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In relation to ATM/debit card transactions, besides giving legal assurance to the 
operation of payment card system electronically, LIET is the first law in Indonesia that 
clearly recognises the legal status of consumer activated terminals such as 
ATM/EFTPOS machines, known as an electronic agent, and the PIN as the substitute 
for a handwritten signature.
710
 The law also provides flexibility for the parties 
conducting electronic transactions to undertake such transactions directly between 
themselves, through their proxies, or through an electronic agent.
711
  
In the case of disputes between parties involved in an electronic transaction, the law 
provides the possibility for any person to file a lawsuit against the provider of the 
electronic system which has caused any loss to society.
712
 A civil claim can be filed 
with the court or other alternative dispute resolution institution pursuant to the laws and 
regulations.
713
 As a proof, electronic information and/or electronic document and/or its 
printout can be used as an extension of legitimate electronic evidence in the existing 
procedural law.
714
  
5.2.1.4. Government Regulation Number 82 of 2012 on The Operation of 
Electronic System and Transaction (GR-OEST) 
GR-OEST is a Republic of Indonesia Government Regulation that was put in place to 
stipulate LIET in greater detail.
715
 Therefore, it is expected that it could be use as a 
guideline for the use of information technology in Indonesia, especially for electronic 
system operators in interpreting and implementing LIET in practice.  
On the other hand, GR-OEST also provides many obligations for electronic system 
providers to comply with in their operations. Hence, in practice the GR-OEST can also 
be used along with other relevant regulations,
716
 as a ‘benchmark’ in assessing the 
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adequacy of the electronic system provider’s compliance with the associated 
information technology regulation in Indonesia. 
In general, the GR-OEST regulates various aspects related to electronic system 
operations, electronic agents, electronic transaction operations, electronic signatures, 
electronic certificate operations, the Trustmark certification agency and domain name 
management,
717
 as follows below.  
5.2.1.4.1. Electronic Systems 
GR-OEST regulates the operators of electronic systems (such as bank with its e-banking 
product) so that they are obliged to ensure (among other things) that:  
 electronic system operators for public services shall guarantee the software that 
they use so that such a system is secure and reliable. For instance, they are to ensure 
that software is free from hidden malicious codes such as ‘Trojan viruses’, ‘worms’ 
and from the possibility of ‘backdoor’ access.
718
 
 service level agreements, information security agreements, and information security 
and internal communication facilities are available. The operator also is obliged to 
guarantee that each component and the integration of the entire electronic system 
could be able to be operated as it should.
719
 
 a risk management policy is applied to each damage or loss that may occur. ‘Apply 
risk management’ here means that the operator should do a risk analysis and 
formulate mitigation and handling measures to cope with threats, disturbances, and 
obstacles to the electronic system being operated.
720
 
 the operator possesses a good governance policy, standard operational procedures 
and accountable audit mechanisms;
721
 the operator should also provide an audit trail 
for all electronic system operational activities. The audit trail record is used for 
oversight, law enforcement, dispute resolution, verification, testing and other kinds 
of examinations. The operator shall notify consumers every time their transactions 
have been successfully conducted, and assure that the audit trail function can also 
detect intrusion efforts and/or intrusion trail for review and evaluation purposes.
722
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 the operator safeguards the confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, 
accessibility, traceability of personal data/electronic information or document that 
they have managed. In cases where the confidentiality of data is being 
compromised, the operator is obliged to give a written notice to the personal data 
owner.
723
 
 the operator owns and applies security procedures (both for fraud prevention and 
mitigation, such as by applying antiviral software, firewalls, intrusion detection 
systems, and so on) and facilities to secure the electronic system to avoid 
disturbances, failures and damage;
724
 
 the operator is obliged to protect users and the public from loss caused by the 
operation of its electronic system. Anyone working in the electronic system is 
obliged to secure and protect the electronic system’s infrastructure and facilities or 
any information transferred through the electronic system. The operator is also 
obliged to provide, educate and train personnel in charge of and responsible for 
securing and protecting infrastructures and facilities of the electronic system.
725
 
5.2.1.4.2. Electronic Agents 
GR-OEST regulates in such a way that the operator of the electronic system can function 
on its own or through an electronic agent. The electronic agent shall operate in 
accordance with the rules including that: 
 the electronic agent used can be in the form of visual, audio, electronic data, and 
other forms;
726
 
 the electronic agents are obliged to contain or to convey information pertaining to 
consumer protection, which at least includes information pertaining to the identity 
of the electronic operator, transacted object, worthiness of security feature of the 
electronic agent, method to use the tools, and call centre number for a consumer’s 
complaint;
727
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 in the operation of electronic agents, the operator is obliged to consider the 
principles of: prudence, security and integration of the information technology 
system, security control over electronic transaction activities, cost effectiveness and 
efficiency, and consumer protection in accordance with laws and regulations. The 
operator is also obliged to have and run standard operating procedures that fulfil the 
user data security control principle in regard to electronic transactions, which 
includes confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, authorisation and non-
repudiation.
728
 
 the operator must conduct an authentication of identity and authorisation test for 
each user that accesses system, database and is involved in the application of 
electronic transactions. The operator is also required to have and implement 
policies and procedures to take action if there is an indication of data theft.
729
 
 the operator shall prepare and implement methods and procedures to protect the 
data, notation, and information related to electronic transactions. The operator also 
is required to have procedures for handling unexpected events quickly and 
appropriately to mitigate the impact of an incident, fraud, and the failure of the 
electronic system.
730
 
 the operator is obliged to prepare and stipulate a procedure to ensure electronic 
transaction that cannot be denied by the consumers (non repudiation).
731
 
5.2.1.4.3. Electronic Transaction Operation 
GR-OEST states that the operator of electronic transactions is obliged to ensure amongst 
other things:  
 Electronic transaction operators in the Indonesia jurisdiction must pay attention to 
security, reliability, and efficiency aspects as regulated by laws and regulations 
enacted by the associated oversight and regulatory authority. In regard to the 
payment system conducted by the banking industry, the sole authority with the 
responsibility for such oversight and the regulatory role is Bank Indonesia, the 
Central Bank of the Republic of Indonesia.
732
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 Electronic transaction operations performed by parties must consider good faith, the 
prudential principle, transparency, accountability, and reasonability. ‘Reasonability’ 
refers to adhering to prevailing propriety consistent with business recent habits and 
practices.
733
  
5.2.1.5. Law No 3 of 2011 on Fund Transfer (LFT) 
At the moment, Indonesia still does not have a specific Payment System Act in place. 
Instead, Bank Indonesia and the Indonesian government have initiated promulgation of 
the Law on Fund Transfer (LFT). One of the ultimate goals of the LFT was to provide 
legal certainty and protection for all the parties that are involved in fund transfer system 
operations. Having a comprehensive legal basis for fund transfer operations either 
domestically or internationally (cross-border fund transfer), it can be expected that the 
ultimate objective of payment system, which is to safeguard the safety and smooth 
operation of the payment system, could always be achieved.
734
  
Pertaining to ATM/debit card operation, the LFT in essence gives legal recognition for 
fund transfer activities using ATM/debit cards in Indonesia. In particular, the LFT has 
legally acknowledged various fund transfer activities both domestically and cross-
border, to be initiated or processed in the electronic form, among other things in relation 
to fund transfer instruction,
735
 electronic signature,
736
 and the authentication and 
acceptance process.
737
 Similarly to the LIET,
738
 the LFT also extends the existing 
procedural law,
739
 by accepting electronic information, electronic documents and/or 
their print-outs as valid legal evidence.
740
 
However, apart from delay and error liabilities as regulated in articles 54 and 55 of LFT, 
the Act does not regulate unauthorised funds transfer transactions nor provide fraud 
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liability rules for the parties involved in the fund transfer system. Hence, this Act itself 
fails to give a clear guidance to overcome prolonged disputes between consumers and 
banks in regard to unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions in Indonesia.  
5.2.2.   Regulatory Framework for ATM/Debit Card Transactions: Bank 
Indonesia Regulations Concerning the Prudential Principle, Risk 
Management, and Security Improvement 
In e-banking practices in Indonesia, e-banking is regulated by Bank Indonesia, the 
Central Bank of Republic Indonesia as provided by its mandate given by LBI.
741
 The 
LBI provides the foundation for Bank Indonesia to regulate and safeguard the smooth 
operation of the payment system in order to achieve an efficient, expeditious, safe and 
reliable payment system.
742
 A payment system in this Act is defined as ‘a system which 
includes regulations, institutions, and mechanisms, used in conducting a transfer of 
funds in order to fulfil an obligation arising out of an economic activity’.
743
 
Bank Indonesia’s core task in payment system has been enumerated in articles 15 to 23 
of the LBI. In these articles, authority is given to Bank Indonesia to act and issue 
licences to any institutions that provide payment system services; payment systems 
institutions are obliged to report their activities; and payment system instruments are 
designated.
744
 The licensing role aims to ensure that all payment system providers fulfil 
minimum requirements in security and efficiency; the reporting obligation is introduced 
so that Bank Indonesia may oversee payment system data and practices; the payment 
system instruments are designated to ensure that all instruments used by the community 
meet the security requirements in accordance with the prudential principle and in 
compliance with international standards and best practice.
745  
The increasing development of non-payment instruments, especially payment cards and 
electronic based payment in Indonesia,
746
 has pushed Bank Indonesia (as the provider 
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 Bank Indonesia is the sole government authority body that under LBI 1999 that is authorised to 
provide and regulate the payment system. In accordance with this mandate, Bank Indonesia articulates its 
task to regulate payment system by enacting Bank Indonesia Regulations and/or Bank Indonesia decrees.  
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 Ibid art 15(1). 
745
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Indonesia [Excerpt of Law of 1999 on Bank Indonesia] (Indonesia) (2008) Bank Indonesia 
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 See full details of the development of payment card industry (figures, infrastructures, institutions, and 
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and regulator of the national payment system in Indonesia) to undertake various 
anticipated actions, including the first payment card regulation in 2005.
747
 The 
enactment of payment card regulation was expected to encourage the creation of a less-
cash society through the use of non-cash transactions that are more secure, prudent, and 
consumer protection oriented, which then (it was hoped) would be able to create greater 
security and increased comfort in the community in regard to payment card transactions. 
This was expected to ultimately improve the efficiency of the national economy and 
contribute to greater economic well-being.
748
  
As the regulator of the card payment industry, Bank Indonesia has issued various 
regulations for the implementation of payment system policy in the form of Bank 
Indonesia Regulations and Bank Indonesia Decrees.
749
 Not only has it issued new 
regulations, Bank Indonesia has also from time to time revised the out-of-date payment 
card regulation in an effort to improve prudential and consumer protection aspects in 
payment card operations.
750
 Bank Indonesia Regulations not only cover bank but also 
non-bank institutions;
751
 however, given that ATM/debit cards can only be issued by the 
bank as an institution that can collect and store consumers’ funds, this thesis only 
addresses regulation on banks as issuers of ATM/debit cards and their counterparts in 
payment card operations.
752
 
Basically, Bank Indonesia regulations and decrees consist of at least three different 
aspects, namely prudential regulation, risk mitigation and consumer protection 
aspects.
753
 However, instead of being under one comprehensive regulation, these three 
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aspects are scattered among various Bank Indonesia regulations and decrees. 
Regulations concerning payment cards are generally enacted by the Bank Indonesia 
Payment System Department. While some other regulations pertaining to risk 
management (including information security provisions), prudential regulation and 
consumer protection for e-banking activities were enacted by the Payment System 
Department, some were also enacted by the Bank Indonesia Banking Department.
754
  
5.2.2.1. Prudential Provisions for Payment Cards 
As a financial institution that manages huge amounts of consumers’ funds, a bank 
should always apply the prudential principle in all their activities to guarantee the safety 
of consumer funds and to create a sound, robust and secure banking industry in the 
Indonesia. Every bank in Indonesia is obliged to apply the prudential principle in their 
activities.
755
 Consequently, Bank Indonesia as the bank regulator and supervisor, has 
issued various provisions related to prudential principles. The prudential provisions 
were developed by referring to best practice and international standards.
756
  
In regard to the prudential principles aspect of ATM/debit card operation,
757
 various 
provisions make them manifest in the Bank Indonesia regulations and decrees. Among 
other things, regulation requires that a bank which intends to act as a Principal,
758
 
Issuer,
759
 and/or Acquirer
760
 obtain approval from Bank Indonesia.
761
 Some of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
emphasises on three regulating aspects. First, the payment system aspect, which consists of, among other 
things, regulations to ensure that e-payment instruments can be used safely, efficiently, promptly and 
reliably; second, the prudential regulation aspect, consisting of regulation to ensure the quality and 
integrity of e-payment activity and to enhance security and minimise fraud on e-payment activity; and 
third, the cardholder protection aspect, consisting of regulations to encourage issuers to implement 
consumer protection aspects and to educate cardholders in using their cards. 
754
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central bank functions such as payment system and monetary policy, will still reside with Bank Indonesia, 
as the Republic of Indonesia’s central bank. Hence, this thesis focuses only on Bank Indonesia’s payment 
system regulations and other Bank Indonesia’s relevant regulations. 
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 LB art 2. 
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Prudential Principles. 
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 Ibid art 1(9): ‘Issuer is Bank or Non-Bank Institution who issued payment card.’ 
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minimum requirements that must be met by the bank in order to obtain approval as 
payment card issuer include a number of documents that provide information regarding:  
 risk management readiness (which includes internal regulation concerning the 
active supervisory role of commissioners and directors, in particular in regard to 
management of payment card risks and the security policy for issuing payment card 
instruments); 
 security control procedures, such as PIN management and card delivery, 
segregation of duties in the payment card process, authentication process, audit trail 
of cardholder activities, data integrity assurance, and confidentiality of cardholder 
identity; 
 reputation risk and operational risk management, which should at least include: 
information regarding benefit and risk of having payment card instruments, disaster 
recovery plan, and business continuity plan. Specific to operational risk 
management, the issuer of payment cards has an obligation to manage operational 
risk, by (among other things) using proven technology which includes the presence 
of various aspects of an information technology security system, such as two factor 
authentication, confidentiality, data integrity, authentication system and data, non-
repudiation, and availability.
762
 
 audit trail system and procedures; 
 good results from an information technology audit that show the employment of 
proven technology in payment card operations and fulfilment of requirements for 
security on system and network;
763
 
 the bank as an acquirer has an obligation to educate and nurture its merchants, and 
stop cooperation with merchants if they perform actions that could harm others, 
such as collusion with fraudsters to steal consumers’ card data, perform cash 
withdrawal transactions, and so on.
764
 
 cooperation of the bank with other parties (such as a switching company, card 
manufacturer, and so on) to provide support for payment card operations. The 
banks are obligated to fulfil all Bank Indonesia’s prudential provisions concerning 
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[is] able to process payment card data issued by other parties.’ 
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 Ibid arts 2(2), 5(2), 7(2). 
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their relations with other parties, and abide by the Bank Indonesia Regulation 
concerning Implementation of Information Technology Risk Management for 
Banks. Such banks also have to have evidence regarding their counterparts’ system 
reliability, security and confidentiality (should be proven by an audit of information 
technology by an independent IT auditor).
765
  
5.2.2.2. Risk Management for Payment Cards 
Bank Indonesia has set forth some risk management provisions in various Bank 
Indonesia regulations, to ensure that bank payment card operations are in conformity 
with Bank Indonesia’s minimum risk management standard.
766
 According to Bank 
Indonesia, risk management is a series of procedures and methodology employed to 
identify, measure, monitor, and control risks arising from the business operations of a 
bank.
767
 Risks that have to be managed encompass various risks such as credit risk, 
market risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, legal risk, strategic risk and compliance 
risk.
768
 
In general, banks are obliged to apply effective risk management principles in their 
operations, which should be commensurate with the goal, business policy, size and 
complexity of its business, and the capacity of the bank. Application of a bank’s risk 
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 Ibid arts 13, 21. The provision of article 21 of BIR-CBPI before it was amended has a ‘liability rule’ 
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management should encompass at least the following aspects: a) active supervision by 
the Board of Commissioners and Board of Directors; b) adequacy of policy, procedure, 
and establishment of limits; c) adequacy of processes of identification, measurement, 
monitoring, and control of risks and the risk management information system; and d) 
comprehensive internal control system.
769
  
Understanding that the use of information technology in the bank’s e-banking 
operations could also increase bank risk, Bank Indonesia has enacted special regulations 
in the information technology area concerning ‘Implementation of Risk Management in 
the Use of Information Technology by Commercial Banks’ (‘IT Risk Management’).
770
 
In providing e-banking services, banks should consider the prudential principles for 
banking, the security and integrity of their IT systems, cost effectiveness, and 
implementation of adequate consumer protection as well as measures in line with the 
bank’s business strategy.
771
 
Based on this IT Risk Management regulation, Bank Indonesia has obliged banks to 
implement effective risk management in the use of information technology, which 
should at least include active supervision by the Board of Commissioners and Directors, 
sufficient policies and procedures for information technology use; adequate processes 
for identification, measurement, monitoring and risk control in the use of information 
technology; and internal control systems for the use of information technology.
772
 This 
provision is an obligation of banks regardless of whether the implementation and 
operation of information technology is done by the bank itself or by a third party service 
provider.
773
 Further, this regulation also obliged banks to identify risks that may arise 
from e-banking activities, whether resulting from the product itself or from the use of 
information technology as consequence of using electronic delivery channel. Hence in 
order to able to calculate and forecast the occurrence or probability of risk posed by an 
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e-banking product, banks must develop a loss event database (historical database),
774
 
and perform risk mitigation on general risk and specific risk that may arise in e-banking 
service provision.
775
 
From the technological and security regulation perspective, many Bank Indonesia 
regulations in the payment card area are intended to prevent and reduce crime and 
simultaneously enhance public confidence in the payment card in Indonesia.
776
 Payment 
card issuers are required to enhance the security of the technology used in their payment 
card system.
777
 As result, Bank Indonesia has enacted some special provisions 
concerning risk management in payment card operations. These provisions include:  
 Banks who issue ATM/debit cards are obliged to implement the risk management 
principle in their payment card system in accordance with Bank Indonesia’s risk 
management provisions.
778
 For instance, pertaining to new electronic banking 
products, banks should prove their readiness to implement risk management, 
especially in security control to ensure the fulfilment of the principles of 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, non-repudiation and availability.
779
  
 To reduce exacerbated losses in the occurrence of fraud and to assist issuers in 
managing their liquidity, issuer banks are obliged to observe security and proper 
controls in the issuance of ATM cards. This includes the following measures:  
  The maximum nominal limit of transferable funds between accounts of different 
banks through ATMs shall be set at IDR25 million per account in one day. This 
provision does not apply if the transfer is made to an account at the same bank. 
  The maximum cash withdrawal limit using ATM cards and credit cards on 
ATMs shall be IDR10 million per account in one day.
780
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5.2.2.3. Security Improvement for Payment Cards 
The improvement of payment card security is aimed to minimise crime/fraud, and also 
to improve public confidence pertaining to payment card usage. Some provisions in 
Bank Indonesia Regulations have enumerated quite detailed material regarding principle 
or ‘security standards’ that should be employed by banks in their e-banking operations. 
The following are among these set standards. 
 In the authentication method employed, banks should implement at least two factor 
authentication, that is ‘what you know’ (PIN, password), ‘what you have” 
(magnetic cards with chips, token, digital signature), “something you are” or 
“biometric” (retinal image, fingerprint); 
 maximum limit for incorrect PIN attempt inputs and its logged list should be set, in 
order to avoid unauthorised access and collect possible evidence of fraud; 
 non-repudiation aspect, so all transactions are credible; 
 segregation of duties in the e-banking operation; 
 installation of antivirus software to minimise external threats such as viruses and 
malicious transactions at all entry points and each computer system and software to 
detect intrusion (intrusion detection system); 
 conduct of periodic penetration testing on internal and external networks; 
 testing of the integrity of e-banking transactions data; 
 availability of a clear audit trail mechanism for all e-banking transactions; 
 performance of detection and monitoring of unauthorised transactions, that is, using 
IDS and/or fraud detection system (neural network); 
 protection of the confidentiality of e-banking information, and so on.781 
Pertaining to improving the security technology employed in the ATM/debit card 
system, issuer banks are obligated to use reliable and secure systems, maintain and 
improve payment card security technology, have written policy and standard operating 
procedure for payment card activities management, and safeguard the security and 
confidentiality of payment card data.
782
 Improvements should be made to the security of 
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the cards themselves and that of the entire payment card system processing or 
technological infrastructure, as follows:  
 by implementing chip technology and a six digit PIN,783 the use of which would 
also function as a replacement of the cardholder’s handwritten signature.
784
 All 
banks will be obliged to use and process on-line ATM/debit card transactions with 
chip technology and six digits PIN as a sole authentication method at the end year 
2020,
785
 without a fallback option of magnetic stripe technology if a chip card for 
some reasons could not be processed.
786
  
 by implementing physical security control on equipment and rooms to protect 
consumers and their transactions from the danger of theft, sabotage and other 
criminal action so as to improve consumer comfort and security in ATM and EFT-
POS transactions that involve the use of physical equipment like ATMs; and by 
performing routine monitoring to ensure the security and comfort of consumers 
using e-banking services.
787
 
 by ensuring the availability of security measures on data transmission between 
Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) terminals and the host computer to protect against 
risks of transmission error, network disturbance, unauthorised access, and so on. 
Security measures shall comprise equipment control, monitoring of quality and 
accuracy of network equipment performance and transmission lines, as well as 
monitoring access to controller software (‘Host-Front End’).
788
 
 by ensuring that the party providing Point of Sale (POS) terminals always increases 
physical security in the vicinity of POS terminals and of the POS terminals 
themselves by (amongst other measures) using POS terminals that minimise the 
possibility of interception on such POS terminals or in the party’s communication 
network. (Point of Sales (POS)/Electronic Data Capture (EDC) enables electronic 
funds transfer from a customer’s account to an acquirer or merchant’s account for 
payment of a transaction.) It should be noted that while transactions undertaken via 
POS terminals located in shopping centres or supermarkets generally involve a 
                                                          
783
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card-based payment instrument supplied by an issuer bank, POS may be provided 
by the bank itself, or financial acquirer, technical acquirer or switching company.
789
  
5.3. Legal and Regulatory Framework for Consumer Protection in 
ATM/Debit Card Transactions in Indonesia 
5.3.1. Legal Framework for Consumer Protection 
5.3.1.1. Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945 
Indonesia is a unitary state governed by the rule of law. As a rule of law country, the 
protection of the human rights of all citizens within the country is necessary and has 
become a basic characteristic of Indonesia as rule of law country (rechtsstaat).
790
 
Indonesia has also embraced democratic principles in the economic sector. Hence, 
democracy in its economic aspects requires that each citizen is equally able to be 
involved in actively participating in economic activities, such as in the trade and 
production of goods and services. 
In Indonesia, the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia has become the highest 
manifestation of the rule of law.
791
 Since human rights are accepted as a factor in 
Indonesia as a state law country, consumer protection has automatically become an 
integral part of the human rights principles embraced by the country.
792
  
Consumer protection as part of a citizen’s basic rights in Indonesia can be found in the 
paragraph 4 of the Preamble to the Constitution of Indonesia 1945, which highlights the 
country’s promises to protect the people, improve people’s general welfare and 
intellectual life based on principles of ‘freedom, abiding peace and social justice’. 
Further, the legal protection concerning basic rights and obligations of Indonesia 
consumers is enumerated more clearly in several provisions of the Constitution, as 
follows:  
                                                          
789
 Ibid appendix 1, art 8.4.2.2.e. 
790
 See Consideration Section of Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 12 Tahun 2011 Tentang 
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 every person is entitled to (legal) recognition, security, protection, legal certainty, 
and equal treatment before the law;
793
 and 
 every person is entitled to the protection of her/himself, family, honour, dignity and 
property under their authority, and is entitled to the sense of security and protection 
from the threat of fear to do or not do something that is a fundamental right.
794
  
As a consequence, based on provision in Article 28D of the Constitution, legislators 
have created in various Acts and regulations governing the rights and obligations of 
consumer, with the aim to protect every citizen’s right in the country.
795
 Meanwhile, it 
is deemed appropriate that Article 28G(1) of the Constitution (the second dot point 
above and especially the second part) applies when an ATM/debit card consumer 
conducts an ATM/debit card transaction at consumer activated terminals. 
5.3.1.2. Law No 8 of 1999 on Customer Protection (LCP)796 
In line with the increasing awareness of the law to protect the consumer in more 
complex economic transactions, the Indonesian government and the legislature has 
issued the LCP, which became effective on 20 April 2000. Acknowledgment of this 
complex economic market has led to law reform in regard to the relationship between 
producer and consumer. The law reform itself marked a paradigm shift in the 
relationship between the producer and the consumer, where the relationship that was 
previously based on the doctrine of caveat emptor
797
 (‘let the buyer beware’) has 
changed into a doctrine of caveat venditor
798
 (‘let the seller beware’).
799
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 Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia 1945 [Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945] 
arts 28D(1), 28H.  
794
 Ibid art 28G(1).  
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(Universitas Indonesia, 2004) 78.  
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This development of consumer protection in the LCP is also in line with the 
development of consumer protection in many developed countries’ regulations and/or 
international guidelines and standards (such as the United Nations (UN) Guidelines for 
Consumer Protection) where legal reforms have been made relating to product 
liability.
800
 One of the main reasons for reforms in the consumer protection law is to 
facilitate and simplify the provision of compensation for consumers who suffer losses 
due to using business actors’ products and/or services in the community.
801
  
As a result, the provisions and scope of LCP are quite similar to the UN Guidelines for 
Consumer Protection.
802
 According to Sidabalok, a prominent consumer protection 
expert in Indonesia, this similarity is evidence that consumer protection is a universal 
issue that has been formulated by many international organisations and shaped the 
guidelines for many countries’ consumer protection enactments, including those of 
Indonesia.
803
 
LCP was enacted to serve as a strong legal foundation to empower consumers by means 
of improving their dignity, awareness, knowledge, concern, ability and independence so 
as to enable them to protect themselves, and to create and develop responsible 
behaviour on the part of business actor.
804
 The establishment of LCP also aimed to 
protect consumer interests in an integrated and comprehensive manner, which can be 
effectively enforced in the community. It was not designed to put business actors out of 
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business.
805
 It was written in the spirit of creating a balance of protection between the 
consumer and business actor’s interests in order to create a healthy and just economy.
806
 
Consumer protection in Indonesia has a broad scope, that is, it covers protection of 
consumer goods and services,
807
 including various aspects related to the consequences 
arising from the use of goods and services. One of the main aspects of consumer 
protection in Indonesia is the question of the responsibility of the business actor for 
damages arising from the use of their goods and/or services.
808
 
Some provisions in the LCP that are vital in ATM/debit card transactions to empower 
consumer protection in Indonesia.
809
 These include that: 
 Consumer protection is based on the principles of consumer benefit, justice, 
balance, security and safety, and legal certainty;
810
 
 Consumer protection goals include (among others) to improve the quality of the 
goods and/or services which will guarantee that businesses will continue producing 
goods and/or services, conforming with the health, comfort, security and safety 
requirements of consumers;
811
 
 The rights and obligations of the consumers and business actors are enumerated 
quite exhaustively. What become rights for consumers on one hand will become 
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obligations for business actors on the other hand  and vice versa. Some rights and 
obligations that relevant to the thesis are set out in the Table 2 below:
812
 
Table 2: Consumer Rights v Business actor Obligations  
Consumer Rights Business actor Obligations 
To obtain comfort, security and safety in 
using or consuming the goods and/or 
services. 
To act in good faith in conducting the 
business. 
To obtain correct, clear and honest 
information on the condition and warranty 
of the goods and/or services;  
To obtain consumer training and education. 
To provide correct, clear and honest 
information with regard to goods and/or 
services. 
To be heard when expressing opinions on 
and complaints about the goods and/or 
services the used or consumed. 
 
To treat and serve the consumers properly 
and honestly and in a non-discriminatory 
manner. 
To obtain proper advocacy, protection and 
settlement in consumer protection disputes. 
To obtain compensation, redress, and/or 
substitution, if the goods and/or services 
received are not in accord with the 
agreement or not received as requested. 
To provide compensation, redress and/or 
substitution for the damages caused by the 
use, consumption and application of the 
goods and/or services; or if the goods and/or 
service received or used do not accord with 
the agreement. 
To obtain rights as regulated in the other 
provisions of the law. 
 
 
Business actor Rights Consumer Obligations 
To receive payment in accordance with the 
sales agreement on the conditions and 
conversion value of the goods and//or 
services. 
To pay the price in accordance with the 
agreed conversing on value. 
To obtain legal protection from consumers 
who act in bad faith. 
To act in good faith in performing the 
transaction of purchasing the goods and/or 
services. 
To undertake proper self-defence in the 
legal settlement of a consumer’s dispute. 
To follow the proper legal settlement in a 
consumer protection dispute. 
To rehabilitate its good reputation if it is 
legally proven that the consumer’s damage 
is not caused by the goods and/or service 
purchased. 
To read or follow the information 
instructions and application or usage 
procedures of the goods and/or services for 
security and safety. 
To obtain rights as regulated in the other 
provisions of the law. 
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 In offering the goods and/or services for trading, the business actors are prohibited 
from making or including a standard clause in each document and/or agreement, 
among others if it states the transfer of the business actor’s responsibility, and/or if 
it regulates matters related to proving the loss of use of the goods or utilisation of 
the services purchased by consumers. These provisions are intended to ensure that 
consumers should have an equal position to the business actor on the basis of the 
principle of the freedom to make a contract. Violation by an business actor of the 
standard clause provisions in this law can cause the agreement to be deemed invalid 
(null and void).
813
  
5.3.2. Regulatory Framework for Consumer Protection 
In order to maintain public confidence in payment card activities, Bank Indonesia 
continuously strives to ensure that the e-payment industry in Indonesia operates in a 
nurturing and efficient environment. One important aspect that will always be a goal for 
Bank Indonesia is to achieve sound payment system operations in Indonesia where there 
is an effective and efficient implementation of customer protection principles in 
payment card operations.
814
  
Consumer protection as an issue in the Indonesian banking industry has become more 
prevalent with the implementation of Indonesian Banking Architecture (Arsitektur 
Perbankan Indonesia (API)),
815
 where one of the six API pillars is ‘realizing the 
empowerment and the protection of consumer of banking services.’
816
 It demonstrates 
the commitment of Bank Indonesia as a regulator and supervisor of the banking industry 
to balance the consumer’s position with that of banks. To achieve this goal, society, the 
banking industry and Bank Indonesia together create a mechanism for consumer 
complaints, establish a banking mediation body, increase transparency of information 
products, and educate consumers concerning bank products and services, including their 
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inherent risks.
817
 As a result, customer protection provisions exist in almost all Bank 
Indonesia regulations and decrees. 
In payment card regulation, all institutions involved in the payment card operations are 
urged to pay attention to consumer interest and safety. In addition to this, consumer 
education is an important aspect that is supposed to be highlighted by banks in their 
information technology operations.
818
 Understanding the significant element of 
consumer protection in banking operations (especially in the payment card system), 
Bank Indonesia has enacted some regulations with many provisions concerning the 
consumer protection issue in the payment card activities. A number of these are outlined 
below. 
5.3.2.1. Consumer Education 
Generally, consumer choices of bank products are often based more on benefits or 
advantages to be derived from such products as explained by the banks. Typically, 
banks prefer to explain only the benefits of a product as opposed to the costs or inherent 
risks associated with it. Banks do this to win consumers’ hearts for the sake of bank 
revenue, reputation and consumer confidence. Hence, the rights of consumers to obtain 
a complete, accurate, current, and complete information regarding bank products 
(including their inherent risks) from banks, as banks are obliged to provide under the 
consumer protection laws, are often not fulfilled. Consequently, a dispute often then 
arises between the bank and its customers in practice. Such disputes can arise due to 
gaps in information about the characteristics of the products offered by banks to 
customers. 
Therefore, transparency of information about all aspects of bank products becomes a 
necessity that cannot be avoided if banking institutions are to maintain their credibility 
and consumer rights be protected (as mandated by LCP).
819
 To overcome these 
problems, Bank Indonesia has enacted Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 
7/6/PBI/2005 Concerning Banking Product Information Transparency and Personal 
Consumer Data. 
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In this regulation, Bank Indonesia has asserted that in order to improve consumer 
protection, transparency in bank product information is very important to banking 
customers so that they can really understand clearly about the benefits and pertinent 
risks associated with the products.
820
 Consequently, banks are obliged to create a 
written policy and procedure in implementing transparency of information regarding 
bank products. This includes: (1) banks being obliged to provide complete and clear 
written information in Bahasa Indonesia regarding the characteristics of each bank 
product;
821
 (2) such information to contain as a minimum the name, type, benefit and 
risk associated with the products, their requirements and how to use the product, and 
cost of product (in terms of risk, there should be a balance between potential benefit 
versus risk that may arise to the consumers).
822
 
In regard to consumer education, banks must educate e-banking customers in an attempt 
to make consumers understand the risks involved in e-banking. Customer education is 
to comprise the rights, obligations and responsibilities of all related parties. Education 
must at least be given when customers apply for e-banking service. Items about which 
consumers need to be educated are (amongst others) in regard to the importance of 
keeping PIN/password secure, for example, by: 
 keeping PIN/password confidential and not disclosed to anyone including bank 
employees; 
 periodically changing PIN/password; 
 using PIN/password that is not easy to predict (not using personal information such 
as date of birth); 
 not writing down the PIN/password; 
 ensuring that the PIN for one product is different from the PIN for another;823 
 implementing prudential principles when using ATMs, which include: a) 
examining the security of the environment around the ATM before deciding to 
                                                          
820
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draw money; and b) ensuring that the money and the card are already retrieved 
before leaving the ATM location.
824
 
In educating their customers, ATM/debit card issuers are obliged to provide written 
information to cardholders using simple Bahasa Indonesia language, readable font, and 
delivered to consumer in the appropriate manner and in a timely fashion. Issuers of 
ATM/debit cards should submit the written information mentioned above directly to 
their potential customer or to the cardholder/consumer’s address using media such as a 
consumer request form, welcome pack, pamphlet, and/or notice/information letter. In 
the event that there have been changes to the substance of the information, the issuer of 
the payment card must re-submit the amended written information to the consumers 
using similar procedures.
825
 Issuers are also obliged to provide ‘hotline’ telephone 
access for consumers, to ensure that consumers have an easy access to verify bank 
facilities and/or information.
826 This written information should at least include: 
 procedure and user guidelines regarding the use of ATM/debit cards, facility 
attached to an ATM/debit card, and risks that might arise from the use of 
ATM/debit card; 
 rights and obligations of ATM/debit card cardholders, which at least includes: 
   important aspects that should be scrutinised by cardholders, including all risks 
that might arise from the use of ATM/debit card, such as a warning not to share 
PIN with others and precautions to be used when consumers conduct 
transactions in ATMs; 
   rights and obligations of cardholders and/or issuers of ATM/debit cards in case 
‘something bad’ happens that could cause a loss to the consumer or issuer 
bank, such as when unauthorised payment card transactions occur, bank 
systems malfunction, and so on.
827
 
   procedures for filing complaints related to problems with the use of ATM/debit 
cards and duration of the complaint handling.
828
 
                                                          
824
 Ibid appendix 1 art 8.4.2.3.e.12)(a)(b). 
825
 BID-CP & Security art VII.A.4.ab. 
826
 BIR-CBPI art 23. See also BID-CP & Security art VII.A.1.a, b. See also BIR-TBPI&UBCPD arts 48; 
Surat Edaran Bank Indonesia Nomor 7/25/DPNP Perihal Transparansi Informasi Produk Bank dan 
Penggunaan Data Pribadi Nasabah [Bank Indonesia Decree Number 7/25/DPNP Concerning 
Transparency of Bank Product Information and the Use of Bank Customers' Personal Data] art II. 
827
 BID-CP & Security art VII.A.2. 
828
 Ibid. 
 
189 
 
  
5.3.2.2. Resolution of Consumer Complaints 
In banking practice that involves customer activities, very frequently the rights of 
customers are not routinely nor duly upheld by banks, leading to disputes between them, 
as indicated by the increasing customer complaint incidents related in the mass media or 
in online forums. Such situations, if not resolved quickly and in an appropriate way, can 
potentially develop into prolonged disputes that will cause greater loss to both parties.
829
 
The increasing number of complaints that are reported in the media
830
 may create 
reputational risk for banks and have a corrosive effect on public confidence in banking 
products and services. Therefore, to mitigate these problems, Bank Indonesia has 
enacted Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 7/7/PBI/2005 Concerning Resolution of 
Customer Complaints as amended by Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 
10/10/PBI/2008 to minimise reputation risk, which urges banks to establish an effective 
mechanism for resolution of customer complaints within an adequate timeframe. This 
regulation also aims to empower customers in their dealings with the banks in regard to 
their problems.
831
 
Some of the important provisions for customer interest in this regulation are that: 
 Banks are required to resolve each complaint lodged by a customer and/or their 
representatives related to their financial transaction using comprehensive 
procedures covering activities to receive complaints, to handle and resolve 
complaints, and to monitor complaint handling and resolution;
832
 
 It is among the responsibilities of a bank’s board of directors that they must ensure 
that their bank meets the requirement to have a unit and/or function established 
specifically to handle and resolve customer complaints and publish them to the 
public;
833
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 Banks, at any time, may be required to explain and provide information about the 
complaint when the customer requests an explanation about the status of the lodged 
complaint. For complaints in writing, banks should convey the result also in 
writing.
834
 
5.3.2.3. Consumer Protection in Payment System Services  
Bank Indonesia recognises that in the relationship between banks and consumers, 
consumers are often in a weak position. The weakness is caused by an imbalance in the 
relationship between banks and consumers, which is partly due to asymmetric 
information distribution, power imbalances, poor quality of service to consumers, 
misuse of consumer personal data, and lack of effective mechanisms for resolving 
disputes between banks and consumers.
835
 
In this regard, Bank Indonesia felt the need to establish a culture of consumer protection 
based on international standards for the payment systems services industry in Indonesia. 
The international standards and best practice are also used by Bank Indonesia in order to 
improve legislation as well as security and efficiency in the country’s payment 
system.
836
 To achieve these goals, Bank Indonesia has issued Bank Indonesia 
Regulation Number 16/1/PBI/2014 Concerning Consumer Protection on Payment 
System Services on 16 January 2014. The regulation includes several important 
principles. Among them are the principles of fairness and reliability, transparency, 
protection of personal data, as well as the effective handling and resolution of customer 
complaints.
837
 
Apart from those important principles, this regulation also includes some other 
important provisions, among them: 
 a prohibition of any ‘hard to read’ standard clause in the agreement between the 
bank and the consumer which by its location or shape is hardly visible or cannot be 
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read clearly or is difficult for consumers to understand, and any such clause that has 
the effect of shifting liability from the bank to the consumer;
838
 
 an obligation on the banks to:  
 provide a reliable system and maintain the confidentiality of data and consumer 
information in the operation of their payment system services;
839
 
 be liable for consumer losses incurred due to the fault of a provider’s 
management and/or staff;
840
 However, again, there is no provision in this 
regulation concerning fraud liability for payment card transactions. 
 provide information about the benefits, risks, and consequences for consumers in 
the use of the bank’s payment system services;
841
 and 
 have a consumer complaints handling mechanism and implement it. This 
includes activities such as receipt of consumer complaints, the handling and 
resolution of such complaints, and monitoring the handling and resolution.
842
  
5.4. Legal and Regulatory Framework of Liability Rules on Unauthorised 
ATM/Debit Card Transactions in Indonesia 
5.4.1. Legal Framework of Liability Rules 
5.4.1.1. The Indonesian Civil Code: Tortious Liability 
Liability is one of the most significant terms in the field of law, especially in the civil 
law area. In general, liability provision based on fault or negligence, also known as 
liability based on tort law (in Indonesia, known as tanggung gugat),
843
 can be found in 
articles 1365 to 1369 of Indonesia’s Civil Code of 1848. Pertaining to liability issues 
that occur in the event of unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions, the relevant 
provisions that fit the situation are Articles 1365, 1366, and 1367 of Indonesia’s Civil 
Code.  
                                                          
838
 See Peraturan Bank Indonesia Nomor 16/1/PBI/2014 Tentang Perlindungan Konsumen Jasa Sistem 
Pembayaran [Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 16/1/PBI/2014 Concerning Consumer Protection on 
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standard clause to those in LCP 1999 art 18. 
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According to Article 1365 of Indonesia’s Civil Code, a party who commits an [at] fault 
or negligent act which causes damage to another party shall be obliged to compensate 
the damage. Meanwhile Article 1366 of Indonesia’s Civil Code further explains that the 
liability for an act as mentioned in Article 1365 exists not only in relation to an 
intentional act by the party responsible for the damage, but also includes any damages 
that were incurred due to the party’s negligence or recklessness (incautious conduct). 
These provisions are probably some of the most popular provisions used in the civil 
lawsuit practices in Indonesia. Typically, in every tort case in the Indonesian courts 
where compensation is sought for damages that have occurred as a consequence of one 
party’s action, this provision is the basis for the suit.  
An action undertaken by one party will be considered as a tort if the act was contrary to 
the law in general. ‘The law’ here not only refers to formal regulations but also includes 
unwritten law such as customs, prudential behaviour, and/or other matters that normally 
the community should abide by. The damages that result from the tort can only be 
claimed when (a) there is a correlation between the act and the loss; and (b) loss arising 
is due to the fault of the offender, whether arising by intention or due to negligence. 
Tort or unlawful act is not only by commission of an act (doing something) but also an 
‘act’ of omission (failure to do something).
844
 
Indonesia’s Civil Code also states that each person/institution is not only liable for 
damage caused by their own actions, but also for damage caused by acts of their 
dependants (vicarious liability), or caused by items or infrastructure under their control 
(occupiers’ liability).
845
  
Further, Hassanah
846
 and Ratnawati
847
 argue that tort doctrine as contained in Articles 
1365 to 1369 of the Indonesian Civil Code can be used within or outside of court 
(arbitrage, mediation, and so on) to claim restitution from banks or other financial 
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institutions. However, the party should prove that the loss of customer funds occurred 
owing to a bank’s fault or negligence.
848
  
5.4.1.2. Law on Information and Electronic Transactions (LIET) 
LIET is a very important piece of legislation for the development of e-banking in 
Indonesia. Even though this Act does not directly regulate e-banking, it is concerned 
with the validity or acceptability of, among other things, electronic 
information/documents, electronic signatures and electronic contracts for the purposes 
of EFTs, provided that they are generated by an electronic system in compliance with 
the requirements set out in LIET.  
In regard to liability,
849
 LIET governs civil and criminal liabilities arising from 
electronic transactions.
850
 LIET makes all electronic system providers, including 
financial institutions, principally responsible for the reliability and security of their 
electronic systems, including their electronic agents.
851
  
In regard to civil liability, Article 12 of the law prescribes that anyone who fails to act 
prudently to avoid unauthorised use of an electronic signature and secure the use of such 
signature in the electronic transaction should be liable for the damage that occurs.
852
 
Meanwhile, Article 15 of this law articulates the general principle that all electronic 
system providers should be responsible for the reliability and security of their electronic 
systems, including for the organisation of their electronic system.
853
 Further, Article 21 
prescribes the liability rule in more detail and differentiates it on whether the transaction 
is done in person, by authority, or whether it is done through electronic agents in the 
following terms: 
 all legal outcomes due to the execution of an electronic transaction shall become 
the responsibility of the parties doing the transaction if it is performed by 
himself/herself; 
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 all legal outcomes due to the engagement of an electronic transaction shall become 
the responsibility of the person who gives the authority if it is performed by means 
of authorisation; or 
 all legal outcomes in the execution of an electronic transaction shall become the 
responsibility of the electronic agent organiser if it is performed through an 
electronic agent.
854
 
Apart from the general liability principles regarding electronic signature and electronic 
transactions outlined above, LIET also stipulates specific provisions in regard of 
damages that occur pertaining to electronic agent operation. According to Article 21 of 
LIET, if the loss in an electronic transaction occurs due to the operation failure of the 
electronic agent caused by the third party’s action directly on the electronic system, all 
legal outcomes shall become the responsibility of the electronic agent organiser.
855
 
Conversely, if it can be proved that the failure of the operation of the electronic agent is 
caused by an act of God (force majeure) or the consumer’s own fault or negligence, 
then all legal outcomes shall become the responsibility of said consumer.
856
  
In regard to the implementation and provision of information technology to consumers, 
Makarim argues that besides fault/negligent liability or presumed liability that explicitly 
is contained in LIET, strict liability is nevertheless also adopted in the LIET. Therefore, 
he proposed that strict liability should also be applied in regards to the operation of 
information technology based on its nature and complexity, and the need to protect 
public interest and confidence in respect of information security.
857
  
5.4.1.3. Law No 8 of 1999 on Customer Protection (LCP) 
The bank’s liability is set out in Article 19 to Article 28 in Chapter VI of the LCP.
858
 
According to the LCP, in essence, a business agent shall be liable to provide 
compensation for damage, contamination, and/or losses sustained by consumers as a 
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result of using goods and/or services produced or traded.
859
 The compensation itself can 
be in the form of cash or in another form which is of similar value (such as the goods, 
services, health maintenance, and so on),
860
 and should be payable within an interval of 
seven days from the date of the transaction.
861
 However, business agent liability will be 
deemed void if the business agent can prove that the damage or loss is caused by the 
consumer’s own fault.
862
 However, the law did not elaborate on what is meant by the 
‘fault of the consumer’. 
Samsul, a parliamentary expert staffer and prominent lecturer in consumer law, argues 
that to some extent, LCP contains good protection provisions for consumers. According 
to him, the LCP has adopted liability based on the fault/negligence principle:  
 First, a business entity will always be deemed to be at fault or negligent 
(presumption of negligence); and  
 Second, an business actor/business entity will be responsible for any damages 
incurred (presumption of liability principle).  
Hence, the business actor entity will be always deemed responsible for any damage 
incurred by consumers (presumed liability), unless the business entity can prove that the 
consumer is the one who is at fault or has demonstrated negligence (contributory 
negligence doctrine).
863
 Thus the onus is on the business actor entity to prove the 
consumer is at fault or negligent in order to avoid liability; the onus is not on the 
consumer to prove the bank is negligent or at fault. Therefore, one can assume that in 
terms of liability for electronic transactions, the LCP adopts liability rules based on fault 
or negligence (fault/negligence liability). However, there is no further explanation in 
this legislation as to what constitutes ‘fault’ or ‘negligence’, especially in electronic 
funds transactions.  
5.4.2. Regulatory Framework for Liability Rules 
Liability regulation in the payment system is one aspect that probably is missing from 
many payments system regulations in Indonesia. In terms of fraud risk, most regulatory 
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content only focuses on risk management and the improvement of security features that 
should be applied by banks. Provisions regarding the rights and obligations of banks 
and consumers in the event of fraud are relatively absent from those regulations. In 
contrast, such regulations have been embraced quite widely in other countries as part of 
the provisions for consumer protection. 
5.4.2.1. Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 14/2/PBI/2012 (BIR-CBPI) 
Nevertheless, Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 14/2/PBI/2012 Concerning 
Amendment of Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 11/11/PBI/2009 Concerning 
Operation of Card-Based Payment Instrument Activities (BIR-CBPI) can to some extent 
be utilised in determining parties’ responsibilities and/or liabilities in regard to the 
occurrence of unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions.  
In this regulation, the ATM/debit card issuer is obliged to implement risk management, 
which includes that concerning liquidity, operational matters, and information 
technology implementation. As part of risk management implementation, issuers of 
ATM/debit card ‘shall be financially ready to meet their liability (payment obligation) 
that might arise in the event of ATM/Debit card fraud’.
864
  
The last sentence above is the only provision on liability contained in the whole of Bank 
Indonesia regulation in the field of payment systems. Nevertheless, from the inclusion 
of the phrase ‘that might arise’ in the provision above, one can infer that there should be 
one or more conditions which should be met before the issuer is liable to pay for the 
damage. It is unfortunate that there is no further information or rules in the regulations 
concerning the sort of conditions that should be met before a bank is obliged to pay for 
the damage.  
5.4.2.2. Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 13/25/PBI/2011 
As more bank payment system instruments (such as the payment card system) 
increasingly rely on information and network technology, banks tend to outsource some 
of the technological aspects of their system to vendors, partners or other third parties for 
better solutions and service.
865
 It is very common now in payment card operations that 
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for the sake of efficiency and/or interoperability of ATM/debit card transactions, issuers 
and/or acquirers of ATM/debit cards might outsource some of their card operations to a 
third party.  
In payment card operations, there are various points of compromise for identity theft 
that can be attacked. The location of points of compromise spread out from cardholder, 
through consumer activated terminal, line communications, and to the bank and/or third 
party’s host computer. Thus, in practice, the institution that manages the payment card 
system at the point of compromise can be the issuer or acquirer, consumer, or another 
party to which operations are outsourced. Accordingly, there will be some complexity 
in determining which party should be legally responsible for the security of the 
compromised point in the payment card system: the consumer, the outsourced party or 
the issuer/acquirer bank. 
To answer this question, Bank Indonesia has enacted Bank Indonesia Regulation 
Number 13/25/PBI/2011 concerning Prudential Principles for Commercial Banks which 
Outsource Some Parts of their Works to Another Party. This provision might be used as 
a guide for determining the party that should be responsible for identity theft/fraud that 
occurs in the party to which the bank has outsourced part of its operations. According to 
the regulation, the bank is the one which should be responsible for such occasions.
866
 
Banks are also prohibited to outsource if this results in a shift of responsibility or risk to 
the associated outsourced party.
867
 This regulation aims to enforce prudential principles 
and risk management in banking operations in accordance with empowering consumer 
protection. The integrity of the banking system specifically and the financial system in 
general can be achieved.  
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5.5. Lessons to be Learned from Other Jurisdictions Pertaining to Fraud 
Liability Rules on Unauthorised ATM/Debit Card Transactions 
5.5.1. United States: Electronic Fund Transfer Act 1978 and Regulation E 
In the United States, the statutory and regulatory law that governs the relationship 
between the financial institution and the consumer whose deposit account is being 
debited or credited is the Electronic Fund Transfer Act 1978 (EFTA) (Codified at 15 
USC §§ 16931693r) and its implementing regulation, Regulation E (12 CFR pt 
205).
868
 Four common consumer electronic funds transfer services that are governed by 
EFTA are ATM transactions (such as cash withdrawals or deposits or transfers between 
accounts), pay-by-phone services (where consumers order their financial institution to 
make payments to another), EFT at point-of-sale system (EFTPOS) transactions (where 
funds are moved from a consumer’s account in a bank to a merchant’s account through 
use of a computer terminal at the merchant’s place of business); and automated clearing 
house (ACH) transactions where a consumer’s account is automatically debited for a 
recurring payment, or is regularly credited with wages, pension, and the like.
869
  
EFTA was enacted by the Congress to provide a basic framework establishing the 
rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of participants in the electronic funds transfer 
system (15 USC § 1693(b) (EFTA § 902(b)). It provides a basic framework of 
provisions to protect individual consumer’s rights.
870
 Meanwhile, Regulation E, which 
was adopted by the Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve Bank, is 
accompanied by an Official Staff Commentary, containing specific rules, examples, and 
guidance for financial institutions and practitioners on many specific issues of electronic 
funds transfers.
871
 Basically, EFTA and Regulation E address two main areas in funds 
transfer operations, namely the adoption of a mandatory error-resolution process for 
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electronic funds transfers (Regulation E, 12 CFR § 205.11) and liability for 
unauthorised electronic funds transfers (Regulation E, 12 CFR § 205.6).
872
  
Other than that primary concern, EFTA and Regulation E also oblige financial 
institutions to pay attention to many consumer protection aspects in fund transfer 
operations, such as the obligation to give initial disclosures before engaging in their 
fund transfer products or services (Regulation E, 12 CFR § 205.7), to give notice of 
changes in terms (Regulation E, 12 CFR § 205.8), to issue receipts for most transactions 
conducted at electronic terminals such as ATMs (Regulation E, 12 CFR §§ 205.9, 
205.16), and to provide periodic statements of account activity (Regulation E, 12 CFR § 
205.9).
873
 This last statement must contain various pieces of information. Among these 
are the amount, date, type, source, and payee of electronic funds transfers to and or from 
the account during the period covered by the statement, the customer’s account number, 
any fees or charges imposed, the opening and closing account balances for the period, 
and the address and telephone number to use for error resolution (Regulation E, 12 CFR 
§ 205.9(b)).
874
 
5.5.1.1. Unauthorised and Authorised Fund Transfers  
In the United Sates, an electronic funds transfer will be categorised as unauthorised if it 
satisfies two conditions. First, the electronic funds transfer is committed by a person 
without actual authority (expressly or impliedly) from the consumer (account holder) to 
initiate the transfer. Second, the consumer has not received a benefit from the transfer 
(15 USC § 16931(11); 12 CFR § 205.2(m).
875
 Therefore, according to Lewis and 
Resnicoff, an ‘unauthorised electronic transfer’ means ‘a transfer from a consumer’s 
account that is initiated by a person other than the consumer without actual authority, 
unless the transfer inures to the consumer’s benefit.’
876
 Other than that, any electronic 
funds transfer if it is initiated with an access device that was obtained in an illegal 
manner, such as through robbery or fraudulent inducement, will also be deemed an 
unauthorised transaction (12 CFR § 205.2(m)(3), Official Staff Commentary).
877
 In 
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contrast, the exception applies so that the transfer is not ‘unauthorized’ where ‘a 
consumer furnishes an access device and grants authority to make transfer to a person 
(such as a family member or co-worker) who exceeds the authority given. 
As Lewis and Resnicoff explain, according to 15 USC § 1693(11) (EFTA § 903(11)), an 
electronic funds transfer will be deemed ‘authorized’ if the person who accessed the 
consumer account has been furnished by the consumer with the consumer’s card, code, 
or other means of access, unless the consumer has notified the financial institution that 
said person is no longer authorised to access the account. The transfer will also be 
deemed authorised if the allegedly unauthorised transfer involved fraudulent intent on 
the part of either the consumer or anyone who acts in concert with the consumer (first 
party fraud).
878
 
5.5.1.2. Consumer’s Liability for Unauthorised Funds Transfers  
In general, consumers in the United Stated are not liable for unauthorised funds 
transfers. The consumer’s deposit bank is the one that should be held responsible for the 
unauthorised transfers. Therefore, the definition ’unauthorised transfer’ is a very 
important factor in the allocation of fraud liability between consumers and payment 
system providers.  
However, in specific circumstances, consumers could have limited liability for the 
unauthorised transfer, but only if these three conditions are met (15 USC § 1693g(a); 12 
CFR § 205.6(a)): (1) an ‘access device’
879
 is used to initiate the unauthorised funds 
transfer; (2) the financial institution has provided the consumer with an access device 
such as PIN, signature, photograph, fingerprint, and so on to identify them when using 
the device (12 CFR Regulation E, § 205.6(a)); and (3) the financial institution has 
disclosed to the consumer in writing concerning its liability for unauthorised transfer  
which includes (among other things) information in a summary of the consumer’s 
liability, the financial institution’s address and number which can be reached if it is 
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believed that an unauthorised funds transfer has occurred, and the financial institution’s 
business hours (12 CFR § 205.6(a)).
880
 This distribution of risk regulation gives the 
consumer’s bank motivation to provide consumers with an access device, disclosure and 
other relevant information pertaining to the possibility of the occurrence of unauthorised 
funds transfers.
881
 
If the three conditions above are met, the consumer may incur liability for an 
unauthorised electronic funds transfer. However, the consumer’s portion of liability will 
be very limited and depend on how rapidly the consumer reports the loss of their access 
device and promptly informs the financial institution of any unauthorised funds 
transfers. If this has occurred, then there will be three categories of consumer liability as 
follows:  
(1)    consumer liability is limited to the amount of $50 for unauthorised funds transfers 
if the consumer reports a lost or stolen ATM/debit card within two business days 
from the time s/he learns of it (Regulation E § 205.6(b)), whichever is the lesser. 
Consumers are not liable for any unauthorised funds transfer that occurs after 
notice has been given to the financial institution;
882
  
 (2)    consumer liability is limited to the lesser of whichever is the lesser $500 or the 
sum of (1) the amount of unauthorised transfer that could have been prevented 
had notice been given within the required two business days, plus (2) the lesser of 
$50 or the aggregate amount of unauthorised transfers that took place within those 
two business days, if the consumer reports a lost or stolen ATM/debit card more 
than two days from the time he learns of it (12 CFR Regulation E § 205.6); 
 (3)    consumer liability is unlimited or similar for all unauthorised funds transfers if a 
consumer fails to report any unauthorised funds transfer within 60 days of 
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For example, you lost your ATM card on March 1
st
. Assume that you had reported the loss to your 
bank on March 2nd. Assume also that the finder makes an ATM withdrawal of $20 on March 1
st
. 
He makes an additional ATM withdrawal of $200 on March 3
rd
. Your liability in this example 
would be limited to $20. Because the $200 withdrawal was made after you gave notice to the bank 
of the loss of your access device, you are not liable for any part of that withdrawal. If, instead, the 
finder had made a $200 withdrawal on March 1
st
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$50 because you are only liable for the lesser of the amount of the unauthorized electronic funds 
transfer of $50. 
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receiving a financial institution’s periodic statement showing the unauthorised 
transfer.
883
 
In regard to the limited liability provisions above, consumer negligence that facilitates 
the occurrence of unauthorised funds transfer — for instance the consumer writing their 
PIN on the card so enabling the thief to access their account — is not relevant. The 
limitation on liability applies whether or not the consumer is negligent (12 CFR § 
205.6(b)-2, Official Staff Commentary).
884
 Other than these rules that grants a financial 
institution’s consumers in the United States very generous consumer protection, a few 
other miscellaneous rules provide even more solace to consumers, such as rules 
pertaining to notification and letter dispatch time, limit of liability, and extenuating 
circumstances for notification delay.
 885
 
5.5.2. Australia: ePayments Code  
In Australia, regulation concerning unauthorised transfers derived from ATM/debit card 
transactions are governed by a voluntary codes, namely the ePayments Code (formerly 
the EFT Code of Conduct), which is administered by the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission. The ePayments Code (the Code) sets out the obligations of 
businesses to consumers, consumer rights and responsibilities, and what to do in the 
event of a complaint or dispute (most commonly, unauthorised transactions).
886
 The 
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Code is a voluntary code, but once adopted the Code is contractually binding on account 
institutions.
887
  
The Code protects consumers
888
 when transferring fund electronically, including ATM 
and EFTPOS transactions, telephone and internet banking, debit card and credit card 
transactions, and some low value stored value products such as smart cards, pre-paid 
telephone cards and digital cash.
889
 The development of the Code was initially driven by 
community and government concern about the use of one-sided terms and conditions in 
allocating liability between the account holder and institution in the event of loss or 
theft of the account holder’s transaction card or PIN.
890
 In preparing the draft of the 
Code, various overseas models of regulation (including self-regulation) of consumer 
electronic funds transfers,
891
 and Cooter and Rubin’s well-known economic theory on 
loss allocation for consumer payments,
892
 were taken into consideration. 
The Code applies only to funds transfers that utilise one or more components such as 
the use of a device (payment card),
893
 identifiers
894
 and pass codes
895
 or any 
                                                          
887
 Virtually all banks, credit unions and building societies (along with a number of non-bank 
subscribers) currently subscribe to the EFT Code. Re-subscription by EFT Code subscribers to the 
ePayments Code commences from the Code’s release date (20 September 2011). ASIC strongly 
encourages organisations that provide electronic payments who have not previously subscribed to the 
EFT Code to subscribe to the new Code. See also W S Weerasooria, Banking Law and the Financial 
System in Australia (Butterworths, 5
th
 ed, 2000) 97. 
888
 See ePayments Code cl 2.6. ‘Consumer means a holder in whose name a transaction is performed 
wholly or predominantly for personal, domestic or household purposes’. ‘Holder means ‘an individual in 
whose name a facility has been established, or to whom a facility has been issued’. 
889
 See ibid cl 2.5.  
890
 Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC), 'Reviewing the EFT Code' (Consultation 
Paper 78, Australian Securities & Investments Commission, 2007) 11. See also Tyree, ‘Banking Law in 
Australia’, above n 886, 3456; Australian Securities & Investments Commission, 'Discussion Paper on 
an Expanded EFT Code of Conduct' (Australian Securities & Investment Commission's, July 1999) 
(‘Discussion Paper on an Expanded EFT’) 26.  
891
 See ASIC, ‘Discussion Paper on an Expanded EFT’, above n 890, 20. Some of this overseas 
regulation is: USA Federal Reserve Board Regulation E (Electronic Fund Transfers) (12 CFR Pt. 205); 
USA Federal Reserve Board Interim Rule Amending Regulation E to Permit Electronic Disclosures and 
Communications [Docket No.R-1002]; European Commission: (a) Communication: ‘Boosting 
Customers’ Confidence in Electronic Means of Payment in the Single Market’ 9 July 1997 COM (97) 
353; and (b) Recommendation Concerning Transactions by Electronic Payment Instruments, 30 July 1997 
(OJ No L 208/52 ff); Payment Cards Act 1984 (Denmark) Consolidated to September 1994; British 
Bankers’ Association Banking Code; New Zealand Bankers’ Association Code of Banking Practice (2
nd
 
ed. 1996). 
892
 Cooter and Rubin, above n 105. 
893
 See ‘defined terms’ in ASIC, ePayments Code, cl 2.6. ‘Device means a device given by a subscriber 
to a user that is used to perform a transaction. Examples include: ATM card, debit card or credit card, 
prepaid card (including gift card), electronic toll device, token issued by a subscriber that generates a pass 
code, and contactless device’. 
894
 Ibid. ‘Identifier means information that a user: knows but is not required to keep secret; and must 
provide to perform a transaction. Examples include an account number or a serial number, or security 
number printed on a credit or debit card’. 
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combination of these. The Code was not intended to cover traditional transactions using 
a manual signature,
896
 because such disputes about the allocation of liabilities are 
adequately governed by Common Law rules. However, Common Law rules are not 
adequate to resolve disputes where an access method to conduct fund transfer uses an 
electronic signature such as PIN. Hence, a code that contains the rights and liabilities 
between parties involved in electronic funds transfer is a good solution when there is a 
dispute concerning liabilities.
897
 
The Code requires subscribers to give consumers clear and unambiguous terms and 
conditions, and stipulates how changes in terms and conditions (such as fee increases) 
are to be notified or handled, and that receipts and statements need to be made or issued, 
and sets out the rules for determining who pays for unauthorised transactions.
898
 
Together with revised legislation in many western countries (such as the US Electronic 
Fund Transfer Act 1978, Danish Payment Card Act 1984 or less formal regulation such 
as EFT Code of Conduct in New Zealand), this regulation has produced a more 
balanced or a more pro-consumer risk allocation rules.
899
 However, Geva contends that, 
compared to regulation in other countries, the Australian EFT Code of Practice is one of 
the most comprehensive in both transaction coverage and treatment of issues of 
unauthorised electronic funds transfers.
900
  
Grabosky, Smith and Dempsey have noted that the Code is an alternative to legislative 
regulatory controls in the banking industries to prevent fraud and to resolve disputes 
between institutions and customers. They state that codes offer two-fold benefits for the 
banking industry (including the banking consumers) as they: (1) act as a form of 
education and publicity for institutions and customers; and (2) provide a statement of 
recommended practice that can be relied upon to resolve individual disputes. The Code 
itself could be treated as a guideline to gauge whether or not the participants in the 
electronic funds transfer have breached civil legal obligations, such as duty of care, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
895
 Ibid. ‘Pass code means a password or code that the user must keep secret, that may be required to 
authenticate a transaction or user. A pass code may consist of numbers, letters, a combination of both, or 
a phrase. Examples include: personal identification number (PIN), internet banking password, telephone 
banking password, and code generated by a security token’. 
896
 See ASIC, ePayments Code, cl 2.6. ‘Manual signature means a handwritten signature, including a 
signature written on paper and or on an electronic tablet’. 
897
 See Tyree, ‘Banking Law in Australia’, above n 886, 3456.  
898
 See ASIC, ePayments Code. 
899
 See ASIC, ‘Discussion Paper on an Expanded EFT Code of Conduct’, above n 890, 28. 
900
 Geva, ‘Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers’, above n 107, 257. 
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insurance, or contractual compliance. Entities that fail to abide by the provisions of the 
Code could have powerful economic and business sanctions applied as consequences 
for any breaches.
901
  
According to clause 2.6 of the ePayments Code, an ‘unauthorised transaction’ is defined 
as ‘a transaction that is not authorised by a user’. The same clause defines a user as ‘a 
holder
902
 or an individual who is authorised by a subscriber
903
 and a holder to perform 
transactions using a facility held by the holder.’ Therefore, a transaction is authorised if 
it is performed by a user or by anyone who performs a transaction with the knowledge 
and consent of a user.
904
 
An unauthorised transaction generally profits the fraudster and causes a loss (and a loss 
that in most incidents of such fraud cannot be recovered). Such losses are to be allocated 
between the account institution, the consumer, and probably other parties involved in 
the payment system or network. Prior to the enactment of the Code, financial 
institutions generally allocated the fraud liability to consumers (‘liability dumping’), at 
least of those losses that were incurred during the period before the consumers reported 
to the bank the loss of card and PIN or unauthorised incident.
905
  
At its inception, the original EFT Code adopted a limited liability scheme in the event 
of a consumer not having been careless with the PIN. However, this scheme was only 
partly successful, because of the financial institutions’ attitudes which often assumed 
that the consumer must have been careless if any unauthorised transactions occurred. 
Another drawback of the original code was the absence of any provision in the Code 
that clearly identified the burden of proof.
906
 
Under the ePayments Code, a limited or divided liability scheme is still adopted but in 
clearer and more detailed provisions. The unauthorised transaction losses are allocated 
to either the consumer (the account holder) or the account institution  depending on 
the circumstances of the case. From the consumer point of view, the liability rules 
adopted by the Code comprise fault-based liability. ‘Fault’ here means that the 
                                                          
901
 Grabosky, Smith and Dempsey, above n 266, 31–2. 
902
  ePayments Code cl 2.6 [Defined Terms] ‘Holder means an individual in whose name a facility has 
been established, or to whom a facility has been issued’. 
903
 Ibid. ‘Subscriber’ means ‘an entity that has subscribed to this Code.’ 
904
 Ibid cl 9.1. 
905
 Tyree, ‘Banking Law in Australia’, above n 886, 350. 
906
 Ibid. 
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consumer will liable for the loss only if the consumer has contributed to the occurrence 
of the fraud, such as by perpetrating the fraud, leaving a card in an ATM, voluntarily 
disclosing one or more pass codes to anyone (including a family member or friend), and 
so on.
907
 Conversely, if a consumer has not contributed to the loss caused by an 
unauthorised transaction, the financial institution will liable for the loss (presumed 
liability)  if such loss is caused by fraud or negligence of the financial institution’s 
employee or agent, including its third party institution involved in system (‘vicarious 
liability’), system malfunction, and/or third party fraudulent activities.
908
 In the 
ePayments Code, burden of proof is clearly set out and should be borne by the financial 
institution (subscriber).
909
 Proof of ‘fault’ by financial institutions must be ‘on the 
balance of probabilities’.
910
 
5.6. Conclusion  
The existence of a well-founded legal and regulatory basis of payment system in a 
country is an essential factor in creating incentives for all payment system participants 
to build sound business principles such as responsibility, accountability, trust and 
confidence. The proliferation of payment system transactions (especially the ATM/debit 
card transactions), the increasing use of technology in e-banking and more incentives 
for fraudsters to perpetrate identity theft and fraud in payment card operation have made 
the risk management mechanism for a robust and secure payment system more 
important.  
In Indonesia, consumer protection has a very strong legal basis since it is governed not 
only by regulations but also by Indonesia’s Constitution. In order to improve consumer 
protection, banks are obliged to: implement better corporate governance, provide 
comprehensive, fast and fair procedures to resolve consumer complaints, provide 
comprehensive and in writing consumer education, and ensure bank transparency, so as 
to help consumers understand about the benefits and pertinent risks involved in any 
given e-banking product. Banks also are prohibited from including ‘liability dumping’ 
in the standard clauses in their bank–consumer contract.  
                                                          
907
 See ePayments Code cl 10 [Liability]. See also Tyree, ‘Banking Law in Australia’, above n 886, 351.  
908
 ePayments Code cl 10. It is clear that novus actus interveniens is not a defence in the ePayments Code 
for unauthorised transactions conducted by third party fraudsters. 
909
 Ibid cll 10.4, 11.2, 11.3. 
910
 ‘Balance of probabilities’ refers to burden of proof in civil trials. It is also known as the 
‘preponderance of evidence’. In a civil trial, one party’s case need only be more probable than the other. 
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In regard to fraud liability issues, unfortunately Indonesia still does not have specific 
regulation of loss allocation rules that could give incentives to the parties involved in 
ATM/debit card transactions to safeguard their transactions. Instead, Indonesia only has 
general fraud liability rules regulated by scattered regulation such as the LCP, LIET, and 
Indonesia’s Civil Code (tort law). Even though all of this legislation revolves around 
bank or business actor liability for damages in relation to their products and services, 
typically liability will — in the end — be diverted to the consumer when it can be 
proved that the loss was incurred due to the fault or negligence of the consumer.  
A subsequent difficulty, however, is to determine what constitutes negligence or fault in 
ATM/debit card transactions. In this regard, due to the existence of an asymmetry of 
information and the problem of lack of resources, consumers always experience 
difficulties in proving that they are actually innocent. The prolonged disputes 
themselves are not only detrimental to consumers, but also pose legal and/or 
reputational risk to the bank. 
In contrast to the above problems, in United States (which has its EFT Act 1978 and 
Regulation E), the bank is the party that should always be liable for unauthorised 
transactions, regardless of whether consumer negligence exists or not (‘strict liability’). 
Consumers are only liable for the entire loss if it can be proved that they are involved in 
the unauthorised ATM/debit transaction, or fail to notify the bank within 60 days of the 
bank statement (listing the unauthorised transaction/s) having been mailed to the 
consumer.  
Meanwhile, unlike the United States, Australia has an e-Payment Code which allocates 
presumed liability to the business actor and no fault liability for the consumer in the 
event of an unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction. A consumer might be liable for 
their loss only if the financial institution could prove on the balance of probability that 
the consumer was negligent or at fault so as to enable the unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions to happen (liability based on fault/negligence). The Code itself enumerated 
the nature of bank and consumer liability in ATM/debit card transactions in detail, and 
placed greater burdens on the banks as the owner of the system to prove consumer 
negligence. As result, prolonged disputes between bank and consumer about who 
should be liable for consumer losses caused by unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions in the United States and Australia generally can be avoided.  
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Therefore, specific and clear fraud liability regulation such as that in the US and/or in 
Australia that remains absent in Indonesia is strongly needed not only to improve 
consumer confidence, but also to provide legal certainty and incentives for consumer 
and banks to be more cautious in ATM/debit card transactions. 
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CHAPTER 6 THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LIABILITY AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
BETWEEN CONSUMER AND BANK CONCERNING 
UNAUTHORISED ATM/DEBIT CARD TRANSACTIONS IN 
INDONESIA 
 
6.1. Introduction 
When the bank and/or the customer fails to prevent the occurrence of identity theft of 
the customer’s ATM/debit card data that lead to identity fraud which eventually causes 
the loss of consumer funds, the big question that usually arises is who should bear the 
loss  whether the bank, the customer or other parties. In order to answer this question, 
in theory the disputant parties could rely on either the bank–consumer contract or 
country’s loss allocation rules. 
This chapter will elaborate on what sort of liability principle theories are relevant for 
use by the plaintiff in the allocation of losses in the event of an unauthorised ATM/debit 
card transaction; the remedies, the possibility of defence for the defendant; and the real 
condition of consumer protection law regarding an unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transaction. Several cases concerning unauthorised ATM/debit transactions in an 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) institution or Indonesian courts also are discussed 
in order to understand whether there is gap between the liability theories and their 
implementation in consumer protection law in Indonesia. 
There are various types of liabilities, such as vicarious liability, occupiers’ liability and 
tortious liability. In this chapter, there is a detailed in depth discussion of tortious 
liability, more so than other types of liability. This is the most common type of liability 
and is often used by plaintiffs to claim redress from (defendant) banks in Indonesia. 
There is also a discussion of actions against negligence which involves fault elements. 
6.2. Overview of Liability Law in Indonesia  
Common law and civil law countries generally share common values in terms of 
liability law, not least in Indonesia, with relatively similar meaning. This is not 
surprising considering the likelihood of encounters between the common law systems 
and continental civil law derived systems. In the Netherlands (from whose civil law 
system many of Indonesia’s laws were derived) and other civil law countries, the 
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judge’s decisions (case law) is increasingly regarded as an important source of law,
911
 
whereas in common law countries there is a tendency for statutes to increasingly 
encroach upon the common law.
912
 For instance, in the United States, Eskridge et al 
posit that ‘[s]tatues in twenty-first century America are exuberantly bounteous’.
913
  
However, it has to be admitted that liability law in common law countries (such as the 
United States or Australia) is far more developed than that in Indonesia. One obvious 
background to this difference is that common law countries have the doctrine of 
precedent (whereby decisions of superior courts are binding on lower courts). This 
makes the development of the law very dynamic as it offers reliable guidance over time 
in various situations (by establishing like and dissimilar situations for the application of 
law) without the need for legislative change, which is generally a ponderous and most 
time-consuming undertaking. Meanwhile, in civil law countries (especially in 
Indonesia), the rule of law is mostly based on legislation rather than case law resulting 
in the development of liability rules being quite static.  
As evidence of this, to date there has been no landmark decision in Indonesian courts 
over a tort liability case. The landmark decision pertaining to tort law that extended the 
scope of the tort-related article in the Indonesia Civil Code was the Dutch court’s case 
of Lindenbaum v Cohen (1919). To this day, the Dutch case is referred to in every tort 
case in Indonesia.  
The relative stagnation of liability law development in Indonesia can be seen from 
several pieces of evidence. First, it can be seen from the terminology of liability. The 
term of ‘liability’ is often translated as ‘responsibility’. Hence, in many English 
translations of Indonesian law books, the use of the term ‘responsibility’ actually 
                                                          
911
 Irianto, above n 160, 7.  
912
  Penemuan Hukum [Legal Discovery] (10 April 2010) <http://wonkdermayu.wordpress.com/kuliah-
hukum/penemuan-hukum-atau-rechtsvinding/>. See also Pam Stewart and Anita Stuhmcke, Australian 
Principles of Tort Law (Federation Press, 2
nd
 ed, 2009) 20. In Australia, the most recent and important 
example of the incursion of statute into the common law of torts is that of the legislation which has been 
introduced in every jurisdiction following the Ipp Report (tort law reform legislation), e.g., the Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (NSW). The legislation aims to reform aspects of the common law tort of negligence. 
913
 See Eskridge, Jr et al, ‘Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public 
Policy’; and ‘William D Popkin, ‘Materials on Legislation: Political Language and the Political Process’, 
cited in Robert F Blomquist, 'The Trouble with Negligence Per Se' (2009) 61(2) South Carolina Law 
Review 221, 222. According to Eskridge et al, ‘more than 200,000 bills are introduced in the 50 state 
legislatures each biennium, and more than 10,000 in each Congress.’ Meanwhile, Popkin asserts that 
‘Legislation is around us ... Statutes have infiltrated into traditional common law areas and created whole 
bodies of law to deal with the modern welfare state and to regulate activities of modern business.’ 
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denotes two meanings but in practice the two Indonesian words are used 
interchangeably: namely, ‘responsibility’ (‘tanggungjawab’) and ‘liability’ (‘tanggung 
gugat’). Thus, the real meaning of ‘responsibility’ in many writings — that is, whether 
it connotes responsibility or liability — can only be inferred from the context of or 
circumstances around the related passages.  
Second, many statutes, ordinances or administrative regulations prescribe no liability 
rules at all. That is, there is no provision that overtly governs compensation or redresses 
to the plaintiff for losses if the defendant breaches their duty of care and thereby enables 
fraudulent activities to occur (fraud liability). For example, LFT governs funds transfer 
operations very specifically and in detail. Unfortunately, the law only prescribes the 
‘rules of the game’ if funds transfer is delayed or misplaced, but not when the 
consumer’s funds are missing due to fraud.  
Nevertheless, in the LCP, LIET and Civil Code (tort), there are indeed provisions 
concerning the liability of the producer, provider, or tortfeasor that causes harm to the 
plaintiff. However, all the redress provisions in these laws, ultimately count on tortious 
fault/negligence-based liability. So the damages only can be awarded to the plaintiff if 
the defendant’s fault/negligence can be established, and the plaintiff is free from any 
fault (‘clean hands’ principle).
914
 Even worse, in the tort law, the onus of proof lies with 
the plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff has a burden to proof that a tort has been committed by 
the defendant. This is, in most cases, difficult or even impossible. 
Since Indonesia’s law lacks regulatory provisions and good jurisprudence (case law) in 
the e-banking fraud liability area (such as in the unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions), the greatest legal value in assessing liability problems will be obtained not 
only from Indonesian law resources, but also from those of other jurisdictions that have 
similar problems and more pertinent and valuable jurisprudence.  
Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that some attributes of liability rules, such as 
the definition of contributory negligence as a means of defence in common law 
countries, now has a different meaning compared to that of Indonesia’s definition.
915
 In 
                                                          
914
 Munir Fuady, Perbuatan Melawan Hukum [Tort] (PT Citra Aditya Bakti, 2010) 7980. 
915
 See contributory negligence and comparative negligence definitions in Garner, above n 797, 1134: 
‘contributory negligence: A plaintiff’s own negligence that played a part in causing the plaintiff’s injury 
and that is significant enough (in a few jurisdiction) to bar the plaintiff from recovering damages. In most 
jurisdictions, this defence has been superseded by comparative negligence’; ‘comparative negligence: A 
 
212 
 
  
common law countries, the contributory negligence principle has transformed into a 
comparative negligence principle. In many western countries, the new definition of 
contributory negligence under current circumstances and legal policy is contained in a 
common law country’s statute that is the result of that country’s laws having been 
reformed. 
Meanwhile, in Indonesia the contributory negligence principle retains the old and 
unchanged definition (known as ‘pure contributory negligence’ where the slightest fault 
on the part of the plaintiff renders any claim null and void), since the ‘judge made law’ 
function is almost never effectively utilised. In the absence of civil liability law reform, 
in practice, the liability law revolves on the old paradigm of tortious liability, with pure 
contributory negligence as a defence. As a result, this — coupled with the lacked of 
current economic and technological knowledge among most law enforcer (including 
judge in the court) — makes a fair and just decision in a dispute between banks and 
their consumers over unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions often unreachable.  
6.2.1. General Concept of Liability Rules and the Cause of Action 
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, liability is ‘the quality or state of being legally 
obligated or accountable; legal responsibility to another or to society, enforceable by 
civil remedy or criminal punishment’.
916
 Meanwhile, the law.com legal dictionary, 
defines liability as the ‘legal responsibility for one’s acts or omissions’. Gibson and 
Fraser contend that liability is actually: 
the function of the law of tort to determine when the law will, and when it will not, 
provide a remedy for damages suffered to a plaintiff. Where a plaintiff has suffered 
damage in accordance with the rules of liability, providing that the rules are correctly 
stated, then they can be said to be the victim of a tort and entitled to seek a remedy for 
the infringement or breach of their interest. It is this pursuit of remedies by a plaintiff, 
which is the very essence of tort law.
917
  
Therefore, in essence, any person or institution who fails to fulfil their legal 
responsibility that is created either by regulation or contract, leaves themselves open to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
plaintiff’s own negligence that proportionally reduces the damage recoverable from a defendant’. See also 
‘contributory negligence’ in Indonesia as defined by FuadyAccording to Fuady, contributory negligence 
is a doctrine that completely bars a plaintiff’s recovery if the damage suffered is partly the plaintiff’s own 
fault (also known as ‘pure contributory negligence’ / ‘clean hands’ policy): Fuady, ‘Perbuatan Melawan 
Hukum’, above n 914, 7980.  
916
 Garner, above n 797, 997. 
917
 Andi Gibson and Douglas Fraser, Business Law (Pearson Prentice Hall, 2
nd
 ed, 2006) 88. 
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a lawsuit for any consequential damages or court order award.’
918
 Marzuki explains that 
liability (aansprakelijkheid) is a specific form of responsibility in the area of civil 
law.
919
 
When a consumer experiences harm while he or she is using a business product (goods 
or services), generally many countries in the world have established a consumer’s right 
to redress in their law on consumer protection.
920
 However, when business actors refuse 
to redeem a consumer’s loss, typically the consumer will struggle to attain redress 
through the liability law area. The terms for various liability rules that exist in the law 
regarding liability encompass many facets, including strict liability,
921
 absolute 
liability,
922
 civil liability,
923
 joint and several liability,
924
 vicarious liability,
925
 occupiers’ 
liability,
926
 contractual liability,
927
 presumed liability,
928
 and tortious liability.
929
  
                                                          
918
  Gerald Hill and Kathleen Hill, Liability (13 February 2013) Fine Communications 
<http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=1151>. See also Marzuki, An Introduction to Indonesia 
Law, above n 145, 2589. 
919
 Marzuki, ‘An Introduction to Indonesian Law’, above n 145, 258. 
920
 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), G20 High-Level Principles 
on Financial Consumer Protection (16 September 2012 2011) OECD <www.oecd.org/daf/fin/financial-
markets/48892010.pdf> 7; OECD, Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic 
Commerce (16 September 2000) OECD 
<http://www.oecd.org/sti/consumer/oecdguidelinesforconsumerprotectioninthecontextofelectroniccomme
rce1999.htm> 18; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD 
Recommendation on Consumer Dispute Resolution and Redress (12 July 2007) OECD 
<http:/www.oecd.org/sti/consumer/38960101.pdf> 9; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), 'OECD Policy Guidance on Online Identity Theft' (2008) 11; Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, 'United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection (as expanded in 1999)' 
(United Nations, 2003) 6; Susan L Rutledge et al, 'Good Practices for Consumer Protection and Financial 
Literacy in Europe and Central Asia: A Diagnostic Tool' (The World Bank, 2010) 6; Consumer 
International, In Search of Good Practices in Financial Consumer Protection (12 July 2013) Consumer 
International, <http://www.consumersinternational.org/news-and-media/resource-zone/in-search-of-good-
practices-in-financial-consumer-protection/#.UkPxuT-tPSg> 16. 
921
 Garner, above n 797, 998. ‘Strict liability: liability that does not depend on actual negligence or intent 
to harm, but that is based on the breach of an absolute duty to make something safe.’ 
922
 Ibid. ‘Absolute liability’ equals ‘strict liability’. ‘Most [it] often applies either to ultra-hazardous 
activities or in products-liability cases … also termed absolute liability; liability without fault.’ 
923
 Ibid 997. ‘Civil liability: 1. liability imposed under the civil, as opposed to the criminal, law. 2. the 
state of being legally obligated for civil damages.’ 
924
 Ibid. ‘Joint and several liability: liability that may be apportioned either among two or more parties or 
to only one or a few select members of the group, at the adversary’s discretion. Thus, each liable party is 
individually responsible for the entire obligation, but a paying party may have a right of contribution and 
indemnity from non-paying parties; Joint liability: liability shared by two or more parties.’  
925
 Ibid 998. ‘Vicarious liability: liability that a supervisory party (such as an employer) bears for the 
actionable conduct of a sub ordinate or associate (such as an employee) because of the relationship 
between the two parties.’ 
926
 Gibson and Fraser, above n 917, 121, 123. Occupiers’ liability is a field of law of tort which is 
concerned with the responsibility of the occupiers who because of their control over the premises 
(through ownership or lease), then they have a duty of care to ensure that anyone (even a trespasser) who 
comes on to their premises is not exposed to any danger or risk of harm. According to Gibson and Fraser, 
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In Indonesia, contractual liability is never used by bank consumers to claim economic 
losses that occur due to unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions. In contrast, banks 
always use the bank–consumer agreement to reject consumer claims over unauthorised 
ATM/debit transactions. This fact is not surprising, since the bank–consumer contract is 
the bank’s standard contract. On the one hand, this contract has many provisions that 
limit bank liability; on the other hand, it attributes liability to the consumer and/or even 
shifts the bank’s liability to the consumer (liability dumping). Therefore, most of the 
damage claims by consumers concerning unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions in 
Indonesia are based on liability law under the Indonesia’s Civil Code or under LCP and 
not based on contract. 
From court verdicts on unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions as can be seen in 
section 6.4.3.2.2 and 6.4.3.3 below — the tortious liability principle is widely used as a 
determining principle for allocation of loss in the Court of Justice or ADR institutions in 
Indonesia. Although tortious liability might be predominant in civil lawsuits in 
Indonesia, other types of liability law that are arguably inter-connected with tortious 
liability, such as occupiers’ liability and vicarious liability, will also be discussed. 
Therefore, even though this thesis will focus quite exhaustively on tortious liability that 
arises from liability for breach of duty to take reasonable care that raises prima facie 
questions of negligence, nevertheless occupiers’ liability and vicarious liability also will 
be discussed whenever necessary.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
premises in occupiers’ liability includes a wide range of fixed and movable structures, such as plant and 
machinery, as well as movables such as ships, railway carriages, and even ladders.  
927
  See definition of contractual liability at InvestorWords, Contractual Liability (2013) 
www.investorwords.com <http://www.investorwords.com/19034/contractual_liability.html>. Contractual 
liability is ‘the liability assumed when entering into a contract in which either party to the contract fails to 
perform in accordance with the terms, otherwise known as a breach of contract’. A promise to perform or 
deliver a service that may be enforced through adjudication. 
928
 See Celina Tri Siwi Kristiyanti, Hukum Perlindungan Konsumen [Consumer Protection Law] (Sinar 
Grafika, 2008) 94. In presumption of liability, the defendant is always considered responsible until he/she 
can prove that he/she is innocent. So, the burden of proof is on the defendant. 
929
 Garner, above n 797, 998. ‘Tortious liability: liability that arises from the reach of a duty that (1) is 
fixed primarily by the law, (2) is owed to persons generally, and (3) when breach, is redressable by an 
action for unliquidated damages. See also BusinessDictionary.com, Tort Liability (2013) 
www.businessdictionary.com <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/tort-liability.html>. There 
tort liability is defined as: 
legal obligation of one party to a victim as a results of a civil wrong or injury. This action requires 
some form of remedy from a court system. A tort liability arises because of a combination of 
directly violating a person’s right and the transgression of a public obligation causing damage or a 
private wrongdoing. Evidence must be evaluated in a court hearing to identify who the 
tortfeasor/liable party is in the case. 
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6.2.2. Tortious Liability 
The law of tort is an area of law that generally interests people and businesses only 
when a loss-making event arises.
930
 Nevertheless, its scope is beyond other forms of 
civil liability such as contracts.
931
 According to Gibson and Fraser, a tort is: 
a civil wrong other than claim for breach of contract and for which a right of civil action 
for damage may arise. It is an act or omission of the defendant that creates an 
infringement of an interest of the plaintiff that the law will recognise and which 
involves the plaintiff proving on the balance of probabilities that their version of the 
facts is the more believable.
932
 
Therefore, tort law revolves upon the interactive relationship between the plaintiff and 
the defendant, and its goal is to focus on how to correct wrongful losses between 
tortfeasor (wrongdoer in tort, defendant in a tortious action) and victim (plaintiff in such 
an action).
933
 
The word of ‘tort’ originates from Anglo-French, and means a ‘wrongful’ or ‘illegal’ 
act. According to the law, a civil wrong  including in regard to the rights and 
obligations of an individual — can only be determined by the law of torts (in Dutch 
‘tort’ is translated as ‘onrechmatige daad’ or ‘unlawful act’)
934
 and includes acts of 
omission as well as commission in the code law state of the Netherlands (the colonial 
source of much Indonesian law) just as it does in the law of Australia, a common law 
country. The law of torts itself is difficult to define succinctly since it has extensive 
meanings and its boundaries are indistinct. However, torts differ from other forms of 
civil liability such as contracts, albeit sometimes there is a degree of ‘cross over’. Tort is 
dynamic. Political, economic, social mores and the existence of gaps in civil liability 
law may affect the development of tort law.  
The law of torts can be divided into three types, namely intentional (or direct) torts, 
unintentional (or indirect torts), and miscellaneous torts. Intentional tort is where a 
defendant ‘intentionally carries out a wrongful act that directly causes harm to the 
plaintiff’.
935
 Some examples of intentional torts include trespass to the person (assault, 
battery, false imprisonment), to land, and/or to goods. Unintentional torts lack the 
                                                          
930
  Fuady, ‘Perbuatan Melawan Hukum’, above n 914, 2. See also Gibson and Fraser, above n 917, 81. 
931
 Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 912, 4. 
932
  Gibson and Fraser, above n 917, 82. 
933
 Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 912, 5. 
934
 Fuady, ‘Perbuatan Melawan Hukum’, above n 914, 2. The concept of tort is well-known in European 
civil law countries. 
935
 Gibson and Fraser, above n 917, 86. See also Makarim, above n 857, 179. 
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element of intention and are based on a legal concept known as ‘actions on the case’, 
and the best example of it today is negligence. Makarim contends that negligence per se 
and res ipsa loquitur are two kinds of negligence where the plaintiff does not need to 
prove his/her claim.
936
 Miscellaneous torts are neither intentional nor unintentional, and 
the example most relevant to business is nuisance.
937
  
Agustina in her dissertation in Indonesia (as cited by Makarim) compared ‘unlawful act’ 
that is derived from Indonesia’s Civil Code with tort law in common law countries. In 
essence, she maintained that both terminologies have many things in common, with 
only slight differences existing. Makarim concurs with Agustina that in general 
‘unlawful act’ — ‘perbuatan melawan hukum’ in Bahasa Indonesia and ‘onrechmatige 
daad’ in Dutch — is basically similar to tort, and thus the terminology could be used 
interchangeably.
938
  
In Indonesia, before 1919, tortious liability or ‘unlawful act’ only suggested the action 
of breaking the statute (narrow interpretation); however, since the Netherlands’ 1919 
landmark case of Lindenbaum v Cohen (reported in Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1919 
— which is no less remarkable than the 1932 United Kingdom (House of Lords) 
equivalent case of Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] — the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge 
Raad) accepted a more extensive interpretation of the requirement of ‘unlawfulness’. 
The impact of this case was very wide: the Hoge Raad extended the scope of protection 
of the general tort so as to include, in addition to any act which breaches the statute, and 
any of the following actions: (1) any action that is in conflict with another party’s 
rights;
939
 (2) any action that is in conflict with the party’s own legal obligations;
940
 (3) 
                                                          
936
 Makarim, above n 857, 180. 
937
 Fuady, ‘Perbuatan Melawan Hukum’, above n 914, 3. See also Gibson and Fraser, above n 917, 86. 
938
 Makarim, above n 857, 16977. 
939
 Rachmat Setiawan, Tinjauan Elementer Perbuatan Melawan Hukum [Basic Overview of Tort] 
(Alumni, 1982) 17. A subject’s personal rights include the right to freedom, a good name and honour, and 
property rights. See also Setiawan, Aneka Masalah Hukum dan Hukum Acara Perdata [Various Legal 
Problems and the law on Civil Procedure] (Alumni, 1992) 2602. 
940
 Setiawan, ‘Tinjauan Elementer Perbuatan Melawan Hukum’, above n 939, 1819. Legal obligation is 
an obligation that derived from regulation. Hence tort in this case is any act or omission that conflicts 
with regulation. See also Setiawan, ‘Aneka Masalah Hukum dan Hukum Acara Perdata’, above n 939, 
2524. Setiawan describes further that based on current case law in the Netherlands, in order for a matter 
to be established as tort, several requirements must be met. Indeed for it to be held that ‘any action … is 
in conflict with its own legal obligation’, several pre-requisites must be satisfied. These are: a) the 
plaintiff’s interest is in jeopardy because of such tort; b) the violated regulations were intended to protect 
the interest of the plaintiff; c) the plaintiff’s interests are included in the interests intended to be protected 
by the Article 1365 of the Indonesian Civil Code; d) the violation of the regulation was contrary to the 
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any action that conflicts with morality;
941
 or (4) any action that conflicts with prudential 
principles or appropriate conduct in a good society.
942
  
As described previously, tort provisions that are relevant to the unauthorised ATM/debit 
card transactions in Indonesia are Articles 1365 to 1367 of Indonesia’s Civil Code 1848. 
Article 1365 is the ‘umbrella’ provision for tort claims in Indonesia. The tortious 
liabilities principle that is contained in this Article is ‘at fault/negligence’ liability, that 
is, liability based on fault/negligence.
943
 According to Article 1365, ‘A party who 
commits an unlawful act which causes damage to another party, shall be obliged 
because of his/her fault to compensate the damage’. Kristiyanti concurs with this Article 
from the point of view of common sense. According to her, it does make sense nor is it 
reasonable that a guilty party not compensate their victims for losses sustained; 
conversely, it is not fair that innocent parties should compensate the losses suffered by 
others (or that the victim be recompensed by other than the guilty party).
944
 In fact, 
Kristiyanti’s view on the article 1365 of Civil Code is indisputable and also reflects the 
view of the author and that of the vast majority of Indonesians. However with the 
current bank-consumer standard contract which is always favours the bank and/or with 
the current legislation regarding fraud liability that is too general to be implemented in 
regard to unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions cases, the consumer victims always 
have difficulties in proving bank negligence and/or fault. 
Meanwhile Article 1366 of Indonesia’s Civil Code further explains that the liability for 
such acts applies not only in relation to an intentional act by the party responsible for 
                                                                                                                                                                          
proper good conduct that should be addressed to the plaintiff; e) there is no justification under the law [for 
the action or lack thereof]. 
941
 Unwritten rules with respect to proper conduct, which reasonably can be expected of reasonable 
people in their conduct within the community (objective criteria — special expertise/knowledge of the 
tortfeasor may aggravate criteria applicable). See Setiawan, ‘Tinjauan Elementer Perbuatan Melawan 
Hukum’, above n 939, 1920. According to Setiawan, what constitutes good moral conduct alter 
according to the place and time. See also Setiawan, ‘Aneka Masalah Hukum dan Hukum Acara Perdata’, 
above n 939, 2656. 
942
 Fuady, ‘Perbuatan Melawan Hukum’, above n 914, 6; Setiawan, ‘Aneka Masalah Hukum dan Hukum 
Acara Perdata’, above n 939, 25170, 2669; Setiawan,’Tinjauan Elementer Perbuatan Melawan 
Hukum’, above n 939, 17; Hermansyah, above n 683, 2613. See also Gibson and Fraser, above n 917, 
69, 303. According to Rachmat Setiawan, an act is in conflict with appropriate conduct in a good 
society if: (a) that act jeopardises other people’s rights without any compelling reason; (b) that act is 
useless and endangers other people, which action according to the common people should not be done. 
943
 Kristiyanti, above n 928, 923. 
944
 Ibid 93. 
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the damage, but also includes any damages that occurred because of the party’s 
negligence or recklessness (‘less cautious’ conduct).
945
  
Besides tortious liability, Indonesia’s Civil Code also states that each person/institution 
is not only liable for damage caused by their own action, but also for the damage caused 
by acts of the dependents (vicarious liability), or by items or infrastructure under their 
control (occupiers’ liability).
946
  
6.2.3. Vicarious Liability 
In law, a person is liable for any of their conduct that causes harms to others. However, 
there is always a possibility that a person is to be held responsible for the acts or 
omissions of another, even though the person does not have any wrong or direct 
causation to the damage incurred. This is known as ‘vicarious liability’, which is always 
strict liability. Vicarious liability is liability ‘that a supervisory party (such as an 
employer) bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate (such as an 
employee) because of the relationship between the two parties’.
947
 A common example 
of vicarious liability can be found in the relation between an employer and its employee 
or between a principal and its agent.
948
 In relation to agency, Gautama asserts that 
agency is governed by Articles 17921819 of Indonesia’s Civil Code.
949
 According to 
him, Article 1792 of the Code concerning ‘mandate’ seems too narrow and refers ‘only 
to agency contracts which involve representation, that is, ostensible mandates by virtue 
of which an agent is able to bind his principal directly to a third party’. The principal is 
liable for the torts of his agent committed while acting in his capacity as principal’s 
agent.
950
 
                                                          
945
 Indonesian Civil Code art 1366: ‘An individual shall be responsible, not only for the damage which he 
has caused by his act, but also for that which was caused by his negligence or carelessness.’ See also P N 
H Simanjuntak, Pokok-Pokok Hukum Perdata [The Civil Law Cores] (Djambatan, 2009) 353. 
946
 Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata [Civil Code] art 1867: ‘An individual shall be responsible for 
the damage which he has caused by his own act, as well as for that which was caused by the acts of the 
individuals for whom he is responsible, or caused by matters which are under his supervision.’ See also 
Makarim, above n 857, 165; Marzuki, An Introduction to Indonesia Law, above n 145, 259; Kristiyanti, 
above n 928, 934. 
947
 Garner, above n 797. See also Marzuki, ‘Pengantar Ilmu Hukum’, above n 155, 259; Hans Kelsen, 
Teori Umum Tentang Hukum dan Negara [General Theory on Law and State] (Nusa Media, 2011) 
1012. 
948
 Gibson and Fraser, above n 917, 139. 
949
 According to Article 1792 of the Indonesian Civil Code, the ‘mandate’ (lastgeving, pemberian kuasa) 
is a contract in which one person, the principal or mandating party, gives to another, the mandate, a power 
to execute a legal act in the principal’s name. 
950
 Sudargo Gautama, Indonesian Business Law (PT Citra Aditya Bakti, 2006) 1059. 
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Muhammad argues that the acknowledgement of vicarious liability is derived from 
Article 1367 of Indonesia’s Civil Code.
951
 Its acknowledgement by the law can be 
demonstrated by several Indonesian Supreme Court cases, among them, the Indonesia 
Supreme Court verdict in PT Bintang v PT Indah, dated 4 June 1973 No 
558/K/SIP/1971.
952
 
The principle of vicarious liability can also be found in the legislation governing 
electronic transactions. Article 21(2).c of LIET in essence states that the provider of the 
electronic agent shall be responsible for any legal ramifications arising from the use of it 
in electronic transactions. This Article is progressive, because it has provided legal 
certainty regarding the application of the responsibility of the principal for the agent that 
is not a natural person. Hence, the legal status of any electronic agent (such as ATMs, 
EFT-POS machines, and so on) has been equated by LIET with the legal status of a 
human agent. As a result, banks as the providers of electronic agents such as ATM 
and/or EFT machines (and therefore are the principals) will be responsible for any legal 
ramifications that are derived from electronic transactions that happen in regard to their 
electronic agents.  
Further, sometimes it is more efficient for banks to outsource some parts of their 
business activities or their supporting system to other parties (outsourcing 
company/agent) based on outsourcing agreements. An outsourcing company could to 
some extent just provide workers to undertake the bank’s activities, or even provide 
comprehensive business solutions (including provision of staff for such tasks as are 
covered by said agreement, for example a call centre for banking customers or 
ATM/EFTPOS inter-operability under similar principal and/or switching company). In 
                                                          
951
  Indonesia Civil Code art 1367: ‘an individual shall be responsible for the damage which he has caused 
by his own act, as well as for that which was caused by the acts of the individuals for whom he 
responsible, or caused by matters which are under his supervisor.’ 
952
 Facts of the case: on 4 June1965, Soegiono Atmodiredjo (employee of PT Star-owned bus company) 
caused a bus owned by PT Indah to be burned due to his negligence. When Mr Atmodiredjo was refueling 
the bus (itself owned by PT Bintang) in Purwokerto terminal using a bucket, a bus passenger threw 
cigarette butts down and ignited a fire on PT Bintang’s bus. That fire also burned the PT Indah bus that 
was parked nearby. On 1 September 1966, the PT Indah bus owners sued the owners of the first bus (PT 
Bintang) for damages. 
In an earlier criminal case, Mr Atmodiredjo has been sentenced on the basis of ‘negligence caused the 
fire’ (judgment dated February 4, 1966). The Tegal District Court ruled in a civil case (filed by PT Indah, 
on 7 March 1968) that PT Bintang pay compensation to PT Indah. Next, PT Bintang appealed, but the 
High Court’s decision on 20 May 1970 in essence is still the same as the district court verdict. PT Bintang 
further filed a cassation. The Supreme Court in its verdict on 4 June 1973 rejected PT Bintang’s cassation. 
Accordingly, the High Court’s decision was final and binding.  
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relation to the issues of liability rules that might apply to this kind cooperation, Bank 
Indonesia has enacted Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 13/25/PBI/2011 Concerning 
the Prudential Principle for a Commercial Bank which Outsources Some Parts of Its 
Works to Another Party. Article 3(3) highlights that the bank, as the principal of the 
work, is responsible for any legal effect that occurs in relation to this outsourcing 
agreement, regardless of whether the outsourcing company is the one who is executing 
the bank business activities. Banks also are liable if the outsourcing party has caused 
damage to the banks’ consumers.
953
  
From the case law and regulations above, it can be concluded that the liability for an 
unlawful act or tort not only bind a bank itself (as tortfeasor) for its direct actions, but 
for the actions of its employees and/or agents (both electronic and natural persons) who 
are under its supervision and whose actions are therefore the bank’s responsibility.
954
 
Therefore, banks will always be liable for their employees’ conduct that is subject to 
Article 1367 of Indonesia’s Civil Code and causes damage to consumers or other third 
party. The damages themselves should be treated as a cost of business.
955
  
6.2.4. Occupiers’ Liability 
Occupiers’ liability is a field of tort law which concerns the responsibility of the 
occupiers who because of their control over the premises (through ownership or 
lease),
956
 have a duty of care to ensure that anyone (even trespassers) who comes on to 
their premises is not exposed to any danger or risk of harm.
957
 Rustard and Daftary 
contend that ‘a property owner who invites the public onto his property for business 
purposes is potentially liable if those invitees are harmed by negligent or accidental 
(inadvertent) acts by third parties’. As indicated earlier, property in the banking context 
includes ATMs/EFTPOS machines and associated physical and electronic (including 
                                                          
953
 See Peraturan Bank Indonesia Number 13/25/PBI/2011 Tentang Prinsip Kehati-hatian Bagi Bank 
Umum yang Melakukan Penyerahan Sebagian Pelaksanaan Pekerjaan Kepada Pihak Lain [Bank 
Indonesia Regulation Number 13/25/PBI/2011 Concerning Prudential Principle for Commercial Bank 
which Outsource Some Parts of Its Works to Other Party] ('BIR-Outsource to Other Party') art 3(3). 
954
  Abdulkadir Muhammad, Hukum Perdata Indonesia [Indonesia Civil Law] (Citra Aditya Bakti, 2010) 
271–2. 
955
 Djumhana, above n 68, 341. 
956
 ‘Premises’ include a wide range of fixed and movable structures, such as plant and machinery, as well 
as movables such as ships, railway carriages, and even ladders. See Gibson and Fraser, above n 917, 123.  
957
 Ibid 121.  
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software) infrastructure. Courts will impose liability if the risk of harm to visitors was 
reasonably foreseeable.
958
  
The main element of occupiers’ liability is the occupier’s control over the property. The 
duty of care owed by the occupier/s is directed not only to the invitee, but to anyone 
who enters the premises including guests (those who enter by express or implied 
permission), and even those who are uninvited, such as trespassers. Hence liability of 
the occupiers will arise if an accident occurs which is caused by the defective or 
dangerous condition of the premises.
959
 
When an accident occurs in or on the premises, the plaintiff must ascertain at least two 
elements to establish a case of ’occupiers’ liability, which are: (1) ‘the defendant has 
occupation or control of the land or structure’; and (2) ‘the defendant was negligent.’
960
 
Therefore, the plaintiff has to establish that the defendant was responsible for the harm 
that happened within the plaintiff’s property, or that the defendant ought to have known 
that the there was a foreseeable risk of injury and unreasonably has done nothing to 
remove the risk. 
However, the degree of care that is to be expected from the occupiers relies on whether 
or not the risk is obvious. If the risk is obvious (to the plaintiff), the duty of the 
defendant will be minimal, and vice versa. In the High Court in The Council of the Shire 
of Wyong v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40, Mason J explained how to test for determining 
what the occupier must do to discharge the duty of care. He contended that two 
questions should be raised: 
 Would a reasonable person in the defendant’s position have foreseen that the 
conduct involved a real risk of injury to the plaintiff? If the risk is real, and it 
doesn’t matter if it is remote or unlikely to happen, then; 
 What would a reasonable person do in response to the risk? 961 
These questions require some factors to be considered. These include the foreseeability 
(by the defendant) of the risk, information regarding the magnitude of the risk, the cost 
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 Michael Rustad and Cyrus Daftary, E-Business Legal Handbook (Aspen Law & Business, 2001) 
3978. 
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 Gibson and Fraser, above n 917, 121. See also Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1986) 
162 CLR 479. 
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 Gibson and Fraser, above n 917, 121.  
961
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of removal the risk, its degree of probability, whether the risk is ordinary, and whether it 
is obvious risk.
962
 
In Indonesia, occupiers’ liability is derived from Article 1367 of Indonesia’s Civil 
Code, especially its last sentence: ‘an individual shall be responsible for the damage 
which he has caused by his own act, as well as for that which was caused by the acts of 
the individuals for whom he responsible, or caused by matters which are under his 
supervision’ (emphasis added).  
Fuady argues that if someone suffers a damage caused by infrastructure under the 
occupier’s control, the law obliges the owner of the infrastructure to help the victim and 
also to warn the user of such infrastructures regarding the risk (duty of rescue or 
warning). Defendants are also liable for the damages if it is established that the 
defendant has an obligation to control that risk in regard to its controlled party/parties 
(such as guests or consumers) but has done nothing to secure them from third party 
attack.
963
 Further Setiawan explains that the statute does not give the responsibility for 
monitoring just to the owner of infrastructure, but also to every person that has an 
obligation to secure and monitor the infrastructure, such as the tenant, user, or employee 
of the owner.
964
 
6.3. Tort of Negligence 
Historically, tort caused by negligence or an inadvertent form of violation of customs 
and proprietary conduct in public has been so regarded and unlawful in the Netherlands 
and Indonesia after the 1919 Lindenbaum v Cohen case. Meanwhile, in common law 
countries, a tort of negligence has been recognised since the early 19
th
 century.
965
  
In tort law, the tort of negligence is the most pervasive tort in practice — including in 
Indonesia — in providing remedy to victims who suffer loss because of the fault of 
another. Negligence is the most common action in tort law. Vickery and Pendleton state 
that ‘[n]egligence law is concerned with whether people have been so careless or faulty 
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 Ibid. 
963
 Fuady, ‘Perbuatan Melawan Hukum’, above n 914, 94. See also Sidabalok, above n 792, 107. 
964
 Setiawan, ‘Tinjauan Elementer Perbuatan Melawan Hukum’, above n 939, 556. 
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 Fuady, ‘Perbuatan Melawan Hukum’, above n 914, 3. See also Gibson and Fraser, above n 917, 712. 
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[sic], or breached [a] special legal duty, that they should be liable for the loss they have 
caused.’
966
 Black’s Law Dictionary defines negligence as: 
the failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have 
exercised in a similar situation; any conduct that falls below the legal standard 
established to protect others against unreasonable risk of harm, except for conduct that 
is intentionally, wantonly, or wilfully disregardful of others’ rights.
967
  
Meanwhile, Gibson and Fraser define negligence as ‘the omission to do something 
which a reasonable person would do, or doing something which a prudent and 
reasonable person would not do. It is the failure to exercise reasonable care and skill.’
968
  
6.3.1. Element of Negligence 
In order for it to be determined that an action in negligence has occurred, the elements 
of negligence should be present, namely: a duty of care, and a breach of that duty, 
causation, and damage.
969
 Even though each of these elements is complex, it is essential 
for each to be established by the plaintiff in order to be successful in a tort of negligence 
case.  
In the negligence claim inquiry, the court is supposed to find any relevant legal rules 
and concepts applicable to the specific case, whether they are well established, still 
being developed and/or even subject to some uncertainties.
970
 In Jaensch v Coffey 
(1984) 155 CLR 549 at 585–86, the ‘components’ of an action in negligence are set out 
by Deane J as follows: 
(i) a relevant duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff to take reasonable care 
resulting from the combination of (a) reasonable foreseeability of a real risk that injury 
of the kind sustained by the plaintiff would be sustained either by the plaintiff, as an 
identified individual, or by a member of a class which included the plaintiff, (b) 
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  Roger Vickery and Wayne Pendleton, Australian Business Law: Compliance and Practice (Pearson 
Education Australia, 2009) 85. 
967
 Garner, above n 797, 1056. 
968
 Gibson and Fraser, above n 917, 93. See also Sidabalok, above n 792, 10711. 
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  Zulham, Hukum Perlindungan Konsumen [Consumer Protection Law] (Kencana, 2013) 84; Donn B 
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 Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 912, 136. 
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existence of the requisite element of proximity in the relationship between the parties 
with respect to the relevant act or omission and the injury sustained, and (c) absence of 
any statutory provision or other common law rule (e.g., that relating to hazards inherent 
in a joint illegal enterprise) which operates to preclude the implication of such a duty of 
care to the plaintiff in the circumstances of the case; (ii) a breach of that duty of care in 
that the doing of the relevant act or the doing of it in the manner in which it was done 
was, in the light of all relevant factors, inconsistent with what a reasonable man would 
do by way of response to the foreseeable risk..; and (iii) injury (of a kind which the law 
recognizes as sounding in damages) which was caused by the defendant’s carelessness 
and which was within the limits of reasonable foreseeability.
971
 
6.3.1.1. Duty of Care 
A duty of care is ‘a legal relationship arising from a standard of care, the violation of 
which subjects the actor to liability’.
972
 The plaintiff must first ascertain that the 
defendant owed a duty of care. In common law countries, the landmark case which 
shows circumstances where the defendant owe a duty of care to the plaintiff, was first 
described by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson (1932) AC 562 in terms of the 
‘neighbour’ principle:  
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your 
neighbour; and the lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted 
reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can 
reasonable foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who in law, is my 
neighbour? The answer seems to be  persons who are so closely and directly 
affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so 
affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in 
question.
973
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 See Jaensch v Coffey (1984) in Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 912, 136. 
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[Note: To understand this passage of Lord Atkin, it is necessary to see the passage to what he is alluding. 
Thus, see also re the origin of the phrase and concept to which he refers: Mark 12: 30–1 and especially 
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such consideration shown to oneself). Lord Atkin moves from this generous definition in the New 
Testament to a far more narrow ‘legal’ one (see italicised section in text above) and one far from the 
definition in both the Jewish Torah and the Christian New Testament.] See further below: 
Donoghue v Stevenson (1932):  
Facts of the case: A friend bought a bottle of ginger beer for Donoghue. The ginger beer was in an opaque 
glass bottle. While in the course of drinking the contents of the bottle she noticed the decomposed 
remains of a snail. As a result, she became sick and suffered shock. She sued the manufacturer of the 
ginger beer (Stevenson), alleging that he had been careless in manufacturing his product so as to allow a 
snail to be part of the contents.  
Decision: The plaintiff was entitled to recover damages against the manufacturer in negligence. Any 
person who manufactures products in such a way that there is no reasonable possibility of intermediate 
examination before they reach the ultimate consumer, and who knows that the absence of reasonable care 
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In this case, a specific and a general ratio decidendi (‘reason for decision’) held by the 
court are: (1) specific ratio: ‘where a product cannot be inspected prior to use, the 
manufacturer has a duty to take reasonable care to ensure it does not contain any 
harmful defect’; (2) general ratio: ‘the rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes, 
in law, you must not injure your neighbour’. Thus the general rule from this case is: 
‘you must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably 
foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour’.
974
  
However, before Lord Atkin’s landmark decision in Donoghue v Stevenson (1932), it 
was the judgment of Brett MR (later Lord Escher) that applied. His decisions in Heaven 
v Pender (1883) 11 QBD 503 and in Le Lievre v Gould [1893] 1 QB 491 relied entirely 
on ‘reasonable foreseeability’. In the former case, however, he proposed a general rule 
for the imposition of duty of care which was later approved by Lord Atkin in his 
landmark judgment. The obiter dicta of Brett MR advised: 
[W]henever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to 
another that every one of ordinary sense who did think would at once recognise that if 
he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those 
circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the person or property of the other, a 
duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger.
975
 
6.3.1.2. Breach of Duty of Care  
In a breach of the duty of care, the plaintiff has then to prove that the defendant has 
breached the standard of care owed to the plaintiff. In common law, this required 
consideration of two factors, namely ‘the degree of foreseeable risk created by the 
defendant’s conduct and the reasonableness or otherwise of the defendant’s 
response.’
976
 An objective standard is required to test in regard to the ‘reasonable 
person’ and based on the facts of the case, how such a person would have responded to 
the foreseeable risk.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
on their part will result in an injury to the consumer’s life or property, owes a duty to the consumer to 
take reasonable care. See also Goldman v Hargrave (1967) 1 AC 645. See also Cook v Cook (1986) CLR 
376. 
Since the decision in Donoghue v Stevenson, the law of negligence has developed and expanded 
significantly so that the tort of negligence today offers a remedy in many categories of cases and new 
duty situations are still occasionally being recognised or extended by the courts. 
974
 Vickery and Pendleton, above n 966, 88. See Fuady, ‘Perbuatan Melawan Hukum’, above n 914, 87.  
975
 Heaven v Pinder (1883) 11 QBD 503 at 509. See Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 912, 133.  
976
 Gibson and Fraser, above n 917, 100. See Kosciusko Thredbo Pty Ltd v Smith (2001) NSWCA 355. 
See also Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 912, 156. 
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In the tort of negligence, a defendant’s conduct is gauged by the test or standard of what 
a ‘reasonable person of ordinary prudence’ would have done in the same circumstances 
as the defendant. Hence, on the balance of probabilities, the plaintiff must prove that the 
defendant omitted to do something, which a reasonable person would have done or did 
what a reasonable person would not have done under those circumstances. If under the 
test it is concluded that the defendant’s conduct falls below the reasonable person’s 
standard of care, the defendant will be deemed to have breached of their duty of care. 
In common law, the meaning of negligence can be distilled from the decision by 
Alderson B in Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Co (1856) 11 Exch 781; 156 EF 1047 at 
1049: ‘Negligence is the omission to do something which the reasonable man guided 
upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, 
would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.’
977
 
The standard of care test is basically objective, even though it has inevitably some 
limited subjective elements. The subjectivity elements of this standard before the court 
for the individual case depend on the specific attributes of the defendant, such as 
whether the defendant is merely a layman or a professional with knowledge specific to 
the area.
978
  
6.3.1.3. Causation and Scope of Liability 
There is no cause of action for negligence unless the plaintiff can prove on the balance 
of probabilities that the harm suffered was caused by the defendant’s breach of their 
duty of care. Causation also has an important role in determining to what extent 
damages could be recoverable.
979
 Stewart and Stuhmcke stress that the question of 
causation comprises two main issues: 
The first is concerned with factual causation: that is, whether the defendant’s negligence 
was at least a partial cause of the plaintiff’s damage. It needs to be established whether 
it was a “material cause” or a “necessary condition” of the loss. The second and more 
difficult question is whether the defendant should bear legal responsibility for the 
                                                          
977
 Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 912, 1589. See also Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5B(1)(c); 
Rustad and Daftary, above n 958, 141. 
978
 Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 912, 15868. A court may consider evidence of the standards set by 
professionals to assist in the determination of the legal standard of care expected of the defendant.  
979
 Gibson and Fraser, above n 917, 107; Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 912, 190. See Fuady, 
‘Perbuatan Melawan Hukum’, above n 914, 11112. 
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plaintiff’s loss and whether liability should extend to all the damage suffered by the 
plaintiff: that is, what is the “scope” of the defendant’s liability.
980
 
In the civil liability law reforms undertaken in most Australian states and territories (for 
instance, in New South Wales (NSW) with the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)), general 
principles are drawn to determine causation in negligence. According to section 5D(1) 
of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), a test for determination that negligence has 
caused a particular harm comprises two elements, namely ‘factual causation’ and ‘scope 
of liability’. Cited in Stewart and Stuhmke, this provision is mirrored in other Australian 
civil liability reform legislation. The relevant section in regard to a determination of 
causation states:
981
 
(a) that the negligence was a necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm (“factual 
causation”), and 
(b) that it is appropriate for the scope of the negligent person’s liability to extend to the 
harm so caused (“scope of liability”).
982
 
The plaintiff’s harm/loss actually can be caused by so many factors. These factors could 
combine to produce a particular outcome. From these many possibilities, it is the task of 
the law to extract one or more circumstances to identify which events or factors are 
‘necessary conditions’ of the loss, hence giving rise to liability, that is, a factor without 
which the loss would not have occurred (cause sine qua non).
983
 Fuady argues that it 
must be determined whether the factor that is alleged to be the cause of the damage is 
proximate (and therefore applicable) or too remote for consideration.
984
 
The issue of ‘remoteness’ also occurs in causation and the possibility of damages. In 
general, the basic principle is that damages cannot be recovered if a defendant’s careless 
act that caused the damage is considered to be too remote (beyond the scope of 
liability).
985
 Again, the question of remoteness is to be determined by judge in resolving 
the foreseeability test  there has to be a real (not fanciful) risk where the reasonable 
person could foresee the damage occurring from the action/omission.
986
  
                                                          
980
 Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 912, 190. 
981
  For the meaning of harm, see Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5: ‘“Harm” means harm of any kind, 
including the following: (a) personal injury or death; (b) damage to property; (c) economic loss.’ 
982
 Ibid s 5D(1). Other similar legislation includes: Civil Liability Act 2003 (Queensland), Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (Tas), Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT). 
983
 Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 912, 192.  
984
 Fuady, ‘Perbuatan Melawan Hukum’ above n 914, 103. 
985
 Gibson and Fraser, above n 917, 110.  
986
 Ibid 107. See Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co (1961) AC 388. See also 
Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co. Pty (1967) AC 617 (PC). 
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6.3.1.4. Damages 
In regard to consumer protection, all consumer protection guidelines enacted by 
international organisations (such as United Nations, organisation for economic co-
operation and development (OECD), Consumers International (CI) and so on) concur 
that one of the most important provisions that should exist in ‘a country’s consumer 
protection law is the availability of effective consumer redress for loss or damage 
sustained by consumers’ when such loss or damage is caused by the business actors’ 
products or services.
987
  
Therefore, in a consumer’s claim in legal proceedings concerning a dispute between 
consumer and business actor, damage generally will be constructed as an actual damage 
or loss suffered by the plaintiff because the defendant has been in breach of his/her duty 
of care in the form of failure to conform with the standard of care that a reasonable 
person would exercise.  
In the civil law, the award of damages is intended to compensate the plaintiff for the 
loss and/or damage caused by the defendant. In order to be successful in recovering 
their damage, the plaintiff should prove causation between the defendant’s breach and 
the loss or damage sustained by the plaintiff, and that such loss or damage is not too 
remote from the breach.
988
 However, the amount claimed by the plaintiff may not be 
awarded; the final amount that the defendant must pay to the plaintiff will be 
determined by whether or not causation is clearly demonstrated and whether or not the 
defendant has any valid defences that they can submit in order to dilute or even 
eliminate the plaintiff’s claim. 
In Indonesia, the concept of damages is well accepted in the practice of law, and can be 
derived from breach of contract
989
 or because of a statutory provision, including due to 
unlawful act (tort as governed by Article 1365 of Indonesia’s Civil Code) that caused 
economic loss to consumers because the consumers’ consumption or use of the business 
actors’ goods or services.
990
 Where a plaintiff files a lawsuit based on tort (Article 1365 
of Indonesia’s’ Civil Code), Setiawan asserts that generally consumers could claim 
                                                          
987
 See above n 920. 
988
 Gibson and Fraser, above n 917, 107.  
989
 The damages that derive from breach of contract will not be discussed in this thesis. 
990
 Fuady, ‘Perbuatan Melawan Hukum’, above n 914, 134. See LCP 1999 art 19(1). See also Sidabalok, 
above n 792, 1457, 1567; Makarim, above n 857, 165.  
 
229 
 
  
several types of restitution, including: (1) damages in the form of cash for pure 
economic loss; (2) damages in the form of non-cash or restoration (for example, of 
premises) to its original state; (3) a statement that the act conducted was an unlawful 
act/tort; or (4) the prohibition of certain acts.
991
 The damages themselves can be divided 
into three categories, namely: (1) nominal damages; (2) compensatory/actual damages; 
and (3) punitive damages,
992
 which include material and/or immaterial damage.
993
 In 
Indonesia’s Civil Code, the general provision for the type of damages are governed by 
Articles 1243–1252 (more in relation to the contractual default), which include several 
types of damages as follow: (1) costs (expenses actually incurred and become the 
burden of plaintiff); (2) damages sustained as a direct and immediate result of the 
default; (3) loss of potential profit due the default; and (4) statutory interest of 6 per cent 
annually as of the date the lawsuit is submitted. Even though this provision is not 
directly related to the damages in the field of tort, however, by analogical interpretation 
 this provision is deemed applicable to the tort situation (Article 1365 of Indonesia’s 
Civil Code), or even in the situation of a violation of consumer protection legislation.
994
 
In the determination of damages, as long as the amount is not specified in the 
regulation, a judge has the freedom to define the sum of damages based on their opinion 
of the merits of the case.
995
 
6.3.2. Defences in Tort of Negligence 
Generally, the plaintiff can only claim damage if the defendant is proved to be at fault 
and there is no defence accepted by the court. The most common defences in the civil 
                                                          
991
 Setiawan, ‘Tinjauan Elementer Perbuatan Melawan Hukum’, above n 939, 39. 
992
  Fuady, ‘Perbuatan Melawan Hukum’, above n 914, 1345, 1425. Nominal damages are awarded to 
the victim even though there was not actual loss or injured incurred. Judges can determine a sum of 
money based on fairness or sense of justice to the victim. Compensatory damages are a compensation 
payment to the victim for damages that actually incurred and suffered by the victim due to the existence 
of an unlawful act. This includes compensation for various losses arising due to the mental distress caused 
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loss suffered by the victim. 
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will depend on the victim’s specific situation such as natural condition of premise and atmosphere of tort, 
background of tort, type of tort (gross or ordinary negligence) and so on. See also Makarim, above n 857, 
176. 
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 Sidabalok, above n 792, 1601. See also Makarim, above n 857, 1756; Setiawan, ‘Tinjauan 
Elementer Perbuatan Melawan Hukum’, above n 939, 2832. 
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 See Sidabalok, above n 792, 1579. 
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liability claim are contributory negligence, comparative negligence, and assumption of 
risk.
996
  
6.3.2.1. Pure Contributory Negligence 
Pure contributory negligence is probably one of the most common defences raised by 
the defendant to address claims for damages by a plaintiff.
997
 If the defendant pleads 
this defence, then the onus of proof lies with them to show that the plaintiff has 
demonstrated pure contributory negligence that has enabled the damage to occur.
998
 
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, contributory negligence is: ‘a plaintiff’s own 
negligence that played a part in causing the plaintiff’s injury and that is significant 
enough (in a few jurisdictions) to bar the plaintiff from recovering damages’.
999
 
Originally, the pure contributory negligence doctrine was ‘the principle that completely 
bars a plaintiff’s recovery [of damages] if the damage suffered is partly the plaintiff’s 
own fault’.
1000
 Hence, in former times in common law countries, pure contributory 
negligence acted as a complete defence.
1001
 In order to use this doctrine, the plaintiff or 
victim of an unlawful act could not contribute in any way to the occurrence of damages 
(the ‘clean hands’ doctrine). Therefore, in pure contributory negligence, the redress 
principle was an ‘all or nothing’ approach.
1002
 However, pure contributory negligence 
not only applied to the brick-and-mortar world, but also to transactions in cyber-world. 
For instance, an on-line commerce provider could defend against a claim for Internet 
security issues on the grounds that plaintiff also contributed for the damaged by losing 
their password.
1003
 An early United Kingdom (UK) example of this doctrine can be seen 
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 Fuady, ‘Perbuatan Melawan Hukum’, above n 914, 3. See also Gibson and Fraser, above n 917, 
7981; John W Bagby, ‘Cyberlaw Handbook for E-Commerce’ in Makarim, above n 857, 180. 
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 Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 912, 2423.  
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 Gibson and Fraser, above n 917, 111.  
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 Garner, above n 797, 1134. 
1000
 Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 912, 243.  
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lawresources.co.uk/Contributory-negligence.php>; Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 912, 244.  
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917, 7980. Butterfield v Forrester (1809) 103 ER 926: The plaintiff was riding his horse very fast. The 
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 Rustad and Daftary, above n 958, 308. 
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in Butterfield v Forrester (1809) 103 ER 926.
1004
 It should be noted that today such a 
doctrine is not universally applied in common law countries. 
Stewart and Stuhmcke argue that the doctrine of pure contributory negligence only 
created unfairness especially for the plaintiff by failing to recognise the different level 
of the degree of fault between the parties involved: ‘[t]he unfairness of this rule 
operating as a complete defence was that a plaintiff who had been even slightly careless 
would be completely prevented from recovering any damages as the result of an injury 
caused mainly by the defendant’s negligence’.
1005
 
6.3.2.2. Comparative Negligence 
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, comparative negligence is ‘a plaintiff’s own 
negligence that proportionally reduces the damages recoverable from a defendant.’
1006
 
Therefore, the comparative negligence doctrine is ‘the principle that reduces a plaintiff’s 
recovery proportionally to the plaintiff’s degree of fault in causing the damage, rather 
than barring recovery completely.’
1007
 Hence, the degree of negligence of the defendant 
is compared to that of the plaintiff.
 1008
 
Comparative negligence is a doctrine that arose as a reaction to ‘unfairness’ found in the 
application of the doctrine of pure contributory negligence.
1009
 As a consequence, 
several common law countries have abolished pure contributory negligence and have 
superseded it by statute and adopted the ‘comparative negligence’ doctrine.
1010
 This 
statute rule, instead of common law, is generally known as ‘apportionment legislation’. 
Apportionment legislation was introduced in England and its introduction has been 
followed in Australia to enable damage to be apportioned in a more just and equitable 
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7980. Butterfield v Forrester (1809) 103 ER 926: In this case, a plaintiff failed to redeem damages from 
a defendant where a plaintiff demonstrated contributory negligence when he rode his horse into a pole 
which the defendant had wrongly placed across the highway, despite the pole being visible from a 
distance. Indeed the plaintiff have shown a ‘slight’ carelessness when he rode the horse too fast. 
Meanwhile, the defendant apparently had greater fault when he wrongly placed the pole across the 
highway. Even thought the plaintiff had shown negligence, the accident would never have occurred if the 
defendant had not wrongly placed the pole on the highway.  
1005
 Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 912, 244.  
1006
 Garner, above n 797, 1056. 
1007
 Ibid 1134. 
1008
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way between the plaintiff and defendant. According to Stewart and Stuhmcke, the aim 
of apportionment legislation is ‘to adjust compensation according to degrees of fault’; 
they add that it now operates in cases of contributory negligence to reduce the amount 
of damages awarded to a plaintiff ‘to the extent that the plaintiff’s carelessness 
contributed to the damaged suffered.’
1011
 The Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) is an 
instance of apportionment legislation pertaining to pure contributory negligence.
1012
 In 
England, the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 (UK) is an instance of 
reform involving the comparative negligence doctrine, where judges apportion liability 
(and hence damages) according to the degree of culpability of the tortfeasor and 
plaintiff for the injury/damage sustained by the latter.
1013
  
Nowadays, pure contributory negligence still survives in some jurisdictions; however, 
for countries that have already reformed their liability law, contributory negligence (of 
the plaintiff) will be treated as ‘comparative negligence’ and no longer constitute a 
complete defence. Thus, if a defendant’s defence of plaintiff contributory negligence is 
accepted by the court, the plaintiff’s damages may be reduced according to the degree 
of negligence of the plaintiff. For instance, if the plaintiff is deemed 20 per cent 
responsible for the event that caused the damage, then the defendant will only be 
responsible for 80 per cent of the plaintiff’s damages. 
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 Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 912, 24650.  
1012
 Ibid 254; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). However, instead of using comparative negligence, the 
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        known at the time. 
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 Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 912, 2467. See UK Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 
1945 (UK) s 1(1):  
Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any 
other persons, a claim in respect of that damage shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of the 
person suffering the damage, but the damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to 
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See also 5S of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Contributory negligence can defeat claim):  
In determining the extent of a reduction in damages by reason of contributory negligence, a court 
may determine a reduction of 100% if the court thinks it just and equitable to do so, with the result 
that the claim for damages is defeated. 
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Apportioning damages in percentage terms between the plaintiff and the defendant in 
real cases is not an easy task for the courts. Basically, the courts have to compare the 
negligence of the plaintiff and that of the defendant, and transform it into a percentage. 
Hence, in the apportionment of fault, ‘the damages will be reduced to an amount which 
the court considers to be fair having regard to the extent of the plaintiff’s responsibility 
for the damage’.
1014
 However, each court might have different opinion regarding the 
degree of fault attributable to the plaintiff and the defendant.
1015
 As evidence of this, in 
Pennington v Norris (1956) 96 CLR 10, the trial judge reduced the plaintiff’s damages 
by 50 per cent for contributory negligence, while the High Court judge argued that 
damages should only be reduced by 20 per cent.
1016
 
Nevertheless, very valuable guidelines about how to gauge the parties’ responsibility for 
the damage can be distilled from the Tasmanian High Court decision in the Pennington 
v Norris, as follows: 
The only guide which the statute provides is that it requires regard be had to “the 
claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage” ... What has to be done is to arrive 
at a “just and equitable” apportionment as between the plaintiff and the defendant of the 
“responsibility” for the damage. It seems clear that this must of necessity involve a 
comparison of culpability. By “culpability” we do not mean moral blameworthiness but 
degree of departure from the standard of care of the reasonable man. To institute a 
comparison in respect of blameworthiness in such a case as the present seems more or 
less impracticable, because, while the defendant’s negligence is a breach of duty owed 
to other persons and therefore blameworthy, the plaintiff’s “contributory” negligence is 
not a breach of any duty at all, and it is difficult to impute moral blame to one who is 
careless merely of his own safety... Hence in our opinion, the negligence of the 
defendant was in a high degree more culpable, more gross, than that of the plaintiff. (at 
16)
 1017
 
From the case above, we can conclude that unlike negligence that depends on a breach 
of duty to another, contributory negligence is only concerned with the failure of a 
person to take care of his or her own safety and interests. Therefore, in order to use 
contributory negligence as a defence in a tortious liability claim, the defendant is 
required to establish that:  
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1017
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(a) the plaintiff failed to take the precautions a reasonable person would have taken for 
their own protection (that is, the standard of care applicable to the plaintiff’s act) and; 
(b) the damage was reasonably foreseeable (that the injury is within the risk) and was 
partly caused by the plaintiff’s negligent act.
1018
 
In most states of Australia, a finding of contributory negligence by the court will focus 
on only the plaintiff’s conduct according to the standard of what a reasonable person 
would have done in the same situation. Regarding the plaintiff’s standard of care, the 
statutory standard of care in Australia is that which is stated, for example, in section 
5R(2) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW): ‘the matter is to be determined on the 
basis of what that person knew or ought to have known at the time’.
1019
 Thus, common 
knowledge by a reasonable person in the same circumstances is a benchmark to be 
tested by the court. 
As in pure contributory negligence so in modified contributory negligence or 
comparative negligence, the onus of proof rests with the defendant who pleaded this 
defence in order to defend him/herself against a claim from the plaintiff over damages. 
If the defendant is successful in proving their defence, there will be a reduction in 
damages to be paid to the plaintiff, based on the comparison of the plaintiff’s degree of 
lack of standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the plaintiff’s 
position, ‘and the matter will be decided on the basis of what the person knew or ought 
to have known at the time’.
1020
 The standard of care test that the defendant must pass to 
evade claims of contributory negligence/comparative negligence is basically similar to 
the standard of care that is owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. In relation to the 
amount of the reduction, Gibson and Fraser state that, ‘the reduction is calculated on the 
basis of the damages that would have been awarded to the plaintiff if there had been no 
fault on their part, and then reduced by the percentage of their negligence.’
1021
 
In Indonesia, Article 1365 of Indonesia’s Civil Code obliges the tortfeasor/defendant to 
redress the damage to the victim/plaintiff in full; however, if the loss incurred is 
attributed to the tortfeasor and also to the victim’s own fault/negligence (joint 
fault/negligence), then the tortfeasor need only to pay partial compensation. In other 
words, the victim in such circumstances should also bear part of the damages suffered. 
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This condition has existed in the Netherlands since 1916 and is acknowledged in Dutch 
case law.
1022
 In general, plaintiff fault or negligence will reduce the liability of the 
defendant. Both plaintiff and defendant should bear the damages based on their degree 
of fault/negligence.
1023
 The division of liabilities between plaintiff and defendant is 
known in the civil law, and also in tort under customary law (as can be seen from 
Indonesia’s Supreme Court Verdict on 10 January 1957 No 206 K/Sip/1955).
1024
 
6.3.2.3. Voluntary Assumption of Risk 
As explained above, the defendant may be able to avoid liability for the claim for 
damages from the plaintiff, if that defendant can raise a defence that the plaintiff has 
assumed and consented to the possibility of risk existing in their activities, and such a 
defence is accepted by the court. In Scanlon v American Cigarette Company (Overseas) 
Pty Ltd (No 3) [1987] VR 289, Nicholson J asserted that there are three elements that 
must be established in raising the defence of voluntary assumption of risk by the 
plaintiff. These elements are: 
 precise knowledge of the risk by the plaintiff; 
 understanding and appreciation of the risk by the plaintiff; and  
 voluntary participation.1025 
 
With the development of civil liability reforms, defence using a voluntary assumption of 
risk generally can now be raised in regard to a general action (previously this defence 
typically was only used in sporting situations). The plaintiff will not recover any 
damages if the defendant successfully submits the defence of voluntary assumption of 
risk. However, this defence only can be raised if the plaintiff has obviously not paid 
attention to the obvious risk,
1026
 and hence ignored their own safety, where another 
reasonable person in their position would have acted differently to avoid it.
1027
 
Therefore, the plaintiff cannot recover damages for harm, even if the defendant is at 
fault, if the plaintiff voluntarily assumes a known risk. For instance, if a web site warns 
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the user that it does not in use the most current standard security software, a plaintiff 
may have voluntarily assumed a known risk.
1028
 
Nevertheless, using this defence in circumstances other than sporting or recreational 
activities might be difficult. A cause of difficulty in using such a defence is the problem 
of establishing whether ‘the plaintiff had a precise knowledge of the risk, a full and free 
understanding and appreciation of the particular risk, and voluntarily accepted the 
risk.’
1029
 In relation to the defence, a plaintiff is deemed to be aware of the risk if they 
are aware of the type or kind of risk in general (not necessarily to understand the risk in 
detail, such as knowing its precise nature, extent or manner of occurrence). 
6.3.2.4. Novus Actus Interveniens: (‘A New Intervening Act’) 
In a tortious liability case, especially in data security breaches such as happens in 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions, it is very common for the defendants to 
argue that their acts were not the cause of the plaintiff’s loss because there was an event 
which intervened between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s harm, such as the 
intervening criminal acts of third parties who steal the consumer’s data to commit 
identity theft and fraud.
1030
  
In this regard, a defendant usually asserts that the intervening incident might be said to 
be the ‘real’ cause of the plaintiff’s loss. Hence, it is commonly argued that the later 
conduct severs or breaks the chain of causation between the defendant’s negligence and 
the plaintiff’s damage. This condition is sometimes dubbed a novus actus interveniens: 
a new intervening act. If the court finds that on the balance of the probabilities that an 
intervening act indeed severed the causal link to the accused, then the defendant’s 
conduct would not be a cause of the loss and the defendant would not be liable for the 
damage.
1031
 
The problem for the court in cases where an intervening act is said to exist is whether 
that intervening event is sufficient to break the chain of causation between the negligent 
act of the defendant and the plaintiff’s loss. Several approaches have been 
acknowledged in determining whether a particular act can constitute an intervening act 
                                                          
1028
 Rustad and Daftary, above n 958, 398. 
1029
 Gibson and Fraser, above n 917, 113.  
1030
 See Nasruddin v PT Bank Mandiri Tbk case. See also Jennifer A Chandler, 'Negligence Liability for 
Breaches of Data Security' (2008) 23(2) Banking and Finance Law Review 263. 
1031
 Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 912, 2012.  
 
237 
 
  
that breaks the chain of causation between a defendant’s act and the plaintiff’s loss. 
These include voluntary acts, the ‘very risk’ created by the defendant, and coincidence: 
(1) voluntary acts: 
Smith J in the Haber v Walker (1963) VR 339 stated that: 
[T]he intervening occurrence, if it is to be sufficient to sever the connection, must 
ordinarily be either: 
(a) human action that is properly to be regarded as voluntary; or 
(b) a causality independent event the conjunction of which with the wrongful act or 
omission is by ordinary standards so extremely unlikely as to be termed a 
coincidence.
1032
 
Hence defendants can basically escape liability if they can prove that a voluntary act of 
the plaintiff was actually the main cause of the damage sustained by the plaintiff, and so 
severed the causal link between defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s loss. If this 
cannot be demonstrated, liability remains. 
(2) The ‘very risk’ created by the defendant: 
Pertaining to novus actus interveniens, Stewart and Stuhmcke noted that ‘[i]n some 
circumstances, it may be that such an action is the very thing against which a defendant 
has a duty of care to protect the plaintiff’s loss notwithstanding a subsequent act’.
1033
 In 
many cases where the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff and the risk can be 
categorised as ‘reasonable foreseeable’, the second act or event that occurs and is 
claimed by the defendant to be the ‘real’ cause of the plaintiff’s loss and thus is used by 
the defendant as the intervening act to escape liabilities, such a claim is mostly rejected 
by the courts on the basis that the causal link persists and the damage or harm sustained 
by the plaintiff was actually facilitated by the negligence of the defendant. Hence, it 
cannot break the chain of causation as can be seen from various judgments in cases such 
as Chomentoski v Red Garter Restaurant (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 1070, March v 
Stramare (1991) 171 CLR 506, and Medlin v SGIC (1995) 182 CLR 1.
1034
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(3) Coincidence: 
A coincidence is a circumstance where the defendant can build a defence against a 
damage claim by the plaintiff by using novus actus interveniens, where the condition 
that causes a plaintiff’s loss was actually a fortuitous event which is causally unrelated 
to the act of the defendant. Stewart and Stuhmcke summarise the judgments in cases 
such as March v Stramare (1991) 171 CLR 506 at 516 and Canterbury Bankstown 
RLFC Ltd v Rogers (1993) Aust Torts Reports ¶81–246, observing that: 
A tortfeasor will not be liable where injury is caused by a coincidence, even where the 
tortfeasor’s actions might have resulted in the plaintiff being in the place at the time 
when the coincidence occurs, so long as the risk to the plaintiff has not been increased 
by the actions of the tortfeasor.
1035
 
In Indonesia, Fuady states that in general in cases where it can be proven that there is no 
‘reasonable foreseeability’, the intervening act will be deemed a ‘superseding cause’. 
Consequently, the defendant’s act will not be treated as the necessary proximate cause 
for the damage that occurred, and the defendant will not be liable for damages (that is, 
the relationship between the damage to the plaintiff and the defendant’s act is too 
remote as it was ‘unforeseeable’ and so no risk prevention could have been adopted by 
the defendant in relation to such risk). However a defendant will not be liable for the 
damages, if the victim also contributed to the occurrence of damages, such as when the 
victim does nothing to prevent losses.
1036
 In other words, in cases where the defendant 
owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and the risk can be categorised as one of ‘reasonable 
foreseeability’, the novus actus interveniens that occurs and becomes the ‘real’ cause of 
the plaintiff’s loss will render the defendant liable for damages to the plaintiff (with 
restitution in the form of monetary compensation as the most likely outcome, as 
indicated earlier).  
Nevertheless, in the area of e-banking in Indonesia, legislation invalidates the novus 
actus interveniens principle. Its invalidation in Indonesia can be seen from (among 
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others) Article 21(3) of LIET, which states that: ‘if the damage [to] electronic 
transactions occurred because of the failure of an electronic agent due to the direct acts 
by third party/ies against the electronic system, then all legal consequences will be the 
liability of the provider or owner of an electronic agent.’ This creates a statutory 
‘proximity’ for the ‘provider or owner of the electronic agent’ that is not broken by the 
‘intervening acts’ of third parties and thus appears to eliminate any defence based on 
such ‘new intervening acts’ that may be perpetrated by fraudsters. However, as Article 
21(4) of LIET makes clear, such liability is void ‘if damage [to] electronic transactions 
is occasioned by failure of the operation of the electronic agent due to negligence of 
service users’; in such instances ‘any legal consequences shall become the responsibility 
of the service users.’  
6.4. Consumer Protection for Unauthorised ATM/Debit Card 
Transactions: Concept and Practice of Dispute Resolution and 
Redress in Indonesia 
6.4.1. Unauthorised ATM/Debit Card Transaction: Consumer as a True 
Victim  
Typically, payment fraud (such as unauthorised payment card transactions) will cause 
losses of actual consumers’ funds in their banks.
1037
 For consumers, besides the direct 
financial cost (the defrauded amount that is not reimbursed by banks), they also suffer 
indirect financial costs or consumer costs (the out-of-pocket costs or lost wages) 
incurred by the victim in order to resolve a fraud case, such as postage, copying, 
notarising documents, and legal fees associated with investigation and prosecution. 
These costs may also include the expense generated by any fraudulent debts, with such 
expenses including interest on loans, credit cards and so on, paid in order to avoid 
further problems.
1038
 Some consumers also suffer from privacy infringement,
1039
 mental 
distress, trauma and frustration regarding uncertain situations related to whether or not 
their money will be reimbursed by the card issuer bank. An example of the experiences 
(including economic and psychological damages and stresses) of a victim comes from 
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Mr Panggabean, a 55 year old public high school teacher and the victim of an ATM 
card-trapping fraud.
1040
  
The Example of Mr Panggabean Case: 
On 19 May 2012, Mr Panggabean conducted an ATM transaction at a Bank DKI ATM 
booth in Cibubur Square Mall. Instead of the normal transaction occurring, his ATM 
card became stuck inside the ATM slot. Panicking because he had never had such an 
experience, he followed the suggestion of a ‘good Samaritan’ who had stepped into the 
booth and suggested to him that he call the Bank DKI call centre number as shown on 
the sticker attached to the body of the Bank DKI ATM, in order to get help and 
overcome the problem (the sticker was fake but had been made with such precision as 
to make it indistinguishable from the genuine one). The ‘call centre officer’ — who was 
actually one of the ‘con artists’ in this fraud — then pretended to help and asked him to 
make several attempts to retrieve the card from the ATM, such as by pressing some 
combinations of the buttons on the ATM keyboard. However, none of the attempts 
succeeded. The ‘officer’ then asked him to verify his identity by supplying his name, 
PIN, date of birth and so on in order to cancel the card and issue the new one. Because 
of the stressful situation and believing that he was speaking with an authorised bank 
officer, he then revealed all the information demanded and left the ATM, believing the 
bank would be securing his card. Something that Mr Panggabean didn’t know was 
(because, as he later argued, he had never had consumer education about ATM risk 
from his bank) that the ‘good Samaritan’ was actually a con artist and the call centre 
was actually fake.  
Soon after Mr Panggabean left the ATM, the fraudster pulled out the consumer’s ATM 
card using special devices (such as metal clip or customised screwdriver) and withdrew 
Mr Panggabean’s money using the correct consumer PIN. As result, all Mr 
Panggabean’s money —as much as IDR45,698,000 or around AUD4500 — was 
drained from his account. Sadly, this was not the end of his misery. Instead, this was 
just the beginning of his ordeal.  
Following the loss, he wrote of his experience to more than 10 newspapers and 
magazines, asking for help since Bank DKI itself refused to recognise any liability as he 
had willingly supplied his information and the correct PIN and number had been used in 
the transaction. After his demand for the bank to reimburse his loss was rejected by the 
bank, he then approached mediation for his loss at the Banking Mediation Agency in 
Bank Indonesia (the central bank of the Republic of Indonesia) on November 2012.  
Unfortunately, after several meetings, by December 2012 no agreement had been 
concluded and the bank still refused to be liable on the ground that the loss was due to 
Mr Panggabean’s own mistake in revealing his PIN (the bank blamed the perpetrators 
for their success in attaching card-trapping device and fake call centre number to the 
bank’s ATM booth, and did not perceive this situation as at all due to any negligence on 
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the bank’s part). Moreover, the bank also requested that Mr Panggabean pay the 
monthly instalment and interest on the loan from which he would never benefit.  
As a result of the fraud, Mr Panggabean’s son failed to continue his university studies 
and Mr Panggabean spent most of his free time (including weekends) giving tutorials 
for extra cash to compensate for his loss. Sad, frustrated, angry, regretful and mentally 
distressed are just some of words that can now give some semblance of his condition.  
The only hope and avenue left now is to launch a civil suit in the court or go to the 
Consumer Disputes Resolution Body. But the very negative stigma of court proceedings 
(which often involve many ‘phantom’ expenses, the lack of knowledge on the part of 
judges about e-banking transactions, and the prolonged trial process from District 
Court, High Court and Supreme Court (a process that may take years) combined with a 
great uncertainty as to the result (on top of the costs involved), the court process is 
deemed a difficult (if not altogether impossible) option for Mr Panggabean.  
His is by no means a unique experience for, as described in the background to this study 
given in the Chapter 1, in Indonesia many unauthorised ATM/Debit transactions that 
have caused money to be lost from consumer bank accounts ended up with banks 
refusing to redeem the money. The most common defence supplied by the banks is 
either that the alleged transactions are deemed valid due to the use of the correct card 
number and PIN or to some extent the consumers have been deemed to have been 
negligent and so enabled fraudsters to carry out unauthorised ATM/Debit card 
transactions. 
As a consequence of weak consumer protection in Indonesia, the loss of customers’ 
money from their banks due to fraud can create a severe crisis. The loss of money for 
some consumers who have been unable to obtain remedies from their banks not only 
creates harsh economic hardship, but also varying degrees of psychological distress 
(such as frustration, sadness, loss of hope, depression, and indeed, mental distress). 
However, fraud not only affects individual consumer victims (and their immediate 
families) monetarily but also alters their perceptions and behaviours (consumer 
confidence) which can have a significant impact on the issuer bank and retail merchant, 
particularly if this experience — or knowledge of such experiences — becomes 
widespread.
1041
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Levi and Burrows argue that consumers and other individuals (‘public at large’) are 
‘ultimately the victims of most fraud, as they generally bear the costs of fraud through 
higher insurance premiums, reduced dividends or pensions, higher credit card fees or 
interest rates, higher fees for banking services, higher taxes, and so on (including 
psychiatric services and redundancies)’.
1042
  
Consumer protection issues in Indonesia are ‘an iceberg above the sea phenomenon’, 
that is, there are far more problems than are easily visible. Many parties, including 
consumers believe that there are issues regarding consumer protection in Indonesia; 
however, data on the number of consumers that experience pure economic loss in the 
use of a bank’s particular products and/or services are scarce and incomplete. To this 
day, Indonesia does not have a data centre that actively records and stores consumer 
protection related cases. Many consumers who have lost money from their bank 
accounts prefer to be silent rather than complain to the relevant consumer organisations. 
This is worsened by the prevalent cultural Indonesian behavioural norm that values 
avoiding an open conflict, especially with one who is deemed superior in most 
aspects.
1043
 Some consumers also treat a loss as a ‘divine will’, and hence they must 
bear it.  
These facts are consistent with the results of research by the Indonesian National Law 
Development Agency (BPHN), which concluded that the majority of Indonesian people 
keep silent about an instance of a loss that they have experienced. They are reluctant to 
file a claim for compensation and report the complaint to the competent bodies. This 
reaction is variously motivated. The predominant reasons are that the victim consumers: 
(1) do not want a legal ‘hassle’; (2) worry that the situation might be exacerbated if they 
make a complaint; (3) do not want to be involved with the police (because of the 
inherent stigma attached to Indonesia’s police department); (4) do not know exactly 
where to complain about the incident and are afraid of the cost of making and 
processing the complaint; and (5) are pessimistic regarding whether the reported 
incident will be addressed properly or even that the report itself will receive any 
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attention.
1044
 This acts in the banks’ rather than the victim consumers’ favour — at least 
in the short term in the matter of possible litigation, but is not in the long term interests 
of either consumers or banks. 
Siahaan contends that, in fact, the lack of consumers’ reports concerning their losses 
when consuming or using products or services from its producer (the card issuer in 
regard of card payment transaction) not only will be to the detriment of the rights of 
those consumers themselves, but also to all other relevant stakeholders. The absence of 
actual consumer complaints is detrimental to all parties for a number of reasons. 
Businesses or government authorities will not be aware of the issues regarding the 
problems of consumer protection when no complaints filed. The absence of consumer 
complaint data ‘sends the wrong signal’ to card issuers because they feel that there is 
nothing wrong with their goods or services. That same absence of consumer complaints 
has led not only to a lack of awareness on the part of the government in regard to the 
existence of problems, but consequently an inability to seek and then impose 
appropriate solutions. In relation to consumers themselves, any losses incurred will not 
be recovered if the losses are never reported and/or claims made to the court or dispute 
resolution body that the business actors responsible for the losses should make 
restitution for those losses.
1045
 Given their international experience, however, it could be 
argued that larger businesses, major banks and government should be somewhat aware 
of potential problems, even with the lack of consumer reports. 
6.4.2. Consumer Protection in ATM/Debit Card Transactions 
In general, consumers are in a weak position compared to banks as producers of 
banking products and/or services.
1046
 Huzna Zahir (former chief of the Indonesian 
Consumer Protection Agency) contends that many fraudsters are taking advantage of 
inherent weaknesses in the banking system and its infrastructures. She further argues 
that theft of a consumer’s funds from their bank accounts through ATM/debit card fraud 
basically can be considered as violating the consumer’s right to security (and privacy of 
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transactions) as well as reducing the convenience of utilising the banking products and 
services.
1047
  
Beside the classic asymmetry problems concerning information about bank products 
and services,
1048
 the absence of information about the inherent risks for consumers is 
probably one of the biggest issues in this regard in the banking industry. Hence, it is not 
surprising that Muliaman Hadad (former Bank Indonesia Deputy Governor) urges banks 
to educate their consumers, especially regarding payment card transactions. He further 
argues that good consumer education could reduce the possibility of disputes caused by 
the consumer’s lack of understanding of fraud risk and the methods used to perpetrate 
such fraud.
1049
 Such education is, therefore, in the interests of the bank as well as the 
consumers, by reducing consumer’s unwitting ‘cooperation’ in their exposure to fraud. 
Its prevention through increased consumer education benefits both bank and consumer. 
Disturbingly, many consumers are also unaware of their rights as consumers.
1050
 Hence, 
most of the time, they have become objects of business activities undertaken by the 
business actors in pursuit of profit. Business actors (that is, businesses, including banks) 
typically attempt to optimise their profit through by (either or both) increasing sales and 
decreasing costs so as to maximise shareholder or business owner returns. In a bid to 
increase sales, business actors may employ advertising and other promotional activities, 
and various sales methods; while in a bid to decrease costs, necessary but expensive 
updates or repairs may be delayed or blame-shifting occur, and standard 
agreements/contracts be adopted. The agreements may indeed be designed to place 
consumers at a disadvantage compared to the business actor whose interests the contract 
will seek to protect.
1051
 The common general principle for business actors everywhere is 
to make the ultimate profit with the minimum capital. It is also most likely that this 
principle will jeopardise consumer rights, either directly or indirectly.
1052
  
It has been shown that in the complex environment of the financial sector, banking 
consumers are particularly vulnerable to identity theft and identity fraud related to bank 
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products and services, such as in bank payment card operations. In the event of theft 
or/and fraud occurring, consumers are still in a very weak position in regard to 
recovering their lost funds from the bank.  
Bank consumers are in a weak position from the beginning of their relationship with the 
bank. The legal relationship between the bank and its customers is initiated when the 
customer and the bank enter into a deposit contract and the account is established.
1053
 
This relationship is generally governed by a bank’s standard contract where often the 
terms and conditions have been created by the bank in the bank’s favour.
1054
 Although 
the adoption of a standard contract has itself been legitimated by the Indonesian legal 
system, in practice there are still many forbidden clauses such as ‘liability dumping’ 
contained in them.
1055
 According to Anderson et al, liability dumping is a condition 
where ‘firms seek to manage risk … by externalising it on less powerful suppliers or 
customers’.
1056
  
Such liability dumping has been banned by the LCP. Article 18 of LCP explicitly 
prohibits the transfer of responsibility by businesses to their customers. Any violation of 
these provisions will cause the agreement to become null and void. Nevertheless, due to 
the lack of oversight of the bank agreement clauses with customers, most bank–
consumer contracts still have liability dumping provisions. This causes a noteworthy 
inequality in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the 
detriment of a consumer’s rights when fraud occurs. Hence, despite the existence of 
prohibition of ‘liability dumping,’ some additional form of legal protection for bank 
consumers is no doubt needed in order to maintain their trust in bank operations.
1057
 
Otherwise it could be argued that there are less than optimal circumstances for 
motivating banks to reduce fraud as ‘liability dumping’ reduces the impetus for change 
by reducing impact on the banks themselves by minimising the possibility of a bank 
having to cover consumer fraud losses.  
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6.4.3. Forum to Resolve Unauthorised ATM/Debit Card Transactions: 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Body and the Court 
Settlement of a civil or commercial dispute in Indonesia is generally conducted through 
lengthy litigation in the courts. However, out of court settlement also has been known in 
civil lawsuits. Article 45 of the LCP has opened up the possibility for any aggrieved 
consumer to sue business actors through institutions in charge of resolving disputes 
between consumers and business operators, or through judicial courts based on the 
voluntary choice of the parties to the dispute. Further, the LCP states that the settlement 
of disputes should be conducted outside the court in order to reach an agreement 
regarding the type and amount of compensation and/or regarding certain measures that 
must be taken to ensure that no such damages should occur again to consumers.
1058
 
During its development, the current settlement of a lawsuit outside the court system 
through a variety of arbitration and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is relatively 
popular in Indonesia.
1059
 Owen states that ADR is becoming more routine and accepted 
in Indonesia because it allows the disputing parties to resolve disputes quickly and 
inexpensively through a trusted third party.
1060
 Zulham notes that ADR provides many 
benefits to the parties involved including: (1) greater guarantee of confidentiality; (2) 
involvement of expertise in the specific field; (3) simpler and more efficient procedures; 
(4) final and binding decision; and (5) no publication of the verdict without the parties’ 
consent.
1061
 It could be argued that while the final provision reduces overall 
transparency and reporting of disputes, it could also make it attractive to various parties 
(especially defendants) and thus increase willingness to participate. 
The exercise of arbitration and ADR has been practised from ancient times in Indonesia 
and is based on customary law in many communities in Indonesia. This traditional type 
of dispute resolution had been widely practised throughout the archipelago of Indonesia 
and ultimately became institutional and formalised by the enactment of the Law 
                                                          
1058
 See LCP 1999 art 47. 
1059
 Romli Atmasasmita, Pengantar Hukum Kejahatan Business [Introduction to the Law on Bisnis 
Fraud] (Prenada Media, 2003) 37. See also Mas Achmad Santosa, Development of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) in Indonesia (2003) ASEAN Law Association (ALA) - Indonesia 
<http://www.aseanlawassociation.org/docs/w4_indo.pdf> 
1060
 Owen et al, above n 64, 22. See also Alexander H Bevan, Alternative Dispute Resolution (Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1992). Note: re ADR, LAADR art 6(5) states that mediation must begin within 7 days of a 
mediator being agreed upon, and conclude within 30 days (art 6(6)). 
1061
 Zulham, Hi and Hum, above n 969, 88. 
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Number 30 of 1999 concerning Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(LAADR).
1062
  
LAADR principally encourages people to use arbitration or alternative dispute resolution 
to resolve civil disputes between parties. According to this law, an ‘arbitration 
institution’ is the governing (decision-making) body, and arbitrators are selected (and 
mutually agreed upon) by the parties to the dispute to give a verdict on a particular 
dispute. This process has been previously agreed upon, usually prior to any dispute 
arising, although an arbitration agreement can also be made subsequent to disputes 
arising (Article 1(3)). The institution is also able to give a binding opinion on a 
particular legal relationship in a case where no conflict has yet arisen.
1063
 Where parties 
cannot agree on the choice of arbitrators, the Chairman of the District Court can select 
an arbitrator or arbitration panel (the various permutations of this process are covered in 
detail in chapters II and III of the Act).  
ADR, on the other hand, is a mechanism that is used to resolve the dispute or difference 
of opinion through the procedures agreed upon by the parties of a settlement which 
explicitly state that disputes are to be settled out of court by way of ‘consultation, 
negotiation, mediation, conciliation, or expert opinion’.
1064
 According to LAADR, every 
dispute in the private law area that can be filed with the court can also be settled through 
ADR. Besides LAADR, LIET also provides opportunity for disputant parties to settle 
their disputes by ADR.
1065
  
6.4.3.1. Bank Indonesia Banking Mediation Agency 
Customer dispute settlement regulation as stipulated by Bank Indonesia in 2005
1066
 is in 
practice, however, still far from successful. Much consumer dissatisfaction and many 
                                                          
1062
 Santosa, above n 1059.  
1063
 See art 1(8) of Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 30 Tahun 1999 Tentang Arbitrase dan 
Alternatif Penyelesaian Sengketa [Law of Republic of Indonesia No 30 of 1999 on Arbitration and 
Alternative Disputes Resolution] (Indonesia) (LAADR1999). 
1064
 See art 1(10) of LAADR 1999. 
1065
 See art 39(2) Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 11 Tahun 2008 Tentang Informasi dan 
Transaksi Elektronik  [Law No 11 of 2008 on Electronic Information and Transactions] (Indonesia) 
('LIET') 
1066
 Peraturan Bank Indonesia Nomor: 7/7/PBI/2005 Tentang Penyelesaian Pengaduan Nasabah 
sebagaimana telah diubah dengan Peraturan Bank Indonesia Nomor: 10/10/PBI/2008 [Bank Indonesia 
Regulation Nomor: 7/7/PBI/2005 Concerning Resolution of Customer Complaints as amended by Bank 
Indonesia Regulation Number 10/10/PBI/2008] ('BIR RCC'). See also Surat Edaran Bank Indonesia 
Nomor 7/24/DPNP Perihal Penyelesaian Pengaduan Nasabah sebagaimana telah diubah dengan Surat 
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complaints are still emerging regarding the way in which banks resolve consumer 
problems. Consumer’s disappointment is mostly caused by a bank’s rejection of a 
consumer’s claim, either in full or in part.  
In accordance with LAADR and due to the existence of many prolonged disputes 
between banks and consumers, Bank Indonesia in 2006 stipulated the Bank Indonesia 
Regulation Concerning Banking Mediation to facilitate the resolution of unsettled 
disputes between banks and their customer as set out in the Bank Indonesia Regulation 
on Resolution of Customer Complaints. The goal of this regulation is to maintain the 
banks’ good reputation and also to create an alternative dispute resolution venue for 
customers when their claims are rejected by their banks.
1067
  
Mediation in this regulation means a dispute settlement process involving a mediator to 
assist disputing parties to reach a settlement in the form of a voluntary agreement for 
some or all aspects of the problem under dispute.
1068
 It is expected that this mediation 
process could provide a simple, efficient and fast mechanism for customers that are 
willing to settle their disputes with banks. Moreover, Bank Indonesia anticipates that the 
existence of the Banking Mediation Agency (of Bank Indonesia) will provide better 
protection to small consumers in the resolution of disputes against their own bank.
1069
 
Following this enactment, every consumer that has unsettled disputes with banks, and 
with the financial claim in such dispute being no more than IDR500 million,
1070
 can file 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Edaran Bank Indonesia Nomor 10/13/DPNP [Bank Indonesia Letter Number 7/24/DPNP Concerning 
Resolution of Customer Complaints as amended by Bank Indonesia Letter Number 10/13/DPNP]. 
1067
 See Bank Indonesia Regulation Number: 8/5/PBI/2006 Concerning Banking Mediation as amended 
by Bank Indonesia Regulation Number: 10/1/PBI/2008. See also Sembiring, above n 694, 1846. 
1068
 Bank Indonesia Regulation Number: 8/5/PBI/2006 Concerning Banking Mediation as amended by 
Bank Indonesia Regulation Number: 10/1/PBI/2008 art 1(3). Bank Indonesia will perform as a mediation 
agent until the Indonesian Banking Association can form an independent banking mediation institution. 
See Garner, above n 797, 1071. ‘Mediation’ is defined as a method of non binding disputes resolution 
involving a neutral third party who tries to help the disputing parties reach a mutually agreeable solution.  
1069
 Bank Indonesia Regulation Number: 8/5/PBI/2006 Concerning Banking Mediation as amended by 
Bank Indonesia Regulation Number: 10/1/PBI/2008 arts 4, 5 and their elucidation. See also Heriani, 
above n 1049. In performing its banking mediation function, Bank Indonesia will assist customers and 
banks to review the dispute at its core in order to reach an agreement. In this regard, Bank Indonesia shall 
facilitate dispute settlement by way of summoning, bringing to meet, hearing, and motivating the 
customer and the bank to reach an agreement without giving a recommendation or a decision. In doing 
this, Bank Indonesia shall appoint an independent mediator that fulfils some qualifications such as having 
knowledge in banking, finance and/or law. 
1070
 See Bank Indonesia Regulation Number: 8/5/PBI/2006 Concerning Banking Mediation as amended 
by Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 10/1/PBI/2008 arts 1s(4), 6. See also art 6 and its elucidation. In 
this regulation: ‘Dispute’ means a complaint submitted by the customer or customer representative to a 
banking mediator, after the dispute had undergone a dispute settlement process by the bank as stipulated 
in Bank Indonesia Regulation Concerning Customer Dispute Settlement. Meanwhile, the meaning of 
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their dispute with Bank Indonesia for alternative dispute resolution by way of a 
mediation process. Sondang Martha Samosir (former chief of Bank Indonesia’s Banking 
Mediation Agency) concluded that cases related to the payment system are the type of 
cases that mostly arise. Further, the former Bank Indonesia Deputy Governor, 
Muliaman Hadad, has explained that the payment system’s problems are dominated by 
ATM/debit and credit card cases.
1071
 
However, although the BI banking mediation process is free of charge,
1072
 relatively 
rapid compared to judicial settlements,
1073
 and should be promoted and published by 
banks to their consumers,
1074
 its existence is still not recognised by most bank 
customers, as is shown in the results of the survey conducted by the author. Of the 30 
consumer interviewees (including 6 consumers who had experienced unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions) from 6 respondent banks in Jakarta, Denpasar and 
Yogyakarta from July to August 2012, only 5 of had any knowledge about the BI 
banking mediation section as an alternative disputes resolution body in Indonesia.
1075
  
Furthermore, the mediator provides neither recommendations nor decisions binding on 
either party; the mediator is there to encourage the parties to reach agreement and not 
provide them with a solution. However, under Article 6(7) the successful conclusion of 
a mediation process involves a ‘written agreement resolving the dispute or difference of 
opinion’. Such agreement ‘will be final and binding on parties for execution in good 
faith’ (emphasis added) but it must be registered at the District Court within 30 days of 
signing. If the disputing parties reach no mutual agreement, the parties must then bring 
                                                                                                                                                                          
‘financial claim’ here is the customer’s potential financial loss that is considered as being caused by the 
Bank’s mistake or negligence. The financial claim value shall cover direct damage/loss and/or expenses 
already paid by the customer in the effort to settle the dispute, but not immaterial loss or consequential 
damages such as damage or loss due to defamation and misdemeanour. 
1071
 Heriani, above n 1049. 
1072
 However, in the event that customer or bank has the initiative to present expert witnesses, then the 
customer and bank have agreed to cover the expert witness expenses. 
1073
 Bank Indonesia Regulation Number: 8/5/PBI/2006 Concerning Banking Mediation as amended by 
Bank Indonesia Regulation Number: 10/1/PBI/2008 art 11: ‘to avoid excessive time frame on the dispute 
resolution process, the process of mediation shall have been completed in no more than 30 (thirty) 
working days, with option to extend for another 30 (thirty) working days’. 
1074
 Surat Edaran Bank Indonesia Nomor 7/24/DPNP Perihal Penyelesaian Pengaduan Nasabah 
sebagaimana telah diubah dengan Surat Edaran Bank Indonesia Nomor 10/13/DPNP [Bank Indonesia 
Letter Number 7/24/DPNP Concerning Resolution of Customer Complaints as amended by Bank 
Indonesia Letter Number 10/13/DPNP]. According to this regulation, banks should publicise banking 
mediation as an alternative dispute resolution to its customers by providing the information in the form of 
leaflets, pamphlets, posters, booklets, website, or other means of publicity in each branch, or send such 
information along with the results of any customer’s complaint by letter to the customer’s address. 
1075
 See, eg, interviews with bank consumers C-1C-30.  
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the case to either arbitration or a court of law in order to secure a binding decision. In 
practice, Samosir has argued that not all of the cases brought to Indonesia’s Banking 
Mediation Agency can be settled smoothly and a consensus reached.
1076
 
As Bevan argues, ‘where there is a wide disparity between the parties in terms of power, 
then mediation may not be suitable’.
1077
 In fact, many cases that are brought to 
Indonesia’s Banking Mediation Agency by consumers are the same cases that have 
failed to be resolved on the first attempt at resolution within a bank’s internal dispute 
resolution unit. In such instances, it is obvious that a bank generally has far much more 
power and knowledge than consumers, and greater control than consumers. All payment 
card system infrastructure is created by or decided upon by the bank and ultimately 
under the control of the bank. For instance, by examining the CCTV footage record (if 
any), transaction records, a consumer’s transactions pattern and so on, the bank is the 
one who most probably knows whether the unauthorised transactions claimed by the 
consumers were indeed done by third party fraudster or someone else. Banks are also 
the ones who know almost everything about the type of identity theft and identity fraud 
that might jeopardise their payment card system and/or their consumers’ funds.  
Therefore, technically, it is very easy for a bank that lacks a commitment to fairness and 
does not have act in good faith to conceal the facts about unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions as such revelations may be feared to weaken the bank’s position.  
By way of contrast, it is very difficult for most consumers to articulate their position 
since in general consumers have limited knowledge about the banking system and it is 
almost impossible for them to access knowledge about that system or access ‘back 
room’ knowledge of a bank’s operations. Consumers remain vulnerable to this day. 
Bank Indonesia still does not openly publish on its payment system website any 
ATM/debit card fraud figures (which are reported regularly by banks) nor details about 
the results of Bank Indonesia’s supervision of the banks’ ATM/debit card systems. 
                                                          
1076
 Heriani, above n 1049. In light of Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 8/5/PBI/2006, dated 30 
January 2006, on Banking Mediation (State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Number 7/2006, 
Supplement to State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Number 4601), BI thought it ‘necessary to set 
forth the implementation regulation in a Bank Indonesia Circular with the provisions as follows: 
2(11).The Agreement reached in the Mediation process shall be contained in a Deed of 
Agreement, which shall be final and binding on the Customer and the Bank. Being final shall 
mean that the Dispute cannot be submitted to the executives of the Banking Mediation function for 
Mediation reprocess.’ 
1077
 Bevan, above n 1060.  
 
251 
 
  
Although there are some payment card fraud figures disclosed in the Bank Indonesia’s 
payment system yearly report that are also posted in the Bank Indonesia’s website, these 
figures could not be easily retrieved by using Internet search engines ( the layperson’s 
usual method of finding material). This makes these fraud figures unreachable by the 
vast majority of people unless they know to read the Bank Indonesia’s report and are 
aware of how to source it.
1078
  
In general, banks commonly state that their systems are infallible. In practice however, 
there is much evidence to the contrary. The classic ‘trump card’ for banks in the 
disputes with their consumers over unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions is the 
liability dumping clause in the bankconsumers standard contract. In this contract, there 
are provisions that transfer bank liabilities to the consumer. Such a provision can 
include that if a consumer’s ATM/debit card data is compromised and used by 
fraudsters, regardless of whether the consumer has or has not contributed to the crime, 
the bank will be deemed to have no liability for the consumer’s damage (loss, injury). 
As a result, in most cases, disputes between banks and consumers over unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions have to be escalated to arbitration or litigation in the court, 
because the mediation process has failed to achieve an agreement or the expected 
dispute resolution result.
1079
 Even if the mediation is entirely successful or even 
partially in terms of a bank finally having agreed to redress the consumers’ losses, often 
the reason behind these decisions could not be treated as a legal guidance for common 
consumers. Very often the basis of the agreed mediation decision was not a legal fact 
but mostly at the discretion of bank management and achieved by a direction from 
bank’s management concerning the consumer’s status. For instance, the consumer 
victims tend to have redress if they are old (to avoid ‘karma’), have a favourable 
affiliation to a political party or religious organisation, a high ranking police/military 
official, the central bank, and so on. This was revealed by a number of banking 
mediation body interviewees.
1080
  
                                                          
1078
 No consumers volunteered knowledge of such material in the interviews conducted. 
1079
 Heriani, above n 1049. 
1080
 Interview results from several Bank Indonesia Banking Mediation Body officers who requested 
anonymity. See, eg, BI-MBO-1; BI-MBO-2 (BI banking mediation body officer).  
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6.4.3.2. Consumer Dispute Settlement Body (CDSB) 
6.4.3.2.1. Brief Overview  
LCP establishes an independent body — the National Consumer Protection Agency —
to regulate consumer protection and a dispute settlement body (the Consumer Dispute 
Settlement Body (CDSB)) in each district in Indonesia to function as a type of ‘small 
claims court’ (without being a court) for resolving disputes between business actors and 
consumers in Indonesia.
1081
 A CDSB can be used by disputant parties to resolve 
disputes that generally only involve relatively low amounts that are not worth settling in 
court in terms of expected length of time to be taken and proceedings cost that would be 
involved.
1082
 CDSBs are also chosen by consumers who are reluctant to file a lawsuit in 
the court because of their inferior position in terms of social and financial resources 
compared to those of business actors.
1083
 
Based on interviews with six consumers that had been victims of unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions as explained previously, most of the consumers’ claims for 
unauthorised ATM/debit card damages failed either in the banks’ internally provided 
dispute resolution processes and then in the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) venues 
provided, such as the Bank Indonesia Banking Mediation Agency. Accordingly, the 
opportunity to file a lawsuit at a CDSB as a ‘last resort’ for out of court settlement 
becomes the preferred choice for few banking consumers to settle their dispute with 
banks. 
Article 49 of LCP introduced CDSBs to handle business actor/consumer disputes and to 
serve as a mechanism for out of court settlement of such disputes.
1084
 CDSB members 
                                                          
1081
 LCP 1999 art 45(1). CDSB has been established in several cities in Indonesia with the enactment of 
Presidential Decree No 90 Year 2001 Concerning the Establishment of CDSB at city of Medan, 
Palembang, Jakarta Pusat, Jakarta Barat, Bandung, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Malang and 
Makasar. 
1082
 Sidabalok, above n 792, 1489. See also Adrian Sutedi, Tanggung Jawab Produk Dalam Hukum 
Perlindungan Konsumen [Product Liability in Consumer Protection Law] (Ghalia Indonesia, 2008) 223; 
Zulham, Hi and Hum, above n 969, 1408; Shofie, ‘Kapita Selekta Hukum Perlindungan Konsumen di 
Indonesia’, above n 683, 1236; Susanti Adi Nugroho, Proses Penyelesaian Sengketa Konsumen Ditinjau 
Dari Hukum Acara Serta Kendala Implementasinya [Consumer Dispute Settlement Process from 
Procedural Law Perpective and its Implementation Constrains]  (Kencana Prenada Media Group, 2006) 
15. 
1083
 Nugroho, above n 1082, 75, 85. 
1084
 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 8 Tahun 1999 Tentang Perlindungan Konsumen [Law 
No 8 of 1999 on Consumer Protection] (Indonesia) ('LCP') art 1(18). 
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consist of representatives of government, consumer and business. The CDSBs’ 
functions among others are:  
(a)  to handle and settle consumer disputes through mediation,
1085
 arbitration
1086
 or 
conciliation;
1087
 
(b)  to provide consultation for consumer protection; 
(c)  to undertake supervision regarding the inclusion [and nature] of a standard clause; 
(d)  to report to the public investigator if there are any violations to the provisions of the 
LCP; 
(e)  to receive written or oral complaints from the consumers regarding violations of 
consumer protection; 
(f)  to investigate and examine the consumer protection disputes; 
(g)  to summon the business actors who are accused to have violated consumer   
      protection; 
(h) to summon and bring witnesses, expert witnesses and/or each and every one 
considered to have known that there has been violation of the LCP; 
(i)   to request assistance from investigators to bring the business actors, witness, expert 
witness, or each and every one intended by points (g) and (h) above who are not 
willing to fulfil the summons issued by the CDSB; 
(j)   to obtain, examine and/or evaluate the letters, documents or other evidence to be 
used for investigation and/or examination; 
(k)  to decide and determine if the consumer has suffered any damages or not; 
(l)   to notify the decision to the business actors who have violated consumer protection;  
(m) to impose administrative sanctions against the business actors who have violated 
LCP.
1088
  
In accordance with this provision and in order to develop an effort for consumer 
protection, the CDSB shall establish a committee that must be uneven in numbers and 
consists of representatives of all elements (government, consumers, and business actors) 
                                                          
1085
 See Garner, above n 797, 1071. ‘Mediation’: a method non binding disputes resolution involving a 
neutral third party who tries to help the disputing parties reach a mutually agreeable solution. 
1086
 Ibid 119: ‘Arbitration: a method of dispute resolution involving one or more neutral third parties 
who are usually agreed to by the disputing parties and whose decision is binding.’  
1087
 See ibid 329: ‘Conciliation: 1. a settlement of disputes in an agreeable manner; 2. a process in which 
a neutral person meets with the parties to a dispute and explores how the dispute might be resolved; 3. A 
relatively unstructured method of dispute resolution in which a third party facilitates communication 
between parties in an attempt to help them settle their difference.’  
1088
 See LCP 1999 art 52. See also Santosa, above n 1059; Sidabalok, above n 792, 1489; Sutedi, above 
n 1082, 24. 
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and shall be assisted by a registrar.
1089
 The decision by such committee shall be final 
and binding and has to be enacted within 21 days of the case having been received.
1090
 
Within seven days of receiving the CDSB’s decision, the business actors are obligated 
to implement the said decision.  
Each consumer who has suffered damages when consuming an business actor’s 
products and/or services may file a lawsuit against the business actor that is believed 
liable for the damages, through either an ADR forum or the court. If the disputants 
agree to choose an ADR or out-of-court institution as the forum to settle their 
dispute,
1091
 civil lawsuit in the trial court can only be made if the ADR failed to satisfy 
one or both disputants. In regard to ADR, the LCP has obliged the Indonesian 
government to establish CDSBs to settle consumer disputes outside the court. However, 
even though CDSB’s decision is final and binding,
1092
 if the parties are not satisfied 
with its decision, they may appeal to the District Court and further to the Supreme Court 
to obtain a final decision.
1093
 The party may submit an appeal to the trial court (District 
Court) within 14 working days of receiving the notification of the CDSB decision.
1094
 
Once the court accepts the appeal, the dispute settlement mechanism will be referred to 
ordinary court regulation.
1095
  
Nevertheless, many substantive laws in Indonesia also provide specific procedural law 
thatdiffers from the ordinary procedural law mentioned below, such as proceeding law 
mechanism in LCP.
1096
 For instance, in the LCP every consumer that has experienced 
damages may file charges against the business actors through ADR or in an ordinary 
                                                          
1089
 See LCP 1999 art 54. 
1090
 See ibid arts 54, 55. See also elucidation of art 54(3): What is meant by the expression ‘the CDSB’s 
decision is final’ is that there is no appeal and cassation in the CBDS mechanism. 
1091
 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 8 Tahun 1999 Tentang Perlindungan Konsumen [Law 
No 8 of 1999 on Consumer Protection] (Indonesia) ('LCP') art 47. This provision states that out of court 
settlement process only can be conducted in order to reach an agreement regarding the type and amount 
of compensation and/or regarding certain measures that must be taken to ensure that no such damages 
should again occur to the consumers in the future. 
1092
 LCP 1999 art 54(3). 
1093
 Ibid arts 56(2), 58(2). See also MVT/Yoz, above n 137. This is an online report concerning 
discussion at an international seminar on Commercial Arbitration (Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta 
(Indonesia)) regarding controversy about the CDSB final and binding decision that can still be appealed 
to the District Court and then the Supreme Court. 
1094
 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 8 Tahun 1999 Tentang Perlindungan Konsumen [Law 
No 8 of 1999 on Consumer Protection] (Indonesia) ('LCP') arts 45(1) and (2), 47, 56(2). See also 
Sidabalok, above n 792, 149. 
1095
 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 8 Tahun 1999 Tentang Perlindungan Konsumen [Law 
No 8 of 1999 on Consumer Protection] (Indonesia) ('LCP') art 48.  
1096
 Mertokusumo, ‘Hukum Acara Perdata Indonesia’, above n 152 8. 
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court of justice. In regard to settlement through ADR, if one of the disputant parties is 
not satisfied with the decision of the ADR process, the LCP provides opportunity for the 
party to make an appeal to the ordinary court of justice.  
However, the procedural law in the court for cases arising from a complaint that has 
moved from a CDSB to the court is regulated differently by the LCP. Unlike in the 
ordinary trial court mechanism under regulations that in principle do not limit the length 
of the trial process, the time allowed for the process in trial court under LCP for CDSB 
appellate is limited (those regulations being the Herziene Inlandsch Reglement (HIR) 
for people living in Java and Madura areas or Rechtsreglement voor de Buitengewesten  
(RBg) for those living outside those areas). According to Article 58 of LCP, the District 
Court that examines a CDSB appellate case has to finish its examination and conclude 
its decision on the case within 21 days of receiving the appeal. A party that does not 
favour the District Court decision may submit a cassation to the Supreme Court of the 
Republic of Indonesia within a period of 14 days of the handing down of the appellate 
decision. The Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia is then obliged to render a 
decision within 30 days of receipt of the cassation petition. All in all, the whole dispute 
resolution process through the CDSB plus its appeal mechanism to the courts (District 
Court and Supreme Court) will only take approximately 100 proceeding days between 
initial lodgement of complaint with the CDSB and the final Supreme Court verdict. This 
is a far shorter period than that of the average length of process of civil lawsuit in the 
ordinary court, which can take approximately six to eight years from its inception in the 
256-District Court until its final verdict in the Supreme Court.
1097
  
6.4.3.2.2. Unauthorised ATM/Debit Card Transaction Cases in CDSB 
(Which Are Then Appealed to the Court) 
From the Supreme Court of Republic of Indonesia’s website, CDSB proceedings, and 
mass-media, it can be seen that there have been several civil lawsuits concerning 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions cases that have begun in the CDSB and 
which have been finalised at the cassation stage or after civil law review in the Supreme 
Court. These cases are:  
                                                          
1097
 See n 141.  
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1. Evi Yulisna br Harahap v Bank Mandiri (Card Trapping Case) 
Facts of the case:  
On 13 October 2012, the plaintiff withdrew some money from the defendant’s ATM in 
Tanjungsari (Simpang Pemda) Gas Station (Medan, West Sumatra). The withdrawal 
failed but the card was ‘swallowed’ by the ATM, as indicated by the ATM’s monitor. 
The plaintiff claimed that she called the call centre number that appeared on the ATM to 
ensure that everything was under control. The plaintiff also claimed that she never 
revealed her PIN during the conversation. On 15 October 2012, the plaintiff attended 
the defendant’s branch in Taman Setia Budi Indah Medan, the branch where the 
plaintiff had opened their account, just to find that she had losses totalling IDR78 
million (from funds that she had previously deposited with the defendant’s bank). The 
fraud was then reported to the defendant, Police Department, and Bank Indonesia, but 
there was not an outcome acceptable to the consumer. In the meeting with the 
defendants, Taman Setia Budi Indah Branch Head Mr Zulkarnaen Lubis and Mr 
Syahrudin Dalimunthe (the defendant’s ATM Head) admitted that someone had 
compromised their ATMs, but they refused to be liable for the plaintiff’s loss. The 
CCTV footage at the site was not up date and could not be used to confirm the 
transactions.  
– The plaintiff then filed a lawsuit with the CDSB. On 14 February 2013, the CDSB 
judges in verdict number 77/Pen/BPSK-Mdn/2012 concluded in favour of the plaintiff 
and instructed the defendant to make redress for the plaintiff’s damages within 14 days 
of the decision. However, the defendant refused to make redress and submitted an 
appeal to the District Court of Medan (the case was still in proceeding).
1098
  
                                                          
1098
 See Sarsin Siregar, Perlindungan Nasabah Jangan Sekedar Retorika [Consumer Protection Should 
Not be just Rhetoric] (26 March 2013) MedanBisnis 
<http://medanbisnisdaily.com/news/read/2013/03/26/20104/perlindungan_nasabah_jangan_sekadar_retor
ika/#.Ux70NoXInxA>; See also Sarsin Siregar, Evi Yulisnawati Minta Putusan BPSK Medan Direalisir 
[Evi Yulisnawaty Asked CDSB-Medan's Verdict to be Fulfilled] (27 March 2013) MedanBisnis 
<http://medanbisnisdaily.com/news/read/2013/03/27/20328/evi_yulisnawaty_minta_putusan_bpsk_meda
n_direalisir/#.Ux72UoXInxA>; Far, Uang Rp76 Juta Raib di Bank Mandiri [Rp76 Million Disappears 
from Bank Mandiri] (14 May 2013) SumutPos <http://sumutpos.co/2013/05/58129/uang-rp76-juta-raib-
di-bank-mandiri>. 
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2. Mr Bahari v PT Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) Tbk (Card Trapping 
Case)
1099
  
Facts of the case:  
 The plaintiff is the defendant’s consumer. On 15 December 2007, the plaintiff 
withdrew money from the defendant’s ATM at Gunung Pamela Hospital (Medan), but 
the card was trapped by the machine. A stranger then stepped into the defendant’s ATM 
booth and encouraged the plaintiff to press the cancel button on the keypad. Because all 
efforts failed and the ATM card was still trapped inside the ATM slot, the plaintiff 
immediately visited the defendant’s branch at Tebing Tinggi to report the incident. The 
plaintiff met with the defendant’s security officer who told him that if the card was 
swallowed by the ATM, it meant that the card was safe. Later, it was revealed that on 15 
and 16 December 2007, several unauthorised withdrawals and transfers had been made 
from the plaintiff’s account and drained his funds, with a total loss of IDR60 million.  
 The plaintiff filed the arbitration lawsuit with the CDSB of Medan. In verdict 
number 5/PEN/BPSK-Mdn on 12 March 2008 the CDSB ordered the defendant to pay 
damages of IDR60 000 000 to the plaintiff, this amount being equivalent to restitution 
of the funds lost.  
 Following this decision, the defendant submitted an appeal to the District Court of 
Medan, with defences listed as follows: (1) Bank Indonesia Circular Letter No 
7/60/DASP dated 30 December 2005 which urged banks to provide consumer 
protection, prudential action, and enhancement of bank payment card security, but never 
obliged banks to provide security officers or police to safeguard bank ATMs (as 
interpreted by the CDSB of Medan). Further the defendant contended that the security 
enhancement that is encouraged by Bank Indonesia circular only obliges banks to 
provide chip-based payment card technology, security enhancement on EDC or ATM 
machines and their supporting infrastructure, and the use of six digit PIN for 
ATM/Debit cards; (2) The defendant argued that they could not be punished by having 
to provide redress to the consumer, because the damage incurred was due to the 
consumer’s own fault; (3) The defendant also argued that they had already educated 
consumers about the benefits and risks of payment cards such ATM cards, and the 
procedures that have to be taken by consumers if they experience difficulties with ATM 
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 See Supreme Court decision No 718 K/Pdt.Sus/2008 dated 10 December 2008. 
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transactions. Such consumer education had been undertaken using various means such 
as using brochures, in writing, and in verbal conversation between the defendant’s 
officer and the consumer when the bank gave the card to the consumer in person. This 
included the information that a consumer should not share the PIN information with 
anybody. Further, the defendant stated that LCP Article 5(a) obliges consumer to read 
and follow instructions issued by a party (in this case the defendant) when using that 
party’s products and services; (4) The defendant alleged that the plaintiff had allowed a 
stranger to step into the defendant’s ATM booth to help him with the trapped ATM 
card, and followed his instruction to press the PIN in the keypad which might have 
caused the PIN to be captured by the fraudsters; (5) The defendant argued that the 
damages incurred were not only because of the ATM used by the consumer swallowing 
their card (and then being retrieved from the ATM), but also because other people also 
knew the consumer’s PIN. Therefore, based on Article 19(5) of LCP, business actors 
are not liable to the consumer if the damages occurred are due to a consumer’s own 
fault. Hence, the defendant considers themselves as an business actor of good faith and, 
therefore, do not owe an indemnity obligation to the consumer. Following this appeal 
request, the District Court of Kisaran in their verdict number 06/PDT.G/2008/PN.KIS 
dated 15 May 2008 overturned the CDSB decision, and released Bank BNI from any 
obligation to pay the damages on the basis that the consumer’s damage was due to the 
consumer’s own fault.  
 Following the District Court decision, the plaintiff submitted a cassation to the 
Supreme Court, and argued that his loss was due to a lack of security features as 
follows: (1) The defendant had not yet implemented chip-based payment card by 31 
December 2008 as as required by Bank Indonesia Circular Letter No 7/60/DASP; (2) 
The payment card issuer was obliged to implemented six digit PIN for transaction 
security by 31 December 2006, but was still using four digit PINs for its consumers at 
the time of the offence, in breach of Article 8 of LCP, which forbids an business actor to 
produce and/or transact products and services that are not in conformity with the 
relevant standards as required by the regulation; (3) Bank Indonesia Circular Letter No 
7/60/DASP obliged the issuer of a payment card to improve security features on 
payment cards in order to minimise the crime rate and improve consumer confidence in 
payment cards. This provision is similar to that of Article 4 of LCP, which gives 
consumers the right to convenience, security and safety in consuming an business 
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actor’s products and services. As a consequence, even though the BI Circular Letter 
indeed does not specify in great detail what sorts of security features have to be 
implemented in payment card infrastructures, the plaintiff contended that because of the 
fact that there were so many fraud incidents that involve ATM infrastructure, the 
existence of security officers and CCTV cameras in an ATM booth is deemed to be 
necessary. Therefore, if there are some malfunctions and/or interference with ATM 
infrastructure in the absence of such precautions, the bank as the ATM owner should be 
deemed responsible and liable; (4) In regard to interference by a ‘stranger’ (that is, 
unknown party) in regard to ATM booths which jeopardised the consumer’s transaction, 
the absence of bank security officers at ATM booths is the main cause of the incident as 
it also permitted the trapped card to be seized by the fraudsters; (5) Following the 
chronology of the above event, the Supreme Court judges posits that Bank BNI has not 
demonstrated good faith as it failed to secure its ATM transactions (as demanded by the 
applicable legislation and regulations) whereas the plaintiff had acted in good faith. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court verdict overturned the District Court decision on the 
ground that the District Court has incorrectly applied the right law. This was based on 
the fact that: (1) The consumer’s claim — that he had never revealed his PIN to the 
fraudster and instead only pressed the ‘cancel button’ — was believed by the court; (2) 
The consumer had reported the card-trapping incident to the bank branch within 15 
minutes of the incident having occurred; (3) Bank BNI was deemed to have not abided 
by Bank Indonesia Circular No 7/60/DASP as it had failed to safeguard its consumer’s 
transactions at the ATM by the fact that card-trapping devices had been installed in the 
ATM and there was no bank security officer to secure the ATM booth; (4) The ATM 
card issued by Bank BNI only employed a four digit PIN instead of six digits PIN and 
thus bank practice conflicted with Bank Indonesia’s circular letter. Overall, the Supreme 
Court decision was to order Bank BNI to pay damages equal to the consumer’s losses, 
that is IDR60 million.  
 Following this decision, the defendant submitted the case for civil case review to the 
Supreme Court on the following basis: (1) Bank Indonesia Circular Letter No 
7/60/DASP does not oblige the bank to safeguard and guarantee that ATMs can 
continuously work properly, and/or provide a security officer to safeguard ATMs; (2) 
The defendant also alleged that the Supreme Court exhibited gross negligence or even a 
gross error when it accused Bank BNI of having not fulfilled Bank Indonesia 
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Regulation Number 7/60/DASP in regard to the use of a four instead of six digit PIN for 
ATM transactions, as this obligation will only be applied after 2016.
1100
 Following this 
case review, the Supreme Court civil case review judges rejected the civil case review 
submitted by Bank BNI,
1101
 and so the judgement for the plaintiff stands. 
3. Muhajidin Tahir, SE v PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk and PT Advantage CSM 
(Card Trapping Case)
1102
 
Facts of the case:  
 Plaintiff is the defendant’s consumer and holds an ATM Card issued by the 
defendant. On 16 October 2010 around 6.30am, the plaintiff authorised his wife to use 
his ATM card to make a transaction at an ATM booth located in the District Court of 
Gowa (Makasar). Unfortunately, the card was swallowed by the ATM, and an apparent 
‘good Samaritan’ walked into the ATM booth to offer the use of a mobile phone so that 
the plaintiff’s wife could contact bank consumer call centre (whose number was 
displayed at the ATM) to resolve the ATM problem. The plaintiff’s wife then spoke to 
the person on the phone who claimed to be an officer of the defendant bank, and due to 
this deception, the consumer then revealed her husband’s ATM PIN. The plaintiff’s 
wife then left the ATM with the ATM card still inside the ATM. On 17 October 2010 
around 8pm, the plaintiff received a short message on his mobile from the defendant 
(automatic alert notification), notifying him that there had been an ATM withdrawal on 
his account. The plaintiff then called defendant’s call centre to block his account. 
Unfortunately, several unauthorised ATM transactions in the form of cash withdrawals 
had occurred between 16 and 17 October 2010 and had drained his account. Total losses 
amounted to over IDR45 million. However, from the defendant’s viewpoint, all those 
unauthorised transactions were deemed valid because of the use of the plaintiff’s own 
ATM card and PIN, whereby the plaintiff had violated the bank–consumer agreement 
by surrendering his ATM and PIN to his wife. Therefore, the defendant argued that all 
plaintiff losses were the plaintiff’s liability. 
 Following this unresolved dispute, on 16 March 2011, the plaintiff submitted the 
dispute to the CDSB of Makasar City. CDSB verdict number 04/BPSK/III/2011 dated 
                                                          
1100
 Author’s note: In fact, Bank Indonesia Circular No 7/60/DASP was amended by Bank Indonesia 
Circular Letter No 8/18/DASP dated 23 August 2006, which has delayed the use of six digit PIN for 
ATM card until a date that will be determined by a Bank Indonesia special regulation. 
1101
 See the Supreme Court Civil Case Review Decision No 122 PK/Pdt.Sus/2009 dated 3 March 2010. 
1102
 See the Supreme Court Decision No 769 K/Pdt.Sus/2011 dated 27 February 2012. 
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26 April 2011 was made in favour of the plaintiff. Among the reasons for the decision 
were: (1) Once a consumer’s ATM card is swallowed by a bank’s ATM, then all 
responsibility and liability in relation to the ATM card and its associated accounts 
should lie with the bank; and (2) The use of an ATM card by a family member is not 
violating the law, since this practice was covered by customary law in Indonesia. 
Makassar City CDSB then concluded that the defendant has jeopardised consumer 
protection law and that caused damages for the plaintiff, and therefore, ordered that the 
defendant pay the consumer an amount in excess of IDR45.1 million (and thus 
exceeding the amount lost by IDR7700 million). 
 Following the verdict, the defendant lodged an appeal with the District Court of 
Makasar City, on the basis that Makassar City CDSB incorrectly implemented the law. 
Bank Mandiri submitted that: (1) For transactions on an ATM to occur, every consumer 
has two devices, namely the ATM card and PIN. Hence, even if an ATM card is 
inserted into the ATM but the PIN is incorrect, then the ATM will automatically reject 
the transaction. Since consumers have an obligation to keep their PIN secret (including 
from their family), all consequences of the use of a consumer PIN will fall on the 
shoulders of consumers themselves as highlighted in the bank–consumer agreement; (2) 
Article 5(1) of LCP states that to ensure consumer safety, consumers should read and 
follow the procedures for use of an business actor’s products and/or services. Hence, by 
giving his PIN to other people, the consumer had violated Article 5(1) and should be 
responsible for the consequences; (3) The defendant contended that they had already 
provided consumer education as obliged by the Act in regards to the consumer’s 
obligation to safeguard their PIN as any unauthorised use of it would make the 
consumer liable. The defendant also submitted that it had disseminated their legitimate 
call centre number through various means, such as at bank branches, in brochures, via 
electronic media and at ATM booths. Therefore, consumers should know the 
defendant’s legitimate call centre number, which is 1400 (and also (021) 52997777). 
 Following this appeal from the defendant, the District Court of Makassar City in the 
verdict number 03/Pdt.BPSK/2011/PN.MKS dated 28 July 2011 made a decision in 
favour of the plaintiff and rejected the appeal from the defendant. The District Court 
decision also confirmed that the defendant’s standard clause that contained a liability 
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dumping clause) in the bank–consumer agreement (shifting liability from the bank to 
consumers) breached Article 18 of LCP and therefore should be deemed null and void. 
 Following the District Court rejection, the defendant then submitted a cassation to 
the Supreme Court on 8 August 2011 on several grounds: (1) It was not disputed that 
the defendant had to abide by the law, including civil law and Bank Indonesia 
Regulation such as Bank Indonesia Circular Letter No. 11/10/DASP dated 13 April 
2009 concerning the Implementation of Payment Card, which obliged banks to operate 
their payment card infrastructure by implementing consumer protection principle, 
prudential action, and security enhancement in regard to payment cards. The defendant, 
however, argued that they had implemented Bank Indonesia’s regulation on payment 
cards, such as by providing consumer education on the importance of PIN secrecy (for 
example, by instructing cardholders not to write down the PIN on an ATM card, to 
regularly change PIN, and so on); (2) The defendant also argued that the standard clause 
on the defendant’s agreement did not violate the LCP because it only regulated 
something that is commonly implemented in the payment card system; (3) The damages 
that resulted in regard to the consumer ATM transaction were not incurred due to a 
weakness in the bank’s ATM infrastructure, but because of the plaintiff’s own 
negligence in revealing the ATM PIN to his wife who then further revealed it to other 
people. Based on Article 19(5) of LCP, business actors are not held liable for the 
damage to consumers if that damage occurred because of the consumer’s own fault.  
 The Supreme Court in decision number 769 K/Pdt.Sus/2011 conversely favoured the 
defendant and rejected the District Court and Makassar City CDSB decisions on the 
grounds that: (1) judex factie (CDSB and the District Court of Makassar City) had 
wrongly implemented the law because they had provided an administration sanction 
with general provision (Article 4(a) of the LCP)
1103
 without linking it to other normative 
provisions that have sanction provisions in the LCP. In addition to that, the CDSB does 
not have the authority to punish an business actor with administrative sanctions as 
regulated by Article 60 of LCP;
1104
 (2) the damages incurred by the plaintiff were the 
                                                          
1103
 LCP 1999 art 4.a: ‘The rights of the consumer are to obtain comfort, security and safety in using or 
consuming the goods and/or service.’ 
1104
 LCP 1999 art 60: (1). The consumer dispute settlement body shall be authorised to impose an 
administrative sanction on the business actors who violate Article 19 Section 2 and Section 3, Article 20, 
Article 25 and Article 26; (2) The administrative sanction shall be determined in maximum amount of 
Rp.200,000,000.00 (two hundred million rupiah); (3) Procedure for determining an administrative 
sanction as intended by Section 1 above shall be further regulated by the law. 
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consumer’s own fault, by giving the ATM card and PIN to his wife, which allowed the 
information she (unwittingly) gave to be communicated to other people. 
 Following this cassation decision, the plaintiff filed a request for a civil law review 
with the Supreme Court on 5 October 2012, on the grounds that: (1) The use of Article 
4 of LCP by the District Court and Makasar CDSB in relation to Article 60 of LCP was 
very relevant since both of the articles are contained in the same legislation and are 
interdependent; (2) It is very obvious that the damages sustained by the consumer were 
due to his ATM card having been swallowed as a result of inherent weaknesses of 
bank’s ATMs. Hence, the use of Article 4(a) of LCP by the consumer to show that his 
right to convenience, security and safety while using bank products or services (as 
regulated by that Article) had not been fulfilled; and (3) Article 18(1), (2) and (3) of 
LCP clearly states that every standard clause in the agreement that contains liability 
dumping will be deemed null and void. Following this review, the Supreme Court with 
their decision number 190 PK/Pdt.Sus/20012 dated 20 February 2013 rejected the 
application by the plaintiff for a civil case review on the grounds that: (1) Judex juris or 
the Supreme Court’s cassation decision did not make an incorrect decision according to 
the law and there was no new evidence (novum) that could justify the review; (2) The 
plaintiff’s wife is the party that caused the damages and because of this damages could 
not be awarded against the defendant. 
6.4.3.3. Under Court Litigation 
6.4.3.3.1. Brief Overview of Court Structures and Its Procedural Rules 
In Indonesia, judicial power is deemed very important and explicitly regulated under the 
Indonesian Constitution. Article 24 of the amended 1945 Constitution states that 
judicial power is an independent power to administer juridical proceedings in order to 
uphold law and justice. This judicial power is exercised by one Supreme Court and 
other subordinate judicial bodies in the ordinary court jurisdiction, religious court 
jurisdiction, military court jurisdiction, and administrative court jurisdiction, and by the 
Constitutional Court.
1105
 The judicial bodies consist of the Courts of First Instance 
                                                          
1105
 Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia 1945 [Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945] 
art 24 (1) and (2). See also Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 48 Tahun 2009 Tentang 
Kekuasaan Kehakiman [Law Number 48 of 2009 on Judicial Power] art 18. Nevertheless, this thesis only 
discusses litigation that happened in civil lawsuits before the public court. 
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(District Courts) and the High Court.
1106
 Most notable is the position of the Supreme 
Court. In Indonesia, the Supreme Court is critical because of its function as the ultimate 
upholder of justice in the state.
1107
  
In an ordinary civil lawsuit, if one or more of the disputant parties are dissatisfied with 
the Court of First Instance’s decision,
1108
 it can be appealed (banding) to the High 
Court.
1109
 Cassation (kasasi) may also be requested to the Supreme Court if an appellate 
court decision is considered unfair, or did not satisfy the interests of one of the 
disputants.
1110
 The Supreme Court is the highest state court and has authority to process 
the cassation against the verdict given by the final level of the court beneath the 
Supreme Court.
1111
 In this regard the Supreme Court acts as a last resort of appeal from 
its subordinate court or other judicial bodies.
1112
 In principle, the Supreme Court verdict 
is final and binding, except if there is a request from the unsuccessful party to the 
Supreme Court for a writ certiorari for that Court to conduct a civil case review 
(peninjauan kembali). However, a case review only can be conducted for the disputant 
parties if there is a ‘case or particular circumstances’ such as the discovery of new 
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 Mertokusumo, ‘Hukum Acara Perdata Indonesia’, above n 152, 32. 
1107
 Marzuki, ‘An Introduction to Indonesia Law, above n 145, 121. See also Mertokusumo, ‘Hukum 
Acara Perdata Indonesia’, above n 152, 8. 
1108
 Marzuki, ‘Pengantar Ilmu Hukum’, above n 155, 126. Under Indonesian law, the court of first 
instance (also called a trial court) is the only court that is able to issue subpoenas and examine witnesses 
and where the disputant parties appear before the court, conducts discovery proceedings, and reaches a 
decision. If both parties accept the trial court judgment, then the court’s verdict will be final and binding. 
However, if one of the parties to the dispute does not accept the trial court verdict, the party may appeal 
to the appellate court (the High Court). 
1109
 Ibid 1267. The appellate or High Court when examining the appellate case only deals with the 
case’s documents concerning the case. Hence, it neither does issue subpoenas nor examine witnesses. The 
appellate court decision generally either may establish, reserve, or uphold the trial court judgment. See 
also Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 48 Tahun 2009 Tentang Kekuasaan Kehakiman [Law 
Number 48 of 2009 on Judicial Power] art 27.  
1110
 See Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 48 Tahun 2009 Tentang Kekuasaan Kehakiman 
[Law Number 48 of 2009 on Judicial Power] art 23. See also Mertokusumo, ‘Hukum Acara Perdata 
Indonesia’, above n 152, 2389. See also Marzuki, ‘An Introduction to Indonesia Law, above n 145, 127: 
In this last resort of proceeding, the Supreme Court will examine whether or not appellate court 
has taken proper procedures as prescribed by law and whether or not it has applied law accurately. 
The Supreme Court may rule out the appellate court judgment and at the same time support the 
trial court decision or confirm the appellate court verdict or overrule the appellate court decision 
and at the same time make its own decision over the appealed case.  
1111
 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 48 Tahun 2009 Tentang Kekuasaan Kehakiman [Law 
Number 48 of 2009 on Judicial Power] arts 20, 23. See Marzuki, ‘An Introduction to Indonesia Law, 
above n 145, 127. In Indonesia, following the Latin terminology, ‘trial court and appeal court are called 
judex facti [which] means “the institution that judges the fact”, while the Supreme Court is called judex 
juris [which] means “the institution that decides whether or not its subordinate judiciaries apply law 
properly”.’  
1112
 See Amended Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia 1945 [Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia 1945] art 24A (1). See also Marzuki, ‘An Introduction to Indonesia Law, above n 145, 127. 
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evidence (novum) and /or the presence of an oversight or mistake by the judge in 
applying the law.
1113
 
For the courts’ procedural law, which is based on Article 5(1) of Emergency Law 
Number 1 of 1951,
1114
 Indonesia is still basically using regulations which were adopted 
from the Dutch colonial system: the Herziene Inlandsch Reglement (HIR) for people 
living in Java and Madura areas, and Rechtsreglement voor de Buitengewesten (RBg) 
for people living outside of those areas.
1115
  
6.4.3.3.2. Unauthorised ATM/Debit Card Transaction Cases in Court  
Unlike other settlement disputes in the CDSB, a dispute between a bank and a consumer 
over unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions that is directly submitted to the court is 
quite rare. This dearth of cases is likely to discourage potential plaintiffs from lodging a 
case. The lengthy period of time for the process and the relatively high cost of litigation 
are also deterrents.
1116
 Many people also consider the courts unprofessional in handling 
business disputes, unfair, and unresponsive to the needs of the plaintiff. As a result, 
courts are considered less effective and efficient in the examination and resolution of 
business disputes when these are filed.
1117
  
In addition, there is a lack of legal certainty related to trial results. This is produced by 
reports of past cases where a degree of unpredictability of outcome, and lengthy 
procedures are often made public. This contributes to a reluctance to resolve the dispute 
with the bank in the ordinary court, especially for a consumer that lacks of resources 
compared to a bank. Judges are also accused of having knowledge that is too generalist, 
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 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 48 Tahun 2009 Tentang Kekuasaan Kehakiman [Law 
Number 48 of 2009 on Judicial Power] art 24. See also Marzuki, ‘An Introduction to Indonesia Law, 
above n 145, 127; Mertokusumo, ‘Hukum Acara Perdata Indonesia’, above n 152, 2445. 
1114
 Undang-Undang Darurat Nomor 1 Tahun 1951 Tentang Tindakan-Tindakan Sementara Untuk 
Menyelenggarakan Kesatuan Susunan Kekuasaan dan Acara Pengadilan-Pengadilan Sipil [Emergency 
Law Number 1 of 1951 on Temporary Actions to Perform the Unity of Ordinary Courts' Jurisdiction 
Power and Proceeding]. 
1115
 Mertokusumo, ‘Hukum Acara Perdata Indonesia’, above n 152, 7. However for a civil case appeal 
in the High Court, based on Emergency Law number 1 of 1951, the specific regulation for it is Law 
Number 20 of 1947 for Java and Madura areas, and RBg arts 199205 for areas beyond Java and Madura. 
See also Sidabalok, above n 792, 149. 
1116
 Sutedi, above n 1082, 27. 
1117
 Zulham, Hi and Hum, above n 969, 141. 
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which makes it difficult for them to resolve complex or specific problems related to 
banking.
1118
 
6.4.3.3.3. Nasruddin v PT Bank Mandiri Tbk (Card Trapping Case) 1119  
Albeit the existence of many disadvantages of utilising the court (as mentioned above), 
there was a case in which a consumer (Mr Nasruddin), a victim of card-trapping fraud, 
filed a lawsuit against his bank (PT Bank Mandiri Tbk) in the Jakarta District Court 
(Nasruddin v PT Bank Mandiri Tbk). 
Facts of the case: 
 The plaintiff was the defendant’s consumer and possessed an ATM card issued by 
the defendant. Based on the information supplied by the plaintiff, on 6 July 2010 around 
6.50am in Jakarta, he went to the defendant’s ATM booth at Gonzaga High School (at 
Pasar Minggu, south of Jakarta) to withdraw some money. Because he incorrectly typed 
the total amount of the money to be withdrawn, the plaintiff then cancelled the 
transaction by pressing the ‘cancel button’. Surprisingly, instead of simply cancelling 
the transaction and expelling the card, the card was trapped inside the defendant’s ATM 
(and failed to come out). To resolve the problem, the plaintiff called defendant’s call 
centre number (52889777) that was listed on a sticker attached to the ATM (above the 
ATM slot). When the call was connected, the plaintiff related his ATM card problem to 
the person he believed to be a bank officer named ‘Iskandar’ at the defendant’s call 
centre. The ‘bank officer’ then asked several questions that are commonly asked by a 
call centre officer (for example, bank ATM card numbers, consumer account number, 
and mother’s maiden name and so on). After the consumer had answered all these 
questions, the bank officer told the plaintiff that his account had been blocked. Later, 
the plaintiff was encouraged by a friend to confirm the incident by calling 1400 (the 
defendant’s official call centre number) and ensure that his account was truly blocked. 
The plaintiff then made a visit to the defendant’s South Kemang branch to report the 
incident to Mrs Wildany F Kinana, a consumer service relation officer for the bank. She 
informed him that there had been a withdrawal of IDR8.9 million from the plaintiff’s 
                                                          
1118
 Shofie, ‘Kapita Selekta Hukum Perlindungan Konsumen di Indonesia’, above n 683, 302; 
Nugroho, above n 1082, 1278. See also Bevan, above n 1060, 17; Yusuf Shofie, Perlindungan 
Konsumen dan Instrumen-instrumen Hukumnya [Consumer Protection and Its Legal Instruments] (Citra 
Aditya Bakti, 2009) 35962; Nurdin, above n 155, 23760. 
1119
 See Distric Court of South Jakarta Verdict No 632/Pdt.G/2010/PN.Jkt.Sel dated 30 June 2011. 
 
267 
 
  
account. The plaintiff claimed that this was an unauthorised transaction. Further, 
according to the plaintiff, Mrs Kinana has admitted that there had been many card-
trapping incidents and fake call centre stickers had been involved in a number of 
incidents where other bank consumers had also been defrauded. This information was 
also confirmed by Mr Suroso, the Gonzaga High School security officer, who also 
claimed that consumers had already frequently asked the defendant to improve security 
at ATM booths and place bank security officers on site. Following these requests, the 
defendant allegedly failed to secure ATMs, doing nothing to improve the security of the 
ATM system/booth. Among other things it failed to put security officers in place and 
regularly monitor ATMs. Such inaction had caused many consumers’ ATM cards to be 
trapped and consumers subsequently defrauded. 
 In accordance with these facts, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant committed a 
tort action by: (1) violating the law  among other things Article 1365 of the Civil 
Code (tort article), Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 11/11/PBI/2009 which obliges 
banks to safeguard and improve security on payment card technology, and Article 4(a) 
of LCP, which guarantees consumer rights to comfort, security, and safety in the 
consumption of goods and/or services; (2) violating the subjective right of the plaintiff 
whose deposit has been placed in the bank with an expectation that such funds should 
be maintained properly and safely; (3) failing to carry out its legal obligations as a bank 
that is responsible for managing its system and network of ATMs and ensuring that an 
effective disaster recovery plan is in place to address and minimise problems that might 
arise and interfere with the smooth operation of the ATMs. Further, it is the defendant’s 
obligation to fulfil consumer protection principle and the prudential principle, and 
improve the security of their payment card system and network; (4) their tort action 
having triggered the damage suffered by the consumer, the defendant should be liable 
for the damages. Article 1365 of Indonesian Civil Code regulates that ‘every unlawful 
act that harms another obliges the actor who causes the damage to pay damages due to 
his/her fault.”  
Further, Article 1366 of the same Act states that: ‘Each person is responsible not only 
for the loss caused by his actions, but also for the loss caused by his negligence or lack 
of care’. Because of the causal link between the tort action of the defendant and the 
actual damage suffered (a loss of IDR8.9 million), as well as the damage suffered in 
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terms of lost opportunity as regards the enjoyment and utilisation of lost funds, the bank 
is obliged by law to pay all such damages to the plaintiff. 
 Judges urged the disputant parties to mediate their disputes as governed by the 
Supreme Court Regulation Number 1 of 2008. However, the disputant parties failed to 
reach an agreement. A civil lawsuit examination therefore proceeded. 
 The defendant in its defence stated that the loss of the plaintiff’s funds was a result of 
fraud committed by ‘Mr Iskandar’ as a ‘stranger’ falsifying the defendant’s call centre 
numbers and claiming to be the defendant’s officer. Therefore, the plaintiff should have 
reported any fraud committed by ‘Mr Iskandar’ to the police; and pursuant to Article 
137(7) of HIR, the defendant also argued that the District Court was not authorised to 
examine and adjudicate cases before offences of counterfeiting and fraud that were here 
referred to the District Court had been proven in criminal court decisions, which are 
final and binding. The defendant also argued that because the plaintiff had contacted 
‘Mr Iskandar’ and supplied his bank account number and PIN, which are supposed to be 
kept secret, and this information was later used to cause the loss of customer funds, the 
claim was unsupportable as the judge had to decide that the plaintiff’s claim was not 
able to be accepted because it did not include ‘Mr Iskandar’ in the lawsuit. Other than 
that, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff had agreed to various terms and conditions 
as set forth in the consumer–bank agreement, including the obligation of the plaintiff to 
keep the PIN secret. The plaintiff was also blamed for contacting the number that was 
not the defendant’s call centre number. Therefore, the defendant argued, the bank would 
not liable for the misuse of the PIN. 
 In relation to the allegation that the defendant had not enhanced their security, the 
defendant denied this allegation by stating that all their ATMs are secure. The defendant 
also argued that the presence of security officers is unnecessary to secure ATM 
premises. As to the allegation that there was a malfunction of the defendant’s ATM that 
caused many consumers’ ATM cards to be trapped and which therefore was evidence 
that the defendant had violated Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 11/11/2009 and 
Article 1365 of the Civil Code concerning tort action, the defendant contended that the 
allegation was not based on facts since the appointed ATM was working properly and 
there were no complaints from the other consumers. The defendant also stated that they 
publicise their genuine call centre number quite exhaustively via print and mass media 
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(such as TV programs, commercials) as well as online, in brochures and leaflets at bank 
branches, and on billboards, on the ATM cards themselves and ATM monitors. The 
defendant also stated that they already give many safety tips for consumers, including 
warnings to secure their card and PIN, warnings not to disclose consumer PIN to 
anybody, suggesting that consumers cover keypad with their hand when entering their 
PIN, and so on. Therefore, if a consumer calls a number other than the Bank Mandiri 
call centre number (1400), then all damages incurred should be borne by the consumer 
themselves, because the damage was caused by their own fault or negligence. 
 Following the dispute, the District Court of South Jakarta issued a verdict as follow: 
(1) The lawsuit is a civil tort filed by the plaintiff can be examined by the District Court 
judge without the need to wait for the criminal process, especially as there are no 
criminal proceedings relating to this lawsuit; (2) In a tort civil lawsuit between the 
plaintiff and the defendant, there is no need to add a third party fraudster as party to the 
lawsuit; (3) The tort lawsuit filed by plaintiff against the defendant should be rejected 
because there was no evidence that the defendant had violated the rights of the plaintiff 
subjectively, on the basis that (a) there is no obligation for the defendant to put a 
security guard on each of its ATMs; (b) plaintiff cannot prove the number of complaints 
or complaints from the public that are related to the presence of the card-trapping 
devices installed by criminals on the bank’s ATM;
1120
 (c) The presence of a spurious 
call centre sticker on the ATM should have made the plaintiff more vigilant; (d) The 
defendant had quite clearly informed the plaintiff of the correct call centre number to 
the plaintiff; (e) It is the obligation of the plaintiff to maintain the confidentiality of his 
PIN, so he/she should be held responsible when the PIN is used by an unauthorised 
person; (f) The presence of a spurious call centre sticker on the defendant’s ATM does 
not mean the defendant has violated the Bank Indonesia regulations related to the 
obligation of banks to increase security on its ATM system, although the defendant has 
the obligation to immediately remove it if it is found in ATM booths.  
                                                          
1120
 See Carl and Reni, above n 141. The Indonesian Civil Procedural Law does state the broad principle 
that ‘a person who claims to have a right, or refers to a fact to substantiate his right, or to contradict 
someone else’s right, must evidence the existence of that right or that fact.’ 
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6.5. Conclusion 
In the absence of clear and decisive loss allocation rules for unauthorised ATM/debit 
card transaction, the tort law of negligence under articles 13651367 of Indonesia Civil 
Code becomes the most common legal basis for consumer lawsuits to claim redress 
from the bank. However, the bank liability is voided if the bank can prove that the loss 
was incurred due to the customer’s own fault or negligence. As a result, the dispute 
between a consumer and bank typically revolves around the question of whether the 
bank or consumer is actually at fault and whose fault/negligence has caused the losses.  
The liability principle is acknowledged in Indonesia’s Civil Code as not only containing 
tortious liability principle, but also vicarious and occupier liabilities. LIET, which also 
recognises the vicarious liability principle, specifically governs the use of banks’ 
electronic agents such as ATMs and EFTPOS machines, and also third party providers. 
Banks as the principals of the ATM/debit card system are responsible for any legal 
ramifications that are derived from ATM/debit card transactions which initiated at 
banks and/or banks’ third party electronic agents/infrastructures (vicarious liability). 
Meanwhile, in theory, occupiers’ liability could be drawn if the bank as the owner or 
controller of the ATM/EFTPOS failed to secure or control its electronic agent  which 
has caused damages (pure economic loss) for the user of the electronic agent. However, 
defences as outlined in the above situation serve to restrict liability in practice. 
In tort law, whether in Indonesia or other jurisdictions, generally, the ATM/debit card 
consumer as the party who alleges the bank has undertaken a tortious act, has an 
obligation to prove the defendant bank negligence that has caused a pure economic loss. 
However, this is a difficult and almost impossible undertaking, since all the evidence or 
witnesses relating to unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions are under the control of 
the defendant bank as provider/owner of the ATM/debit card system (such as CCTV 
camera footage, detail transaction records, and so on).  
Several ADR venues in Indonesia are considered not to be optimal in helping consumer 
to settle their disputes over unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions. Bank Indonesia’s 
Banking Mediation Agency gives relatively little help to the disputant party, especially 
the victim, the consumer since it has no power to make a final decision (as a mediator 
only). The CDSBs although giving some hope to the victims of unauthorised 
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ATM/debit card transactions, in practice, all CDSB verdicts on unauthorised ATM/debit 
card transaction disputes that are in favour of consumers (who are awarded damages 
against a bank) are overturned on appeal, whether to the district and/or Supreme Court). 
Hence, their existence seems almost ‘useless’ for consumers. 
In civil court proceedings, in theory, generally damages can be claimed by the plaintiff 
only if the defendant is proved to be at fault or negligent and there are no defences that 
are accepted by the court. However, the most common defence utilised by the defendant 
in a civil liability claim in Indonesia is pure contributory negligence, where the plaintiff 
or victim of an unlawful act should not contribute in any way to the occurrence of 
damages (the so-called ‘clean hands’ policy). As a result, all court verdicts in regard to 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions that are derived from identity theft methods, 
where the plaintiff also ‘contributed’ to the loss, such as in card-trapping fraud, are 
usually all in favour of the defendants. The existence of the bank’s infrastructure of 
various fraudulent devices, such as card-trapping devices, spurious bank call centre 
numbers, as well as the absence of consumer protection material about inherent risk 
(and genuine level of risk) of ATM/debit transactions and so on that have become the 
dominant factor in the occurrence of fraud  tends to be ignored (or their importance 
minimised) by the judges in the consideration of their decisions. Hence court verdicts 
were deemed to have failed to create just and sensible decisions. 
In contrast, the pure contributory negligence principle has been abolished in most of 
western countries because it tends to be unjust to consumers. Instead, for loss allocation 
rules, the pure contributory negligence principle has been superseded by ‘comparative 
negligence’, which is deemed to be more balanced and fair.  
All in all, the failure of banks to secure their ATM/debit infrastructure and operations 
from fraudulent activities, the incomplete consumer protection regulations that lack 
detailed and fair fraud liability rules (especially those that redress provisions in the 
event of unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions), and the many drawbacks in the 
implementation of consumer protection regulations for ADR institutions and courts, 
have generally disadvantaged payment card consumers in practice. All these unfortunate 
factors have also reduced the incentives for banks as providers of ATM/debit card 
operations to improve their security systems and provide easier, timely, and fair redress 
mechanisms for their consumers. Reforms in these areas are accordingly long awaited. 
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CHAPTER 7  LAW REFORM ON THE LOSS ALLOCATION 
RULES AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION BETWEEN CONSUMER 
AND BANK CONCERNING UNAUTHORISED ATM/DEBIT CARD 
TRANSACTIONS IN INDONESIA 
 
7.1. Introduction 
The need for law reform of the loss allocation rules for unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions in Indonesia is clear and is derived from the empirical fact that almost all 
court verdicts concerning unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions disputes between 
bank and consumer favoured the bank, a result that is considered to be unjust and 
arbitrary. The verdicts have ignored several important facts such as the existence of 
inefficiency and asymmetry of information in the payment card system, the inherent risk 
in the ATM/debit card operations, and banks’ reluctance to supply fraud risk education 
to the consumers (a market failure).  
This chapter proposes several ways to overcome the problems. However, due to the 
multifaceted aspects involved in unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions/operations, 
multi-disciplinary approaches using economic, technological and legal aspects are 
deemed required to ensure that the law reform can accurately achieved its objectives.  
It is argued that adjudication/litigation proceedings, which utilise the outmoded and 
unjust concept of pure contributory negligence and allocate the onus of proof in a 
manner that disadvantages consumers, should be reformed. Among the ideas proposed 
to ensure fairness and offer the optimum incentive for a saitisfactory result are res ipsa 
loquitur, negligence per se doctrine, comparative negligence principle, and shifting the 
onus of proof onto the shoulders of the bank involved. The typology of prominent and 
popular identity theft and frauds is also established on the basis on their point of 
compromise to find the the party party or parties that could reduce fraud loss at the 
lowest cost (the ‘least cost avoider/s’) who eventually should be liable for the loss. 
Nevertheless, clear, fair, detailed, and decisive loss allocation rules for unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions in Indonesia are necessary to ensure banks and consumers 
have appropriate incentives to secure ATM/debit card transactions. The rules are 
believed to ensure uniformity, predictability and a more sensible decision if a dispute 
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about an unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction is adjudicated in the court or ADR 
forum.  
In order to optimise resulting law reform recommendations, in the quest of most 
effective, fair and appropriate loss allocation rules concerning unauthorised ATM/debit 
card transactions in Indonesia, both US-style strict liability regulation and the 
Australian fault-based liability regulation model are discussed, compared, and analysed.  
7.2. Compelling Reasons for Law Reform on Loss Allocation Rules 
Concerning Unauthorised ATM/debit Card Transaction in Indonesia 
7.2.1.   Market Failure and Fraud Asymmetry Information in ATM/Debit 
Card Operation in Indonesia 
When a n unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction occurrs and a consumer loses funds 
from their bank account, the natural implication — which has also become the focus of 
this thesis  is the distributive issues, that is, the question of how to re-allocate the 
damages between the two or more parties to the dispute or which party that should be 
liable to bear the loss. Even though this is probably a very simple question, in Indonesia 
the answer is not.  
In cases of unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions, the fraudster that is the party 
most deserving to be punished and liable for the loss, is usually long gone by the time 
the fraud is discovered by the consumer and/or bank, or if apprehended, does not have 
enough money to adequately compensate the loss.
1121
 On which party the fraud risk 
ultimately rests thus probably depends on the circumstances of the payment system, 
such as the instrument used to commence payment, the manner used to process the 
payment, and the means and the point of compromise at which the identity fraud was 
perpetrated.  
In a free market operation, private agreement is generally preferable for market 
participants to achieve an economically efficient result in their economic transactions. 
However, as has been highlighted by CPSS-BIS, an efficient and robust payment 
system could not entirely depend on the market alone: 
[M]arket forces alone, however, will not necessarily achieve the objectives of safety and 
efficiency sufficiently, since operators and participants do not necessarily bear all the 
risks and cost. They may not have adequate incentives to minimise the risk of their own 
                                                          
1121
 Braun et al, above n 279, 142–4. See also Steennot, above n 47, 555; Rusch, above n 106, 561. 
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failure or the failure of a participant or the costs they impose on other participants. In 
addition, the institutional structure of the payment system may not provide strong 
incentives or mechanisms for efficient design and operation.
1122
 
Basically, ADR fora and the courts can play a very important role where market failure 
exists, imposing justice and providing remedy. However, should ADR institutions and 
the courts not manage to create a resolution  due to the absence of common 
guidelines and the very subjective and poor judgment of the adjudicators  the 
legislature / government / payment system authority may do so.  
Government intervention becomes necessary when the market fails to produce the 
expected efficiency result (market failure).
1123
 When market failure exists  legal rules 
(whether in the form of legislation or other measure) are expected by one or more 
market participants to enforce agreement and/or protect one or more weak or victimised 
parties to the contract. Legal rules are also necessary for the victimised party who 
probably is not a party to the contract, but suffered harm or damages when consuming 
or using the product or services offered by another party.
1124
 
Typically, market failures occur in the payment system because of disproportionate 
negotiation cost or asymmetrical information between a bank and its consumer.
1125
 As 
Ramasastry points out, ‘consumer confusion, to the extent it exists with respect to retail 
payments, may indicate market failure’.
1126
 When private agreements fail to work 
properly and fairly, Cooter and Rubin have argued: 
[I]n an operating market, private agreements between parties will generally produce 
economically efficient results without the need for legal intervention. Intervention 
becomes necessary, however, when the market fails to produce these efficient results on 
its own. Rules that are designed to achieve economic efficiency in payment law, 
therefore, should enforce agreements between private parties when no market failure has 
occurred. When market failures exist, legal rules can improve upon private agreements 
if they are designed with the goal of minimizing costs in mind.
1127
 
In Indonesia, the bankconsumer relationship concerning ATM/debit card operation is 
regulated by a bankconsumer standard contract. In practice, there is no chance for a 
                                                          
1122
 CPSS, ‘Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems’, above n 317, 4. 
1123
 See Jean Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, 'Externalities and Regulation in Card Payment Systems' 
(2006) 5(1) Review of Network Economics 3. See also Glaessner, Kellermann and McNevin, above n 51, 
6; Owen et al, above n 64, 14–15. 
1124
 Cooter and Rubin, above n 105, 678.  
1125
 Ibid 66.  
1126
 Anita Ramasastry, 'Confusion and Convergence in Consumer Payments: Is Coherence in Error 
Resolution Appropriate' (2008) 83 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 813, 8467 
1127
 Cooter and Rubin, above n 105, 68. 
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consumer to negotiate provisions within the contract. It is a ‘take it or leave it’ contract. 
With the enactment of the LCP, the contentious dispute between legal scholars and 
practitioners over the validity of standard contracts should have been solved. According 
to the LCP, a standard contract is a valid contract, unless it contains liability-dumping 
provision.
1128
 However, the problem is in practice. As has been discussed earlier, banks’ 
standard contracts for consumer deposit accounts and their payment system instruments 
such as ATM/debit cards still contain many liability-dumping provisions that weaken 
the consumers’ position in the event of an unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction 
dispute. 
Concerning the banks’ standard contracts, Cooter and Rubin argue that most consumers 
actually do not understand and pay attention to the liability terms of a contract when 
opening a bank account.
1129
 This state of affairs arguably exists in Indonesia, where 
consumer literacy regarding financial and legal terms is very low. ‘Liability’, ‘redress’, 
‘compensation legal suit’, and so on are not popular terms in Indonesia since redress 
claims in ADR and Court fora are difficult to win and waste many resources (such as 
money, time and effort). Until recently, the government authority charged with the 
oversight of business actors’ standard contract, namely the National Consumer 
Protection Body,
1130
 and the banking authority, such as Indonesia’s Financial Service 
Authority (OJK) and/or Bank Indonesia, apparently did not consider bank liability 
dumping practices as an urgent problem that requires immediate assessment and action. 
Court judges also do not provide one uniform verdict on whether or not a bank–
consumer contract should be deemed null and void for containing liability-dumping 
provisions.
1131
 Consequently, consumer claims over the loss of money deposited in their 
bank accounts due to unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions are usually rejected by 
the banks. 
Apart from this issue, various Bank Indonesia regulations — such as those on the card-
based payment system and information technology risk management  do exist but 
problems are still encountered in their operation. There are many directives for banks to 
                                                          
1128
 Art 18 LCP. 
1129
 Cooter and Rubin, above n 105, 6970.  
1130
 See art 34 LCP. 
1131
 See art 18(3) LCP. According to this provision, every agreement provision that contained liability 
dumping provision should be declared null and void. However, in the practice most court verdicts even 
ignore the existence of this prohibited provision in the bankconsumer agreement. 
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improve their payment card security systems and safeguard consumer transactions. For 
instance, banks have an obligation to utilise chip card technology in the ATM/debit card 
operations as a replacement for magnetic stripe technology that are notoriously 
vulnerable. Banks have also been obligated to lengthen the payment card PIN from a 
four to six digit PIN, monitor the security of ATMs, encrypt the data transmitted 
between consumer activated terminal and host computer, and so on. Banks also have an 
obligation to improve consumer awareness among other things by promoting 
transparency and consumer education about the benefits and risks of their products 
and/or services.
1132
 
Unfortunately, in regard to consumer education obligation, banks in Indonesia are 
reluctant to educate their consumers about the risks involved in consumer payment card 
transactions, that is, negative consumer education. Instead, banks are only keen to give 
positive consumer education, that is, just the benefits and advantages of a bank’s 
products and services for consumers. In anecdotal opinions provided by banking 
personnel, giving negative consumer education could reduce consumer confidence in 
making payment card transactions, and thus could reduce consumer transactions 
volumes and eventually, the banks’ fee-based income revenue.
1133
 Hence, on many 
occasions, banks boast about their state-of-the-art security and infallibility. In contrast, 
negative consumer education (tips about security) is very limited and not 
comprehensive. Banks generally only post the tips about security material either on the 
bank’s website and/or in the sticker attached to the bank’s ATM or ATM booth. From 
on-site interviews conducted by the author at several ATM centres with 30 bank ATM 
users, most of them didn’t even notice existence of the bank’s security tips on or near 
the ATM body or booth.  
As a matter of a fact, many experts and payment system institutions concur that risk 
education and knowledge on how to avoid it are very important for consumers as this 
                                                          
1132
 Unfortunately, due to technical and preparation problems, the utilisation of chip card technology for 
bank ATM/debit cards that was supposed to be ready in 2015 has been re-scheduled until 2020 by Bank 
Indonesia. 
1133
 Pusat Riset dan Edukasi Kebanksentralan, 'Hasil Survey Pemetaan Kejahatan Identity Theft dan 
Fraud Pada Alat Pembayaran Menggunakan Kartu: Pencegahan, Mitigasi dan Perlindungan Konsumen 
di Indonesia [Survey Result on Taxonomy of Identity Theft and Fraud on Payment Card Instrument: 
Prevention, Mitigation and Consumer Protection in Indonesia] (BI-Fraud Survey)' (Bank Indonesia, 
2015). This face-to-face survey was conducted by the Central Bank Research and Education CentreBank 
Indonesia in AprilMay 2015 and involved 280 card holders in four prominent cities that have 
experienced payment card identity theft and fraud: Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta and Bali. 
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would raise their awareness and enable them to take precautions against fraud.
1134
 In 
Indonesia, this observation was corroborated by the most recent BI-fraud survey.
1135
 
According to this survey, 71 per cent of respondents admitted that they had never 
received any payment card fraud education from their bank. Further, when they were 
asked about what their response would be if the bank truly gave them payment card risk 
education, 86.2 per cent of respondents indicated that they would still conduct payment 
card transactions but enhance their precautions. Conversely, only 1.8 per cent of 
respondents said that they would probably completely stop using payment card 
transactions, and 11.9 per cent of respondents said that they would worry and probably 
reduce their transaction intensity.  
As result of this lack of adequate risk education, many bank consumers actually have a 
false feeling of security about their bank. Given this asymmetry of information about 
various ATM/debit card fraud methods that could result in the loss of their ATM/debit 
card data or genuine card and PIN, most consumers do not even think about the 
possibility of fraud when conducting ATM/debit card transactions at ATMs and 
EFTPOS machines. In other words, consumers in Indonesia do not generally have any 
awareness of risk nor hence the ability to take precautions against fraud before 
undertaking an ATM/debit card transaction.
1136
 As consequence, even though fraudulent 
activities only happen intermittently,
1137
 once it has happened, most of the targeted 
consumers have fallen into a fraudster identity theft trap, which thus leads to further 
identity fraud.
1138
  
Therefore, market failure has obviously become the case in payment card operation in 
Indonesia, where disproportionate negotiation costs, asymmetric fraud risk information, 
                                                          
1134
 See Tracy Kitten, 3 Reasons Skimmers Are Winning (10 May 2012) Bank Info Security 
<http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/3-reasons-skimmers-are-winning-a-4752/op-1>. See also BCBS, Risk 
Management for Electronic Banking and Electronic Money Activities, above n 3, 67. 
1135
 See BI-Fraud Survey, above n 1133.  
1136
 Ibid. The BI-fraud survey results indicated that only 13% of respondents always feel worried about 
identity theft risk when conducting payment card transactions at a consumer activated terminal. 
1137
 Cooter and Rubin, above n 105, 70. ATM/debit card fraud occurs intermittently; however, due to 
many incentives for this fraudulent activities for individual and local and international organised crime, 
and global interoperability of ATM/debit card infrastructures, its occurrence is certain and the exposure to 
damages is huge. 
1138
 Some fraudulent activities are ‘too perfect’ and/or intangible in the eye of the consumer, such as is 
the case with malware, skimming, and ‘man-in-the-middle’ attack. Some other fraudulent activities which 
are supposed to be more obvious and involve social engineering method — such as card swapping, card 
trapping, and alike — fail to be spotted by consumers because they have not had any exposure to or 
knowledge of such frauds previously.  
 
278 
 
  
a failure to routinely, rigorously and consistently implement the fraud liability dumping 
provisions, and the absence of clear, fair, detailed, and decisive loss allocation rules 
exist in payment system operations.
1139
  
Hence, government intervention in the form of law reform on loss allocation rules for 
the payment card system in Indonesia is necessary immediately. In considering options 
for reform, other countries’ loss allocation rules (such as those of Australia and/or 
United States) will also be considered as long as they fit with Indonesia’s specific 
circumstances. 
7.2.2.   The Absence of Clear, Fair, Detailed, and Decisive Loss Allocation 
Rules and Presence of Unjust Court Verdicts on Disputes between 
Consumers and Banks concerning Unauthorised ATM/Debit Card 
Transactions 
A safe, robust, and efficient payment system is a pre-requisite to the effective 
functioning of the financial system in a country. To achieve this ideal payment system, 
CPSS-BIS has argued that it is very important that a well-founded and robust legal basis 
be established. From the legal perspective, the system not only has to ensure a high 
degree of payment system security and operational reliability, but also should enable 
participants to have a clear understanding of the risk that might be incurred in their 
transactions. The system should also define the respective responsibility of the payment 
system operator and other participants in its operations with regard to various risks that 
are entwined in the payment system operation, such as financial risk, fraud risk, and so 
on, and by whom such risks are to be borne. It is also emphasised that the rules and 
procedures of the system should be enforceable and their consequences able to be 
predicted and understood by participants, thus creating incentives and capabilities to 
manage and contain each of the risks they bear. Poor understanding of payment system 
risks can give participants a false sense of security, leading them to underestimate the 
real threat that always haunts the payment card system.
1140
 
In Indonesia, general loss allocation rules that are utilised in resolving disputes between 
banks and consumers about unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions are embodied in 
several pieces of legislation such as the Indonesia Civil Code, LCP, and LIET. In the 
Civil Law Code, basically a party or parties who commit a fault or negligent act which 
                                                          
1139
 Cooter and Rubin, above n 105, 6970.  
1140
 CPSS, ‘Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems’, above n 317, 37. 
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causes damage to another party shall be obliged to compensate the damage. Meanwhile, 
under the LCP and LIET, banks as a provider are liable for the consumer’s loss due to 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction, unless they can prove that the damage has 
occurred because of a consumer’s own fault or negligence.  
Therefore, one can assume that between a bank and consumer in an ATM/debit card 
fraud liability dispute, the liability would always lie with the bank as the provider of the 
system/owner of the products/services (presumed liability). A bank can only pass this 
liability to the consumer, if it can prove that the consumer’s loss was actually due to the 
consumer’s own fault/negligence (fault/negligence liability). The derivation of these 
liability rules in the payment card area can only be found in the Bank Indonesia 
Regulation.
1141
 In this regulation, bank is encouraged to be financially ready to meet 
their liability that ‘might arise’ in the event of ATM/debit card fraud.   
Unfortunately, none of this legislation further explains what constitutes ‘consumer’s 
own fault/negligence’ or explains the phrase ‘might arise’ either in the general 
circumstances or in the specific circumstance of ATM/debit card identity theft and 
fraud. Consequently — as might be shown in the various court verdicts over 
unauthorised ATM/debit card dispute  there is no uniform understanding by banks, 
consumers, ADR adjudicator and court judges in terms of what constitutes bank or 
consumer negligence in ATM/debit card operations and practices. In this respect, 
Indonesia lags behind the United States with its Electronic Fund Transfer Act 1978 and 
Regulation E which put all liability for fraud in ATM/debit card transactions onto the 
financial institution whether or not there was consumer negligence/fault (strict liability), 
or Australia with its ePayment Code, which has quite clearly regulated which party 
should liable for the losses sustained in cases of unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions.  
Therefore, up until now, Indonesia’s current legal and regulatory arrangements for loss 
allocation rules between consumers and banks in the event of fraudulent activities (fraud 
liability) are deemed too general and ineffective, unable to provide clear, fair, detailed, 
and decisive guidance in e-banking disputes caused by unauthorised ATM/debit 
transactions.  
                                                          
1141
 Elucidation section of art 22 of BIR-CBPI. 
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7.2.2.1. Flaws in the Bank’s Internal Dispute Resolution Unit: Unjust 
Liability Dumping Provisions.  
At the very first stage, a bank’s internal dispute resolution unit typically becomes the 
first resort as thedispute resolution forum. Nonetheless, in this forum the consumer’s 
position is very weak since the bank — which possesses almost all ATM/debit card 
resources and bargaining power  will act as ‘an arbitrator’ or ‘judge’ in the dispute 
and generally may find it difficult to act in a manner that an objective outsider would 
consider ‘fair’.
1142
 In most of the cases, banks rely on the bank’s standard contract. This 
tends to give a one sided allocation of losses to the consumer (liability dumping). As 
long as the unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction is conducted using the correct 
consumer’s card data and PIN, a bank will reject the consumer’s claim  whether or 
not the bank can prove consumer negligence.  
7.2.2.2. Flaws in the Banking Mediation Agency: Increasing the Disparity 
and Uncertainty.  
Bank Indonesia’s Banking Mediation/Facilitation Agency generally would be the next 
forum for ADR. However, although the BI banking mediation process is free of 
charge,
1143
 relatively rapid compared to judicial settlements,
1144
 and should be promoted 
and published by banks to their consumers,
1145
 its existence is still not recognised by 
most bank customers, as is shown in the results of the survey undertaken by the author. 
                                                          
1142
 Banks that don’t have honesty and ‘good will’ will very easily conceal facts that can be of detriment 
to their position, such as by not giving the CCTV footage that records fraudsters’ activities in the bank’s 
ATM, or by arguing liability dumping clause in the banksconsumers agreement as an excuse, and/or 
accusing consumers to some extent undertaking a negligence act that enabled the phantom transaction in 
ATM/debit to occur. There was also the instance where one government bank refused to pay redress to 
the consumer even though they had confirmed the occurrence of identity theft conducted by third party 
that was not in any way associated with the consumer in their ATM booth. A bank may also use 
illegitimate reasons such as that by paying the claim the bank will trigger ‘herd behaviour’ by other 
victims, or that such a decision needs court verdicts, and that redress will be deemed by law enforcement 
to be corruption.  
1143
 However, in the event that customer or bank has the initiative to present expert witnesses, then the 
customer and bank have agreed to cover the expert witness expenses. 
1144
 Bank Indonesia Regulation Number: 8/5/PBI/2006 Concerning Banking Mediation as amended by 
Bank Indonesia Regulation Number: 10/1/PBI/2008 art 11: ‘to avoid excessive time frame on the dispute 
resolution process, the process of mediation shall have been completed in no more than 30 (thirty) 
working days, with option to extend for another 30 (thirty) working days’. 
1145
 Surat Edaran Bank Indonesia Nomor 7/24/DPNP Perihal Penyelesaian Pengaduan Nasabah 
sebagaimana telah diubah dengan Surat Edaran Bank Indonesia Nomor 10/13/DPNP [Bank Indonesia 
Letter Number 7/24/DPNP Concerning Resolution of Customer Complaints as amended by Bank 
Indonesia Letter Number 10/13/DPNP]. According to this regulation, banks should publicise banking 
mediation as an alternative dispute resolution to its customers by providing the information in the form of 
leaflets, pamphlets, posters, booklets, website material, or other means of publicity in each of bank’s 
branches, or send such information along with the results of any customer’s complaint by letter to the 
customer’s address. 
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From the interviews that the author conducted with 30 consumers from 6 respondent 
banks in Jakarta, Denpasar and Yogyakarta, only 5 of the 30 consumers had any 
knowledge about the BI banking mediation section as an alternative disputes resolution 
body in Indonesia.
1146
 These results are further supported by a recent payment card 
fraud survey by Bank Indonesia (BI-Fraud Survey).
1147
  
Furthermore, the mediator provides neither recommendations to nor binding decisions 
on either party. In fact, many cases that are brought to Indonesia’s Banking Mediation 
Agency by consumers are the same cases that have failed to be resolved on the first 
attempt at a bank’s internal dispute resolution unit. However, again, the classic ‘trump 
card’ for banks in disputes with their consumers over unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions is the initial one-sided allocation of risk  the liability dumping clause in 
the bankconsumer standard contracts. Disputes were seemingly heavily resolved in 
favour of the banks who issued such constracts. In this contract, there are provisions 
that transfer a bank’s liabilities to the consumer. Such provisions include, among other 
things, a rule that if a consumer’s ATM/debit card data is compromised and used by 
fraudsters — regardless of whether the consumer has or has not any contribution to the 
fraud — the bank will have no liability for the consumer’s damages.
1148
  
As a result, in most of the cases, the dispute between banks and consumers over 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions in banking mediation agency have to be 
escalated to CDSB or court, because the mediation process failed to achieve an 
agreement or expected dispute resolution result from the consumer’s perspective.
1149
 
Even if the mediation succeeds — entirely or partially (in terms that a bank finally 
agreed to redress the consumer’s loss) — often the reason behind the decision could not 
treated as a legal guidance to resolve consumer disputes. Typically, the basis of the 
agreed mediation decisions was not a legal consideration but an act made at the 
discretion of the management of the the bank involved concerning the consumer’s status 
and/or condition. For instance, the victimised consumers that tend to have redress are 
those that  are old or too poor (to avoid ‘karma’) or are prominent figures that have 
affiliation to the political party, religious organisation, the central bank, or are high 
                                                          
1146
 C-1C-30.  
1147
 See BI-Fraud Survey, above n 1133. From the BI-Fraud Survey on March 2015, of seven victims of 
ATM/debit card identity fraud, only two (29%) knew about the Banking Mediation/Facilitation Agency. 
1148
 See example of bank’s liability dumping provisions at n 66.  
1149
 Heriani, above n 1049. 
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ranking police/military officials, and so on.
1150
 Therefore, banking mediation decisions 
have failed to establish a legal grip that can be used fairly in any bank–consumer 
dispute over unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction.  
7.2.2.3. Flaws in the CDSB: CDSB’s Decision is not Final and Binding 
The opportunity to file a lawsuit at a CDSB as a ‘last resort’ for out of court settlement 
has become the preferred choice for some bank consumers — who have noticed its 
existence  to settle their dispute with banks. The CDSB in general has been chosen by 
consumers that are reluctant to file a lawsuit directly with the court because of the many 
stigmas about launching court proceedings, and their inferior position in term of social 
and financial resources compared to business actors.
1151
 In practice, all of the CDSB 
verdicts on unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction dispute were decided in favour of 
consumers. However, dispute resolution proceedings in the CDSB have their own 
problems for consumers.  
From the author’s direct experience as an observer in the Mr Panggabean adjudication 
(processed in the CDSB), it has revealed that consumers are not able to force banks to 
settle their case in the CDSB if banks are not willing to do so.
1152
 In a CDSB 
proceeding, arbitrators cannot unilaterally proceed and/or conclude the plaintiff’s claim, 
if the defendant disagrees with settling the dispute in the CDSB.
1153
 This situation 
differs from that of procedural law in the ordinary court of justice, where a judge can 
conclude the verdict in favour of claimant or plaintiff in absentia, even if a defendant 
refuse to settle the dispute in the court and/or refuse to attend the trial.
1154
 Hence, the 
CDSB dispute resolution benefits exist mostly only in theory, not in practice. 
Nevertheless, apart from the flaws discussed above, another significant flaw relating to 
CDSB proceedings is the fact that the CDSB’s decision is not final and binding. Banks 
that are not satisfied with the CDSB decision have a legal basis for appealing to the 
                                                          
1150
 Interview results from several Bank Indonesia Banking Mediation Body officers (BI-BMO) who 
requested anonymity: BI-BMO-1; BI-BMO-2. 
1151
 Nugroho, above n 1082, 75, 85. 
1152
 See text above n 1040 and Chapter Six / section 6.4.1 for complete story of the Mr Panggabean case. 
1153
 If one disputant party does not agree to resolve the dispute in the CDSB, the CDSB does not have 
jurisdiction to settle the dispute. Nowadays, there is tendency for more and more banks to refuse to settle 
their dispute with consumers in the CDSB forum and they prefer the dispute to be adjudicated in court. 
The logical explanation for this trend is that the bank is fully aware that most consumers who lack 
resources in terms of money, knowledge, and time will give up the case if the Court that notoriously is 
known as unpredictable, expensive, and corrupt becomes the forum of dispute settlement.  
1154
 See art 125 HIR (in absentia/verstek). 
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District Court  and this is what actually has happened in practice. Hence, all of the 
CDSB decisions on unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction disputes that have been 
decided in favour of consumers were in vain.
1155
 With all of these problems, the purpose 
of CDSB establishment —as a rapid, inexpensive, fair and final forum for alternative 
dispute resolution body — has unfortunately not yet been achieved.  
7.2.2.4. Flaws in the Court: Unjust Contributory Negligence Principle  
The resolution of disputes between banks and consumers usually end up at the court of 
justice as a final adjudication forum.
1156
 It is argued, however, that court decisions were 
almost always in favour of banks, contained many flaws, were inconsistent, and 
generally had a weak legal basis. These verdicts apparently confirm people’s 
accusations that courts are unprofessional in handling business disputes,
1157
 unfair, and 
unresponsive to the needs of plaintiff.
1158
 As Shofie, Anderson and other scholars assert, 
many lawyers and judges mostly have a background in the humanities rather than the 
sciences and have knowledge that is too generalist, so when it comes to complex 
problems related to banking, technical evidence, and in particular of computer evidence, 
evaluation and decision-making are fraught with difficulties.
1159
 Hence, it is argued that 
‘misleading’ decisions have occurred because adjudicators were only using ‘common 
sense’ without being supported by sufficient knowledge and empirical evidence. 
The ‘common sense’ approach by the adjudicators and/or court judges also proves to be 
confusing because they do not examine nor consider the economic, technological and 
regulatory aspects that indeed are entwined in ATM/debit card transactions. This 
situation is also exacerbated by many other factors such as the adjudicators’/judges’ and 
                                                          
1155
 CDSB outcomes tend to always favour consumers. Actually, this is not surprising since the spirit of 
the establishment of the CDSB was to help consumers, who in general are far weaker than business actors 
(for example, in terms of knowledge, financial strength, and human resources). The spirit to defend 
consumers also is derived from the latest development of consumer protection doctrine (doctrine of 
caveat venditor  ‘let the seller beware’) which is employed in many countries’ consumer protection 
regulations, including Indonesia. For more complete information about consumer protection principle and 
regulations in Indonesia, see Chapter 5.3.  
1156
 See Chapter Six / section 6.4.3.2.2. 
1157
 Unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction disputes are probably even more difficult for the judges 
because they involve more complex matters, including multifaceted and seamless bank infrastructures and 
technology security aspects. 
1158
 See explanation in Chapter Six, section 6.4.3.3.2.  
1159
 Shofie, ‘Kapita Selekta Hukum Perlindungan Konsumen di Indonesia’, above n 683, 302. See also 
Ross J Anderson, 'Liability and Computer Security: Nine Principles' in Computer Security—ESORICS 94 
(Springer, 1994) 231; Nugroho, above n 1082, 1278. See also Bevan, above n 1060, 17; Shofie, 
Perlindungan Konsumen dan Instrumen-Instrumen Hukumnya, above n 1118, 35962; Nurdin, above n 
155, 23760. 
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payment system industry stakeholders’ lack of knowledge about the taxonomy of 
ATM/debit card identity theft/fraud methods, trends and developments in fraud liability 
or loss allocation rules, and consumer protection in many developed countries. 
However, the most blunders from these adjudicators’ decisions probably derive from 
the use of an old, abandoned, and unfair contributory negligence doctrine in the dispute 
between banks and consumers, as the way of adjudicators in articulating general loss 
allocation rules embodied in the existing legislation.  
As a consequence, court judges always accede to a bank’s defence which argues in 
terms of the infallibility of bank’s ATM/debit card system (which actually is 
anecdotal),
1160
 the existence of consumer contributory negligence (which omits the part 
played by bank negligence (such as by its failure to safeguard its ATMs from 
interference by a fraudster’s malicious software and/or devices), ready acceptance of 
bank assurances of the ‘adequacy’ of its consumer education, and/or the validity of the 
bank’s liability dumping provision in its bank–consumer contract. In contrast, in the 
United States, a bank’s claim that its systems were infallible, was rejected by the court 
since it placed ‘an unmeetable burden of proof’ on the plaintiff.
1161
 It is argued that 
unfair approaches by banks and courts to the victimised consumers can discourage 
banks from developing sufficient security measures and playing their appropriate part in 
the development of a secure and robust payment system in Indonesia. 
All in all, court rejections of consumer claims for redress where consumers probably 
only have made a small mistake or demonstrated slight negligence and were the true 
victim of the fraud are unfair for consumers and to some extent could jeopardise 
consumer trust in the banking industries and reduce incentives for banks to improve 
their security systems. Hence, there is always a risk that an inadequate and unfair legal 
framework in terms of loss allocation rules for unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction 
will come to erode consumer confidence in card-based payment in Indonesia.
1162
 
                                                          
1160
 See Anderson, above n 1159. 
1161
 Ibid. Anderson stated that: 
In the landmark court case Judd v Citibank [JC], Dorothy Judd claimed that she had not made a 
number of ATM withdrawals which Citibank had debited to her account; Citibank claimed that 
she must have done. The judge ruled that Citibank was wrong in law to claim that its systems 
were infallible, as this placed ‘an unmeetable burden of proof’ on the plaintiff. Since then, if a 
US bank customer disputes an electronic debit, the bank must refund the money within 30 days, 
unless it can prove that the claim is an attempted fraud. 
1162
 It is an undisputed fact that consumer confidence is vital to the success of a bank’s electronic 
payment system and to the economy in general. 
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Nevertheless, it is unsurprisingly that most of these adjudicator decisions failed to shed 
light on how to satisfy the quest for a fair, predictable, and sensible decision in a dispute 
between bank and consumer over an unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction. If this 
situation persists, it is feared that it will not only cause pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
loss for innocent victimised consumers, but also will jeopardise consumer trust in the 
banking industry as a whole.  
In light of the unfortunate situations detailed above, it is submitted that legal reform of 
loss allocation rules for fraud liability law in Indonesia — to resolve prolonged disputed 
and unjust adjudication verdicts on unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction  is 
undoubtedly needed and immediately relevant.
1163
 The existence of a clear, fair, 
detailed, and decisive legal framework for loss allocation is a very important aspect of 
improving legal certainty, reducing time and expenses for dispute resolution, and 
increasing predictability in regard to results of disputes regarding unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions. It is believed that the introduction of such a framework 
could encourage disputant parties to settle the dispute between them autonomously, and 
also improve consumer trust and reduce reputational risk for bank. Morse and Raval 
also argue that it could also effect better development of the payment systems in the 
country in question.
1164
  
However, Indonesia does not have a formal law reform agency (such as the Australian 
Law Reform Commission in Australia
1165
 or the Institute for Legal Reform in United 
States),
1166
 hence, it is hoped that this thesis can act as an individual initiative to 
                                                          
1163
 According to Black’s Law Dictionary, law reform is the process of, or a movement dedicated to, 
streamlining, modernising, or otherwise improving the nation’s law generally or the code governing a 
particular branch of the law. What is meant by law reform in this thesis is the process by which the fraud 
liability law — that is too general and does not really cater for banks’ electronic transactions  is to be 
modified, modernised, and supplemented. This law reform aims to improve access for consumers to 
justice, remove unjust and obsolete legal doctrine utilised in the adjudication process, and eliminate 
defects and problems that used to occur in dispute resolution between banks and consumers on 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions. In considering options for law reform, it is argued that the 
proposed legal framework for loss allocation rules in Indonesia needs to be harmonised with prevailing 
well-known standards in other countries.  
1164
 Morse and Raval, above n 44, 543. See also CPSS, 'Clearing and Settlement Arrangements for 
Retail Payments in Selected Countries', above n 245, 11–12. 
1165
 See Australian Law Reform Commission (2015) Australian Government <http://www.alrc.gov.au/>. 
The Australian Law Reform Commission is a federal agency that reviews Australia’s laws to ensure they 
provide improved access to justice for all Australians by making laws and related processes more 
equitable, modern, fair and efficient. 
1166
 Institute for Legal Reform (2014) U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
<http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/>. The U.S. Chamber institute is an advocacy group founded in 
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influence the payment system authority (Bank Indonesia) and payment system industry 
at large (banks, switching company, consumer protection body, CDSB, courts, and so 
on) to undertake law reform and raise public awareness of the practices of the current 
poor and unjust fraud liability law and loss allocation rules on unauthorised ATM/debit 
card transactions in Indonesia.  
7.3. Multi–Disciplinary Approaches to Law Reform on Loss Allocation 
Rules concerning Unauthorised ATM/Debit Card Transactions in 
Indonesia: Economic, Technological, and Legal Perspectives 
The severity of fraudulent activities is sometimes exacerbated by consumer negligence 
or fault, or — probably more appropriately  the consumer’s lack of knowledge (in 
contrast to that of the bank) about various identity theft/fraud methods that are used to 
attack bank consumers in ATM/debit card transactions. This asymmetry of information 
typically is derived from a lack of bank consumer education about inherent 
vulnerabilities and common method of frauds on ATM/debit card operation. This is 
confirmed in the author’s interviews with the victims of unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions. All victimised consumers are consumers that typically never had received 
enough knowledge from their banks about identity theft/fraud methods and how to 
avoid them. In contrast, consumers that attempted to take measures so as to not fall prey 
to such crimes are consumers that to some extent noticed or have knowledge  mostly 
from mass-media/social media (rather than their bank)  about how the identity 
theft/fraud method worked and the consequences if they fall for it.
1167
 Nevertheless, 
there is always a possibility that the consumer is the fraudster itself/dishonest consumer. 
In general, laws, market practices, and/or the consumer precautions can contain risk in 
electronic payment systems.
1168
 More specifically, risk containment in payment card 
fraud may be addressed by fairly allocating the losses among the parties involved in the 
transactions.
1169
 The existence of good fraud loss allocation rules is not only important 
because of their distributional consequences, but also is believed to give incentives to 
all parties involved in the ATM/debit card transaction to improve their precautions and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1998 by the United States Chamber of Commerce representing the nation’s business community with a 
focus on tort reform. 
1167
 See interviews with bank consumers C-1C-30. 
1168
 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, above n 190, 38. 
1169
 Hayashi, Sullivan and Weiner, above n 199, 100–101. 
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necessary efforts to prevent and/or mitigate the possible occurrence of identity theft 
and/or fraud.
1170
  
The precaution element basically can be assigned to both parties regardless of the size 
and nature of the party. In order to achieve an efficient legal system, fraud loss liability 
should be assigned to the party under their specific payment system transactions 
circumstances, and be one that ‘is able to take precaution against the loss at the lowest 
cost’.
1171
 Financial institutions and consumers can reduce payment losses by taking 
precautions against fraud according to their own specific circumstances and 
capabilities.
1172
 
Besides that, clear and fair loss allocation rules can also create a far higher degree of 
certainty regarding results as to who should be liable for unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transaction loss. Such certainty would encourage the liable party to take adequate 
precautions either to prevent the risk from occurring or to mitigate the risk if it still 
occurs regardless of the safety measures taken.
1173
 Thus, the rules can be expected to 
encourage behaviour from the parties involved in the ATM/debit card transaction to 
minimise identity theft/fraud occurrence to the ATM/debit card system as a whole. 
Considering the fast and complex development of electronic fund transfer system (such 
as ATM/debit card transactions), inherent vulnerabilities of ATM/debit card 
infrastructures, rapid innovation, adaptation, and development of crime/fraud risk, 
asymmetry of information between banks officers/fraudsters and consumers, and weak 
legal protection on consumers in the event of unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions 
in the bank–consumer contract provisions, general fraud liability regulation, and in its 
adjudication practices  it is submitted that multi-disciplinary approaches to establish 
the fraud liability rules is necessary. These should include legal, economic, and 
technological aspects that are heavily involved in the bank ATM/debit card transactions.  
It is submitted in this thesis that the use of multi-disciplinary approaches will benefit 
law reform in Indonesia in creating clear, fair, detailed, and decisive loss allocation 
rules for unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions, because such approaches will 
consider many different but relevant aspects that are involved in unauthorised 
                                                          
1170
 Levitin, above n 114, 3. See also Gillette, above n 130, 189. 
1171
 Cooter and Rubin, above n 105, 74, 84.  
1172
 Ibid 73.  
1173
 Rusch, above n 106, 595.  
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ATM/debit card transactions. It is believed that by having clear, fair, detailed, and 
decisive loss allocation rules for unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions, incentives 
will be created for payment system stakeholders to improve their ATM/debit risk 
precautions and/or prevention and mitigation performance. It will also encourage 
disputant parties to settle their disputes concerning unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions more efficiently between themselves in accordance with the reformed loss 
allocation rules. Hence, any dispute resolution adjudicated — whether within a bank’s 
dispute resolution unit, ADR forum and/or court in the future  can be settled faster, 
inexpensively, and more predictably, and could certainly reflect the presence of justice, 
efficiency and legal certainty for the disputant parties. 
7.3.1. Economic Perspective: Facts and Principles 
According to the CPSS, risks such as fraud, operational and other risks in the retail 
payment system ‘are generally addressed through technical features of various payment 
instruments and system control’.
1174
 Even though banks as professional entities have 
much information about security threats to their retail payment system,
1175
 typically 
bank management generally does not take elaborate and costly security measures for 
retail payment system such as they would for the wholesale payment system. Bank 
management typically will consider that it would be far too expensive, involve longer 
processing times, or otherwise not be suitable for the retail payment system.
1176
 The 
retail payment system with its larger number of participants generally employs a more 
moderate security system (having to adapt to the technology owned by the participants 
who are very diverse — not only domestic but also international participants). Bank 
management decisions over their infrastructure and security for ATM/debit card 
operation always contain a trade-off between a bank’s increased profit oriented 
economic objective and reluctance to have ‘excessive’ investment on bank security 
infrastructure (which could reduce those profits).  
                                                          
1174
 CPSS, Clearing and Settlement Arrangements for Retail Payments in Selected Countries, above n 
245, 1. 
1175
 Every bank in Indonesia has a risk management unit, one task of which is to update the information 
about various threats that could compromise bank security. The information can be obtained from various 
sources, such as various local/international conferences concerning payment system fraud/computer 
security risks; security risk information mailing lists from various banking security institutions, 
international ATM organisations, consumer fraud incident reports, the central bank, information exchange 
between banks, fraud reports from particular central bank/payment organisations, and so on. Most of the 
time, the type of identity theft and fraud that happens in one region (such as in Europe or the US), soon 
typically will also happen inside Indonesia. 
1176
 Roberds, above n 265, 43. 
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From the discussion in the previous chapters, some evidence is given of how a bank’s 
economic considerations have overpowered technological and legal requirements to 
provide optimum security and consumer protection in the ATM/debit card operation. 
These include, among other things:  
 Banks not having equipped all of their ATM/debit card infrastructure with state-of-
the-art technology, such as chip technology capability, anti-skimmer sensor and 
anti-card-trapping automatic sensor; 
 Banks not having equipped each of its ATMs/ATM booths with CCTV cameras. 
And even where CCTV does exist, some of them exhibit many issues concerning 
recording quality and/or retention or duration or the recording; 
 Despite the fact that many instruments and incidents of fraud are present or occur at 
a bank’s ATMs/ATM booths — including card swapping, card trapping, and card 
skimming, presence of fake call centre stickers, use of PIN-hole camera, and PIN-
pad overlays — banks to some extent exhibit a serious deficiency in monitoring 
their ATMS/ATM booths either by using active surveillance technology or more 
frequent physical monitoring, or by placing a security guard; 
 Banks having deliberately ‘accepted’ dangerous and illegitimate merchants double 
swiping practices; 
 Banks only being keen to give ‘positive consumer education’ and reluctant to give 
‘negative consumer education’ about inherent fraud risk methods on ATM/debit 
card transactions; 
 Banks having adopted a liability dumping policy in their bankconsumer standard 
contract which reflects bank reluctance to redress consumer losses due to 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions.  
The connection between law and economics has been known for quite a long time. Each 
impacts to a varying degree upon the other. Descriptions of the relationship can be 
broadly categorised into two groups namely ‘law and economics’ and ‘economic 
analysis of law’.
1177
 In general, the term ‘law and economics’ focuses on economic 
problems, and legal rules are only utilised as a tool to resolve market failure 
                                                          
1177
 Geoffrey P Miller, 'Law and Economics versus Economic Analysis of Law' (2011) 19(2) American 
Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 459, 459. See also Richard A Posner, 'Values and Consequences: An 
Introduction to Economic Analysis of Law' (The University of Chicago Law School, 1998) 1; Alain 
Marciano and Giovanni B Ramello, 'Consent, Choice, and Guido Calabresi's Heterodox Economic 
Analysis of Law' (2014) 77(2) Law and Contemporary Problems 97, 97. 
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problems.
1178
 Meanwhile, ‘economic analysis of law’ denotes an economic method or 
the tools that can be used by legal and policy practitioners to analyse in positive and 
normative sense any kind of problem in order to make decisions and understand the 
working of the legal system, including in the adjudication process,
1179
 or in the law 
reform process.
1180
 In short, economic analysis of law ‘is the use of economic principles 
and reasoning to understand legal materials’.
1181
  
In general, economic analysis of law can be used to see and predict the effect of the law 
on the participant’s behaviour; and/or to improve law by highlighting the negative 
consequences of the law in one or more aspects, such as in terms of economic 
efficiency, or the distribution of income and wealth, or other values.
1182
 In its 
development, the economic analysis of law not only came to focus on areas of law 
which have economic objectives, but also on all areas of the law, such as family, crime, 
procedural, contract, tort, crime, institutions, and the payment system.  
In recent times, many economists in the modern law and economic tradition have been 
attracted to seeing the relation of economic and law, especially in the quest to achieve 
efficient social goals by utilising lawmaking and judicial rulings.
1183
 Economic analysis 
of the law starting to emerge in 1960s and has been advocated by several prominent 
scholars in their seminal works. These include Ronald Coase in his article “The 
Problem of Social Cost”, and Guido Calabresi with his article about risk distribution 
and tort.
1184
 However, it was Richard Posner at the beginning of 1970 who formally 
‘invented’ the economic analysis of law with a general text book on economic analysis 
of law and the establishment of the Journal of Legal Studies.
1185
 In the payment system 
area  especially on the loss allocation for consumer payments — Robin and Cooter’s 
                                                          
1178
 Marciano and Ramello, above n 1177, 978. 
1179
 Sophie Harnay and Alain Marciano, 'Posner, Economics and the Law: From "Law and Economics" 
to an Economic Analysis of Law' (2009) 31(2) Journal of the History of Economic Thought 215, 21526, 
229. See also Miller, above n 1177, 459. 
1180
 Hamay and Marciano, above n 1179, 226. See also Posner, above n 1177, 2. 
1181
 See Miller, above n 1177, 459. See also Cento Veljanovski, Economic Principles of Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007) 1. In his book, Veljanovski denotes economic analysis of law as the 
economic approach to law. 
1182
 Posner, above n 1177, 2. See also Veljanovski, above n 1181, 1; Marciano and Ramello, above n 
1177, 98. 
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 Enrico Colombatto, 'A Free-Market View on Accidents and Torts' (2014) 77(2) Law and 
Contemporary Problems 117, 117. 
1184
 Guido Calabresi, 'Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts' (1961) 70(4) The Yale 
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 See Posner, above n 1177, 12. See also Veljanovski, above n 1181, 35.  
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seminal article on loss allocation between consumers and financial institutions
1186
 
stands out and has become a prominent reference for many countries’ payment system 
loss allocation rules, including the EFT Act 1978 in United States and the Australian 
ePayments Code. They believed that ‘applying economic analysis to loss allocation in 
the payment system leads to a set of recommended rules that are fairly close to 
legislation championed by consumer interests’.
1187
 
It is submitted that this thesis also advocates the use of Cooter and Rubin’s loss 
allocation principles, namely ‘loss spreading’, ‘loss reduction’, and ‘loss 
imposition’,
1188
 as tools that can assist in resolving unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transaction disputes between consumers and financial institutions. Cooter and Rubin 
believed that applying economic analysis to loss allocation in the payment system is 
appropriate since loss allocation in the payment system is related to a technical and 
largely monetary subject, and also could lead to the creation of comprehensive loss 
allocation rules that could safeguard consumer interest.
1189
 
The principles are believed to be able to enrich legal considerations in the fraud liability 
law reform process in Indonesia, either in terms of creating clear, fair, detailed, and 
decisive loss allocation rules in the regulations and/or by resolving disputes more fairly 
between banks and their consumers regarding unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions. Cooter and Rubin’s work also stated that the concept encompassed a wider 
range of matters than the valuable concerns that were expressed in Calabresi’s earlier 
seminal article.  
7.3.1.1. Loss Spreading Principle 
In this principle, Cooter and Rubin argued that in regard to pertinent risk in payment 
system, it is better to assign liability for a loss to a financial institution instead of to an 
individual consumer. Financial institutions are believed to be the most appropriate party 
that can achieve risk neutrality at the lowest cost by spreading the loss across the entire 
group of customers and consumers. However, as Rusch pointed out, ‘A loss spreading 
                                                          
1186
 Cooter and Rubin, above n 105. In this article, Cooter and Rubin argue that economic approach on 
payment system is justified since loss allocation in the payment system is technical and largely monetary 
subject, hence economic analysis will be deemed appropriate and indisputable. 
1187
 Cooter and Rubin, above n 105, 66.  
1188
 Ibid.The article deals only with losses due to fraud, forgery and error. However, for the purpose of 
this thesis, the Cooter and Rubin loss allocation principles are only used for losses due to fraud in 
ATM/debit card transactions.  
1189
 Ibid. 
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rationale would accept the level of unauthorized debits as a cost of doing business and 
would not necessarily foster any incentives or realistic opportunities to decrease the cost 
of operating the payment system as a whole’.
1190
 
In general, financial institutions obviously have greater economic resources compared 
to consumers. Financial institutions can predict their revenue and exposure to loss from 
the intermittent occurrence of fraud. Subsequently, the loss then can be spread among 
their consumers in the form of a charge for their products and services. Example of such 
charge is the fee for the use of a bank’s ATM and EFTPOS machines for a financial 
transaction, a fee for bank account administrative costs, a fee from interbank fund 
transfers using clearing or wire transfer (RTGS), credit card interest, and so on. Another 
reason is that a financial institution does not have a deleterious asymmetric information 
issue about inherent fraud risk in the payment system operation. On the other hand, 
most individual consumers do not have sufficient resources to bear the loss incurred and 
typically have taken no precautions whatsoever against fraud risk due to the problem of 
asymmetric information about inherent risk in the ATM/debit card operation.
1191
 
Therefore, the loss spreading principle definitely attributes liability for payment losses 
to financial institutions instead of consumers.
1192
 
7.3.1.2. Loss Reduction Principle  
Unlike the loss spreading principle that tends to place the burden of loss on the financial 
institution’s shoulders, the loss reduction principle principally can be assigned to 
financial institution and/or consumers as parties involved in the payment system 
transaction that have ability to reduce fraud losses at the lowest cost. Liability is a 
useful incentive for the parties involved in the payment system transaction to induce 
precautions and/or innovations against fraud. Principally, both or either financial 
institutions and/or consumers can avoid or prevent payment losses.
1193
 
This principle is considered more complex, because its purpose deals with human 
behaviour, which tends to change over time and probably has different standards of 
                                                          
1190
 Rusch, above n 106, 592, 561.  
1191
 Cooter and Rubin, above n 105, 703.  
1192
 Ibid 66. 
1193
 Ibid. See also Geva, ‘Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers’, above n 107, 
211.  
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behaviour among participants.
1194
 Other than this, fraud methods are varied and witness 
different levels of parties’ involvement and/or degrees of negligence/fault that enable 
the fraud to happen. In the event that more than one party can reduce the losses, the 
imposition of loss allocation rules should achieve balance and could avoid moral hazard 
in its implementation. Cooter and Rubin stated that the ‘paradox of compensation’ 
should be avoided. That is, ‘[h]olding one party strictly liable for a loss erodes the other 
party’s incentive to take precaution and to refrain from any action that would increase 
the loss’.
1195
 As a solution to this problem, Cooter and Rubin affirm that from an 
economic analysis perspective, fault-based liability rules are an answer to the paradox, 
even better than strict liability rules: 
Any fault rule, including simple negligence, negligence with contributory negligence 
defense, and comparative negligence, will motivate one party to satisfy the legal 
standard of fault in order to avoid liability, while inducing the other party to take 
precaution because it must bear any residual responsibility of the loss.
1196
 
7.3.1.3. Loss Imposition Principle 
While the loss spreading and loss reduction principles focus on the assignment of 
liability to the parties involved in the payment system transaction, the loss imposition 
principle’s centre of attention pertains to the enforcement in the most efficient way of 
the assigned liability rules agreed by the payment system industry/authority. Given the 
inefficiency and expensive process in place for payment system participants to settle 
fraud liability disputes in court civil suits, criminal trials, administrative proceedings, 
and ADR currently, it should be noted that to achieve ultimate efficiency, the 
enforcement of loss allocation process should be simple, efficient, and cheap.
1197
  
If existing loss allocation rules are unjust and/or not comprehensive (that is, tends to be 
inefficient and/or unfair for one or more participant in the payment system), reallocating 
loss with simple, clear, fair, detailed, and decisive liability rules and an efficient 
adjudication mechanism are undoubtedly very important. This approach is deemed 
necessary to improve certainty and predictability in the fraud liability dispute resolution, 
simplify adjudication proceedings, and discourage disputant parties from bringing their 
                                                          
1194
 Cooter and Rubin, above n 105, 73.  
1195
 Ibid 74.  
1196
 Ibid. 
1197
 Ibid 78. According to Cooter and Rubin, ‘the loss imposition principle [is] designed to avoid costly 
litigation and to overcome under enforcement, especially for small losses by consumers’. 
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dispute to ADR and/or court, a process that — in the case of Indonesia  notoriously 
exhausted parties’ valuables resources such as money, time and effort.
1198
  
Cooter and Rubin stated that selecting a basic mechanism to establish clear, fair, 
detailed, and decisive liability rules is not difficult: ‘strict liability rather than fault-
based liability, single factor standards rather than multiple factor standards, objective 
rather than subjective tests, and statutory liquidated damages rather than damages based 
on individualized determination of loss’ are what they suggest.
1199
 However, all these 
choices demonstrate a trade-off, especially for an ATM/debit card payment system that 
relies on both banks and consumers for fraud containment. For instance, while loss 
allocation rules using strict liability are easy to administer compared to fault/negligence-
based liability that tends to be complicated and probably more expensive in its 
determination processed,
1200
 there are problems. Strict liability only provides a rough 
allocation of liability to one party and probably discourages the other party from taking 
precautions against fraud risk; whereas fault-based liability provides precise loss 
allocation rules for both parties according to their specific circumstances and 
capabilities for reducing or preventing fraud losses, but this approach also has 
drawbacks in terms of economic costs.
1201
  
7.3.2. Technological Perspective: Facts and Principles 
In general, banks always anecdotally state that their systems are infallible. In reality, 
however, there is much evidence to the contrary. Examples of this can be seen in several 
unpublished Bank Indonesia documents on its payment system supervision of the 
banks’ payment card systems. It was found that some bank systems were actually 
vulnerable to identity theft/fraud. For instance, the internal audit document of one bank 
admitted that there was no segregation of duties regarding consumer data within 
different bank departments; consumer data was stored as plain data without adequate 
security and/or encryption; and even worse, many staff could access data without a 
                                                          
1198
 Ibid 7883. Compared to banks that have strong and excellent resources, consumers are always 
intimidated by many problems such as high cost from lawyer’s charges, difficulties in collecting 
documentary evidence, and long duration of adjudication process, especially for litigation in the court of 
justice. With the non-existence of small claim court in Indonesia, sometimes civil suit in the court is not a 
popular option for unauthorised ATM/debit card victimised consumers, since the court’s litigation 
expenses and hassle may outweigh the monetary value of the consumer’s claim.  
1199
 Ibid 78.  
1200
 Ibid 85. According to Cooter and Rubin, ‘the overall cost of imposing fault-based rules invariably 
will exceed the advantage gained in loss reduction’. 
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password or authorisation. Other than this, data storage inside magnetic stripe in 
consumers’ ATM/debit card are all in plain text without any security protection, and 
therefore very easy to copy and be subjected to abuse by internal or external fraudsters. 
Not to mention the threat from malware and eavesdropping method by which fraudsters 
can cleverly steal or intercept consumer ATM/debit card transactions by exploiting even 
slight vulnerabilities in a bank’s system.  
In order to create fair, robust, and objective loss allocation rules for payment card 
transactions, it is necessary for the law reformer in Indonesia to at least identify and 
understand — from a technological point of view — various aspects of identity theft 
and fraud in ATM/debit card operations. It is submitted that knowledge of how various 
identity theft and fraud risks may arise or be transmitted within the payment card 
system determine where they are borne (point of compromise) and who are the likely 
perpetrators is extremely important for the law reform process.  
While ATM/debit card payment seems seamless to the consumer, the system itself in 
fact requires complex technology which most users or cardholders do not understand. 
Payment cards with chip and/or magnetic stripe technology as data container, consumer 
activated terminals such as ATM and EDC machines, a communication network that 
links the consumer activated terminal either directly or indirectly (via aother bank’s 
and/or switching company infrastructure) to the host bank computer and infrastructure, 
are some examples of the heavy involvement of information technology features utilised 
in the bank’s ATM/debit card system.
1202
  
As has been described previously, in the ATM/debit transactions vulnerabilities lie 
almost at every transaction point from its inception until its settlement.1203 From the 
basic identity theft/fraud typology on a consumer ATM/debit card transaction discussed 
earlier in the Chapter Four and section 7.4.1 above, generally fraudsters attack either a 
bank’s infrastructure (technology), process/procedures, and/or the consumer. That is, a 
bank and its counterparts, their infrastructure computer and such infrastructure as 
ATM/EDC/EFTPOS machines, and networks, transaction process or procedures (where 
bank, merchant, switching company and other bank’s counterpart owner/employee 
                                                          
1202
 See Chapter Two for details about technology and infrastructures employed in the ATM/debit card 
operation such as ATM/debit card, magnetic stripe, chip, ATM/EFT machines, EFT network, and so on. 
1203
 CPSS, ‘Clearing and Settlement Arrangements for Retail Payments in Selected Countries’, above n 
245, 11–12. See also FFIEC, ‘Retail Payment Systems’, above n 180, 24.  
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could become a perpetrator of identity theft/fraud) or bank and/or its counterpart 
databased computer, and the consumer itself  could become ‘the weakest link in the 
chain’. The fraudster typically will attack the ‘weakest link’ as a point of compromise 
for identity theft, which typically later is transformed into identity fraud. 
Pertaining to the threat of identity theft and/or identity fraud in the bank’s ATM/debit 
card operation, banks all over the world (including in Indonesia) have developed 
various risk management measures — including consumer education — to fight the 
occurrence of such theft/fraud. Unfortunately, unlike scheme credit card operations 
which are relatively advanced in terms of security features (with the implementation of 
chip card based on EMV standard), the ATM/debit card system in Indonesia at the 
moment still only relies on magnetic stripe card technology. Hence, from a 
technological point of view, ATM/debit card transactions are very vulnerable to various 
identity theft methods such as skimming at ATM/EFTPOS terminal, card trapping at 
ATMs, double swiping at merchants, waitress attack in the restaurant, malware in 
ATM/EFTPOS machines, eavesdropping in the communication line or node, and so on. 
From a technological point of view, expecting consumers to act vigilantly to spot the 
fraudser’s malicious devices are — in regard to most of the fraud occasions — absurd, 
due to the consumers’ false sense of security and trust in the ATM/debit card operation, 
and also the fact that the nature of fraudsters’ malicious devices makes them difficult or 
impossible to detect by untrained eyes of consumers as laypersons, especially in the 
absence of fraud risk education by banks. 
From empirical evidence, some unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions are due to 
consumer negligence, but others are not. Indeed, because of a consumer’s negligence 
fraudsters may assume control of the consumer’s card and PIN and initiate an 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction. Anderson even contends that most frauds are 
due to blunders in application design, implementation and operation.
1204
 Other than this 
— regardless of consumer’s negligence and given the extent and frequency of the 
breach of banks and their counterpart institutions infrastructure that contains consumer 
payment card data and PIN — unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions that occur 
because of hacker activity are probably far more frequent compared to instances of 
negligence by consumers. 
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  Anderson, above n 1159. 
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However, even though a number of banks in Indonesia have enhanced some of their 
ATM/debit card operations — with the installation of various additional security 
features such as anti-skimmer devices and/or jitter at the ATMs, CCTV, and placement 
of ATM security tips stickers in several ATM booths, and so on  nevertheless, 
fraudsters on many occasions have succeeded in defrauding consumers’ ATM/debit 
transactions. As evidence of this, from time to time there is news about ATM/debit card 
frauds that has caused significant monetary damages to consumers and/or banks. These 
references are found in the mass-media either in articles on fraud and/or fraud claims in 
a ‘readers column’. Even though not very complete, Bank Indonesia’s annual payment 
system report also confirmed the existence of identity theft and fraud on ATM/debit 
card transaction and the losses sustained by consumers.
1205
  
The inherent vulnerabilities in a ATM/debit card system might exist in various aspects 
of the ATM/debit card operation, such as people, processes, and technology. If a bank 
improves their security features (prevention and/or mitigation enhancement), it and its 
consumers may not necessarily be exempt from fraudster attack. It has been asserted by 
Greene in his ‘balloon effect’ theory
1206
 that fraudsters almost always find new ways to 
circumvent and/or evade a bank’s security features and steal consumer data (identity 
theft) to ultimately perpetrate unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions (identity 
fraud).  
The plan of Bank Indonesia  Indonesia’s Central Bank — is in the near future to 
oblige all banks in Indonesia to implement as standard a requirement for the 
introduction of domestic proprietary chip technology in their ATM/debit card system. 
Even though it is believed that this will reduce identity theft and fraud, it is not regarded 
as a universal panacea. Payment card equipped infrastructure such as ATM/debit card 
and its processing devices such as ATM/EFTPOS with chip capable technology could 
indeed now defend consumer ATM/debit cards from the risk of identity theft using 
skimming method.
1207
 However, even these are still not infallible, as they are vulnerable 
to malware and skimming attacks that target consumer data within the ATM/debit 
                                                          
1205
 See Direktorat Akunting dan Sistem Pembayaran and Departemen Pengelolaan Uang, 'Laporan 
Sistem Pembayaran Dan Pengelolaan Uang 2012 [Payment System and Cash Management Report 2012]' 
(Bank Indonesia, 2012), 44. 
1206
 See Chapter Three / section 3.3.1.3 to understand more about the ‘balloon effect’ theory. 
1207
 Until recently, consumer data recorded in the payment card’s chip was relatively secure from 
skimming attack thanks to many security layers, such as tamper resistant smart card design, cryptographic 
protocols, on-line authorisation transactions, and specific operating system. 
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card’s magnetic stripe on the back of bank’s chip card.
1208
 Other than that, when faced 
by various identity theft methods that target the consumer’s genuine card — such as 
card swapping, card trapping, lost and stolen card (including swallowed card theft in the 
ATM), and so on  the chip card itself is as vulnerable as old magnetic stripe card. 
Like the economic principles that can be utilised as explanatory tools to rationalise or 
comprehend existing fraud liability rules and the adjudication decisions in the disputes 
between banks and their consumers over unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions, a 
technological perspective can also be very helpful to shed the light on the questions 
such as where was the exact location of the identity thefts occurred (point of 
compromise), what kind of fraud method and malicious devices were employed, and 
who was the most likely the perpetrator. Therefore, it is submitted that by knowing the 
answers to these questions, it is easier for the payment system stakeholders to find the 
party that is supposed to be responsible for safeguarding consumer ATM/debit card 
transactions. Professor Mann is probably one of the mosty prominent scholars in the 
area, and he believes that the question about who bears the risk of unauthorised 
transaction often should be resolved based on the nature of the underlying 
technology.
1209
 
7.3.2.1. Banks’ Moderate Security Technology against Flaws and 
Vulnerabilities in ATM/Debit Card Operation  
Actually, banks probably can make their ATM/debit card operation nigh‘infallible’, if 
they implement the most recent and sophisticated security features technology. For 
instance, by employing chip technology for ATM/debit cards and public key 
infrastructure and/or biometrics as an authentication tool in place of the static and 
fragile PIN, and leasing line infrastructure for communication data between consumers 
activated terminal and bank’s data centre, banks would increase their consumer data 
security. However, even though this approach probably enhances consumer transaction 
security, due to the nature of the retail payment system nature which involves a great 
                                                          
1208
 The magnetic stripe media is still provided in the chip card as a data ‘back up’ if the consumer 
activated terminal still has no capability to process chip card technology. The payment card industry 
actually noticed that the existence of magnetic stripe media in the chip card reduced ‘the infallibility’ of 
thestate-of-the-art chip card technology. However, this decision is driven by the need of the payment card 
stake holder (issuer, acquirer, principal, etc) to ensure optimum fee based income to be generated from 
card transactions and by user demand for functionality, since not all countries has embraced chip card - 
EMV technology standard. 
1209
 Ronald J. Mann, 'Making Sense of Payments Policy in the Information Age' (2005) 93 Georgetown 
Law Journal . 
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number of consumers, bank infrastructure such as ATM and EDC/EFTPOS machines, 
bank counterparts’ supporting parties (that is, network, hardware and/or software 
vendors, and switching companies) and domestic/international inter-operability, this 
option probably will be difficult to implement due to an excessive time, effort, and 
investment requirements, and probably will be contrary to the demand for user 
convenience and to business requirements, especially in the short to medium term.  
Therefore, up until now banks prefer to choose a business approach with only moderate 
security (and commensurate low/moderate costs) in ATM/debit card operations. 
Meanwhile, educating consumers with exhaustive fraud risk information is also not an 
option for many of Indonesia’s banks, since it is believed (at least anecdotally) that this 
will reduce consumer confidence and hence bank revenue from fee-based transactions.  
Therefore, in reference to all of the above situations , it is submitted in this thesis that 
banks in Indonesia need to be more specific, actually conscious and aware that 
consumer security in bank ATM/debit card operations are actually on the brink of 
compromise during the ATM/debit card operation, because of such several unfortunate 
factors detailed below. 
1. Technological advances that increase a bank’s dependence on information 
technology and computer-network environment have made transactions more 
complex and they now involve various nodes across various institutions and include 
consumer roles to initiate the payment at a bank’s consumer activated terminals.
.1210
 
Transactions and their makers become more vulnerable to abuse if people 
(consumer, bank staff, and others) are not well prepared with the latest fraud risk 
education to consumers; and if the technology and processes involved in the 
ATM/debit card operationsare not state-of-the-art’ with up-to-date security features, 
good standard operating procedures, and/or robust IT risk management. In general, 
bank security systems in Indonesia are still poor.
1211
 Consumer education is crucial. 
                                                          
1210
 See FDIC, above n 254, 1–2. See also Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee, ‘Inquiry into Fraud 
and Electronic Commerce’ (Parliament of Victoria, 2004) 1; Rambure and Nacamuli, above n 32, 63. See 
also Bolton and Hand, above n 257, 235; Hayashi, Sullivan and Weiner, above n 199, 99; Gates and 
Jacob, above n 258, 7. See also Glaessner, Kellerman and McNevin, above n 51, 1; Malakedsuwan and 
Stevens, above n 258, 1819. 
1211
 Opinion of the Brigadier General of Indonesia’s Police Department, Victor E Simanjuntak of the 
banking security system. See Mitra Tarigan, Sepertiga Kasus Skimming di Dunia Terjadi di Indonesia 
[One Third of World Skimming Case Happened in Indonesia] (2 July 2015) Tempo.co 
<http://nasional.tempo.co/read/news/2015/07/02/063680461/sepertiga-kasus-skimming-di-dunia-terjadi-
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As the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision pointed out several years ago, 
‘risk may be heightened where a bank does not adequately educate its customers 
about security precautions’.
1212
 
2. The deficiency in consumer fraud risk education (negative education)1213 is a 
siutation that creates a huge asymmetry in information between that of the 
consumers compared to that of the bank and/or e-banking attacker, which makes 
consumers very vulnerable to abuse. As evidence of this, the BI-Fraud Survey 
results have confirmed the extent of this lack of education, where 70 per cent of 
banking consumers in Indonesia state that they have never received any fraud risk 
education from their banks. Consequently, many respondents are still utilising 
dangerous practices: 37 per cent of consumers use a birthday date as their 
ATM/debit card PIN and 13 per cent of consumers use a simple number such as 
1234, 0000, 1111 as their PIN (which is very vulnerable for ‘PIN guessing’ attack). 
As Facciolo asserts, ‘inability to use technology safely and poor appreciation of the 
risks involved, makes consumers doubly vulnerable’.
1214
 The lack of fraud risk 
education by banks was also highlighted by a lack of comprehensive and published 
ATM/debit card fraud reports from the payment system authority.
1215
 As Kitten 
asserts, the level of consumer vigilance also depends on the quality and 
effectiveness of consumer education by the banks (that is, whether or not the banks 
have issued or had available comprehensive consumer education material and 
whether the material in question has been effectively delivered to consumers).
1216
 
3. With the advance of technology and the innovation of ever more sophisticated 
methods of identity theft, many malicious devices such as skimmer tools and spy 
cameras have become tinier, easy to customise, and can deliver data wirelessly; 
                                                                                                                                                                          
di-indonesia>. In fact, ATM/debit card operations still use old and vulnerable technology such as 
magnetic stripe card and static PIN. Banks also lack active monitoring on public consumer activated 
terminals, surveillance tools (such as CCTV), state-of-the-art e-banking, security infrastructure (such as 
ATMs with malicious device sensors and Anti Malware) and a neural network application. With these 
deficiencies, it is very difficult for banks to create deterrence, spot the occurrence of identity theft, or 
mitigate the fraud and immediately notify consumers who are affected by the fraud to reduce/stop 
consumer’s damages.  
1212
 BCBS, Risk Management for Electronic Banking and Electronic Money Activities, above n 3, 67. 
1213
 United Nations, ‘International Review of Criminal Policy’, above n 267, 347. 
1214
 Facciolo, above n 293, 623.  
1215
 See Chapter Four / section 4.3.4 of this thesis. 
1216
 Kitten, 3Reason Skimmers are Winning, above n 1134, Several experts in discussion, among them 
are: John Buzzard (FICO’s Card Alert Service), Carolyn Criscitiello (a vice president in M&T’s 
Alternative Banking and Retail Service Division) and Avivah Litan (Gartner fraud analyst). See also 
BCBS, Risk Management for Electronic Banking and Electronic Money Activities, above n 3, 67. 
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malware and eavesdropping techniques have also become more advanced and hard 
to detect; and even conventional methods such as card trapping using matchsticks 
or toothpicks which cleverly attach inside the ATM slot combined with ‘perfect’ 
fake call centre stickers as well as social engineering by con artist have all have 
proven to be very effective tools to steal consumer ATM/debit card data without the 
theft being immediately noticed by the consumer (as a layperson), especially if they 
have not had any education from their bank about the various identity theft and 
fraud methods. It is also argued that from empirical evidence, even trained 
consumers will arguably have difficulties in spotting these malicious devices. Some 
of them (such as malware, eavesdropping tools and some types of skimmers) are 
passive attacks that are ‘intangible’, out of sight, perfectly disguised, or simply 
unable to be distinguished from legitimate transactions/facilities (such as a bank 
anti-skimmer device) because of their ‘perfection’, and/or lack of bank’s 
information and/or disclosure.
1217
 
4. In the electronic world, the original of a message is indistinguishable from a copy 
in an electronic environment. Hence, unauthorised transactions perpetrated by 
fraudsters will most probably be treated by the issuer bank as genuine or valid 
transactions. The potential for fraud is therefore substantial due to the ease of 
intercepting and altering information in electronic form without detection, and the 
speed of processing multiple transactions.
1218
  
5. Law enforcement agencies lack technical expertise as well as sufficient regulatory 
powers and equipment to investigate and prosecute fraudulent electronic 
transactions.
 1219
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 Because many banks have many ATMs with different brands, the anti-skimmer attachment on the 
ATM’s slot also will have lots of variations in term of shape, colour, and dimensions. Hence, 
theoretically, consumers will never be able to judge whether the anti-skimmer device attached to an 
ATM’s slot is legitimate or not. 
1218
 UNCITRAL, ‘Model Law on Electronic Signatures with Guide to Enactment’, above n 337, 20. In 
practice, this condition is taken for granted by the bank with its bankconsumer’s liability dumping 
provision which states that all consumer transactions as long as they are using the correct ATM/debit card 
data and PIN will be deemed as valid transactions. This provision also becomes the main defence for 
banks in rejecting consumer claims over unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions. 
1219
 United Nations, ‘International Review of Criminal Policy’, above n 267, 347. Mitra Tarigan, 
Sepertiga Kasus Skimming di Dunia Terjadi di Indonesia [One Third of World Skimming Case Happened 
in Indonesia] (2 July 2015) Tempo.co 
<http://nasional.tempo.co/read/news/2015/07/02/063680461/sepertiga-kasus-skimming-di-dunia-terjadi-
di-indonesia>. ATM skimming fraud in Indonesia is pervasive.Iin the last three years of 5500 ATM 
skimming cases in the world, one third or 1549 cases happened in Indonesia. However, only a few of the 
perpetrators could be arrested and prosecuted. However, a recent arrest that will raise awareness is that of 
‘six people [who] allegedly used ATM skimmers — equipment designed to filch ATM card data and 
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7.3.2.2. Typology of Identity Theft/Fraud in an Unauthorised ATM/debit 
Card Transaction according to Its Point of Compromise  
From the inherent risk and identity theft/identity fraud methods in ATM/debit card 
transaction in Indonesia (as has been described in Chapter Four), all those risk and 
identity theft/frauds can be summed up according to the circumstances of the identity 
theft/fraud circumstances based on the point of compromise. By knowing the point of 
compromise, this thesis argues that it becomes easier to determine the party that is 
supposed to be more vigilant, owes a duty care, and is in a better position to reduce the 
possible occurrence of identity theft/fraud at the lowest cost. Thus, the basic typology of 
identity theft/fraud in consumer ATM/debit card transactions will be outlined below:
1220
 
7.3.2.2.1. First Party Identity Theft/Fraud Typology1221 
First party fraud occurs when cardholders use their genuine ATM/debit card to conduct 
legitimate or authorised ATM/debit card transactions and then repudiate having 
authorised the transactions or claim that the transactions were flawed.
1222
  
7.3.2.2.2. Second Party Identity Theft/Fraud Typology1223 
For second party fraud, an acquaintance of the cardholder has typically stolen the 
genuine cardholder’s card temporarily or made a transaction beyond authorisation and 
used the PIN that has been previously shared by the cardholder or reached by guessing 
according to their knowledge of the cardholder’s credentials or other information to 
make one or more unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
PINs — to steal a total of Rp 1.24 billion from 112 customers of Bank Central Asia, Indonesia’s largest 
private lender by assets.’: ‘Police Bust ATM Skimming Racket’ Jakarta Post, 4 November 
2015,<http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/police-bust-atm-skimming-racket/> .  
1220
 The identity theft/fraud typology in this section is based banking practices in Indonesia where all 
bank ATM/debit cards and their associated PINs are normally delivered directly to the consumer in ‘face-
to-face’ transactions in a bank’s office. Therefore, one member of the fraud taxonomy that used to be 
added in credit card fraud descriptions — ‘card not received’ — is not discussed here.  
1221
 First party fraud is that committed against a financial institution by one of its own consumers; 
second party fraud is fraud committed by someone close to or known to the victim, usually a relative or 
employee. 
1222
 In first party fraud, there is no a point of compromise since the consumer actually is the perpetrator 
and basically has conducted legitimate transactions. 
1223
 First party fraud is fraud committed against a financial institution by one of its own consumer; 
second party fraud is fraud committed by someone close to or known by the victim, usually a relative or 
employee. 
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7.3.2.2.3. Third Party Identity Theft/Fraud Typology1224 
1. The Lost and/or Stolen ATM/Debit Card Which Targets Consumers as a Point 
of Compromise 
This identity theft occurs when attackers target consumers/cardholders as a point of 
compromise to get their genuine ATM/debit card outside of a bank’s 
premises/infrastructures. This fraud typology includes, among other things, the 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction performed by a fraudster using a 
consumer/cardholder’s genuine ATM/debit card, which has been stolen directly from 
cardholder using identity theft methods such as ‘lost and stolen card’, or card swapping 
(social engineering). Meanwhile, a fraudster can obtain a cardholder’s PIN by various 
PIN theft methods, such as PIN guessing, shoulder surfing, or PIN cracking etc. 
2. The Lost and/or Stolen ATM/Debit Card Which Targets Consumers and Bank 
Infrastructures as a Joint Point of Compromise 
This identity theft occurs when fraudsters target a consumer/cardholder and/or bank 
infrastructure and/or data network as a joint point of compromise. Fraudsters firstly 
compromise a bank’s consumer activated terminal/ infrastructure with malicious 
devices to steal the consumer’s genuine ATM/debit card (card trapping), and/or 
subsequently trick a consumer into revealing their PIN inadvertently. This identity 
theft/fraud typology includes among other things card trapping, or card swapping 
methods. There is also a possibility that the fraudsters may directly tamper with or break 
into a bank’s ATM to steal consumer’s genuine card, such as in identity theft using the 
‘swallowed ATM/debit card theft’ fraud method. Meanwhile, the fraudster obtains the 
cardholder’s PIN by PIN guessing, PIN cracking, ‘shoulder surfing’ (fake ‘Good 
Samaritan’/con artist approach), fake bank ATM call centre, PIN hole camera, PIN-pad 
overlay, or other.  
3. The Counterfeit ATM/Debit Card  
This identity theft occurs when fraudsters target a bank and/or its counterpart’s 
infrastructure and/or data network as the point of compromise. This identity theft/fraud 
typology includes among other things the unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction 
performed by a fraudster using a counterfeit card that uses the consumer’s real data that 
                                                          
1224
 Third party fraud is fraud committed against an individual by an unrelated or unknown third party. 
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has been previously stolen from the consumer‘s ATM/debit’s magnetic stripe card, from 
a communication network, data in transit in the ATM/merchant’s EDC, and/or a bank / 
its counterpart computer and/or data centre. Included in this fraud typology are various 
identity theft methods such as card skimming, eavesdropping, malware, and so on. 
Meanwhile, a fraudster has obtained the cardholder’s PIN, typically by PIN cracking, 
eavesdropping, the use of malware, PIN hole camera, PIN-pad overlay, and so on.
1225
 
Typically, a consumer will not notice about the identity theft  because the fraudster’s 
malicious devices are not designed to halt or disturb the transaction, so the ATM/debit 
card operation appears to work very normally.  
From these basic typologies of ATM/debit ‘card present’ identity theft/fraud (even 
though probably not exhaustive), identity theft and fraud methods, the point of 
compromise, type of fraudster and attacker, and probably its prevention and mitigation 
methods, can be enumerated and depicted in the matrix table below.  
Table 3: ATM/Debit Card Point of Compromise, Attacker, Identity Theft, 
Prevention/Mitigation Methods and Least Cost Avoider 
Point of 
Compromise 
 
Goal 
Attacker& 
Type of 
Attack 
Identity Theft 
Method& PoC 
Identity Theft Prevention/ 
Mitigation
1226
 
Least Cost 
Avoider
1227
 
Consumer 
Genuine 
Card 
Third 
Party/  
Active 
Attack 
- Lost/Stolen 
Card, Card 
Swapping 
outside banks 
premises 
Lost/ Stolen Card & Card 
Swapping risk education: 
- Do’s & don’ts 
- Awareness/ precaution 
about risk 
 Consumer 
                                                          
1225
 Banks typically have a defence that their system already has encryption, a firewall, or other security 
features. However, fraudsters typically can exploit any vulnerabilities that exist in the system with such 
vulnerabilities able to be triggered by poor security implementation, delays in software patch updates, 
absent or out of date anti malware applications, eavesdropping / ‘man in the middle’ attack on the bank’s 
inter-operability nexus (where data change from encrypted format to the plain format in order to be 
encrypted by other different counterparty system), and so on. See Geva, ‘Consumer Liability in 
Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers’, above n 107, 226. 
1226
 Identity Fraud methods and the prevention/mitigation method are not discussed in this matrix 
because once an identity theft operation succeeds, then typically the identity fraud operation— such as 
unauthorised ATM withdrawal/transfer/transactions either using the victimised consumer’s genuine 
ATM/debit card or counterfeit card  will be very difficult to avoid since it’s using correct and 
indistinguishable data/PIN.  
1227
 The ’Least Cost Avoider’ is a party or parties that could reduce fraud loss at the lowest cost. 
Theoretically, a consumer could become the party that is able to reduce fraud loss only if they previously 
had fraud risk education, including ways to avoid it. Conversely, without fraud risk education, this is 
unlikely as the consumer as a layman typically has a false sense of security about e-banking products, 
hence most of them take no precautions when conducting ATM/debit card transactions and become an 
easy target for identity theft. 
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PIN 
Passive 
Attack 
- Shoulder 
Surfing, PIN-
guessing 
ATM 
Machine 
Slot 
Genuine 
Card 
Third 
Party/ 
Active 
Attack 
Card Trapping 
PoC: Bank & 
Consumer 
- Consumer fraud risk 
education 
- ATM with sensor 
- Bank’s active surveillance 
Primary: 
Issuing Bank 
Secondary: 
Consumer 
Card Swapping 
PoC: Bank & 
Consumer 
- Consumer fraud risk 
education 
- Personalised ATM/debit 
card 
Card Swallowed 
Theft 
PoC: Bank 
- ATM top fascia key/lock 
enhancement 
- Automatic disablement of 
card (card block) 
Issuing Bank 
Card 
Data 
Third 
Party/ 
Bank/ 
Vendor’s 
Staff  
/Passive 
Attack 
Skimming 
- Anti-skimmer, jitter, ATM 
with sensor, CCTV 
- Active monitoring 
- Chip card & Chip ATM 
- Skimming risk education  
 
 
 
Issuing Bank 
Acquiring- 
Bank 
Bank’s- 
Vendor 
 
Malware 
PoC: Bank 
- Anti malware 
- OS patch update 
- Know your employee 
- Better encryption 
Eavesdropping 
- Better encryption and data 
management; IDS 
PIN 
Passive 
Attack 
- PIN-Hole 
Camera 
- PIN-Pad Overlay 
- Shoulder Surfing 
- Malware, Eaves-
dropping, Social 
Engineering 
- PIN shield 
- Active monitoring 
- Consumer education 
- Anti PIN-pad overlay 
- Anti malware 
IDS 
Merchant 
EDC/EFT-
POS 
Card 
Data  
Third Party/ 
Merchant 
Owner/ 
Staff / 
Passive 
Attack 
PoC: 
Bank 
- Malware 
- Eaves-dropping 
- Anti malware 
- Strong encryption 
- Merchant & user risk 
education 
- EDC physical & logical 
security 
- EDC with bar & facing 
consumer 
- PIN shield 
Issuing Bank 
Acquiring- 
Bank 
Merchant 
PIN 
- Malware 
- PIN-cracking 
- PIN-guessing 
- Shoulder Surfing 
Merchant 
Cash 
Register 
Card 
Data  
Third party 
/ Merchant 
Owner/ 
Staff 
/Passive 
Attack 
PoC: Bank 
& Merchant 
- Hacking 
- Malware 
- Double Swiping 
 
- No double swiping policy 
& regulation 
- Consumer boycott 
 
Issuing Bank 
Acquiring- 
Bank 
Merchant PIN 
- Shoulder Surfing 
- Malware 
 
  Merchant Skimming - EDC secure position Issuing Bank 
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Merchant/
Restaurant, 
etc 
Card 
Data 
Owner/ 
Staff / 
Passive 
Attack 
PoC: Bank 
& Merchant 
- Consumer swipe Acquiring- 
Bank 
Merchant 
PIN Shoulder Surfing PIN Shield 
Data 
Network 
 
Card 
Data  
Third Party/ 
Bank/ 
Vendor’s 
Staff/ 
Passive 
Attack 
PoC: Bank 
Eavesdropping 
- IDS 
- Strong encryption 
- Hash 
- etc 
Issuing Bank 
Acquiring- 
Bank 
Merchant PIN 
- PIN-guessing 
- PIN-cracking 
Bank &/or 
Counter-
part Host 
Computer 
Card 
Data  
Third Party/ 
Bank/ 
Vendor’s 
Staff / 
Passive 
Attack 
- Malware 
- Pin-cracking 
- Firewall 
- IDS 
- Anti malware 
- Strong encryption 
- etc 
Issuing Bank 
Acquiring- 
Bank 
Banks- 
Vendor 
PIN 
- Malware 
- PIN-cracking 
- PIN-guessing 
Personalized 
Identified 
Information 
Database 
(PII): 
facebook,  
office, civil 
register 
database, & 
so on) 
PII 
Third Party/ 
Bank / 
Vendor’s 
Staff / 
Passive 
Attack 
 
- Data Gathering 
- Dumpster Diving 
- Social 
Engineering 
 
- Do not share PII 
- Card and PIN delivery in a 
separated envelope 
- Activated card with secret 
information 
- Consumer education 
Issuing Bank 
Acquiring- 
bank 
Consumer 
 
7.3.2.3. PIN as an Electronic Signature Has Not a Non-Repudiation Value 
In ATM/debit card operations, the validity of cardholder is identified by their 
ATM/debit card. As an attribution, instead of digital signature, the PIN has become a 
primary choice by bank as an authentication feature in order to secure cardholder 
ATM/debit card transactions.
1228
 In other words, a PIN basically is a cardholder’s 
electronic signature
1229
 as it replaces a written signature.
1230
  
                                                          
1228
 CPSS, Retail Payment in Selected Countries, above n 187, 5. See also Marco Gercke, 'Legal 
Approaches to Criminalize Identity Theft' in United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (ed), Handbook 
on Identity-related Crime (United Nations, 2011) 12. See also Australian Payments Clearing Association, 
above n 195; Hendry, above n 203, 76; Geva, ‘Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds 
Transfers’, above n 107, 208.  
1229
 Electronic signatures are a broader notion of signature in the electronic form. Among others are 
digital signatures, biometric signatures (such as finger print, iris or retina), PINs, digitised versions of 
handwritten signatures, and other methods, such as clicking an ‘OK-box’. See UNCITRAL, 'UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Electronic Signatures with Guide to Enactment', above n 337, 21. 
1230
 Meyer and Matyas, above n 72, 430–1. See also Madan and Reid, above n 205, 48. 
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In an electronic environment, the genuine electronic data is indistinguishable from a 
copy. With the development of various PIN theft techniques,
1231
 the ease of intercepting 
and altering information in electronic form without detection, and so on, the possibility 
of fraud occurring is considerable.
1232
 Because a PIN does not have something unique 
that is closely identifiable only with the individual cardholder (such as is the case with 
the manual or handwritten signature,
1233
 or a given biometric (for example the 
cardholder’s retinal image), or a digital signature,
1234
 then it is actually impossible for 
an issuing bank to distinguish an unauthorised PIN entry from an authorised one.  
Geva has canvassed an important remark about the concept of electronic authentication 
and its legal value, as follows:  
...electronic authentication is carried out by means of compliance with an agreed-upon 
security procedure, which can be entered into a terminal by anyone to whom it becomes 
available. Electronic authentication is a means of legitimizing the action of that person, 
or of attributing it to him or her, but not of identifying him or her. It is very much like a 
door key facilitating entry to the system, or better, a seal affixed to an instrument, 
authenticating it, but not identifying the one who actually placed it. Consequently, any 
technologically effective entry of an access code, even when it is carried out by an 
unauthorized person to whom it may have become available unlawfully, appears to the 
financial institution as a valid authentication. Prima facie, the electronic authentication 
would thus justified the account institution debiting the customer’s account. In this 
sense, the authentication by means of compliance with a security procedure is not an 
electronic equivalent to a manual signature; rather, it is more analogous to the 
placement of an “electronic seal”. The financial institution in unable to distinguish 
between an authorized and unauthorized authentication and is likely to be inclined to 
                                                          
1231
 As has been described in the Chapter Four / section 4.2.2, a PIN as static and consists of a simple 
four or six digits, and is very easily stolen or revealed using various methods such as PIN-guessing, PIN-
cracking, shoulder surfing, discovered from a written record kept by the consumer in their wallet or bag, 
obtained with a PIN-hole camera, PIN-pad overlay, malware, and so on.  
1232
 UNCITRAL, 'UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures with Guide to Enactment', above n 
337, 20. 
1233
 Geva, ‘Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers’, above n 107, 367. 
1234
 See UNCITRAL, 'UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures with Guide to Enactment' 
above n 337, 22. According to UNCITRAL: 
Digital signatures are created and verified by using cryptography, the branch of applied 
mathematics that concerns itself with transforming messages into seemingly unintelligible form 
and back into the original form. Digital signatures use what is known as “public-key 
cryptography”, which is often based on the use of algorithmic functions to generate two different 
but mathematically related “keys” (i.e. large numbers produced using a series of mathematical 
formula applied to prime numbers). One such key is used for creating a digital signature or 
transforming data into a seemingly unintelligible form, and the other one for verifying a digital 
signature or returning the message to its original form. Computer equipment and software utilizing 
two such keys are often collectively referred to as “cryptosystems” or, more specifically, 
“asymmetric cryptosystems” where they rely on the use of asymmetric algorithms. In addition to 
generation of key pairs (public key and private key), a “hash function” is used in both creating and 
verifying a digital signature which creates a digital representation, or compressed form of the 
message (“message digest” or “finger print”). Any change to the message invariably produces a 
different hash result when the same hash function is used. It is virtually impossible to derive the 
original message from knowledge of its hash value. 
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pass the risk of an unauthorized but properly authenticated transfers onto the 
customer.
1235
  
Typically, a bank always says that PINs were generated and verified with secure 
cryptographic hardware which is impossible for its staff or a third party to know. Hence, 
the consumer as the owner of the PIN should always be responsible for its use and 
secrecy. As Anderson asserts, ‘[p]eople who complain are therefore routinely told that 
they must be lying, or mistaken, or the victim of fraud by a friend or relative (in which 
case they must be negligent).
1236
 This is also the situation in Indonesia. 
However, in practice blunders in application design, implementation and operation has 
rendered PIN secrecy able to be compromised.
1237
 The other problem with PIN 
technology is that it is an old and outmoded technology.
1238
 PINs are also static and 
normally consist of a four or six digit number and have been chosen by financial 
institutions as a cost-effective mass-distribution authentication method.
1239
 The 
combination of PIN and magnetic stripe card is considered a weak and inherently 
insecure authentication method compared to other methods such as a manual signature 
or a strong electronic authentication method such as a biometric and digital signature, 
the purpose of which is to ensure non-repudiation.
1240
  
According to Kondabagil, non-repudiation is: 
the assurance that a neutral third party can be convinced that a particular transaction or 
event did (or did not) occur. It involves creating proof of the origin or delivery of 
electronic information to protect the sender against false denial by the recipient that the 
data has been received, or to protect the recipient against false denial by the sender that 
the data has been sent.
1241
 
                                                          
1235
 Geva, ‘Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers’, above n 107, 2289. 
1236
 Anderson, above n 1159. 
1237
 Ibid. See also Nick Gifford, Information Security: Managing the Legal Risk (CCH Australia 
Limited, 2009); Nicholas Bohm, Ian Brown and Brian Gladman, 'Electronic Commerce: Who Carries the 
Risk f Fraud?' (2003) (3) Journal of Information & Technology; Geva, ‘Consumer Liability in 
Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers’, above n 107, 2267. 
1238
 Mohammed, above n 195, 214. See Hendry, above n 203, 37. See also Meyer and Matyas, above n 
72, 475. See also Radu, above n 210, 388; Pipkin, above n 226, 130. 
1239
 White, above n 111, 33. 
1240
 Administrator, Thursday Thinkpiece: Mason on Digital Signatures (August 22 2013) Slaw Canada's 
Online Legal Magazine <http://www.slaw.ca/2013/08/22/thursday-thinkpiece-mason-on-digital-
signatures/>. See also White, above n 111, 33; Andrian McCullagh, 'Legal Aspects of Electronic Contract 
and Digital Signatures' in Anne Fitzgerald et al (eds), Going Digital 2000 (Prospect Media, 2
nd
 ed, 2000) 
198. According to McCullagh, a PIN comprising only a four digit number is far less strong compared 
with digital signature where its private key consisting of two large prime number that are so large that the 
ordinary person will not be able to remember them. 
1241
 Kondabagil, above n 194, 70–3. 
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There is a difference in the use of the term ‘non-repudiation’ in its crypto-technical and 
legal contexts. According to McCullagh and Caelli, in the legal sense ‘the signatory to a 
document is always able to repudiate a signature that has been attributed to him or her’; 
whereas in the crypto-technical sense: 
Non-repudiation is a property achieved through cryptographic methods which prevents 
an individual or entity from denying having performed a particular action related to data 
(such as mechanisms for non-rejection or authority (origin); for proof of obligation, 
intent, or commitment; or for proof of ownership).
1242
  
In this regard, as long as a digital signature’s private key has not been stolen by a 
fraudster and the digital signature is verified, it can be treated as an electronic 
equivalent to a manual signature. The owner of the private key is then prevented from 
repudiating the digital signature.
1243
 In other words, a digital signature provides a ‘non-
repudiation’ function  that is, it has the ability to identify the author and whether the 
document has been changed since it was digitally signed. 
The evidence shows that when the correct PIN is used to authenticate ATM/debit card 
transactions, then from a technological point of view it does not automatically prove 
that the transaction was authenticated and authorised by the purported cardholder.
1244
 
For instance, when a fraudster manages to skim and steal a consumer’s ATM/debit card 
magnetic stripe data and obtain its PIN using the PIN-hole camera/PIN-pad overlay 
method, technically he/she can created a counterfeit card to make an unauthorised 
withdrawal which drains the consumer’s money from their bank. The transaction itself 
will be deemed valid according to the bank’s system because it used the correct 
ATM/debit card data and PIN. The problem with current banking technology is that it 
cannot distinguish whether the ‘valid withdrawal transactions’ were generated or keyed-
in by the real consumer with his/her genuine magnetic stripe card and PIN, or by an 
unknown fraudster with a counterfeit card and the (illegally obtained) correct consumer 
PIN. Hence, referring to this scenario example, it is argued that PIN as an authentication 
method in ATM/debit card transactions has no non-repudiation aspect at all.  
                                                          
1242
 William Caelli, Dennis Longley, and Michael Shain, Information Security Handbook (Macmillan, 
1991) cited in Andrian McCullagh and William Caelli, 'Non-Repudiation in the Digital Environment' 
(2000) 5(8) First Monday, Peer-Reviewed Journal on the Internet . In this definition, the authors using 
the Australian Federal Government’s Electronic Commerce Expert Group adopted a technical meaning of 
non-repudiation in its report to the Australian Federal Attorney General.  
1243
 Ibid. 
1244
 Geva, ‘Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers’, above n 107, 22830, 
2334, 23941.  
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7.3.3. Law Perspective: Facts and Principles  
Indonesia, as a civil law country, does not have the doctrine of precedent. Hence, the 
rule of law which is implemented by adjudicators in various ADR fora and ultimately 
by the judges in the court, is often only based on the regulations themselves and not on 
previous judgements. As has been previously discussed, in the absence of clear, fair, 
detailed, and decisive fraud liability regulation, court decisions over disputes between 
banks and consumers concerning unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions are 
commonly only resolved based on too general fault/negligence liability regulations.  
The unclear definition of unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions, of consumer and/or 
bank fault/negligence in such transactions (to name but a few evidences of lack of 
sufficient detail) combine with adjudicators/judges’ lack knowledge about the relevant 
and update economic, technological and ATM/debit card regulation aspects, the 
existence of inherent risk in the ATM/debit card operation, and the asymmetry of 
information suffered by consumers to ensure that ADR and/or court verdicts tend to be 
varied, inconsistent, unpredictable and, it is argued, unjust.  
The main issue of this thesis — and one that has also become the central issue in 
consumer protection implementation in payment card operation in Indonesia and other 
countries as advocated by many scholars and prominent institutions — concerns fraud 
liability and the loss allocation rules for unauthorised electronic fund transfers/ 
ATM/debit card transactions.
1245
 A key point with this issue is that that all the 
ATM/debit card transactions that were claimed as unauthorised by the consumers are — 
from a technological point of view — all conducted using correct consumer ATM/debit 
card data and PIN or agreed-upon security procedures to allow the bank to debit the 
consumer’s fund.  
From the many instances of unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions disputes in 
Indonesia (as has been reported by consumers and/or adjudicated in the ADR body / 
court of justice), the most intriguing questions pertaining to fraud liability rules that 
should be reformulated to assure fairness for both parties are: how to formulate fair loss 
allocation rules between banks and their consumers for unauthorised ATM debit card 
transactions, especially when: (1) there is no clear evidence in regard to who actually 
                                                          
1245
 See nns 10717.  
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perpetrated the unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction and whether there is fault or 
negligence on the part of the bank’s and/or consumers; and (2) both banks and 
customers exhibit negligence that enabled the fraudsters to conduct unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions (joint liability).  
In regard to the very important questions above, it is submitted that ADR and court 
verdicts at various levels have been shown to be unpredictable, inconsistent and 
arguablely unjust decisions. While CDSB as an ADR institutions tend to make decisions 
that always favour the consumer/cardholder, conversely, the Supreme Court of Justice, 
as an appeal court, tends to have verdicts that favour the banks.  
In most of the Supreme Court decisions concerning unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions, it is submitted that generally the verdicts were based on the contributory 
negligence principle and/or probably the wrong ‘common sense’ valuation by the 
court’s judges due to their lack of knowledge on payment card regulation, the typology 
of ATM/debit card identity theft and fraud, and economic and technological aspects that 
are intertwined with unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions. These court decisions 
were deemed unjust to consumers and as such could hinder the development of 
electronic payment in Indonesia. 
Therefore, in the current circumstances where there is no specific regulation for fraud 
risk and/or negligence liability in ATM/debit card transactions and to assure fairness on 
each adjudications’ verdict on unauthorised ATM/debit card disputes between bank and 
its consumers, it is submitted that resolution of disputes should involve progressive, up 
to date and relevant legal, economic and technological facts and principles that are 
pertinent to the specific unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction.  
7.4. Proposed Law Reform Implementation on Loss Allocation Rules 
concerning Unauthorised ATM/Debit Card Transactions in Indonesia  
In general, banks have more power and resources compared to consumers in an 
unauthorised ATM/debit card dispute. Since most consumers are laypersons that do not 
have much knowledge about the economic, technical and legal aspects related to the 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions and a bank’s ATM/debit card system and 
operation, and often lack other reseouces, in many instances the consumer as plaintiff 
finds it difficult to prove that the bank as defendant was negligent and that negligence 
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has caused damages to the plaintiff. Conversely, banks usually succeed. They boast of 
their ATM/debit card infallibility (which is actually merely anecdotal) and maintain that 
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence — at least in terms of the definitions 
supplied by the banks themselves.  
In several unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction cases that ended up at court as the 
final adjudication forum, almost all of the verdicts favoured the bank on the basis that 
the consumer’s losses were due to consumer’s own contributory negligence. The 
problem with these court verdicts are is that they have many flaws that contribute to 
making the verdicts able to be considered unjust to the consumers involved. In this 
regard, it is submitted that in the adjudication proceeding, judges deny several 
economic, technological and legally important legal facts about the nature of the 
identity theft/fraud and the bank’s contributory negligence in failing to secure its 
infrastructure and provide adequate fraud risk education to the consumer. Arguably, the 
bank’s contributory negligence was the main enabler or dominant contributing cause 
that facilitated the occurrence of unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction.  
These misleading verdicts could, if they continue, on one hand reduce consumer 
confidence and hinder development of the electronic payment system which is actually 
very good for the country’s economic efficiency and development. On the other hand, it 
could also discourage banks — as the owners of electronic banking systems (including 
as issuers of ATM/debit cards) — from improving security of bank’s electronic banking 
infrastructure and giving comprehensive and adequate fraud risk education to their 
consumers. 
The principal objective of any resolution on an unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transaction dispute between a bank and consumer is to make a decision that will 
implement and enhance fairness to disputant parties. The desired fairness is to be 
attained in the context of creating incentives for banks and consumers so that 
ATM/debit card fraud precautions are improved and benefits are maximised for society 
as a whole. The question of who should bear the loss on unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions requires the availability of good and fair rules to provide a sensible answer. 
It is believed that the fair distribution of losses among market participants could affect 
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the incentives to commit fraud.
1246
 As Levitin has asserted, ‘The greater a party’s 
liability for fraud losses, the greater incentive the party will have to take care to avoid 
fraud’.
1247
 
Therefore, it is believed that the law reform objective for fraud liability law/loss 
allocation rules for unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions in Indonesia can be 
achieved by synthesising multi-disciplinary approaches such as legal, economic, and 
technological principles into several actions concerning unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transaction disputes, as follow:  
1).   In civil liability adjudication/litigation proceedings, law reform can be achieved by: 
 a). promoting the movement to shift the burden of proof from the plaintiff 
(consumer) to the defendant (bank), such as utilising the negligence per se 
doctrine as a legal basis for a plaintiff to claim damages from a defendant. 
Hence, the defendant is the party that should prove that they had no 
fault/negligence,
1248
 and/or the plaintiff’s negligence was the actual cause of 
the occurrence of the unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction. If a defendant 
fails to prove at least one of these two defences, the defendant is obliged to 
remedy the consumer’s loss; and/or  
b).   replacing the unjust and obsolete pure contributory negligence doctrine (which 
is commonly used in ADR/Court adjudication proceedings in Indonesia) with 
the comparative negligence doctrine which is deemed more fair and widely 
used in many developed countries. This replacement is considered important to 
achieve a fair and more predictable legal adjudication in cases in ADR and/or 
Court. With the adoption of a judge-made law role (as played by judge in the 
common law countries), judges in Indonesia could reform the law by setting 
new precedents in the unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction cases that 
come before them.
1249
 This option is deemed valid and timely, since the 
                                                          
1246
 Roberds, above n 265, 43. See also Roger Clarke and Alana Maurushat, 'Passing the Buck: Who 
Will Bear the Financial Transaction Losses from Consumer Device Insecurity' (2007) 18 JL Inf. & Sci. 8, 
39; Levitin, above n 114, 3; Rusch, above n 106, 595; Gillette, above n 130, 1856.  
1247
 Clarke and Maurushat, above n 1246, 39. 
1248
 For instance, because ‘act of God’ was the cause of the consumer’s loss. However this defence is 
arguably cannot be used in the event of unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions but only where bank 
infrastructure malfunctions, such as in a natural disaster (earthquake etc). 
1249
 Law reform of fraud liability law and loss allocation rules by modifying and/or supplementing tort 
law in the Indonesian Civil Code is not recommended in this thesis, since the legislation process for 
amending Civil Code law can be very long and full of uncertainty. As a reference for this pessimistic 
view, see as an example one pertaining to the amendment process of Indonesia Criminal Code that was 
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movement of the appointment of progressive judges is on the way in 
Indonesia;
1250
 and/or 
2). creating clear, fair, detailed, and decisive fraud liability rules for unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions. It is believed that a simple set of clear, fair, detailed, 
and decisive fraud liability rules would create more uniform results in fraud liability 
dispute resolution between consumers and their banks, regardless of which 
adjudication forum is used. It is believed if such rules existed, they could be treated 
as a common guideline and probably could remedy an adjudicator’s lack 
knowledge on the relevant economic, technological and legal aspects that are 
intertwined specifically with unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions. Therefore, 
the existence of these rules not only will avoid prolonged disputes between banks 
and consumers concerning unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions that have 
caused damages to consumers, but also create incentives for banks and consumers 
to enhance their vigilance against identity theft and fraud in ATM/debit card 
transactions.  
7.4.1. Law Reform in Civil Liability Adjudication/Litigation Proceedings  
7.4.1.1. Civil Lawsuit Based on Tortious Liability: Breach of Statutory 
Duty (Negligence Per Se) 
Generally, in a common law country a breach of statutory duty differs from ordinary 
negligence under tort. Breach of statutory duty can arise without negligence because the 
statute may impose a strict and particular standard of care. Nevertheless, a failure to 
abide by a statutory duty of standard of care can constitute negligence.
1251
 In Indonesia, 
the action of breaking a statute can be considered an unlawful act. Makarim states that 
in Indonesia, negligence per se or breach of statutory duty can be used to claim damages 
for which the defendant is liable.
1252
 By way of a comparison, in Australia when a 
plaintiff wants to establish a tort breach of statutory duty against a defendant that is not 
a statutory authority, he or she must establish that: 
(a) the statute intended to confer a civil remedy for its breach; 
                                                                                                                                                                          
started in the 1980s and has not yet finished when this thesis was written. See Zainal Abidin, Menelisik  
Pembahasan RUU KUHP [Investigating the Criminal Code Bill Process]  (no date)  
<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1.../edit?usp=sharing>.  
1250
 Satjipto Rahardjo, Penegakan Hukum Progresif [Progressive Law Enforcement] (Kompas, 2010) 
5569. 
1251
 Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 912, 428. Gibson and Fraser, above n 917, 117.  
1252
 Makarim, above n 857, 167. 
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(b) the defendant breached the duty imposed upon it by the statute; 
(c) that this breach caused the loss or injury to the plaintiff and that damage was of a 
kind the statute was intended to prevent; and  
(d) the plaintiff was within the protection of the statute.
1253  
From various regulations that are relevant with bank ATM/debit card operation as 
described in the Chapter Five and various identity thefts and frauds as described in 
Table 4, the relation of the occurrence of identity theft/fraud and the possibility of 
breach of statutory duty by the bank, is as follows (see below). 
Table 4: ATM/Debit Card Point of Compromise, Identity Theft Methods and  
Bank Statutory Duties 
Point of 
Compromise 
 
Goal 
Identity Theft 
Method&  
Bank’s Statutory Duties  Statutes 
Consumer 
ATM/ 
Debit 
Genuine 
Card 
- Lost/Stolen 
Card, Card 
Swapping 
outside bank 
premises 
Obligation to give fraud risk 
education to consumer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Constitution  
- LIET 
- GR-OEST 
- LBI 
- BIR-CBPI 
- BIR-Risk 
Management 
- BIR-TBPI & 
UBCPD 
- BIR-RMUITCB 
- BID-CP & 
Security 
- BID-Chip & PIN 
- BIR-CPPSS 
  
 
PIN 
- Shoulder 
surfing, PIN-
guessing 
Bank ATM 
Machine 
Slot 
ATM/ 
Debit 
Genuine 
Card 
Card Trapping - Obligation to protect consumer 
from loss caused by the bank’s 
electronic agent; 
- Obligation to secure and protect 
electronic system infrastructure or 
any data transferred through a 
bank’s electronic system; 
- Obligation to safeguard the 
confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, authenticity, 
accessibility, traceability, and 
non-repudiation of consumer 
data; 
- Obligation to provide payment 
system instrument that meets 
security requirements, 
international standard and best 
practice; 
- Obligation to implement fraud 
prevention devices such as IDS, 
anti-skimming, anti malware, 
firewall, and so on; 
- Obligation to provide Chip 
Card Swapping 
Card Swallowed 
Theft 
Card 
Data 
Skimming 
Malware 
Eavesdropping 
PIN 
- PIN-Hole 
Camera 
- PIN-Pad 
Overlay 
- Shoulder 
Surfing 
- Malware, 
Eaves-
dropping, 
Social 
Engineering 
Merchant 
EDC/EFT-
POS 
Card 
Data  
- Malware 
- Eaves-dropping 
                                                          
1253
 Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 912, 428, 4301. Gibson and Fraser, above n 917, 430. See also 
Restatement (Second) of Tort s 286 (1965). 
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PIN 
- Malware 
- PIN-cracking 
- PIN-guessing 
- Shoulder 
Surfing 
technology & PINs with at least 6 
digit characters; 
- Obligation to implement physical 
security control on bank’s 
equipment and rooms such as at 
ATM/EFT-POS to protect 
consumers and their transaction 
from danger of theft, sabotage, 
and other criminal action; 
- Obligation to secure data 
transmission from EFT terminal 
to host computer from risks of 
network disturbance, 
unauthorised access, and so on; 
- Obligation to perform routine 
monitoring to ensure the security 
and consumer comfort using e-
banking services; 
- Obligation to give fraud risk 
education to consumer; 
- Obligation to provide 
compensation, redress and/or 
substitution for the damages 
caused by the use of the bank’s 
services; 
- and so on.  
 
 
 
Merchant 
Cash 
Register 
Card 
Data  
- Hacking 
- Malware 
- Double 
Swiping 
PIN 
- Shoulder 
Surfing 
- Malware 
 
Merchant/Re
staurant, etc 
 
Card 
Data 
Skimming 
PIN 
Shoulder 
Surfing 
Data 
Network 
 
Card 
Data  
- Eavesdropping 
- Malware 
PIN 
- PIN-guessing 
- PIN-cracking 
Bank &/or 
Counter-part 
Host 
Computer 
Card 
Data  
- Malware 
- Cracking 
PIN 
- Malware 
- PIN-cracking 
- PIN-guessing 
Personalized 
Identified 
Information 
(PII): 
Facebook,  
Office, Civil 
Register 
Database, & 
so on) 
PII 
 
- Data Gathering 
- Dumpster 
Diving 
- Social 
Engineering 
 
Obligation to give fraud risk 
education to consumer 
 
In Indonesia, the Tuan Bahari v PT Bank Negera Indonesia (Persero) Tbk verdict has 
indicated that negligence per se can be implemented to claim redress in a dispute 
between a bank and a consumer concerning unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions. 
In principle, a bank as a prudential and fiduciary institution should always abide by the 
regulations in conducting their business to ensure that they will only provide robust and 
secure products/services to their consumers. In this case, PT Bank Negara Indonesia has 
been punished by the Supreme Court’s judges and ordered to redeem the consumer’s 
loss due to third party identity theft and fraud, on the basis that the defendant failed to 
comply with Bank Indonesia’s security regulation that obliged the bank to have Chip 
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technology and a six digit PIN in ATM/debit card operation, and that it had also been 
negligent in failing to provide a security guard to improve ATM security and safeguard 
the consumer’s transaction. In this case, the court also argued that bank also failed to 
prove the existence of consumer negligence that could have caused the PIN to be 
inadvertently revealed to the fraudster.
1254
  
Therefore it is submitted that consumers in Indonesia that have lost their funds 
(deposited previously in the bank) due to an unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction 
which was enabled by the breach of one or more elements of the bank’s statutory duty 
(as obliged by one or more regulations described in the Chapter Five) can have their 
civil lawsuit adjudicated based on the negligence per se principle. Theoretically, what a 
consumer should have proved in this lawsuit is just the gap between the bank’s 
ATM/debit card operation and the specific infrastructures, standard or procedures it was 
obliged to provide under the regulations.
1255
 
7.4.1.2. Civil Lawsuits Based on Tortious/Negligence Liability: 
Comparative Negligence instead of Contributory Principle on 
Unauthorised ATM/Debit Card Transaction Disputes in 
ADR/Court Proceedings with Multi-Disciplinary Approaches: 
Economic, Technological and Legal 
7.4.1.2.1. Burden of Proof: Plaintiff v Defendant 
When a cardholder experiences one or more ‘phantom’ ATM/debit card transactions 
and reports it to the bank, in most cases such claims are rejected by the card issuer bank. 
The cardholder then has to bring the unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction case to 
the ADR or court to redeem their losses. However, one classic problem when a plaintiff 
brings a civil dispute before the law concerns the burden of proof. In this regard, is it the 
consumer who has to prove that the ATM/debit card transaction was unauthorised, or is 
it the bank that has to prove that the transfer was authorised? In circumstances where 
both consumer and bank probably have contributed to the loss, who has to prove the 
existence of fault or negligence that enabled the fraud to happen?  
                                                          
1254
 See explanation of Mr Bahari v PT Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) Tbk in Chapter Six / section 
6.4.3.2.2 
1255
 For reference case, see Tuan Bahari v PT Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) Tbk [Supreme Court of 
Republic of Indonesia], 718 K/Pdt.Sus/2008, 10 December 2008.. 
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In the law of torts — whether in Indonesia or other jurisdictions — it is very common 
that the onus of proving negligence lies with the party who alleges it.
1256
 Nevertheless, 
in order to avoid liability the bank — as the provider of the system — should also prove 
the soundness of its security procedures and its lack of negligence in performing the 
authentication procedure in the payment transaction.
1257
 
Therefore, at the proceedings stage the plaintiff has to prove, by a predominance of 
evidence, that the defendant to some extent has been negligent and that this negligence 
has caused damage to the plaintiff.  
However, in most cases plaintiffs usually have difficulty in providing evidence to 
support their allegation, since unauthorised ATM/debit card cases normally involve 
very technical matters and all necessary evidence and/or relevant information are not in 
the plaintiff’s hand. This difficulty becomes two fold when a plaintiff does not bring an 
expert witness to reveal — either from theory or empirical evidence  that the bank’s 
system is not infallible and that the possibility of identity theft and/or fraud is huge and 
pervasive.
1258
 In an identity theft and fraud case where the fraudster probably may have 
unlawfully acquired a consumer’s ATM/debit card data by various ‘passive’ identity 
theft/fraud methods,
1259
 in most of the cases a consumer cannot provide information 
about where, when, how, and by whom their ATM/debit card data was compromised. 
Instead, all relevant evidence or witnesses (such as CCTV footage and audit trail of 
transactions) may be under the control of the defendant, and thus evidence (including 
that from witnesses) may be very difficult or impossible for the consumer to obtain by 
                                                          
1256
 See Article 163 HIR /Article 283 RBg : ‘They who say they have the right, or they mention 
something that works to strengthen their rights or to deny the right of another person, that person must 
prove the existence of such rights or that event’,;and Article 1865 BW (Indonesia Civil Code): ‘Anyone 
who argues that they have right, or in order to enforce its own right or denied the rights of others, which 
refers to an event, required proving the existence of such rights or event’. See also Andrian McCullagh 
and William Caelli, 'Non-Repudiation in the Digital Environment' (2000) 5(8) First Monday, Peer-
Reviewed Journal on the Internet; Geva, ‘Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds 
Transfers’, above n 107, 2356: Clarke and Maurushat, above n 1246, 489. 
1257
 Geva, ‘Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers’, above n 107, 2356. 
1258
 Expert witness testimony from the police department or central bank might also be necessary to 
corroborate the allegation that the identity theft and/or fraud on ATM/debit card operation are actually 
classic foreseeable risks. As can be seen from several unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction related 
civil suits in the Indonesian courts discussed earlier, it is argued that one of the probable causes of the 
failure of plaintiff claims is their ignorance of the importance of expert testimony and/or their inability to 
bring expert witnesses before the court. 
1259
 For an example of passive attack on ATM/debit card operations, see Chapter 4 / section 4.2.1.3 of 
this thesis. 
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the consumer and so prove that the ATM/debit card transaction was indeed 
unauthorised.
1260
  
However, to overcome the burden of proof problem for consumers, it is submitted that 
the adjudicators actually can shift the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the 
defendant, based on the most current legislation that indicates that rule on the onus of 
proof is more on the side of the defendant (LCP and LIET), and/or by using a maxim in 
the law of tort known as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as the principle of 
evidence.
1261
 For that reason, the burden of proof should lie with the defendant (bank), 
the institution that owns all the payment infrastructure and information about the 
consumer’s ATM/debit card transactions. 
1. Onus of Proof Lies with the Defendant Based on LCP & LIET 
It is argued that instead using the old law that lays the burden of proof on the plaintiff 
who asserts the claim (such as in HIR, RBg or Civil Code), the adjudicator should 
utilise LCP and/or LIET which contain newer, more specific, and better provisions on 
consumers protection in regard to disputes concerning unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions. The LCP and LIET both are specific regulations that implicitly shift the 
burden of proof from the consumer as the user of the payment card system to the bank 
as the provider of the payment card system. In these regulation, in principle a bank will 
always be deemed to be at fault or negligent (presumption of negligence) and liable for 
any damages incurred by a consumer in the use of bank infrastructures and/or products 
or services. Banks can shift the liability to a consumer only when the bank can prove 
that the consumer is the one who is at fault or has demonstrated negligence that enabled 
the occurrence of the damages.
1262
 Thus the onus is on the bank to prove the consumer 
is at fault or negligent in order to avoid liability; the onus is not on the consumer to 
prove the bank is negligent or at fault. This regulation’s purpose is to give more 
protection to consumers, who are generally in a weaker or disadvantagious position 
compared to that of banks or producers. This approach is also deemed appropriate due 
to the fact that the determination of security features on ATM/debit cards, adoption of 
                                                          
1260
 Fuady, ‘Perbuatan Melawan Hukum’, above n 914, 99101. 
1261
 Fred E Heckel and Fowler V Harper, ‘Effect of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor’, (1928) 22 
Illinois Law Review 724, 727.  
1262
 Samsul, ‘Perlindungan Konsumen’, above n 795, 145–6. See also arts 19(1) and 19(5) LCP. See also 
art 21(2)c and 21(5) LIET.  
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state-of-the-art technology and security features within the bank’s infrastructure, 
procedures, and the provision of a fraud risk education policy are all in bank’s exclusive 
hand. 
2. Onus of Proof Lies with the Defendant Based on Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine 
Res ipsa loquitur is Latin for ‘the thing speaks for itself.’ According to the Legal 
Information Institute, res ipsa loquitur in tort law is:  
a principle that allows plaintiffs to meet their burden of proof with what is, in effect, 
circumstantial evidence. The plaintiff can create a rebuttable presumption of negligence 
by the defendant by proving that the harm would not ordinarily have occurred without 
negligence, that the object that caused the harm was under the defendant’s control, and 
that there are no other plausible explanations.
1263
  
So in this case, the plaintiff’s obligation is merely to describe the situation, the facts and 
nature of the damages that he/she suffered (the circumstantial evidence). The plaintiff 
does not need to prove his/her claim.
1264
 In regard of circumstantial evidence, Heckel 
and Harper argue that ‘circumstantial evidence is made sufficient, as a matter of law, to 
sustain a recovery in the absence of explanation by [the] defendant’.
1265
 However, the 
facts related to damages should always be accompanied with a statement of the 
circumstances in which the damage occurred, which must make negligence a reasonable 
inference. Other than that, the circumstances, which became the cause of the damage, 
must be exclusively within the defendant’s knowledge and/or that the instrumentality 
must have been under the defendant’s exclusive control both at the time of incident and 
at the time of the negligent acts that are presumed to have caused the injury/damage.
1266
  
It is argued that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine suits unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions where the point of compromise of the identity theft method is within the 
bank’s and/or its counterpart infrastructures — such as where malware or 
eavesdropping is used at an ATM/EFTPOS machine or network, or card skimmers, 
                                                          
1263
 Legal Information Institute, Res Ipsa Loquitur 
(<http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/res_ipsa_loquitur>. See also Vickery and Pendleton, above n 966, 90. 
1264
 Makarim, above n 857, 180. 
1265
 Heckel and Harper, above n 1261, 727. See Mayes v Kansas City Light & Power Co (1926) 121 Kan 
648, 249 Pac 599; Eaton v New York Cent. & HRRR Co (1990) 195 NY 267, 88 NE 378. See also Fuady, 
‘Perbuatan Melawan Hukum’, above n 914, 100. 
1266
 Heckel and Harper, above n 1261, 7256. See Mardo v Valley Smokeless Coal Co (1924) 279 Pa 
209, 123 Atl 779; New v Bradshaw (1922) 89 Okla 205, 214 Pac 557; Carter Oil Co v Independent 
Torpedo Co (1924) 107 Okla 209, 232 Pac 419; Lakey v North McAlester Coal Co (1924) 98 Okla 130, 
224 Pac 309; Goldman, etc., Bottling Co v Sindell (1922) 140 Md 488, 117 Atl 866; National Biscuit Co 
v. Wilson (Ind 1906) 78 NE 251. See also Fuady, ‘Perbuatan Melawan Hukum’, above n 914, 99. 
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card-trapping devices, and a PIN-hole camera at an ATM. Banks as the ‘owners’ of the 
ATM/EFTPOS machines and their networks, obviously have full control over such 
infrastructure. 
In Indonesia, Fuady states that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine can be used in tort cases as 
long as several conditions are fulfilled, namely that:  
(1)    [such] an event usually does not occur in the absence of negligence (or intention) 
of the perpetrator (the perpetrator in this case is the bank); 
(2)    the losses incurred are not caused by the actions of the victim; 
(3)    [the] instrument which causes a loss is in the exclusive control of the party that is 
accused of negligence; 
(4)    the negligence caused [is] within the scope of a legal obligation of the perpetrator 
(not of the fraud but of the negligent act) to the victim; 
(5)   the victim was not negligent (no contributory negligence).
1267
 
Fuady argues that in practice, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is widely used in relation 
to a defendant who is an expert or a professional group member or group who is 
required to carry out their activities with a high degree of care or prudence. In this 
regard, a bank is definitely an instance of a professional financial institution that 
required to be very careful and skilful in its operations and obliged to exercise a high 
degree prudence in those operations, among other things to ensure the safety of its 
consumer transactions.
1268
 Other than that, it is also argued that most successful identity 
theft and fraud in ATM/debit card operations are typically facilitated by a bank’s 
preceding and dominant negligence that might cause the occurrence of the subsequent 
negligent conduct of the consumer. For instance, in the card-trapping fraud method, 
consumer negligence in revealing his/her PIN to the con-artist may never happened if 
the bank had not previously been negligent in securing its consumer activated terminal. 
Further, Fuady believes that the implementation of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine will 
benefit society, as: 
(1)  It is more just and equitable for the parties; 
(2)  There is a presumption of negligence;  
                                                          
1267
 Fuady, ‘Perbuatan Melawan Hukum’, above n 914, 103. See also Makarim, above n 857, 167. 
1268
 See regulations describe in Chapter Five of this thesis, especially section 5.2.2 ‘Regulatory 
Framework for ATM/Debit Card Transactions: Bank Indonesia Regulations Concerning Prudential 
Principle, Risk Management, and Security Improvement. 
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(3)  ‘Circumstantial’ evidence is accepted; 
(4) Defendants are forced to explain the nature of the disputed occasion/incident; 
(5) There can be a solution in cases where more than one perpetrator is involved.
1269
 
In the rules of evidence law in Indonesia, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine can be 
implemented by the judge based on presumed evidence. This is derived from both 
Indonesia’s Civil Proceedings Law (Procedural Law) and the Civil Code, as governed 
by Articles 1915, 1916, 1921, and 1922 of Indonesia’s Civil Code.
1270
 Zulham states 
that the use of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is nothing but a means to preserve 
consumers’ interests.
1271
 Subekti contends that presumption that is based on statute or 
fact is indeed recognised in the procedural law in Indonesia. However, Subekti argues 
that presumption is only ‘tentative evidence’, and thus it should be followed up with 
other evidence.
1272
 Sutantio and Oeripkartawinata concur with Subekti that several 
complementary presumptions are needed to shed light on and prove the fact that is 
being disputed. Presumption is needed when in the court examination process, it is very 
difficult to present a witness that is directly involved or knows about the facts.
1273
 
Judges decide on the value of the various presumptions and the facts upon which they 
may be based, that is, whether they have probative force or value as evidence. In other 
words, the judge has full authority to attribute the level of strength to the presumption, 
whether as perfect evidence, preliminary evidence, or lacking any probative force at 
                                                          
1269
 Fuady, ‘Perbuatan Melawan Hukum’, above n 914, 1048. Fuady contends that basically the res 
ipsa loquitur doctrine is derived from the thought that it is unfair for the victim of an unlawful act (in this 
case the consumer) who knew nothing about the incident should bear the loss arising due to the negligent 
act of the perpetrator (of the negligent act, that is the bank), especially if the perpetrator of the negligent 
act / defendant (in this case a bank) is a party that actually understands more about the actual incident that 
is the basis of the dispute. In such circumstances, it is impossible for the victim to prove the perpetrator’s 
negligence before the court. With the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, the burden of proof shifts from the victim 
to the perpetrator, and the victim does not have to prove perpetrator’s negligence but the mere existence 
of circumstances that would indicate that such a result usually will occurs if there is negligence on the 
part of the perpetrator would suffice. 
1270
 Ibid 103. See art 1915 of Indonesia’s Civil Code: Presupposition is a conclusion which the law or 
the judge draws from a known or unknown actual event that has taken place. There are two types of 
presuppositions: (i) presupposition based on the statute and (ii) presupposition which is not based on 
statute. Article 1922 of the Indonesian Civil Code states: ‘Presuppositions which are not based upon the 
statute shall be considered by and shall be at the discretion of the judge, who shall only pay attention to 
those which are significant, accurate, specific, and consistent with one another. Such presupposition shall 
only be noted in circumstances in which the law admits evidence by witnesses, and also due to bad faith 
or an act or deed of deceit.’ See also R Subekti, Hukum Pembuktian [The Law of Evidence] (PT Pradnya 
Paramita, 2005) 459. 
1271
 Zulham, Hi and Hum, above n 969, 91. 
1272
 Mertokusumo, ‘Hukum Acara Perdata Indonesia’, above n 152, 177; Simanjuntak, above n 945, 
380. 
1273
 Retnowulan Sutantio and Iskandar Oeripkartawinata, Hukum Acara Perdata Dalam Teori dan 
Praktek [Civil Law Proceeding in Theory and Practice] (CV Mandar Maju, 2009) 77. 
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all.
1274
 However, whether or not there will be a presumption or what quality of 
presumption will be attributed by the judge, will rely heavily on the judge’s individual 
knowledge. The role of ‘expert witness’ is very important to improving a judge’s 
knowledge about particular facts.
1275
  
7.4.1.2.2. Test for Comparative Negligence: Between Bank and/or 
Consumer Negligence 
Court verdicts in cases of unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction disputes (mentioned 
earlier) were all adjudicated and examined by the relevant Indonesian courts on the 
basis of tortious liability claims based on tort law.
1276
 In order to establish tort law as a 
claim basis, the Indonesian Civil Code and jurisprudence requires that the perpetrator’s 
act contain the element of fault, that is, intention or negligence, and no defence.
1277
 
Nevertheless, many flaws occurred in the CDSB and court verdicts. It is argued that 
most of these flaws were caused by the lack knowledge on relevant facts, legal, 
economic and technological, and subjective interpretation between the between 
consumer, bank and adjudicator of fault or negligence in the ATM/debit card 
operation.
1278
  
Below is the author re-visits and conducts a comparative analysis of the CDSB/court 
verdicts concerning unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction disputes between banks 
and consumers using multi-disciplinary approaches and the comparative negligence 
principle, and argues that many of the CDSB/court cases considerations as described 
earlier at Chapter Six / section 6.4.3.2.2 and 6.4.3.3.3 actually were not accurate, as 
follows:  
 Evi Yulisna br Harahap v Bank Mandiri (Card Trapping Case) 
Fact of the Case: 
 The plaintiff withdrew some money from the defendant’s ATM at the 
Tanjungsari Gas Station (Medan, West Sumatra, Indonesia). The withdrawal 
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 Ibid 78. 
1275
 Teguh Samudera, Hukum Pembuktian Dalam Acara Perdata [Evidence Law in the Law on Civil 
Procedure] (Alumni, 1992) 76, 82. See also Clarke and Maurushat, above n 1246, 489. 
1276
 See Chapter Six / sections 6.4.3.2.2 and 6.4.3.3.3 of this thesis.  
1277
 See Hermansyah, above n 683, 264. ‘Fault’ in Article 1365 of the Indonesian Civil Code has every 
gradation from ‘intentional fault’ to ‘negligence’. See also Kelsen, above n 947, 958. 
1278
 See CDSB/court verdicts at Chapter Six / section 6.4.3.2.2 and 6.4.3.3.3. 
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failed but the card was ‘swallowed’ by the ATM. The plaintiff then called the 
call-centre number that appeared on the ATM to make sure that everything was 
under control. The plaintiff has asserted that she never revealed her PIN during 
the conversation. Later, the plaintiff eventually found that she had lost funds 
totalling IDR78 million from her account. Following the plaintiff’s report, the 
defendant officers admitted that someone had compromised their ATMs, but 
they refused to be liable for the plaintiff’s loss. The CCTV footage at the site 
was not up-to-date and could not used to confirm the transactions.  
 The plaintiff then filed a lawsuit with the CDSB which then concluded a verdict 
in favour of plaintiff and instructed the defendant to make redress for the 
plaintiff’s damages within 14 days of the decision. However, the defendant 
refused to make redress and submitted an appeal to the District Court of Medan. 
The case is still in trial (as at 30 August 2015). 
Anaylisis of the Case: 
  From the facts of the case (that also seems similar to Mr. Panggabean case 
described in the subsection 6.4.1), apparently a third party fraudster managed to 
install a malicious card-trapping device and stuck a fake call centre number on 
the defendant’s ATM. The defendant’s officer confirmed this. If this is true, it is 
argued that the defendant to some extent has been negligent as it failed to secure 
its ATM/ATM booth (occupiers’ liability), thus liable for the consumer’s 
damages. Further, the plaintiff admitted that she indeed called the ‘fake 
defendant call centre number sticker’ that was attached to the ATM to report the 
incident, but insisted that she did not reveal her PIN number (most consumers 
typically think that the sticker is genuine since it is stuck to the bank’s ATM and 
has a ‘perfect bank logo’). 
 The CDSB judges ordered the defendant pay the plaintiff damages. According to 
the author, the CDSB decision was reached based on the fact that the defendant 
has been negligent by failing to keep its electronic agent secure  which has 
given the fraudster opportunity and that person/s has managed to install 
malicious devices (card-trapping device and fake call centre number). At this 
point, we can assume that the defendant was punished based on the tortious 
liability principle (negligence) coupled with vicarious and occupier liabilities 
(negligence to secure and monitor the defendant's ATM). However, apart from 
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the CDSB decision, the judges failed to notice that the plaintiff assertion that she 
did not reveal her PIN when contacting what she believed was the ‘defendant’s 
call centre’ actually did not make any sense (it is to be assumed that by putting a 
fake bank consumer call centre number on the ATM or its booth that a fraudster 
is attempting to use a common social engineering method to gain the consumer’s 
PIN, deceiving the consumer into unwittingly revealing their PIN). Most 
probably, a fraudster ‘apprentice’ acting as a fake bank call centre officer at the 
other end of the phone was successful in tricking the plaintiff to reveal her PIN). 
If this is the real case, then to some extent the plaintiff probably also contributed 
to her loss, a situation where the defendant’s liability should be reduced 
(comparative negligence). Nevertheless, how much the decrease in the 
defendant's liability (still liable in part as it had failed to secure its ATM 
infrastructure) will of course still rely on many tests in relation to the degree of 
negligence committed by the defendant, and whether or not the defendant had 
previously provided education to the plaintiff about the inherent risks in the 
ATM/debit card operation (such as card-trapping identity theft/fraud method and 
fake call centre PIN theft methods). 
 The CDSB decision ordered the defendant make full redress to its consumer 
showed that the arbitrators involved in the case basically did not understand 
completely about the technicality of ATM operation, the facts about the 
adequacy of defendant’s consumer education material, and plausible 
comparative negligence doctrine instead of contributory negligence doctrine that 
has already abandoned by most countries. The CDSB verdicts that favour 
consumers  even though in line with consumer protection spirit  might be 
deemed unfair for a bank since such a consumer had to some extent contributed 
to their loss.  
 Mr Bahari v PT Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) Tbk (Card Trapping Case)  
Facts and Analysis of the Case:  
 The plaintiff is the defendant’s consumer. His ATM/debit card was 
trapped/swallowed by the ATM while he conducted a transaction. A stranger then 
stepped into the defendant’s ATM booth and encouraged the plaintiff to press the 
cancel button on the keypad. Nevertheless, even though the plaintiff followed this 
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stranger’s advice, the ATM card was still trapped inside the ATM slot. After that, 
the plaintiff straight away visited the defendant’s branch at Tebing Tinggi to 
report the incident. At the branch, the plaintiff met the defendant’s security officer 
who told him that if the card was swallowed by the ATM, it meant that the card 
was safe. Later, it was revealed that several unauthorised withdrawals and 
transfers had been made from the plaintiff’s account and drained his funds, with a 
total loss of IDR60 million. 
 In accordance with these facts, it is obvious that the plaintiff’s loss of funds was 
due to fraudulent activities by an unknown third party fraudster who had 
successfully installed a card-trapping device in the defendant’s ATM. If this is 
true, it is argued that the defendant to some extent was negligent in failing to 
secure its ATM/ATM booth (occupiers’ liability). This then contributed to a con 
artist being able to act as a fake ‘Good Samaritan’ and apparently stealing the 
plaintiff’s PIN (using, it is assumed, the shoulder surfing method). According to 
LIET, the ATM is a bank’s electronic agent. Hence, the bank, as principal of its 
electronic agent and the owner of the ATM/ATM booth, must be liable for its 
electronic agent (vicarious liability and occupier liability). 
 The plaintiff then filed a lawsuit with the CDSB based on the LCP. In its verdict 
the CDSB punished the defendant by ordering it to redress the plaintiff’s loss. 
CDSB decisions are, among other things, based on the fact that the defendant is 
guilty of negligence if it failed to abide by Bank Indonesia’s regulations that state 
that the bank is to secure its ATMs (negligence per se / tortious liability), that is, 
by not installing CCTV and/or a security guard, which in turn enabled the 
fraudster to proceed with his crime and caused a loss for the plaintiff. 
 The defendant then appeals to the District Court  which then, conversely, 
reaches a verdict in favour of the defendant. The District Court’s decisions 
apparently were based on the fact that the plaintiff has a ‘pure contributory 
negligence’ that enables the loss by unintentionally letting a stranger capture his 
PIN (it is argued that this decision was unjust because it did not consider the 
negligence on the part of the defendant to secure its ATM/ATM booth which then 
had become the main enabler of the processof identity theft). 
 Following this decision, the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court on the basis 
that the defendant failed to comply with Bank Indonesia’s security regulation that 
 
327 
 
  
obliged all banks to have ‘chip technology’ and six digit PINs for ATM/debit 
cards (negligence per se) and exhibited negligence by failing to provide security 
guards to improve ATM security (tortious liability). Interestingly, the Supreme 
Court concurred with plaintiff’s argument and overturned the district court 
decision. It ordered the defendant to fully redress the plaintiff’s damages based on 
several argumentations as follows (which, according to author analysis, are not 
entirely accurate): 
(1). The judges believed that the plaintiff never revealed his PIN (the plaintiff 
argued that he only pressed the cancel button).This argumentation from a 
technical ATM operation point of view, is hard to believe. According to the 
author’s knowledge of the technical operation of ATM/debit card systems — 
and also based on several interviews with card-trapping victims such as Mr. 
Panggabean — as a victim is often in a state of panic, with their ATM/debit 
card trapped inside an ATM slot, victims generally follow the deceitful 
instruction from a stranger acting as a ‘Good Samaritan’ to key their PIN into 
the ATM PIN pad in order to make the ATM machine spit the card out. Thus, 
the plaintiff in this case was probably not aware that he was being observed 
by the con artist when keying in the PIN (identity theft using the ‘shoulder 
surfing’ method). From the author’s knowledge of the technical operations of 
ATMs, just pressing the ‘cancel button’ will never reveal the plaintiff’s PIN, 
but only will reverse the transaction to the previous stage. Judges’ 
argumentation in this matter has shown that in general they do not understand 
how ATMs work, which tends to make their decisions misleading, lacking in 
substance, and not credible.  
(2). The plaintiff reported the incident to the security officer in the bank branch 
within 15 minutes of the incident. According to the author’s opinion, this fact 
well supported the final judges’ decisions, since the defendant’s security 
officer failed to treat the plaintiff’s report appropriately and immediately, 
which would otherwise have prompted the adoption of a mitigation process to 
avoid consumer’s subsequent loss (vicarious and negligence liability 
principle). 
(3). The judges concluded that the defendant had failed to comply with Bank 
Indonesia’s security regulation and so permitted the fraudster to install the 
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malicious card-trapping device. It had also failed to provide a security guard 
at the ATM booth (negligence per se and tortious liability. These are, it is 
argued, very sensible considerations by the judges). 
(4). The judges decided that the defendant had not complied with Bank 
Indonesia’s regulation concerning the minimum digit for PINs. (The judges 
believed it was supposed to be six digits instead of just four digits. Actually, 
this consideration was a fatal mistake made by the judges in the Court of 
cassation, since the obligation to change the consumer PIN to six digits still is 
yet apply, coming into effect on 1 January 2016. More interestingly, this 
obvious mistake made by Court of cassation judges was later brought by the 
defendant into the final stage  the ‘case review’ stage in the Supreme 
Court. Surprisingly, this incorrect Supreme Court judges verdict was backed 
up by the Supreme Court civil case review judges on the basis that the Court 
of cassation judges had applied the right law (which actually is wrong).  
 This Supreme Court’s final verdict became the sole verdict that so far favours a 
consumer. Unfortunately the decision was never plausible since it contains a few 
incorrect and fatal considerations (points (1) and (4) of the Judges’ reasoning). 
 Muhajidin Tahir, SE v PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk and PT Advantage CSM 
(Card Trapping Case) 
Facts and Analysis of the Case: 
 The plaintiff is a consumer who authorised his wife to make a transaction using 
his ATM card and PIN. It was very unfortunate that while his wife was making a 
transaction in the defendant’s ATM, the ATM card was trapped in a card-trapping 
device installed by the third party fraudster in the ATM slot. Further, the ATM 
PIN was also obtained by fraudster, as the plaintiff’s wife was ensnared by the 
con artist who acted as a ‘Good Samaritan’ who was ‘helping’ the plaintiff’s wife 
to unwittingly contact a fake call centre. As result, the plaintiff’s savings in the 
defendant institution were drained. A prolonged dispute occurred since the 
plaintiff’s claim for redress was rejected by the defendant on the ground that the 
plaintiff had breached the confidentiality of the PIN by having revealed it to his 
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wife. Thus, according to the defendant, the loss that had occurred was triggered by 
the plaintiff’s own fault (plaintiff’s contributory negligence).  
 The dispute then was brought to the CDSB under the LCP. The CDSB found in 
favour of the plaintiff and ordered the defendant to pay the damages in full, 
apparently on the basis that defendant had ‘vicarious and occupier liability’ for the 
ATM /ATM booth. Hence, according to the CDSB, all identity theft that occurrs 
after a consumer’s ATM card has migrated from his/her possession to the bank’s 
infrastructures (such as when a payment card has inserted into the ATM slot) will 
then be the bank’s responsibility and liability will attach to the bank. Meanwhile, 
the plaintiff’s conduct in revealing the ATM PIN to his wife was — according to 
CDSB — not a breach of a contract since it is recognised under customary law 
(adat). However, it is unfortunate that the CDSB did not dig further into the 
question of the existence of ‘negligence’ on the part of plaintiff’s wife by 
unwittingly revealing the PIN to others.  
 The defendant then appealed to the District Court on the basis that the defendant 
had educated the consumer quite well including by issuing its official contact 
centre number, hence the plaintiff’s loss was basically derived from the plaintiff’s 
own fault by giving his confidential PIN to his wife who then called the 
fraudster’s phone number instead of defendant’s official phone number (which 
had been given to the plaintiff). The District Court issued a verdict in favour of 
the plaintiff and rejected the defendant’s appeal. Importantly, the verdict also 
confirmed that the liability dumping provision in defendant’s standard contract 
was in violation of the LCP, and hence should be deemed null and void.  
 The defendant then made a cassation to the Supreme Court on the ground that the 
defendant had abided by Bank Indonesia regulations concerning payment card 
operation, consumer protection and so on, and had educated the plaintiff about the 
importance of PIN secrecy. In regard to liability dumping provision, the defendant 
argued that this provision was a customary provision in the payment system 
industry. Concerning the loss, the defendant asserted that it happened due to the 
plaintiff’s own fault, not because the defendant’s infrastructure had weaknesses. 
In contrast to the CDSB and District Court decisions, the Supreme Court decision 
was in favour of the defendant, on a basis similar to the defendant’s 
argumentation above. 
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 Apparently in this verdict, the Supreme Court decision was based on pure 
contributory negligence, that is, the plaintiff was negligent in revealing the ATM 
PIN to his wife who later revealed it to the fraudster. Interestingly, the fact that 
the defendant failed to safeguard the safety of their consumers — that is, was 
negligent in terms of failing to prevent their ATM booth from having malicious 
devices installed by a third party (occupiers’ liability) that became the main 
enabler of the identity theft — was not discussed whatsoever by the judges. It is 
argued that if a bank could prevent a fraudster from setting up their card-trapping 
device at an ATM, the question of consumer fault would never have arisen. The 
matter of consumer ‘fault’, where a consumer revealed his PIN and authorised his 
wife to conduct a transaction would not have become a problem as her action 
would never have been been able to be used to create an unauthorised ATM/debit 
card transaction. Therefore, this court’s verdict seems unfair for consumer and did 
not create incentives for bank to improve the security of its ATMs/ATM booths. 
 Nasruddin v PT Bank Mandiri Tbk (Card Trapping Case)  
Facts and Analysis of the Case:  
 The plaintiff is a defendant’s consumer who holds a ATM/debit card issued by the 
defendant. According to plaintiff’s explanation, he was about to withdraw money 
from an ATM of the defendant when his ATM was trapped in the ATM slot when 
he attempted to cancel an incorrect transaction. He then called the defendant’s call 
centre number that appeared on the defendant’s sticker that was stuck on the body 
of the ATM. He answered several questions from the ‘defendant’s call centre 
officer’ named Iskandar. These questions included his ATM card number, 
mother’s maiden name and so on. Subsequently, the plaintiff found that his 
savings in the defendant institution had been drained.  
 Later, the plaintiff obtained information from the defendant’s officer that accepted 
the plaintiff’s loss of funds report and from a school guard near the compromised 
ATM premises; both of them concurred that card-trapping frauds frequently 
occurred in association with the particular ATM. As a result, the plaintiff alleges 
that the defendant was negligent in failing to secure the ATM from card-trapping 
fraud even though many crimes had frequently occurred at the scene (if this is the 
case, then this is indeed a foreseeable risk). The plaintiff argued that the defendant 
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should put a security officer at the ATM site and conduct closer security 
monitoring. The absence of such security precautions by defendant were believed 
to have caused damage to a number of its consumers; 
 However, apart from the fact that the plaintiff’s ATM/debit card was really 
entrapped in the defendant’s ATM slot, it seems that the rest of the story was not 
true. From the point of view of ATM operations, if the plaintiff just pressed the 
‘cancel button’, it will not cause the ATM/debit card to be trapped inside the 
ATM. Most probably, based on the card-trapping method typology, a fraudster/s 
had managed to install the card-trapping device in the ATM slot and stuck a fake 
bank call centre number on the body of the ATM. Thus, when the plaintiff 
inserted his ATM/debit card into the ATM slot, the card-trapping device 
entrapped the ATM/debit card inside the slot, but did not activate the ATM 
system. Therefore, the plaintiff’s story about entering the incorrect amount and 
then pressing the cancelation button that caused his ATM/debit card to be trapped 
in the ATM slot was deemed to be false information because in the card-trapping 
fraud method typically the ATM system is still not in an active mode. 
 The plaintiff then filed a lawsuit against the defendant to the District Court based 
on tortious liabilities governed by articles 1365 and 1366 of Indonesia’s Civil 
Code, where the defendant allegedly had: 
1) violated the law (that is, the obligation of the defendant under Bank Indonesia 
regulations to safeguard and improve payment card security, and obligations 
under the LCP to provide comfort, security and safety for those utlising the 
defendant’s services — occupiers’ liability); 
2) violated the subjective right of the plaintiff to protection of his deposit in the 
defendant institution; 
3) breached duty of care requirements to safeguard and improve the security of 
its payment cards; 
4) undertaken unlawful conduct that caused the plaintiff damage. 
 Following the allegation, the defendant raised several defences as follow: 
1) The fraudster (referred to as Mr Iskandar) was the one who should be liable 
for the plaintiff’s loss (novus actus interveniens  intervening causation). 
Therefore, the defendant argued that the civil lawsuit only could be 
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adjudicated after the fraudster’s criminal offence had been tried in a criminal 
court. 
2) The litigation only could proceed if the fraudster also could be a party to and 
present before the court. 
3) The plaintiff’s loss was due to the plaintiff’s own negligence in revealing his 
PIN to someone other than the defendant’s official staff. 
4) The defendant had fulfilled its obligation to improve its ATM security, and 
had also conducted various consumer education initiatives including 
disseminating their official call centre number to consumers. 
 After examining the case, the District Court issued a verdict as follows: 
1) That the civil lawsuit can be examined by the court without the need to have 
the fraudster tried for (and convicted of) a criminal offence preceding any 
civil action. Hence, novus actus interveniens is not a defence in the 
defendant’s tortious liability cases. 
2) The defendant was not liable for the plaintiff’s loss on the grounds that:  
a) The defendant had provided enough security for their ATM; 
b) The plaintiff was unsuccessful in their attempt to prove that many other 
consumers had also become the victim of card-trapping fraud method at 
the defendant’s ATM; 
c) The plaintiff should have been more vigilant when seeing a spurious call 
centre number for the defendant and the existence of such a number on the 
defendant’s ATM does not automatically mean that the defendant has 
conducted an unlawful act; 
d) The defendant had done enough to publish its official call centre number; 
e) The plaintiff should be responsible for their PIN secrecy and deemed 
responsible if it is used by an unauthorised person. 
 Again, the court’s verdict ignored the fact that bank’s failure to prevent the 
fraudster’s card-trapping devices being set up at the bank’s ATM was the main 
contributing factor that enabled the identity theft/fraud to occur. The court also 
ignored the fact that bank’s consumer education about the bank’s genuine call 
centre number is not the same as the fraud risk education required by regulations. 
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 These unfortunate circumstances are also exacerbated by the use of the old and 
unjust contributory negligence doctrine in the litigation.
1279
 It is argued that the 
court’s use of the pure contributory negligence principle to favour the defendant 
in the court’s decision — when that defendant actually exhibited greater 
contributory negligence in regard to the occurrence of card-trapping fraud than 
the plaintiff — was neither fair nor sensible. Therefore, it is argued that law 
reform in regard to unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions should also 
include reform of ADR/court litigation proceedings processes.  
Fuady contends that according to Articles 1365 and 1366 of the Indonesian Civil Code, 
for an unlawful act to be viewed as a tort or to have created tortious liability, it should 
contain the following elements:
1280
 
(1)  An act. It is generally accepted that tort or unlawful act not only consists of an 
action (an act of commission), but also failing to do something (an act of 
omission).
1281
 
(2)  Such act being unlawful. After the case of Lindenbaum v Cohen in 1919, the 
element of unlawfulness must be interpreted in the broadest sense, which includes: 
(a) acts that violate applicable laws; (b) acts that violate the rights of others that are 
guaranteed by law; (c) acts contrary to the legal obligations of the perpetrator; (d) 
acts contrary to morality or decency; and/or (e) acts contrary to good manners in 
society (failure to consider the interests of others). 
(3)  Culpa or fault. In order to use Article 1365 of the Indonesian Civil Code in a tort 
claim, the law and jurisprudence require that there is a fault element in the 
perpetrator’s act. An act would be considered to contain the fault element if it has 
met the following criteria: intention or negligence, and no defence.
1282
 In this 
regard, an unlawful act intentionally committed has a higher degree of fault 
compared to an unlawful act that occurred due to negligent conduct. An act will be 
depicted as having ‘intention’ if it possesses the following elements: (a) an 
awareness (state of mind) to perform the act; (b) the act leads to a particular 
                                                          
1279
 See general discussion about CDSB and court litigation flaws in Chapter Seven / sections 7.2.2.2 
and 7.2.2.4 of this thesis. 
1280
 Fuady, ‘Perbuatan Melawan Hukum’, above n 914, 99103. 
1281
 Soeroso, above n 844, 294; Hermansyah, above n 683, 260. See also Sidabalok, above n 792, 
10711. 
1282
 See Hermansyah, above n 683, 264. ‘Fault’ in Article 1365 of the Indonesian Civil Code has every 
gradation from ‘intentional fault’ to ‘negligence’. See also Kelsen, above n 947, 958. 
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consequence; and (c) the ‘awareness of commission or omission of an act is not just 
that it will inflict certain consequences, but includes the belief that the existence of 
the act ‘certainly’ can produce the intended consequences. In this regard, even 
where the perpetrator of a particular action (or an omission) does not intend to harm 
others, however, the perpetrator can still be considered to have an intention to 
commit an unlawful act, when the offender knows or is reasonably suspected of 
knowing that his actions/omission would cause a loss to another person.
1283
 
(4)  An occurrence of damages suffered by the victim. Damages here include not only 
actual damages but also immaterial damages, which can be valued monetarily. 
(5)  Causality between an unlawful act and the associated damages.
1284
  
As a guidance for the test of comparative negligence in the tortuous liability cases, it is 
argued that a flow chart for negligence test below (Figure 20) — that used to be utilised 
in court proceedings in common law countries  if examined carefully using a multi 
disciplinary approach (involving economic, technological and legal perspectives) will 
supply great assistance to payment card stakeholders, especially for payment system 
authority and adjudicators. It could thus be used to fairly gauge the comparative 
negligence of acts undertaken by banks and/or consumers that contributed to the 
occurrence of unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions in Indonesia. It is believed that 
fair allocation of losses between banks and/or consumers based on comparative 
negligence could create proportional incentives for banks and/or consumers to improve 
precautions taken against identity theft and/or fraud in ATM/debit card operations. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1283
 Marzuki, ‘Pengantar Ilmu Hukum’, above n 155, 2589; Kelsen,above n 947, 958. 
1284
 Fuady, ‘Perbuatan Melawan Hukum’, above n 914, 59. See also Sidabalok, above n 792, 108; 
Gibson and Fraser, above n 917, 1014, 4550, 834; Shofie, Kapita Selekta Hukum Perlindungan 
Konsumen di Indonesia, above n 683, 297; Kristiyanti, above n 928, 789; Muhammad, above n 954, 
260; Hermansyah, above n 683, 2645; Simanjuntak, above n 945, 3534; Setiawan, ‘Aneka Masalah 
Hukum dan Hukum Acara Perdata’, above n 939, 2818. 
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Figure 20: Flow Chart of Tests for Negligence 
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1. Do the Defendants Owe the Plaintiffs a Duty of Care? 
a.  Should the Defendants Have Reasonably Foreseen that their Conduct Could 
Cause Loss to Someone in the Plaintiff’s Position? 
As can be seen from various regulations on ATM/debit card transactions, consumer 
protection, and liability rules on unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions in Indonesia 
as described in the Chapter Five (ATM/debit card security, consumer protection, and 
liability regulations) and information contained in the Table 5, a bank as a financial 
institution and owner of e-banking infrastructure is obliged by regulations to be aware 
of, prevent and mitigate various inherent fraud risks in e-bank operations, such as in 
ATM/debit card operations.
1285
  
From the empirical evidence it is known that bank ATM/debit card systems are 
considered a relatively easy and prominent target for fraudsters.
1286
 A bank’s inability to 
establish good security technology on their ATM/debit card infrastructure — including 
good procedures for identification, authentication, and authorisation of ATM/debit 
cards; and/or the delivery of quality fraud risk education material to consumers  could 
result in the occurrence of unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions that can drain 
consumer deposits at the bank.  
From the many reports by consumers, in the mass media or by the centeral bank of 
unauthorised ATM/debit card fraud incidents,
1287
 most consumer ATM/debit card 
identity theft and fraud incidents in Indonesia (such as skimming, card trapping, 
malware, social engineering, PIN theft using PIN-hole camera, PIN-pad overlay, 
malware, counterfeit card, and other methods) should be considered foreseeable risks, 
because they have occurred frequently either in Indonesia and/or in various overseas 
countries for a long time. In this regard, a bank as a professional entity and one that has 
a special fraud unit arguably know the nature of these identity theft and fraud risks, 
including the factors that enable such events to happen. For instance, the risk of 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions using skimming, card trapping, malware and 
counterfeit card is still high as long as the bank still employs magnetic stripe card 
                                                          
1285
 See BID-RMUITCB. In this regulation various inherent identity theft/fraud risks in e-banking 
operations have been enumerated, such as the risk of skimming, network interception, ‘man-in-the 
middle’ attack, virus, ‘phishing’, key logging, ‘spoofing’, social engineering, and so on. 
1286
  See discussion in Chapter Three. 
1287
  For instances of ATM/debit card fraud reports, see the skimming deluge case in 2010 and 2013, the 
Body Shop case, and the bank ATM/debit card fraud data in Table 1. 
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technology and is unable to fully monitor and secure their consumer activated terminals 
from the possibility of fraudster attack that uses various kind of malicious devices. It is 
submitted that banks actually can foresee the risk of identity theft and fraud to their 
consumers in ATM/debit card operations in Indonesia (owe profesionall liability to its 
consumer).  
b. Was the Defendant’s Control so Great and Plaintiff’s Position so Vulnerable 
that a Duty of Care was Created? 
A bank as a fiduciary, prudential and professional institution is obliged by the 
ATM/debit card security, consumer protection, and liability regulations to safeguard its 
consumer transactions by regularly enhanced and implemented state-of-the art fraud risk 
management of the people, processes, and technology involved in electronic banking 
operations. This obligation is derived from the fact that consumer as a layperson in the 
bank’s ATM/debit card operation is very vulnerable to fraudulent activities. 
In theory, consumers can reduce losses by improving ordinary prudence, knowledge of 
various fraud method, and exercising due care in making payments.
1288
 However, most 
consumers are not familiar with technology and how it works. The absence of fraud risk 
education by banks, and the fact that banks only give positive education about the 
‘infallibility’ of their ATM/debit card operations, has made consumers more vulnerable 
due to a false sense of security and an incapacity to detect identity theft methods due to 
the absence of adequate fraud risk education. A false sense of security is bad because it 
does not encourage consumers implement precautions in regards to fraud risk.
1289
  
Banks can reduce payment losses by taking precautions against fraud according to the 
specific circumstances and fraud typology. Choices about the quality and level of 
security either of the infrastructure and procedures under the control of bank (such as 
the installation of state-the-art ATM/EFT-POS machines, antivirus software, encryption 
software, CCTVs, and employment of security guard personnel, their number and 
hours) and in regard to infrastructure that is transferred so as to be under the control of 
consumers (such as the security and quality of chip and/or magnetic ATM/debit card, 
number of PIN digits, and fraud risk material)  all are determined exclusively by 
                                                          
1288
 Cooter and Rubin, above n 105, 73.  
1289
 See CPSS, ‘Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems’, above n 3176. 
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bank. In this regard, consumers do not have options at all and can merely accept and use 
what their bank has provided.  
Several instances of specific statutory duty imposed by regulations on a bank in its 
ATM/debit card operations include (among other things) the obligation to: 
 provide physical security for important information processing facilities, such as 
by the regular maintenance and inspection of the bank’s ATM/ATM 
booth/EFTPOS-terminals  so the bank can prevent or remove any malicious 
device (such as a card-trapping device, a skimming device, a PIN-hole 
camera/PIN-pad overlay device, malware, and so on) to guarantee the safety of 
consumer transactions; 
 provide CCTV to the ATM/ATM booth  so the bank can have complete 
information regarding who initiates an ATM/debit card transaction and/or 
whether or not an attacker has set-up a malicious device at the ATM /ATM 
booth; 
 provide antivirus software to the operating system, application system, database 
and network  so the bank and/or its counterpart agent institutions can detect 
and remove any malicious software (malware) that might be placed in or on the 
ATM/EFT-POS machine/computer and/or bank/counterpart host computer 
(such as viruses, Trojan horses, worms, spyware, Denial-of-Service (DOS), war 
driving, ‘spoofing’, and ‘logic bombs’; 
 provide an Instruction Detection System (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention System 
(IPS), and encryption for data communicated through communication lines  
so the bank can detect any eavesdropping attack and/or assure data 
confidentiality and integrity;  
 provide and deliver adequate and comprehensive fraud risk education materials 
by letter to the consumers  so consumers can have an awareness of the risk 
and take adequate precautions against the possibility of the occurrence identity 
theft and fraud in ATM/debit card operations.
1290
 
The statutory duties that mainly address banks instead of consumers indeed make sense 
considering that banks are the owners of the e-banking system. As Cooter and Rubin 
                                                          
1290
 It is worth noting that consumer education that lacks fraud risk material and/or is not delivered 
individually to the consumer (such as consumer education material that is only placed on a website, 
pamphlet, or mass-media) is deemed inadequate.  
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argue, the bank is the party that has an ‘innovation element’, that is, it has the possibility 
to innovate and improve its electronic payment transaction systems. Unlike the 
precautions element, which initially can be addressed by financial institutions and 
consumers, in the innovation element, the pendulum of liability will always swing to the 
financial institutions as the only party that own, develop, and have an obligation to 
comply with LIET in general and Bank Indonesia’s specific regulations concerning 
enhancement of payment card security features. Hence, ‘if technological innovation is 
the cheapest way to eliminate a particular type of loss, liability should be assigned to the 
financial institution’.
1291
 From the perspective of innovation, loss allocation rules that 
assign liability to the financial institution can benefit banks, consumers and the payment 
system industry as there is an incentive for the bank to continually improve anti-fraud 
technology through innovation.
1292
  
In conclusion, banks in Indonesia definitely should have foreseen the fraud risk to 
consumers in the ATM/debit card operation. The various regulations imposed by the 
authorities on banks is in the context of safeguarding consumers as the most vulnerable 
party in the ATM/debit card system and is part of a bank’s duty of care obligation to its 
consumers. Therefore, according to the scope of tort based on the Indonesian Civil Code 
and the landmark case of Lindenbaum v Cohen, a defendant’s action or omission that 
fail to prevent and mitigate identity theft and fraud in the ATM/debit card operation can 
be deemed as a tortious action because it is in conflict with:  
 the plaintiff’s right to have secure ATM/debit card infrastructure and fraud risk 
education; 
 the defendant’s own legal obligation/statutory duty to provide various risk 
management and security enhancement in ATM/debit card operations; 
 morality (banks need to admit their systems are not infallible and that there exists 
inherent risk in ATM/debit card operations); and/or 
 a bank’s professional standing and its adherance to the prudential principle.  
                                                          
1291
 Cooter and Rubin, above n 105, 84. 
1292
 Ibid 77.  
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2. Did the Defendants Breach their Duty of Care? 
a.  Should the Defendants have Foreseen the Risk of Identity Theft/Fraud to the 
Plaintiff? 
Improved technology in retail e-banking transactions such as in ATM/debit card 
transactions offers many opportunities for Indonesia banks and consumers such as the 
increased efficiency, quicker transactions, increased consumer loyalty, and more, but 
many aspects of fraud development can also be related to technology. The very 
important question is whether the various identity theft and fraud risks, such as 
skimming, card trapping, malware, counterfeiting card, and so on are new risks or 
actually foreseeable risks?  
In the case of Indonesia, it is argued that most identity theft and fraud in ATM/debit 
card operations are foreseeable risks for banks.
1293
 Lost and stolen cards, skimming, 
card trapping (Lebanese loop), malware and other kinds of criminal methods have been 
around in Indonesia for quite some time. Almost all of these identity theft and fraud 
methods have occurred earlier in other countries ATM/debit card operations. Generally, 
various international journals, bank and technology related newspapers and/or websites 
(whether official website or simply just technology bloggers), specific security risk 
magazines, or the like have openly discussed those identity theft and fraud methods 
quite exhaustively.  
Within a bank’s management, typically a bank’s risk management unit staff members 
have shared and discussed such information with their counterparts in the various 
international or domestic banking forums. Many banks have also been reporting 
instances to the authorities for quite some time now. For instance, Bank International 
Indonesia reported a skimming attack incident at one of its ATM booths to Bank 
Indonesia in 1996. The Jakarta District Court convicted Eng Kim Hook, a Malaysian 
citizen, of skimming fraud in 2003.
1294
 This instance occurred long before the 
‘skimming deluge’ that occurred in 2010 and 2013 in many cities in Indonesia (not to 
mention the individual skimming incidents that randomly occur intermittently and can 
be seen from consumers’ complaints shared in mass-media).  
                                                          
1293
 See discussion in the Chapter Three / section 3.3.5 and Chapter Four.  
1294
 See Jakarta Court Verdict No 532/PID.B/2003/PH.JKT.PST dated 4 June 2003. 
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Therefore, from the time such identity thefts and fraud methods occurred and/or were 
reported publicly onwards, banks had a duty to take reasonable care of consumers 
exposed to such risks. Conversely, given the lack of fraud risk education of consumers 
by the banks, it is also submitted that most identity theft and fraud methods discussed 
above are not foreseeable risks for consumers, unless their bank can prove that they had 
already given adequate fraud risk education to consumers. 
b. Was the Identity Theft/Fraud Risk not Insignificant or Fanciful?  
Identity theft and fraud risks are real and not insignificant nor far-fetched or fanciful. Its 
existence and relatively significant exposure in term of volume and value can be seen 
from various individual consumer reports in the mass-media, Bank Indonesia official 
reports,
1295
 or from several unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction disputes 
adjudicated in ADR and/or court.
1296
 Even though the fraud figures are deemed 
significant, many believe that because of the ‘dark figure’ phenomenon, the actual fraud 
figures are far higher than those presented in the official fraud reports. Moreover, the 
losses of consumers due to identity theft and fraud actually are not only related to the 
pecuniary loss such as fraud damages and/or litigation costs, but also to several other 
non-pecuniary losses, such as mental distress, hassles, and so on. In conclusion, the 
ATM/Debit card identity theft and fraud risks are indeed significant. 
c. Would a Reasonable Bank Have Taken Precautions? 
A bank is a professional institution. Banks, which carry on activities requiring special 
skill or knowledge, are required to assure a reasonable standard or care expected of 
competent practitioners in the banking industry.
1297
 Based on ATM/debit card security, 
consumer protection, and liability regulations, a bank is required to understand the 
inherent risk in their operations. A bank as a professional institution is obliged to secure 
its infrastructure and possess lots of information about various trends in identity theft 
and fraud methods. A bank also has an obligation to educate its consumers about any 
inherent risk its products and/or services. In general, a bank is obliged to guarantee the 
safety of its consumers when using its products and/or services. In this regard, Geva has 
                                                          
1295
 See Table 1. 
1296
 See consumer redress claims in several adjudication cases discussed in Chapter Six / sections 
6.6.4.2.2 and 6.6.4.3. 
1297
 See Stewart and Stuhmcke, above n 912, 15868.  
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stated that a bank can be charged with a duty of care failure if it fails to ensure the 
safety and security of its public-access terminals.
1298
 
Empirical evidence in Indonesia has shown that several reasonable banks indeed have 
taken precautions to contain identity theft and fraud in fulfilment of the security 
enhancement regulations. Some examples of bank security enhancement are: replacing 
old ATM/EFT-POS machines with new ones that are considered more sophisticated and 
secure,
1299
 and installing jitters, anti-skimming devices, CCTV and so on to combat 
skimming fraud. A small number of banks  even though not yet obliged by Bank 
Indonesia’s regulations  have also taken precautions to mitigate unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions by implementing ‘neural network applications’ on their 
ATM/debit card systems to enable ‘real time’ transaction notification for consumers. 
Therefore, it is argued that banks as professional and fiduciary institutions should 
always have to safeguard their consumers and taken precautions against identity theft 
and fraud risks.  
3. Did the Defendant’s Breach Cause Loss to Plaintiff? 
a.  Was the Plaintiff’s Loss Caused by the Defendant’s Breach? 
Identity theft in an ATM/debit card operation that subsequently becomes an 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction (identity fraud) is regrettably becoming more 
frequent, an unfortunate aspect of current electronic payment operations around the 
world, including in Indonesia. Unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions typically 
cause financial losses for the affected consumer, either from unauthorised money 
withdrawals at ATMs or unauthorised electronic fund transfers. 
In the case of ATM/debit card operations in Indonesia, a bank is obliged by ATM/debit 
card security, consumer protection, and liability regulations to implement a secure 
system for all ATM/debit card operations. This includes a safe and robust distribution of 
ATM/debit card instruments (access devices), identification, authentication and 
authorisation of electronic payment instructions procedures, and effective fraud risk 
education for consumers. Banks are also obliged to mitigate the fraud risk, as there is 
the risk that some incidents will nevertheless still happen  such as by providing 
                                                          
1298
 Geva, ‘Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers’, above n 107, 231. 
1299
 Such as having a sensor to spot any malicious device set up inside an ATM slot, a camera in front 
that automatically snaps the cardholder, and so on. 
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reports and effective systems of blocking unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions 
upon being advised of the loss or theft of the consumer’s access device.  
In respect of the Cooter and Rubin economic approach and the loss reduction principle, 
the bank is a cheaper cost avoider for identity theft and fraud perpetrated by third party 
fraudsters who attack bank infrastructure. In this regard, banks can invest in state-of-
the-art ATM/debit card infrastructure to prevent and/or reduce losses that might occur 
because of technical vulnerabilities and/or insecurity of bank infrastructure. The 
occurrence of identity theft incidents to consumer ATM/debit card data and PIN using 
identity theft methods such as malware, card trapping, skimming, and so on are 
evidence of a bank’s inability to secure their ATM/debit card infrastructure.  
The pervasive incidents of card swapping, card trapping, PIN theft using fake bank call 
centre stickers and/or a con artist (social engineering) on bank ATM/debit card 
operations can arguably also be blamed on the banks for their reluctance to give fraud 
risk education to consumers.  
Many scholars concur that good fraud risk education can create precautionary attitudes 
among consumer.
1300
 By knowing the nature and typology of identity theft and fraud 
methods, consumers can most probably avoid several types of identity theft methods, 
especially the tangible methods of identity theft such as card trapping, the use of fake 
call centre number, card swapping, and con artist (social engineering method). 
However, it is submitted that passive identity theft attacks — such as skimming, 
malware, eavesdropping, hacking, PIN-hole camera, and PIN-pad overlays — are types 
of intangible identity theft methods that can only be prevented and removed by banks as 
the owner of the system. Therefore, in such cases, the plaintiff’s loss indeed finds its 
causality in the defendant’s breach of the security and consumer protection regulations.  
However, there is also the possibility that a plaintiff’s loss is due to a consumer’s own 
criminal intention to defraud bank (first party fraud), or due to the actions of someone 
acquainted with the consumer (second party fraud). In first party fraud, the person is 
criminally liable and a bank’s compliance or not to the regulations is not relevant 
because the fraudster legitimately possesses all authentication factors (card and PIN). In 
                                                          
1300
 See Kitten, 3Reason Skimmers are Winning, above n 1134. See also BCBS, Risk Management for 
Electronic Banking and Electronic Money Activities, above n 3, 67. 
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second party fraud, it is argued that the occurrence of identity theft and fraud 
perpetrated by an acquaintance of the consumer (relative or friend, workmate and so on) 
is due to the consumer’s own negligence in failing to safeguard their ATM/debit card 
and associated PIN, an act that is is beyond bank control. Other than this, there are also 
many examples where consumer negligence indeed becomes the main enabler in the 
success of fraudulent activities, such as where a consumer loses their ATM/debit card 
and the PIN was written on the ATM/debit card or the PIN uses the consumer’s birthday 
date. In these examples, the consumer is the cheaper cost avoider. However, the latter 
statement can only be granted if the bank has previously informed the consumer with 
fraud risk education as obliged by regulation.  
b. Should a Defendant be Liable Because a Plaintiff’s Loss was Reasonably 
Foreseeable? 
As has been discussed previously in section 7.3.2.2, ATM/debit card identity theft/fraud 
typology (card present transaction) can be divided according to the perpetrators and/or 
point of compromise into two broad categories, namely: 1) the first/second party 
identity theft/fraud typology; and 2) the third party identity theft/fraud typology. The 
third party identity theft/fraud typology can be further subdivided into three different 
circumstances of ATM/debit card identity theft/fraud, as follows: a) the lost and/or 
stolen ATM/debit card which targets the consumer as the point of compromise; b) the 
lost and/or stolen ATM/debit card which target consumer and bank infrastructure as a 
joint point of compromise; and c) the counterfeit ATM/debit card.  
Even though this thesis argues that most ATM/debit card identity theft/fraud risks are 
foreseeable, it is submitted that in tortious liability adjudication/litigation, the fraud 
damages only can be awarded in full to the plaintiff if the defendant  from economic 
and technological perspectives  is the least cost identity theft/fraud avoider. 
Meanwhile, in unauthorised ATM/debit card dispute cases where both defendant and 
plaintiff have through their fault/negligence contributed to the occurrence of identity 
theft/fraud, it is argued that the damages should be split between the defendant and 
plaintiff according to the degree of fault/negligence of their conduct (comparative 
negligence).  
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i. Proposed General Rules for Loss Allocation Liability Based on Multi-Disciplinary 
Perspectives. 
Basically, according to the LCP and LIET, a defendant is liabile for consumer losses 
(presumed liability). A defendant’s liability will be concluded in law if it is proved that 
the defendant has breached the duty of care owed to the consumer, and consumer is 
guilty of no fault/negligence that facilitated the loss. In Indonesia, the defendant’s duty 
of care can arise from (among other things) statutory duty, ethics, and morality.
1301
 In 
terms of the bank’s statutory duty, it is argued that the defendant’s duty can be divided 
into two broad taxonomies, which are: 1) the duty to secure the bank’s ATM/debit card 
infrastructure (physically and logically) from a fraudster’s malicious device/software; 
and 2) the duty to give identity theft/fraud risk education to consumers.
1302
 These duties 
are established by the regulator because the bank is the owner of the ATM/debit card 
system, and has the capability to determine and sole control over determining the 
adoption of state-of-the-art bank infrastructure, its level of security, and provision of 
consumer protection (including education specific to that bank). From a law of tort 
perspective, the defendant owes a duty of care to protect their ATM/debit card 
infrastructure to ensure consumer safety from identity theft/fraud risks; to do otherwise 
involves a risk of negligence, occupier and vicarious liability.
1303
  
Nevertheless, bank liability also can be seen from another legal perspective. A bank is a 
professional entity, which has great resources in terms of highly skilled staff, 
sophisticated infrastructure, and a great amount of funds. As has been discussed in the 
Chapter 6.2.2, the law of tort itself consists of intentional, unintentional and 
miscellaneous tort. An unlawful intentional act has a higher degree of fault compared to 
an unlawful act that occurred due to negligent conduct. According to Marzuki and 
Kelsen, an act or omission that does not intend to harm others can still be considered to 
have an intention to commit an unlawful act, when the perpetrators knows or is 
reasonably suspected of knowing that their action/omission would cause a loss to 
another person.
1304
 In this regard, Douglass has argued that putting liability on the 
                                                          
1301
 See explanation about tort at Chapter Six / section 6.2.2 on tortious liability. 
1302
 The consumer’s fraud risk education should consist of comprehensive information about identity 
theft/fraud methods and ways to avoid them. This fraud risk material also should delivered individually to 
a consumer’s address (either printed out or through electronic media). See various Bank Indonesia 
Regulations pertaining to risk management and the card-based payment system. 
1303
 See explanation about tortious, occupier’s and vicarious liability in Chapter Six of this thesis.  
1304
 Marzuki, ‘Pengantar Ilmu Hukum’, above n 155, 2589; Kelsen, above n 947, 958. 
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defendant (bank) may have a greater benefit in terms of electronic payment system 
development. According to him: 
Designing a card-based payment system that increases consumer liability for fraudulent 
transactions would likely undermine confidence in the system overall and result in 
reduced transaction volume — the opposite of the desired effect. Given these 
counterincentives among those who promulgate the applicable public laws and private 
rules, increased cardholder liability is likely not a viable option for improving the 
overall efficiency of fraud liability allocation rules.
1305
 
Therefore, it is submitted that in the unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction cases 
where the bank is the fraud least cost avoider, has great control of the improvement 
ATM/debit card infrastructure security, deep knowledge of the inherent risks of 
ATM/debit card operation — and given the fact that consumers have a false sense of 
security and severe asymmetry of information about inherent risks in the ATM/debit 
card operation  the bank is deemed to have performed an intentional act instead of 
just a negligent act that enabled the identity theft/fraud to occur.
1306
  
Thus one can say in the event of identity theft/fraud happening where the risks are 
obvious or foreseeable, the defendant’s liability should be complete or greater than that 
of the consumer (in the case joint liability) because the defendant is a professional entity 
and the action or omission which resulted in the occurrence of identity theft/fraud can 
be deemed to be intentional. The allocation of losses to the bank will increase effective 
loss distribution, and will promote bank investment in more secure or sophisticated 
infrastructure. 
ii. Loss Allocation Rules Based on Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives (Economic, 
Technological, and Legal) of First Party Fraud Typology 
In the first party fraud typology (assuming the defendant can prove it), it is argued that 
this type of fraud is beyond defendant’s liability. In first party fraud typology, a 
defendant has relatively no control ex-ante to prevent the loss because the unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions are derived from the plaintiff’s own criminal conduct. Is 
                                                          
1305
 Douglass, above n 122, 46. 
1306
 It is argued that a bank actually is fully aware that: a bank’s ATM/debit card that still utilises a 
magnetic stripe card is highly vulnerable to skimming attack; the absence of anti malware or malware 
removal in the ATM/debit card’s infrastructure’s computers (either in the ATM/EFT-POS terminal and 
bank/counterpart party’s computer) exposes the consumer’s data to logical identity theft; failure to 
provide CCTV and a security guard to secure a bank’s ATM/ATM booth can have consequence of a 
fraudster installing a malicious device such as a skimmer, card-trapping device, PIN-hole camera, PIN-
pad overlay, fake bank’s call centre number, malware, and so on. 
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impossible for banks to know a consumer’s mens rea in isntances where the fraudulent 
transaction is executed using the right and legitimate authentication method. The 
consumer is deemed liable if he/she acted fraudulently
1307
and/or has benefitted from 
it.
1308
 Therefore, a consumer has no legal basis to claim redress in instances of proven 
first party fraud.  
iii. Loss Allocation Liability Based on Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives (Economic, 
Technological, and Legal) of Second Party Fraud Typology  
Meanwhile, in the second party fraud typology, the defendant also does not have 
liability to redress the plaintiff’s damages, because the plaintiff has a statutory duty to 
safeguard their ATM/debit card instrument and PIN security/secrecy from other parties, 
including his/her own family and/or acquaintances.
1309
 From an identity theft/fraud 
avoidance perspective, the plaintiff is the only party that has the ability to prevent fraud 
losses at the lowest cost in the event fo second party fraud. Hence, the plaintiff will be 
liable for his/her own loss that is caused by his/her own negligence. In this regard, 
Gillette argues that imposing negligence liability on consumers could be expected to 
induce optimal care by consumers.
1310
 Geva also asserts that ‘allocating to the consumer 
losses caused by his or her fault will enhance diligence and minimise losses’.
1311
 
However, if the defendant is unable to prove that the unauthorised ATM/debit card has 
occurred because of a first party or second party fraud, then the defendant should bear 
liability. 
iv. Loss Allocation Liability Based on Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives (Economic, 
Technological, and Legal) of Third Party Fraud Typology 
In the third party identity theft/fraud typology, the defendant’s liability is more difficult 
to define. The defendant’s liability will depend on whether or not the defendant has 
breached its duty of care and so enabled the occurrence of an unauthorised ATM/debit 
card transaction and whether the plaintiff has demonstrated his/her own 
fault/negligence, so the defendant can pass liability — either either full or in part — to 
the plaintiff. However, it is argued that a plaintiff can be blamed for their negligence 
                                                          
1307
 Steennot, above n 47, 555. See also Levitin, above n 114. 
1308
 It is argued that Indonesia should have definition of ‘unauthorised transaction’ such as is the case in 
other countries. In the US an EFT will be deemed authorised if a consumer has benefitted from the 
transfer: (15 USC § 16931(11); 12 CFR § 205.2(m).  
1309
 See Chapter Four / section 4.2.1.1.4. 
1310
 Gillette, above n 130, 184. 
1311
 Geva, ‘Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers’, above n 107, 231. 
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that contributed to the identity theft/fraud, only if the defendant has given the plaintiff 
comprehensive fraud risk education including on ways to avoid it  thus in such 
circumstances the plaintiff is entitled to become the least cost avoider.
1312
 
Therefore, in the third party identity theft/fraud scenario of lost and/or stolen 
ATM/debit card which target the consumer as the point of compromise alone outside a 
bank’s perimeter, then a defendant might be not liable for the plaintiff’s loss if the 
identity theft method was foreseeable for plaintiff and did not require specific fraud risk 
education, such as the risk of use of a lost/stolen ATM/debit card taken by a pickpocket 
or simply misplaced and the plaintiff’s PIN is birthday date or easy to guess numbers or 
recorded on or near the card. In such instances, the plaintiff is the least cost avoider and 
should be liable, because the loss occurred because of the plaintiff’s own fault or 
negligence as regulated by the LCP and LIET. It is argued that US approaches where 
any unauthorised transaction initiated with the access device that was obtained in an 
illegal manner (robbery or fraudulent inducement), regardless of the situation,
1313
 
should be deemed unfair to the defendant who might not be the least cost avoider in 
such circumstances. 
Nevertheless, where a plaintiff has reported an identity theft/fraud to a defendant, the 
defendant bears all the economic losses caused by the use of lost/stolen or 
misappropriated payment instrument after that notification.
1314
  
However, when an identity theft method is foreseeable for the defendant but not the 
plaintiff, and the method is considered very tricky, exploits weaknesses in one or more 
defendant infrastructure, and the risk is unforeseeable for plaintiffs without a specific 
fraud risk education from the defendant, it is argued that to some extent the defendant 
should be liable for the plaintiff’s loss (for instance, the plaintiff may bear a 
predetermined cap/limited loss liability,
1315
 and the defendant bear the remaining 
                                                          
1312
 Most consumers are laypersons and identity theft and fraud methods are specific, varied, perfectly 
disguised or hidden, and laypersons need special knowledge to understand them. Thus, without specific 
information from a bank in the form of fraud risk education as has been obliged under the regulations, the 
consumer will suffer a severe asymmetry of information concerning the inherent risk of identity theft and 
fraud in the ATM/debit card operation. In these circumstances, expecting a consumer to prevent identity 
theft/fraud from occurring in the ATM/debit card operation and/or liable for the consequences is absurd 
and unfair.  
1313
 See (12 CFR § 205.2(m)(3), Official Staff Commentary). 
1314
 Steennot, above n 47, 555. See also Clarke and Maurushat, above n 1246, 47.  
1315
 For instance, see Chapter Seven / section 7.5.2.3 for cardholder limited liability regulation in 
Australia. 
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loss).
1316
 An example of this circumstance is when a fraudster successfully steals the 
consumer’s identity (and later defrauds) an ATM/debit card consumer outside bank’s 
perimeter using the card swapping method. As has been discussed previously, in the 
card swapping method, a fraudster typically exploits the defendant’s ATM/debit card 
anonymity which means that a consumer could not immediately be aware of the swap.  
In the third party identity theft/fraud scenario of card trapping or card swapping which 
targets consumer and bank’s infrastructure as a joint point of compromise, the court 
should observe whether a causal link exists between the plaintiff’s negligent conduct 
and the reasonably foreseeable damage suffered by the plaintiff.
1317
 One of the 
principles that might be beneficial to use is the principle of ‘imminent danger’ (also 
known as the ‘agony of the moment’ rule’, the ‘sudden emergency’ rule or the ‘doctrine 
of ‘alternative danger’). As Stewart and Stuhmcke observe, ‘[c]ourts will often not hold 
a plaintiff negligent where the negligence of the defendant has placed the plaintiff in a 
position of imminent personal danger’.
1318
  
Therefore, the defendant bank might have full liability if it failed to secure its public 
consumer activated terminals and also failed to provide fraud education to the consumer 
about the foreseeable risk of the ATM/debit card operation. In this regard, the defendant 
is the sole least cost avoider. As Clarke and Maurushat argue, it is impracticable to 
make consumers responsible for the impacts of actions by banks’ electronic 
agent/public access terminals that they did not initiate and/or authorise.
 1319
 So, the 
defendant might be liable for all the plaintiff’s loss  since the loss typically originated 
where the fraudster’s malicious device had been successfully planted in the defendant’s 
infrastructure to steal the ATM/debit card ( a theft otherwise attributed to plaintiff 
‘negligence’ in failing to keep their PIN secret due to a social engineering or shoulder 
surfing attack). As Geva asserts,  
in the case of the electronic authentication, the institution is bound to implement a safe 
system [for] the distribution of access devices, a safe security procedure for the 
authentication of payment instructions, as well as an effective system of blocking access 
upon being advised of loss or theft of the access device. The financial institution may 
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 Both US and Australian loss allocation rules have a pre-determined cap on loss liability. 
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1319
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also be charged with a duty to ensure the safety and security of public-access 
terminal.
1320
  
However, the defendant’s liability can be reduced and re-allocated in part to the 
plaintiff, if a defendant has provided the necessary fraud risk education to the consumer 
about the specific identity theft method utilised by the fraudsters. In this case the 
identity theft risk is a foreseeable risk for the plaintiff, at least the identity theft method 
which attacks a consumer’s PIN. For instance, in the various unauthorised ATM/debit 
card cases that were adjudicated the ADR/court as discussed in the Chapter Six, all were 
related to unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions that were derived from the card-
trapping identity theft method which utilises the consumer’s genuine card, and they 
typically involved to a fake bank’s call centre sticker and associated fraudulent 
personnel to whom the consumer unwittingly reveals their PIN, or a con artist (fake 
‘Good Samaritan’) who steals the consumer’s PIN by ‘shoulder-surfing’ or other means. 
In all these identity theft methods, the defendant is arguably the least cost avoider. For 
instance, to avoid the installation of card-trapping device in the bank’s ATM, the 
defendant can replace its old ATMs with the more advance ones which can incorporate 
a sensor to detect a foreign object or malicious device set up in the ATM slot. The 
defendant bank also can place security guards to safeguard their ATMs, making sure no 
one can install malicious devices. Meanwhile, to avoid PIN-theft through the use of 
social engineering methods (such as those mentioned above), a bank could educate its 
consumers with regular and up to date fraud risk education which could contain 
information regarding various popular and prominent identity theft/fraud methods, 
including social engineering methods and ways how to avoid them. 
In the last scenario, that of third party identity theft, which involves the use of 
counterfeit ATM/debit cards and typically employs sophisticated and intangible 
malicious device/software planted in the defendant’s infrastructure and that impossible 
for a consumer to detect  the defendant is definitely the sole least cost avoider, and 
therefore should bear all the consumer’s loss. For example, a bank should be liable for 
consumer losses that are derived from identity theft/fraud involving a consumer’s 
ATM/debit card data and using skimming, card swallowed theft, malware, and 
eavesdropping.
1321
 A defendant bank also should liable for consumer PIN theft using a 
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 Geva, ‘Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers’, above n 107, 231. 
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 In these identity theft methods, all the fraudster’s attacks are directed to bank infrastructure such as 
ATM/EFTPOS machines/computers and the bank’s network. 
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PIN-hole camera, PIN-pad overlay, malware, and/or the shoulder surfing method. As 
Geva asserts, ‘facilitating payments without providing adequate security is a risk to be 
assumed by the financial institution. In effect, this means that where the customer 
denies responsibility, the risk ought to be allocated primarily to the financial institution 
that chose to facilitate a transfer not reliably authenticated’.
1322
 Further he states that 
‘the imposition of loss on financial institutions will enhance the development of 
improved technologies for precluding unauthorized transfers as well as for identifying 
the wrongdoer and his or her apprehension’.
1323
  
Referring to the fact that many identity theft and fraud methods and/or fraudsters 
malicious devices are undetected by both defendant and plaintiff, and the fact that not 
all banks have equipped their infrastructure with appropriate monitoring/surveillance 
devices, many unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions are considered as ‘phantom 
withdrawals’, that is, unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions where there is no clear 
evidence in regard to who the perpetrator actually was. In these circumstances, the 
perpetrator can be anyone, and the fraud itself might fall into the category of first party 
fraud, second party fraud or third party fraud typology. However, regardless of who the 
perpetrator was, it is argued that in this kind of circumstances, the defendant should be 
liable based on several argumentations, as follows: 
 Based on the LCP and LIET, a defendant always is presumed liable for consumer 
losses. Liability will stay with the defendant when it cannot prove under the balance 
of probability that the plaintiff is at fault or has demonstrated negligence that 
enabled the loss to occur. These rules will create strong incentives for defendants as 
the least cost avoider to enhance their ATM/debit card system security to prevent 
the occurrence of identity theft/fraud, and/or to establish more advanced 
mitigation/surveillance methods to prevent excessive losses if a preventive measure 
can be penetrated, and/or to detect the perpetrators for better evidential and 
apprehension purposes. 
 From a technological perspective, most identity theft and frauds are intertwined 
with technological aspects of ATM/debit card operation. Hence, it does make sense 
that defendant as the sole party that can secure their own infrastructure and/or third-
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 Geva, ‘Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers’, above n 107, 230. 
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party counterpart/agents and safeguard a plaintiff’s transaction should be liable 
because the defendant typically has a statutory duty, and occupier and vicarious 
liability
1324
 to do so.  
 Defendants typically enjoy huge profits from their operations. The defendant 
bank’s revenue is arguably much higher than the cost for security enhancement in 
ATM/debit card operation. Defendants also are able to absorb consumer losses 
from fraud by spreading the loss to others. This is done in the form of transaction 
fee, credit interest, and so on. Most plaintiffs, however, have no capacity to spread 
the loss. Hence, allocating the liability to the consumer without strong evidence and 
compelling reason is not only deemed unjust but also can reduce consumer 
confidence in electronic banking operations — something that the defendant also 
does not want to have happen. 
c. Does the Defendant Have a Defence? 
i. Voluntary Assumption of Risk 
In the absence of fraud risk education undertaken by the bank, and the presence of 
intensive promotion of the infallibility of a bank’s electronic payment system in 
Indonesia, it is submitted that a plaintiff does not have a precise knowledge of the 
inherent fraud risk and various identity theft/fraud methods that might be encountered in 
a ATM/debit card transaction. Instead, consumers have a false sense of security that 
causes them not to take any precautions when conducting ATM/debit card transactions. 
It is also argued that a common defence by banks in court litigation that the consumer 
had already been given education is utopian rather than factual. Some banks have 
already given security tips for consumers to improve security (such as by urging 
consumers to keep their PIN secret and not to reveal it to anyone, and warn consumers 
about fake Good Samaritans at ATM booths. However, these bank security tips 
normally are only placed on small sticker and stuck to the ATM body/booth.  
This kind of education it is argued cannot be claimed as ‘a fraud risk education’ because 
it does not contain any information whatsoever about other identity theft/fraud methods 
such as other popular and the most recent the identity theft/fraud methods, fraud trend 
                                                          
1324
 See art 1367 Indonesia’s Civil Code. See also art 21(2)b LIET; art 10 Peraturan Bank Indonesia 
Nomor 16/1/PBI/2014 Tentang Perlindungan Konsumen Jasa Sistem Pembayaran [Bank Indonesia 
Regulation Number 16/1/PBI/2014 Concerning Consumer Protection on Payment System Services].  
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data, information on how to spot a fraudster’s malicious device, how to avoid it, and so 
on.
1325
 A bank’s security tip notice is relatively small and stuck onto the ATM 
body/booth, and has generally failed to raise consumer’s fraud awareness or encouraged 
them to take suitable precautions because it is simply too small and also because most 
consumers typically already have a false sense of security and so only focus on 
finishing the ATM transaction as quickly as they can. Under the regulations, a bank is 
not only obliged to supply fraud risk education, but should also deliver it to the 
consumer’s address individually using a written message
1326
  which has never 
happened in Indonesia. Hence, it can be concluded that most consumers in Indonesia 
have no fraud risk awareness when conducting ATM/debit card transactions.  
Besides that, often in the unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction dispute proceedings, 
banks offer as a defence based on the assertion that their systems are infallible  thus, 
if there were any unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction, it must be derived from 
first/second party fraud, or from third party fraud that is facilitated by a consumer’s own 
negligence. Indeed, as has been discussed previously, the consumer’s fault/negligence 
may have contributed to an unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction. This assumption 
then is normally ‘wrapped-up’ in the bank–consumer contract’s standard provisions, 
which contain a one sided fraud allocation loss to the consumer. In essence, the 
contract’s provisions oblige consumers to keep their ATM/debit card safe and their PIN 
secret. Any misuse of these instruments by third party fraudsters will be the consumer’s 
own responsibility and all transactions executed using correct consumer’s ATM/debit 
card data will be deemed valid and become a consumer’s own responsibility, with 
consequent liability if that duty is breached.  
From the identity theft and fraud typology described in the section 7.3.2.2 above, the 
perpetrator of an unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction actually can be first party, 
second party or third party fraudsters. Clarke and Maurushat contend that ‘who caused 
the unauthorised banking transaction is virtually unascertainable. Digital evidence and 
forensics issues exacerbate the problem’.
1327
 Thus, the point of compromise can be 
                                                          
1325
 For a comparison with genuine fraud risk education in other countries, see fraud risk education by 
the Australian Payment Clearing Association (APCA) in Australia <http://www.apca.com.au>; Financial 
Fraud Action (FFA) in the United Kingdom <http://www.financialfraudaction.org.uk>; and Bank Negara 
Malaysia in Malaysia <http://www.bnm.gov.my>.  
1326
 See BIR-CBPI. 
1327
 Clarke and Maurushat, above n 1246, 456. 
 
354 
 
  
directed to the consumer itself, bank and/or its counterpart infrastructures alone, and one 
or more of them. As Budniz contends, ‘transactions involving electronic transfers are 
becoming ever more complex and less transparent’.
1328
 In this regard, Clarke and 
Maurushat have warned that the facts about technical vulnerabilities in any system 
should always be considered from the legal and evidential perspectives. According to 
these authors, ‘the technical vulnerability may be derived from a physical feature in the 
device, at the point of connection to the device, from the use of particular software, or, 
all too commonly, from combinations of several such factors’.
1329
 
From empirical evidence, the consumer’s ATM/debit card data and PIN can be stolen 
with or without consumer’s negligence or fault. In many instances, especially if the 
fraudster employed identity theft passive attack method such as skimming with PIN-
hole camera or PIN-pad overlay, and malware  the consumer even might not have 
noticed that their ATM/debit card data and PIN had been compromised. According to 
Anderson, consumers ‘cannot reasonably be expected to establish whether the problem 
lies in the card, in the reader, in the network, in the settlement system, or in the bank 
branch’.
1330
 
This situation is exacerbated by a bank’s moderate security choices, lack of state-the-art 
fraud prevention infrastructure, lack of comprehensive fraud risk education, and the 
absenceof bank fraud mitigation aspects, such as of neural network applications, real 
time on-line transaction notification, and/or regular publication of reports of statistics on 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions. All of these ‘poor’ choices by banks are 
mostly driven by business or economic considerations to reduce expenses and maximize 
profit, not from a policy of fraud containment. As result, consumers are highly 
vulnerable to fraudulent activities in their ATM/debit card transactions. Specific to the 
absence of real time notification of ATM/debit card transactions from the bank, 
typically the fraud damage becomes excessive, since the consumer has no information 
whatsoever to detect a fraudulent transaction in real time. 
On the occasion of most frauds, banks typically are unwilling to admit that they actually 
contributed to the occurrence of identity theft/fraud: they are reluctant to admit their 
                                                          
1328
 Mark E Budnitz, 'Commentary: Technology as the Driver of Payment System Rules: Will 
Consumers Be Provided Seatbelts and Air Bags?' (2009) 83(2) The Chicago-Kent Law Review 9324. 
1329
 Clarke and Maurushat, above n 1246, 11. 
1330
 Anderson, above n 1159. 
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technical security weaknesses, lack active supervision of their infrastructure (including 
counterpart infrastructure), and/or reluctance to supply fraud risk consumer education. 
Instead, banks are tempted to accuse the consumer of negligence whenever an 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction happens. That is, unless the ‘phantom 
ATM/debit card transactions’ is later acknowledged as fraudulent and overtly becomes 
part of public consumption via the media and comes to the central bank’s attention, 
banks have a tendency to asert that all ATM/debit card disputed transactions must have 
been carried out with the consumer’s genuine card and PIN and/or must have been due 
to fraudulent collusion or negligence. Hence, the consumer’s loss claim often is rejected 
based on an assumption of the existence of pure contributory negligence on the part of 
the consumer.
1331
  
Nevertheless, in regard to unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions which use the 
correct consumer’s PIN, the defendant should have strong evidence that the PIN being 
used in the fraudulent transaction was indeed used by the real consumer. Unlike a 
manual signature or a strong electronic signature (such as digital signature or biometric 
that is individual and unique to the signer) ATM/debit card data and PIN do not have 
non-repudiation value and technically can key into a bank’s consumer activated 
terminal by the legitimate consumer/cardholder or any fraudster who possesses the 
consumer’s ATM/debit card data and PIN. In fact, since the authentication of a 
consumer’s ATM/debit card transaction is verified remotely only by technical means 
using a method without non-repudiation value, and hence relying only on the 
appropriateness of the data, a bank is unable to distinguish whether the data is actually 
coming from a genuine ATM/debit card or a counterfeit card or whether the use of the 
data is authorised or not.  
A bank’s reluctance to invest in state-of-the-art security and fraud risk education 
features is typically related to the relatively high investment cost which it is afraid will 
reduce bank revenue. Anecdotal evidence (from bank officers unwilling to be named for 
obvious reasons) has revealed that bank reluctance to give adequate fraud risk education 
to consumers is also being driven by economic motives, that is, there is a widespread 
                                                          
1331
 See Mr Panggabean case at n 1040. In this case, the consumer’s claim was still rejected even though 
it was proved that a third party fraudster was the perpetrator and bank’s ATM was the point of 
compromise. 
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perception that such education will reduce the number of consumer transactions.
1332
 
However, it is here argued that bank’s economic reason for breaching their statutory 
duty has no economic and legal basis, since bank profits
1333
 are extremely huge and that 
would outweigh the cost to establish more sophisticated banking security features and 
the supply of fraud risk education material in the context identity theft/fraud 
containment (prevention and mitigation). These measures would ultimately increase 
rather than decrease consumer confidence and, importantly for bank revenues, reduce 
consumer and therefore bank vulnerability to the types of fraud outlined in this thesis.  
As a consequence of what they perceive as prioritising profit by avoiding panicking 
consumers (through such education programs) and thus reducing transaction numbers 
and value while also avoiding (or significantly delaying) additional expenditure 
required for infrastructure upgrades and education, banks have generally failed to secure 
their infrastructure from foreseeable risks, such as identity theft using skimming and 
card trapping/Lebanese loop method (occupiers’ liability and tortiuous liability) and 
fake bank’s call centre. Often, banks also have difficulties in proving who actually 
performed the unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction (phantom transaction), since 
the banks have not equipped consumers with a non-repudiation authentication method, 
employed state-of-the-art logical and physical anti fraud infrastructure, nor installed 
CCTV with good and durable footage to catch the perpetrator.  
Banks also have failed to establish consumer fraud awareness and equip consumers with 
adequate knowledge about identity theft/fraud risk to avoid become identity theft/fraud 
victims. When officers from several banks were interviewed, their explanations were 
that the banks tend to educate consumers only about the benefit of bank products and 
services (positive education)  and avoid education about the threat of fraud to those 
                                                          
1332
 See BI-Fraud Survey, above n 1133. In the BI-Fraud Survey 2015, the vast majority of respondents 
assert that bank’s fraud risk education will not decrease consumer’s confident and/or number of 
ATM/debit card transactions. Instead, consumers will be more confident because they would take 
precaution against fraud and have enough knowledge to avoid become the identity theft/fraud victim. 
1333
 See Karnoto Muhamad, 'Focus: Rating 118 Bank Versi Infobank 2015 [2015 Infobank Version 
Rating 118 Banks]', Infobank July 2015, 2266. In this article, it was shown that Indonesia banks’ profit 
in the years 2000 to 2014 consistently increase quite significantly year on year, including the profits of 
prominent banks that have been the main target of fraudster activities. For instance, looking at profits for 
the year 2014 compared to 2013 some prominent banks earned significant profits as follows (assume 
AUD 1 is equal to Rp 10,000,000): Bank Rakyat Indonesia: AUD2,425,000,000  up 13.58%; Bank 
Central Asia: AUD1,651,000,000  up 15.82%; Bank Mandiri: AUD2,065,000,000  up 9.69%; and 
Bank Negara Indonesia: AUD1,083,000,000 up 19.56%. It is argued that such profits ifar outweigh any 
anticipated cost of bank investment to enhance security features in ATM/debit card system and/or provide 
fraud risk education to consumers. 
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products or services (negative education). This practice is taken to avoid loss of 
consumer confidence which could reduce banks’ transactions volume (which then 
reduce banks’ fee based income). Not surprisingly, this lack of consumer education 
about the identity theft and fraud methods has created a big asymmetry of information 
gap between banks’ consumers and the fraudsters  which make bank consumers in 
general easy targets for fraudsters.
1334
  
In this regard, it is submitted that bank should be liable for their ‘intentional’ incapacity 
to safeguard consumer’s safety from identity theft/fraud when conducting ATM/debit 
card transaction in bank infrastructure. As Geva asserts,  
It may be argued that facilitating payments without providing adequate security is a risk 
to be assumed by the financial institution. In effect, this means that where the customer 
denies responsibility, the risk ought to be allocated primarily to the financial institution 
that chose to facilitate a transfer not reliably authenticated.
1335
 
Therefore, it is submitted that voluntary assumption of risk cannot be used by a 
defendant in the defence for waiver of the liability, unless the defendant can prove that 
they already gave comprehensive and adequate fraud risk education that was effectively 
delivered to the consumer. 
Hence, the use of pure contributory negligence as a defence for defendants that is used 
in existing court’s litigation, tends to be unjust for consumers since bank negligence in 
most unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions was actually the dominant contributing 
cause or was more than 50 per cent responsible for the losses compared to the 
consumer’s negligence (if any).
1336
 Other than that, if pure contributory negligence is 
preserved, it will not create incentives for banks to improve ATM/debit card security 
and give comprehensive and adequate fraud risk education to consumers. As an 
alternative for contributory negligence, it is proposed that the comparative negligence 
principle that is fairer and recognised in Indonesia tort law should be used to gauge 
disputant parties’ liability in the unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction dispute 
between bank and consumer.
 1337
 
                                                          
1334
 See, eg, interviews with BO-1; BO-2; BO-3; and BO-4. 
1335
 Geva, ‘Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers’, above n 107, 230. 
1336
 See Fuady, ‘Perbuatan Melawan Hukum’, above n 914, 80. See also Gibson and Fraser, above n 
917, 7980; ePayments Code cl 11.3. 
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ii.  Comparative Negligence Principle 
In comparative negligence, the onus of proof rests with the defendant who pleads this 
defence in order to defend him/herself against a tortious/negligence liability claim from 
the plaintiff for damages. If the defendant is successful in proving their defence, there 
will be a reduction of damages to be paid to the plaintiff, based on the comparison of 
the plaintiff’s degree of lack of standard of care that a reasonable person would observe 
in the plaintiff’s position, ‘and the matter will be decided on the basis of what the 
person knew or ought to have known at the time.’
1338
 The standard of care test that the 
defendant must pass to evade claims of contributory negligence/comparative negligence 
is similar to the standard of care that is owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. In 
relation to the amount of the reduction, Gibson and Fraser state that, ‘the reduction is 
calculated on the basis of the damages that would have been awarded to the plaintiff if 
there had been no fault/negligence on their part, and then reduced by the percentage of 
their negligence.’
1339
 
In Indonesia, Article 1365 of Indonesia’s Civil Code obliges the tortfeasor/defendant to 
redress the damage to the victim/plaintiff in full; however, if the loss incurred is 
attributed to the tortfeasor and to the victim’s own fault/negligence (joint 
fault/negligence), then the tortfeasor need only to pay partial compensation. In other 
words, the victim in such circumstances should also bear part of the damages suffered. 
This situation has actually existed in the Netherlands since 1916 and is acknowledged in 
Dutch case law.
1340
 In general, the plaintiff’s fault or negligence will reduce the liability 
of the defendant. Both plaintiff and defendant should bear the damages based on their 
degree of fault/negligence.
1341
 The division of liabilities between plaintiff and defendant 
is known in the civil law, and also in tort under customary law (as can be seen from 
Indonesia’s Supreme Court Verdict on 10 January 1957 No 206 K/Sip/1955).
1342
 
In regard to unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction, it is argued that the adjudicator in 
ADR/court should seek and compare the degree of fault/negligence of the defendant and 
plaintiff that enabled the identity theft/fraud to occur. Several relevant facts that should 
                                                          
1338
 Gibson and Fraser, above n 917, 112.  
1339
 Ibid 11112.  
1340
 See Arrest Hoge Raad dated 4 February 1976 in Setiawan, ‘Tinjauan Elementer Perbuatan 
Melawan Hukum’, above n 939, 17. 
1341
 Ibid 379. 
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be considered carefully using multi-disciplinary approaches (economic, technological 
and legal), among other things are: 
 Whether the defendant is a professional and highly positioned entity who had 
occupier liability for the ATM/debit card infrastructure, capacity to spread the loss, 
and a due care to provide secure ATM/debit card infrastructures and provide fraud 
risk education for the plaintiff. 
 Most consumers are laypersons who do not have much knowledge about 
ATM/debit card technology and its inherent identity theft/fraud risks. Most 
consumers also have a false sense of security about bank ATM/debit card 
operations. Therefore, it is submitted that a plaintiff’s negligence that contributes to 
the occurrence of unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction that occurs because of a 
defendant’s reluctance to provide fraud risk education (which made plaintiff suffer 
from a severe asymmetry of information about ATM/debit card operations and 
fraud risk information) should be disregarded. However, a plaintiff’s gross 
negligence in failing to abide with a defendant’s security tips on ATM/debit card 
transactions (such as the obligation to avoid selecting an easy to guess PIN, or the 
defendant’s prohibition on a consumer using their date of birth for a PIN) should be 
regarded as a negligence. 
 Fraudster’s malicious device/identity theft methods may be either tangible (such as 
card trapping, skimming, PIN-hole camera, PIN-pad overlay) or intangible (such as 
malware, eavesdropping, hacking) and are difficult for consumers to spot simply 
because they is intangible, cannot be seen, and/or are perfectly disguised. Therefore 
any expectation that a consumer notice the fraudster’s malicious device is 
considered unfair because it is deemed an impossible task. 
 A bank as a professional, fiduciary, and prudential institution has a duty of care to 
ensure consumer security. This is derived from various regulations, ethics, and 
morality.  
 All ATM/debit card infrastructure, identification/authentication/authorisation 
procedures, identity theft/fraud prevention and mitigation policies, consumer 
education, and so on are mostly determined solely by banks. Therefore, when the 
occurrence of unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions are mostly due to a bank’s 
employment of vulnerable technology (such as magnetic stripe card) and weak 
electronic signature methods (such as a PIN) which have no non-repudiation 
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authentication aspect both from technological and legal aspects, or when a bank 
fails to safeguard consumer security by failing to provide adequate CCTV devices 
and guardian/security personnel at bank ATMss/ATM booths, or fails to perform 
active monitoring at consumer activated terminal (occupier liability), it is submitted 
that the bank should be liable for the consumer’s loss.  
However, in some instances of unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions where the 
point of compromise is bank infrastructure and the identity theft methods utilised are 
impossible for consumers to spot because the malicious device is hidden, perfectly 
disguised, or simply intangible (such as is the case with malware, skimming, and 
eavesdropping identity theft methods), it is argued that the use of the negligence per se 
doctrine with its strict liability principle might be justified. Strict liability can also be 
used in situations where a consumer has reported the unauthorised ATM/debit card 
incident and/or possible breach on his/her ATM/debit card and/or PIN, but the bank has 
failed to respond appropriately. Therefore, from the time that a consumer reported it to 
the bank, the bank bears full liability for the consumer’s loss. 
It is submitted in this thesis that with the use of comparative negligence principle to 
gauge a degree of bank and/or consumer negligence and hence liability in the resolution 
of an unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction dispute between a bank and its 
consumer, both disputant parties will have incentives to improve precautionary 
measures. More specifically, a bank will have great incentive to improve its ATM/debit 
card security and provide fraud risk education to the consumer  that is, in order to 
reduce liability. Banks also can have more incentives to settle unauthorised transaction 
disputes in its internal dispute resolution unit instead of at an ADR venue or court to 
avoid prolonged disputes, high litigation costs, consumer disloyalty, and reputation risk.  
The proposed comparative negligence assessment example for unauthorised ATM/debit 
card transactions is set out in Table 5 below.  
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Table 5: ATM/Debit Card Point of Compromise, Identity Theft Methods and  
Comparative Negligence Loss Allocation Percentage 
 
Point of  
Compromise 
 
 
Fraudster 
Goal 
 
Identity Theft 
Methods 
Comparative 
Negligence  
Loss 
Allocation 
Percentage 
 
Note 
B C 
 
 
Consumer 
(C) 
ATM/debit 
Genuine 
Card 
Lost/stolen, card 
swapping outside 
bank’s premise 
 
 
 
0% 
 
 
 
100% 
 
- Consumer is the least cost avoider, so 
should bear 100% of the loss. 
- Will create incentives for consumer to 
improve precaution and prudential 
behaviour. 
 
PIN 
Shoulder surfing, 
PIN guessing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bank’s 
ATM 
Machine 
(B) 
 
 
(1) 
ATM/debit 
Genuine 
Card 
 
 
-  Card trapping  
-  Card swapping 
 
 
 
75% 
 
 
 
0% 
- Bank owes a duty of care (occupier 
liability) 
- Bank is the least cost avoider.  
- Bank’s fault is the dominant 
contributing factor for fraud. 
- Will create incentives for the bank to 
improve security/monitoring. 
 
 
 
(2) 
PIN 
 
 
- fake call centre 
sticker 
- Con-artist 
 
25% 
 
0% 
- In the event of no bank fraud risk 
education, the bank is the least cost 
avoider, & liable for 100% of the loss.  
- Will create incentives for bank to give 
fraud risk education. 
or 
 
0% 
 
25% 
- Where bank fraud risk education 
exists, the consumer is the least cost 
avoider. Therefore, the bank will liable 
for 75% of the loss and consumer for 
25% of the loss. 
- Bank 
ATM 
Machine 
- Merchant 
EDC 
- Cashier/ 
Waitress 
- Bank’s 
network 
- Bank/ 
Counter-
part 
computer 
ATM/debit 
card 
magstripe 
data 
- skimming 
- malware 
- eavesdropping 
- double swiping  
(transform into 
counterfeiting 
card) 
 
 
 
 
 
100% 
 
 
 
 
 
0% 
- Bank owes a duty of care (occupier 
liability) 
-  Bank is responsible for its 
agent/counterpart’s breach (vicarious 
liability) 
- Bank is the least cost avoider, so 
should bear 100% of the loss.  
- Bank’s fraud risk education is 
irrelevant because fraudster’s 
malicious device/software is unseen or 
impossible to spot by consumer. 
- Will create incentives for the bank to 
improve security. 
 
 
PIN 
 
- PIN-hole camera 
- PIN-pad overlay 
- Shoulder surfing 
- malware 
- eavesdropping 
First Party Fraud 0% 100% Consumer’s criminal liability. 
Phantom withdrawal (unauthorised 
ATM/debit card claim by a consumer where 
the point of compromise, identity theft/fraud 
methods, and/or the perpetrator of identity 
theft/frraud cannot be determined/revealed by 
the bank, for instance because a bank does not 
have CCTV and/or CCTV footage on the 
ATM, data stolen using malware, and so on).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0% 
- ATM/debit card data within the 
magstripe card is so vulnerable and 
PIN is weak authentication method 
and does not have non-repudiation 
aspect. Hence, that bank cannot have a 
defence only based on proof that the 
fraud has been conducted using the 
consumer’s correct data and PIN. 
-  Bank is liable for 100% of the loss 
because it was unable to prove 
consumer negligence.  
- create incentives for better security. 
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7.4.2. Law Reform on Fraud Liability Rules by Creating Clear, Fair, 
Detailed, and Decisive Unauthorised ATM/Debit Card Loss 
Allocation Regulations in Indonesia 
7.4.2.1. Between US and Australia Approaches to Fraud Liability Rules 
The quest for an answer to the very important question of who should bear liability for 
the damages incurred by an unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction requires clear, 
fair, detailed, and decisive rules to supply a good answer. The absence of specific 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction loss allocation rules in Indonesia has made the 
unauthorised ATM/debit card dispute resolution decisions between a bank and its 
consumer — either in an internal bank dispute resolution unit or in the various 
adjudication forums  fail to achieve sensible decisions which reflect fairness, and 
predictability/certainty; nor in the absence of such rules has there been any ability to 
create incentives to increase the adoption of identity theft/fraud precautions on the part 
of the least cost avoider party. The importance of the existence of robust payment 
system rules which clearly define the rights and obligations of the parties involved in 
the system has been highlighted by Bank for International Settlement as follows:  
the rules and procedures of a system should be specified clearly, enforceable and their 
consequences predictable. A system which is not legally robust or in which the legal 
issues are poorly understood could endanger its participants. Poor understanding can 
give participants a false sense of security leading them for example, to underestimate 
their credit or liquidity exposures. Participants, the system operator, and other involved 
parties – in some cases including customers – should understand clearly the financial 
risks in the system and where they are borne. An important determinant of where the 
risks are borne will be the rules and procedures of the system. These should define 
clearly the rights and obligations of all the parties involved and all such parties should 
be provided with up-to-date explanatory material. In particular, the relationship between 
the system rules and the other components of the legal environment should be clearly 
understood and explained. In addition, key rules relating to financial risks should be 
made publicly available.
1343
 
In the need to create of clear, fair, detailed, and decisive fraud liability rules for 
ATM/debit card transactions, it is argued that other countries’ unauthorised ATM/debit 
card rules (fraud liability rules) — that are derived from various legal and other 
disciplines’ principles such as economic and/or probably technological principles  
can be studied, compared and, if necessary, adopted. However, they should be examined 
carefully, especially to ensure their compatibility with and appropriateness to the 
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specific circumstances of ATM/debit card operations as part of the retail payment 
system and rule of law in Indonesia.  
The ex-ante precise rules on unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions in Indonesia, 
can be used as a tool to limit judicial discretion which has often proved far from 
sensible but rather has served to create judicial error. Gillette asserts that precise fraud 
risk allocation rules have many benefits, such as that they can create clear liability rules 
which can reduce costs of enforcement processes, make legal doctrine more accessible 
to those untrained in legal matters, and facilitate coordination by ensuring that all 
parties involved in the payment system follow similar patterns of behaviour 
(uniformity).
1344
 Therefore, a precise set of principles and rules, if they could be 
implemented, would enhance fairness to consumers.
 1345
 
From various regulation options for ATM/debit card transactions, such as using 
legislation and central bank regulation with the strict liability principle as in the United 
States (EFTA 1978 and Regulation E) or adopting a payment system industry code of 
practice with fault/negligence based liability as in Australia (ePayments Code), this 
thesis argues that the latter option probably is more appropriate to remedy and create 
sensible and fair resolution of any unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction dispute 
between a bank and its consumer in Indonesia. This choice is derived from several 
considerations as follows:  
1) The fraud liability rules should not only give better consumer protection in the 
ATM/debit card transaction, but also create fairness and incentives between bank 
and consumer to increase precautions to avoid the occurrence of unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions. In fact, both US and Australian fraud liability rules are 
good and contain many provisions that are in line with the spirit of modern 
consumer protection, which places a greater burden on business actors to ensure 
consumers’ safety and/or comfort when they consume business actors’ products or 
services (caveat venditor principle). This comforting approach or less stringent rules 
for consumers is created to maintain a high level of consumer protection and 
promote confidence in the safe and sound practice of the electronic payment 
instrument. However, it is here argued that US unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transaction regulation that employs the strict liability principle which always makes 
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 Gillette, above n 130, 186. 
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 Geva, ‘Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers’, above n 107, 210. 
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the financial institution/bank fully liable for the unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transaction losses (regardless whether or not there was consumer’s negligence)
1346
 
tends to be unjust to the bank and discourages consumers from improving the 
precautions taken when conducting ATM/debit card transactions.
1347
 Whereas, in 
Australia’s e-Payment code, loss allocation rules for unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions are determined according to the degree of fault/negligence (fault-based 
liability) between the bank and consumer, depending on the circumstances of the 
case. Therefore, it tends to be fairer and provide greater incentives for banks to 
improve their security and consumer education, and for consumers to improve their 
precautions in order to avoid the occurrence of unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions.
1348
  
2) Even though Australia’s comparative liability fraud model is probably more difficult 
to adjudicate and administer compared to US strict liability model,
1349
 this 
deficiency can be mitigated by the establishment of fraud loss allocation rules, 
which are clear, fair, detailed, and decisive to make the adjudication/litigation 
proceeding simple and easy. Therefore, the rules not only should include provisions 
that explain what constitutes bank/consumer fault/negligence in the ATM/debit card 
operation, but also decisive loss allocation rules, burden of proof, and guidelines to 
weigh the evidence.
1350
 It is argued that when rights and obligations and also 
liability rules for each party involved in the ATM/debit card operation can be 
specified clearly, are enforceable and their consequences predictable by every 
electronic payment system stakeholder, it will encourage disputant parties to settle 
most disputes between themselves. This will significantly reduce or avoid the need 
to escalate the dispute to the adjudicator/litigator forums which used to happen and 
often created additional pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss or burden for disputant 
parties in terms of time, money, effort, hassle, stress, and so on. 
                                                          
1346
 Actually the consumer might have liability. However, the portion of consumer liability will be very 
limited and depend on how rapid the consumer reports the loss of their access device and promptly 
informs the financial institution of any unauthorised funds transfers. See 12 CFR Regulation E § 205.6. 
1347
 See Geva, ‘Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers’, above n 107, 231. 
According to Geva, ‘the consumer’s fault/negligence may have contributed to an unauthorised funds 
transfer. That is, due to the customer’s fault, a person may unlawfully assume control of the card and 
code, or bypass their use altogether, and initiate an unauthorized transfer. Obviously, allocating to the 
customer losses caused by his or her fault will enhance diligence and minimize losses’. 
1348
 See ePayments Code cl 4. See also Weerasooria, above n 887, 97. 
1349
 See White, above n 111, 4, 187. 
1350
 In the ePayments Code, burden of proof and proof of fault is clearly set out and should be borne by 
the financial institution/bank. 
 
365 
 
  
3) With the Australian e-Payment model, flaws in the unauthorised ATM/debit card 
dispute resolutions which emanate from consumer or adjudicator lack knowledge on 
the economic, technological, and legal aspects (that are closely entwined with 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions) can be reduced or eliminated. This can 
happen because there will be clear rules that link liability to enumerated, prescribed 
and precise acts or omissions constituting fault/negligence concerning unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions, and the burden of proof will always lie on the bank’s 
shoulders. 
4) Compared to US approaches, the Australian e-Payment Code provisions are more 
aligned with existing Indonesian regulations and legal principles concerning 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction and consumer protection, which still rely 
on tortious/negligence liability, not strict liability. 
1351
For instance, the e-Payment 
Code, which employs comparative negligence doctrine, is in conformity with 
Indonesia’s LCP, LIET, and other regulations that place presumed liability on the 
shulders of the relevant business actor/bank in instances of unauthorised ATM/debit 
card transactions. However, an innocent bank can avoid compensating consumer 
losses, if the bank can prove on the balance of probability that the consumer’s loss 
was caused by the consumer’s own negligence.
1352
 Therefore, both bank and 
consumer will have the incentive to increase awareness and precautions to avoid 
identity theft/fraud in their ATM/debit card operations. 
7.4.2.2. The ePayments Code Model and Its Prospects of Settling 
Unauthorised ATM/Debit Card Transaction Disputes between 
Banks and Consumers in Indonesia  
The ePayments Code has been created to provide (among other things) ‘a quality 
consumer protection regime for payment facilities, a framework to promote consumer 
confidence in electronic banking and payment systems, clear and fair rules for 
allocating liability for unauthorised transactions, and effective procedures for resolving 
complaints’.
1353
  
                                                          
1351
 In Indonesia, strict liability is only employed in the Indonesia environmental law. 
1352
 This will not happen in United States. In other words, there the diligent consumers subsidise the 
negligent consumers. 
1353
 ePayments Code cl 4. See also Weerasooria, above n 887, 97. 
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It is submitted in this thesis that if ePayments Code provisions concerning unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions are adopted in Indonesia, the questions existing in regard 
to who should liable for consumer losses that have been caused by various identity 
theft/unauthorised ATM/debit card fraud methods that occur in Indonesia will arguably 
have more clear, fair, predictable, and decisive answers, as will be outlined below. 
7.4.2.2.1. When the Bank is Liable for the Loss 
In the Code, the account institution or issuer bank is liable for replacing consumer 
losses arising from unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions, which occur among other 
reasons because of or on occasions such as:  
1. fraud or negligence by a bank employee or agent, a third party involved in 
networking arrangements, or a merchant or their employee or agent;
1354
 
2. a device, ATM/debit card or PIN which is forged, faulty, expired or cancelled;1355 
3. a transaction requiring the use of a ATM/debit card and/or PIN that occurred before 
the consumer received their ATM/debit card and/or PIN (including a reissued 
ATM/debit card and/or PIN);
1356
 
4. a transaction being incorrectly debited more than once to the same facility; 
5. an unauthorised transaction performed after the bank has been informed that an 
ATM/debit card has been misused, lost or stolen, or the security of a PIN has been 
breached;
1357
 
                                                          
1354
 ePayments Code cl 10.1(a). The issuer bank will be liable for their consumer’s loss if it was caused 
by fraud or negligence of a bank employee or the bank’s third party agent/counterpart employee (such as 
switching company electronic agent or employee, acquiring bank’s electronic agent or employee, 
merchant’s electronic agent or employee, and so on). Therefore, the issuer bank in Indonesia should still 
be liable for the consumer’s loss even if the identity theft/fraud point of compromise were not in its 
infrastructure but at its agent or third party counterparts infrastructures (such by the use of skimmer, card 
trapping, or malware devices found in acquiring bank’s ATM/EFTPOS machines). Another example is 
when identity theft/fraud occurs because of a data breach at the merchant’s computer that is derived from 
he use of prohibited double swipe practices (such as in Body Shop cases). The good thing with this kind 
provision is that the issuer bank in Indonesia will no longer able to avoid liability and pass it to the 
agent/counterpart party with which the consumer has no contractual or direct relationship. Actually, the 
general rule of this provision is already contained in the LCP, LIET, Indonesian Civil Code and Bank 
Indonesia regulations (BID-RMUITCB, BIR-CBPI, BIR-CPPSS, BIR-Outsource to Other Party). 
However, detailed and clear regulation is deemed to be better. 
1355
 Issuer bank is liable for unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions using counterfeiting card method, 
which is normally derived from the use of an identity theft method, such as skimming, malware, 
eavesdropping, and double swiping. 
1356
 ePayments Code cl 10.1(b). The issuer bank is liable for ‘card not received’ fraud that occurs in 
credit card operations. 
1357
 ePayments Code cl 10.1(e). The issuer bank is liable for consumer loss after a consumer notifies a 
bank about a lost or stolen, misused, or possibly breached consumer ATM/debit card and/or PIN. 
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6. an unauthorised transaction that can be made using an ATM/debit card without 
PIN;
1358
 or 
7. where it is clear that a consumer has not contributed to the loss.1359 
  
7.4.2.2.2. When the Consumer/Cardholder is Liable for the Loss 
The consumer/cardholder is liable to bear a loss arising from fraud (unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions) if: a). the bank did not have any liability to the 
consumer;
1360
 and b). the bank can prove on the balance of probability that:  
1. The consumer contributed to the loss through fraud, or breaching the PIN security 
requirements,
1361
 such as: 
a. voluntarily disclosing the PIN to anyone, including a family member or friend; 
b. where an ATM/debit card is also needed to perform a transaction, writing or 
recording the PIN on an ATM/debit card, or keeping a record of the PIN on 
anything  
 carried with an ATM/debit card, or 
 liable to loss or theft simultaneously with an ATM/debit card, unless the 
consumer makes a reasonable attempt to protect the security of the PIN;
1362
 
or 
c.  where an ATM/debit card is not needed to perform a transaction, keeping a 
written record of all the PIN (required to perform transactions) on one or more 
articles liable to be lost or stolen simultaneously, without making a reasonable 
attempt to protect the security of the PIN’
1363
 
                                                          
1358
 ePayments Code cl 10.2. The cardholder can be liable only if the user unreasonably delays reporting 
the loss or theft of the device. 
1359
 ePayments Code cl 10.3. This provision can be used in unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions 
that derive from a fraudster’s passive attack (such as skimming, malware, eavesdropping, PIN-pad 
overlay, PIN-hole camera, and the like). This provision will give strong incentives to issuer banks to 
develop good and reliable administrative procedures in order to make sure that only the genuine consumer 
receives the ATM/debit card and its PIN by verified written acknowledgement from consumer. 
1360
 This condition, therefore, negates the responsibility of bank, as regulated in Chapter C: Liability, 
Clause 10 of the ePayments Code. 
1361
 ePayments Code cl 11.2. 
1362
 ePayments Code cl 12.2.(a) & (b). 
1363
 See ePayments Code cl 12.2.(c). See also cl 12.3. For the purpose of clauses 12.2(b)–12.2(c), a 
reasonable attempt to protect the security of a pass code record includes (i) making any reasonable 
attempt to disguise the pass code within the record, or preventing unauthorised access to the pass code 
record, among other things by: (a) hiding or disguising the pass code record among other records; (b) 
hiding or disguising the pass code record in a place where a pass code record would not be expected to be 
found; (c) keeping a record of the pass code record in a securely locked container; or (d) preventing 
unauthorised access to an electronically stored record of the pass code record.  
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d.  selecting a numeric PIN that represents their birth date, or an alphabetical PIN 
that is a recognisable part of their name  even though the bank has specifically 
instructed the consumer not to do so and warned the consumer of the 
consequences of doing so at the time of selecting the PIN;
1364
 
2. When an ATM/debit card is lost, stolen or misused until it is reported to the 
bank.
1365
 
3. The consumer contributed to losses by leaving their ATM/debit card in the ATM, 
as long as the ATM incorporates reasonable safety standards that mitigate the risk 
of a card being left in the ATM.
1366
 
4. The consumer contributed to losses resulting from an unauthorised transaction by 
unreasonably delaying reporting the misuse, loss or theft of an ATM/debit card, or 
that the security of a PIN has been breached. The consumer is liable for the actual 
losses that occur between: a) when the consumer become aware of the security 
compromise, or should reasonably have become aware in the case of a lost or stolen 
ATM/debit card, and b). when the security compromise was reported to the 
bank.
1367
  
7.4.2.2.3. Consumer/Cardholder Limited Liability 
Limited liability is governed by clause 11.7 of the ePayments Code, and only will apply 
if a PIN is required to perform an unauthorised transaction, and there are no 
circumstances that could make a consumer liable for the loss. Tyree contends that this 
clause about limited liability in the Code is the most important aspect for unauthorised 
transactions. According to him, this clause establishes a basic ‘no fault liability or 
liability without fault’ for consumers, which may only be turned into a ‘fault based 
liability’ if the financial institution can prove a consumer’s fault, such as when the 
consumer was involved in the fraud or utlised the access method contrary to the rules 
set out in the Code.
1368
 
                                                          
1364
 ePayments Code cl 12.5 and 12.6.. 
1365
 ePayments Code cl 11.2(a). However, the consumer is not liable for the portion of losses which 
were: a). incurred on any one day and were in excess of any applicable daily transaction limit; b). 
incurred in any period that exceeds any applicable periodic transaction limit; and so on. See ePayments 
Code cl 12.2(b). 
1366
 ePayments Code cl 11.4. Note: Reasonable safety standards that mitigate the risk of a card being left 
in an ATM include ATMs that capture cards that are not removed after a reasonable time and ATMs that 
require a user to swipe and then remove a card in order to commence a transaction.  
1367
 ePayments Code cl 11.5(a).  
1368
 Tyree, ‘Banking Law in Australia’, above n 886, 351.  
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If the bank fails to prove that the consumer contributed to a loss through fraud, fault 
(such as breaching the PIN security requirements) or negligence (such as leaving a card 
in an ATM, unreasonably delaying reporting the misuse, loss or theft of an ATM/debit 
card, or that the security of a PIN has been breached), then in accordance with cl 11.7 of 
the ePayments Code, the consumer is liable for the least of:  
(a)  $150, or a lower figure determined by the [bank],  
(b)  the balance of the facility or facilities which the [bank]and the holder have agreed can 
be accessed using the [ATM/debit card] and/or [PIN], including any prearranged 
credit, or  
(c)  the actual loss at the time that the misuse, loss or theft of [an ATM/debit card] or 
breach of [PIN] security is reported to the [bank], excluding that portion of the losses 
incurred on any one day which exceeds any relevant daily transaction or other 
periodic transaction limit.
1369
  
Pertaining to limited liability, Geva argues that allocating the loss to the consumer only 
up to a low threshold, irrespective of fault ‘could still enhance diligence without causing 
the consumer undue hardship’. That is, minimum liability will serve as an incentive for 
consumers to guard their card and PIN.
1370
 
7.4.2.2.4. Proof that a User Contributed to Losses 
In proving the balance of probability, that is, whether or not a consumer has contributed 
to the losses in an unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction, the bank is obliged to 
explore all reasonable evidence and explanations regarding the alleged unauthorised 
transaction.
1371
 However, although Indonesian banks tends to judge that any and all 
electronic transactions that use the correct data and PIN as a cardholder valid 
transaction (not actually a sensible claim),
1372
 the Australian ePayments Code (cl 
11.8(b)) (by way of contrast) has prohibited the claim by a financial institution to have 
merely found that ‘a correct device data and pass code’ was used in an unauthorised 
                                                          
1369
 ePayments Code cl 11.7. 
1370
 Geva, ‘Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers’, above n 107, 231, 
293341. 
1371
 ePayments Code cl 11.8(a). See also Article 59(1) of Council Directive 2007/64/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market [2007] 
OJ L 319/1 ('European Payment Services Directive'). In this Article, when a consumer denies having 
authorised an executed payment transaction, the payment system provider has an obligation to prove that 
the payment transaction was authenticated. 
1372
 See ASIC, ‘Discussion Paper on an Expanded EFT Code’, above n 890, 278. In the paper, ASIC 
contends that financial institutions tend to shift the fraud risk onto consumers by showing the record 
which depicts that the correct authentication mechanism was used in the disputed transaction, even 
though it does not show who the purported consumer really is. Further, ASIC also asserts that the one 
sided liability rules from financial institutions generally derive from the standard contract that made 
cardholders liable for any transaction authenticated by use of the card and PIN, regardless of loss or theft 
of the card or surreptitious observation of the PIN. 
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transaction as a proof of a consumer’s involvement in a fraud or a breach of the PIN 
security requirements, recognising: 
the fact that a facility has been accessed with the correct device and/or pass code, while 
significant, does not, of itself, constitute proof on the balance of probability that a user 
contributed to losses through fraud or a breach of the pass code security requirements in 
clause 12.
1373
  
This important clause is derived from the consideration that often it is impossible to 
distinguish an unauthorised PIN instruction from an authorised one, because — from a 
technological viewpoint  the PIN is exactly the same whether keyed in by a fraudster 
or an authorised consumer.
1374
 It is also a fact that PIN security is very weak and 
transactions often involve inherently insecure PIN authentication procedures that make 
them vulnerable to detection, such as from PIN theft methods using ‘shoulder surfing’, 
PIN hole cameras, key loggers, eavesdropping, malware and so on.
1375
 Besides its 
presence in the ePayments Code, this provision is also highlighted in other prominent 
regulations, such as those for Europe where it features in the European Payment 
Services Directive. According to Article 59(2) of the Directive, ‘where [the consumer] 
denies having authorised an executed payment transaction, the use of a payment 
instrument recorded by the [bank] shall in itself not necessarily be sufficient to prove 
either that the payment transaction was authorised by the payer or that the payer acted 
fraudulently…’.
1376
 
It is argued that if this specific clause were to be also employed in the unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transaction loss allocation rules in Indonesia (through regulation 
reform), banks would no longer be able to reject consumer’s losses by utlising as a 
defence their unfair and illegitimate liability dumping provision which gives a one sided 
                                                          
1373
 See ePayments Code cl 11.8(b): ‘the fact that a facility has been accessed with the correct device 
and/or pass code, while significant, does not, of itself, constitute proof on the balance of probability that a 
user contributed to losses through fraud or a breach of the pass code security requirements in clause 12’. 
For pass code security requirements, see clause 12 of the Code that forbid a consumer to:  
(a)   voluntarily disclose one or more pass codes to anyone, including a family member or friend,  
(b)  where a device is also needed to perform a transaction, write or record pass code(s) on a 
device, or keep a  record of the pass code(s) on anything:  
(i)   carried with a device, or  
(ii)  liable to loss or theft simultaneously with a device,  
unless the user makes a reasonable attempt to protect the security of the pass code, or  
(c)  where a device is not needed to perform a transaction, keep a written record of all pass codes 
required to perform transactions on one or more articles liable to be lost or stolen simultaneously, 
without making a reasonable attempt to protect the security of the pass code(s).  
1374
 See ‘Discussion Paper on an Expanded EFT Code’, above n 890, 27.  
1375
 Ibid 28. See also various PIN theft methods in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
1376
 Council Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 
on payment services in the internal market [2007] OJ L 319/1 ('European Payment Services Directive'). 
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allocation of losses to the consumer, that is, where the unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transaction conducted using the correct consumer’s ATM/debit card data and PIN.  
As a consequence, banks will have great incentives to equip themselves with state-of-
the-art identity theft/fraud prevention and mitigation infrastructure to ensure that 
consumer ATM/debit card data and PIN are secure from identity theft/fraud. Banks will 
also probably have greater incentive to equip all the ATMs and their booths with good 
quality CCTV and/or security guard in anticipation of, or for the detection of, possible 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions that occur because of first party or second 
party fraud or third party fraud facilitated by consumer negligence.  
7.5. Conclusion 
Loss allocation rules on unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction disputes depend on 
the specific circumstances of the identity theft/fraud (such as the location of the point of 
compromise, typology of identity theft/fraud methods employed, the authentication 
process, the reliability/vulnerability of the ATM/debit card infrastructure, the possible 
perpetrators, relevant regulations, and whether or not bank has educated consumer about 
inherent risks in the ATM/debit card infrastructures/system.  
The need of law reform on unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions in Indonesia is 
triggered by the failure of Alternative Dispute Resolution forums (the bank’s internal 
dispute unit, Bank Indonesia Banking Mediation Agency, and CDSB) and of courts as 
the final forum to produce sensible decision on resolution of unauthorised ATM/debit 
card transaction disputes between banks and consumers.  
Most court decisions favoured of the bank on the grounds of pure contributory 
negligence, that is, that the consumers enabled identity theft/fraud to occur. These 
decisions are deemed unjust to consumers, given that bank negligence to secure its 
infrastructure and failure to provide adequate fraud risk education or safeguard 
consumer’ transactions are actually the dominant contributory factors that cause 
consumer negligence and facilitate the success of fraudster identity theft and fraud. The 
flaws in the courts decisions were mostly caused by the consumer’s inability to support 
his/her claim and the successful defence by the bank (based on anecdotal defence about 
bank ATM/debit card system’s infallibility and the existence of consumer’s negligence 
that has contributed to the occurrence of the third party fraud. 
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In fact, bank ATM/debit card infrastructure is not infallible/tamper resistant and 
impenetrable due to the various adaptive and innovative identity theft methods adopted 
by fraudsters (such as skimming, card trapping, card swapping, eavesdropping, 
malware, and various PIN theft methods). Often, the consumer becomes the weakest 
link and vulnerable to social engineering attack due to a false sense security fostered by 
a bank’s reluctance to give fraud risk education to consumers. Hence, reliance on 
consumer vigilance is absurd.  
The banks’ magnetic stripe card and PIN technology are weak, have no non-repudiation 
aspect, and are very susceptible to fraud. Unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions 
(identity theft) using either a stolen consumer’s genuine card or use of counterfeit cards 
and methods that are indistinguishable from the authorised transactions. Therefore, the 
bank raising a defence on the basis that unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions were 
enabled by correct consumer ATM/debit card data and PIN was weak as this did not 
automatically prove that a consumer must have been negligent or careless in keeping 
their card data and PIN secret. In other jurisdictions, such as in Australia and the EU, 
this kind of defence is not allowed unless accompanied with other empirical evidence. 
Therefore, this thesis argues that the comparative negligence doctrine — that is actually 
acknowledged in Indonesia’s legal system and deemed fairer and could create 
incentives for both disputant parties for fraud containment  should replace the pure 
contributory negligence doctrine in the effort to fairly determine the bearer of fraud 
losses in the adjudication/litigation process. The application of the comparative 
negligence doctrine using multi-disciplinary approaches to the various typologies of 
identity theft/fraud on ATM/debit card transactions typically will direct liability to the 
least cost avoider in the specific identity theft/fraud circumstances. However, it is 
argued that consumers will only be liable for the loss if they had fraud risk education 
from their bank. Thus, in first party, second party, and third party fraud (where the 
consumer becomes the point of compromise outside the bank’s perimeter), the 
consumer will be the least cost avoider and hence liable for the loss. Meanwhile, in third 
party fraud where bank or its electronic agent/third party counterpart infrastructure and 
consumer become the joint of point of compromise, liability will be divided between the 
bank and consumer according to the degree of fault/negligence involved. Last but not 
least, in the counterfeiting fraud typology where bank infrastructure is the sole point of 
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compromise and the consumer demonstrates no fault/negligence, the bank is fully liable 
for the consumer’s losses. 
In the quest for clear, fair, detailed, and decisive loss allocation rules on the 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction as part of law reform objective, US strict 
liability and Australia’s fault based liability regulation model have been compared and 
critically evaluated. Arguably, Australia’s loss allocation rules for unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions are deemed more appropriate and a better fit with 
Indonesia’s current legal system and the nature of its retail payment system which has 
pervasive consumer activated terminal highly involvement by consumers in the 
initiation of such transactions. It is also believed that fault/negligence based liability 
could also create more incentives for parties involved in the ATM/debit card system to 
improve precautions and identity theft/fraud containment.  
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CHAPTER 8  THE FINAL DENOUEMENT 
 
The development of electronic banking in Indonesia and elsewhere has been facilitated 
by the rapid and advanced development of information, computer and 
telecommunication technology. Globalisation, electronic commerce, and the need to 
conclude economic transactions in the most effective and efficient way have made 
electronic payments or electronic fund transfers the main method chosen by the modern 
society in preference to other payment instruments. From a wide selection of electronic 
payment systems, the ATM/debit card is the electronic payment instrument most widely 
used by people in Indonesia and it has become a mainstay in the country’s electronic 
payment system. This development is characterised by (among other things) the 
proliferation of ATM/debit card consumer activated terminals, namely ATMs and EFT-
POS terminals in a variety of places  ranging from major centres in large cities to 
various crossroads and villages. 
However, as the old proverb of Indonesia ‘ada gula ada semut’ or ‘if there is sugar 
there is ants’, so too it is with bank ATM/debit card operations. Banks have long been 
the place where people deposit money, and the bricks-and-mortar branches and their 
customers subject to robbery using physical attack, with menaces or arms. New 
transaction methods have been accompanied by new methods of robbery. The same 
factors that have supported the development of e-banking, — the advanced development 
of information, computer and telecommunication technology — have also supported the 
rise of identity theft and fraud in the banking sector. Many fraudsters consider that 
attacking ATM/debit card operations well worth attempting since it is relatively easy 
(with technological tools readily available and social engineering skills easy to master 
and the entire operation involving little or no risk of physical violence) with a ‘sky is 
the limit’ potential return and very minimal risk of being caught. The result has been 
rising crime associated electronic transactions of every type, including ATM/debit card 
operations. 
This thesis originated from concerns associated with rampant identity theft and fraud 
that afflicts ATM/debit card consumers in Indonesia. When unauthorised ATM/debit 
card transactions occur and a consumer’s funds in their bank are drained  this is just 
the start for most consumers. The real ordeal occurs when consumer’s claims to obtain 
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compensation for the unauthorised transactions are rebuffed by their banks. The 
rejection is generally justified on the grounds of liability dumping provisions in the 
standard bankconsumer standard contract, in which it is stated that all unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions conducted using the correct consumer data and PIN will be 
considered valid or authorised. That is, it is alleged that the consumer must have 
somehow neglected to maintain the security and confidentiality of their ATM/debit card 
data.
1377
 The research sought to explore this, together with the absence of specific loss 
allocation rules/fraud liability rules in Indonesia, and answer a very important question 
that become the main topic of the thesis  that is, whether the bank or the consumer 
should bear the liability for the loss incurred from the disputed transaction.
1378
 This 
thesis argues that in order to give a comprehensive and sensible answer to the question 
and its legal ramifications, multi-disciplinary approaches, namely economic, 
technological and legal should be employed. Law reform in the area of loss allocation 
regulation in regard to unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions is arguably necessary 
to ensure any dispute between bank and consumer pertaining to unauthorised 
transactions can be settled on a most efficient and fair basis.  
Since the payment system itself is still not well understood by many people in 
Indonesia, Chapter 2 thus sought to explain the reason behind banks’ eagerness to 
embrace and promote payment cards as the preferred instrument for consumer payment. 
The technical nature of bank infrastructure and the basic security procedures involved in 
the ATM/debit card operations are also explained.  
In Chapter 3 inherent and natural risks in the operation of ATM/debit card as part of 
retail payment system are described. The economic and technological reasons behind 
the proliferation of ATM/debit card identity theft/fraud — such as banks employing 
relatively old and vulnerable ATM/debit card instruments and moderate security 
features (and the reasons for this) — are also explored to prepare the ground for the 
discussion of liability rules in later chapters. Incentives for payment card fraud and the 
wide range of fraudsters and their capabilities to perform innovative and adaptive attack 
are also discussed in this chapter, so a more complete picture of unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions are depicted. 
                                                          
1377
  See n 66 for example of bank’s liability dumping provision. 
1378
  See Chapter 1 / section 1.5 of this thesis. 
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Having acknowledged the inherent risks in ATM/debit card operations in Chapter 3, 
Chapter 4 outlined quite exhaustively the identity theft and fraud methods that are 
utilised by fraudsters to compromise consumer card data and PIN. In regard to the thesis 
objective of determining the party or parties that have liability for the damage that is 
caused by such fraud, this thesis has classified the identity theft methods according to 
the point of compromise. These attempts, it is argued, are very important because by 
knowing where the point of compromise is, the position of the pendulum of liability can 
be more easily defined. Hypothetically, the party or parties that by their nature are the 
least cost avoider for the occurrence of identity theft/fraud at the point of compromise 
apparently also become the liable party for the loss. For this purpose, the identity theft 
methods have been classified into five branches of point of compromise, namely 
cardholder as point of compromise, consumer-activated terminal and cardholder as 
(joint) point of compromise, consumer-activated terminal and/or communication 
network as a point of compromise, ATM/EFTPOS communication link as point of 
compromise, and bank and/or its counterpart data centre as point of compromise. 
Chapter 4 generally depicted the occurrence of identity theft/fraud from a technological 
perspective  vulnerabilities in the ATM/debit card systems that occur across the 
whole cycle of operations, and include the aspects of people, processes and technology. 
Several prominent conventional and advanced identity theft methods and tools utilised 
in the crime are enumerated, such as lost and stolen card fraud, card swapping, card 
skimming, malware, eavesdropping, and social engineering. For PIN theft, several 
major methods also have been canvassed such as PIN guessing, shoulder surfing, PIN-
pad overlay, PIN-hole camera and PIN interception/cracking. The perpetrators of 
identity theft/fraud ranging from the consumers themselves (first party fraud), 
consumer’s acquaintances and family (second party fraud) or in third party fraud the 
‘lone wolf’ perpetrator, organised crime bodies (or organised crime working in concert 
with an individual), or simply a disgruntled or dishonest worker / bank owner, 
merchant, or third party agent/counterpart.  
An unpublished ATM/debit card fraud report in Indonesia has shown that the threat of 
identity theft/fraud is real and has grown from year to year.
1379
 Empirical evidence also 
proved that fraudsters are almost always able to circumvent bank security features, 
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  See Table 1: Type of ATM/Debit Card Fraud and Data. 
 
377 
 
  
regardless of bank’s security improvement efforts. However, the report itself has its 
own problem, since it was not constructed using a reliable, current, and complete 
identity theft/fraud taxonomy. As result, the existing fraud report fails to give a clear 
reflection of the seriousness and trends of ATM/debit card fraud in Indonesia. Instead, it 
gives a false sense of security and provides misleading information for identity 
theft/fraud containment to the stakeholders of electronic payment system.
1380
 Hence, it 
is argued that this unreliable report also contributes to the rise of identity theft/fraud 
incidents in Indonesia. 
In Chapter 5, this thesis has endeavoured to provide a complete picture of the legal and 
regulatory framework of ATM/debit card transactions, consumer protection, and 
liability rules on unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions in Indonesia. From the 
regulations, it can be concluded that a bank as a financial institution is a fiduciary, 
professional and prudential entity that owes a duty of care to its consumers.
1381
 In regard 
to a bank’s ATM/debit card operation/system, various acts of legislation and Bank 
Indonesia regulations / decrees have regulated it quite profoundly (providing statutory 
duties that banks must fulfil). In general, a bank as the ATM/debit card system provider 
has many obligations: to provide risk management policy, secure its infrastructure from 
logical and physical attack, and safeguard consumer safety while consuming its 
products or services. Hence, a bank is obliged (among other things) to provide 
consumers with fraud risk education to ensure their safety and their taking of adequate 
precautions, to be responsible and liable for its agent and/or third party counterpart 
conduct, and to provide good and responsive consumer complaint procedures. 
Therefore, from a theoretical legal point a view, consumer protection in ATM/debit card 
transactions has been guaranteed.  
However, when it comes to the fraud liability rules concerning the unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transaction, all of those regulations especially LCP and LIET, only 
provide very general liability rules. Basically, according to the rules, the bank as a 
provider of the ATM/debit card system is liable for consumer losses (presumed 
liability). However, a bank can pass this liability to the consumer if it can prove that the 
losses have occurred because of the consumer’s own fault/negligence (tortious 
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  See results of most recent BI-fraud Survey at n 1136.  
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  See Chapter 5 /section 5.2.1.1. 
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liability).
1382
 What constitutes fault or negligence in regard to the consumer’s 
ATM/debit card transaction is blurred and unclear  which hypothetically has caused 
prolonged disputes between banks and consumers as to who should be liable for 
consumer losses due to the fraud. Comparisons have been drawn with the situation 
regarding unauthorised ATM/debit card regulation in the United States and 
Australia.
1383
 This is considered very important in gauging whether or not Indonesia’s 
regulation concerning unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions is adequate. In fact, 
Indonesia’s regulations contain many deficiencies compared to the US and Australian 
fraud liability rules regulation. In the United States, loss allocation regulation adopts 
strict liability rules. Hence, a bank will always liable for an unauthorised ATM/debit 
card transaction (that is, transaction that is not authorised by the consumer and where 
the consumer has no benefit from the transaction). In Australia, loss allocation 
regulation adopts comparative negligence rules, where provisions regarding when and 
in what circumstances a bank or consumer will be liable for unauthorised ATM/debit 
card transaction have been enumerated quite clearly and in detail. Hence, it is argued 
that the risk of contentious disputes concerning what constitutes fault or negligence in 
ATM/debit card operations in Australia can be eliminated or at least substantially 
reduced. 
In Chapter 6, empirical evidence on the adjudication process in ADR/court forums to 
resolve unauthorised ATM/debit card disputes between banks and consumers are 
brought forward and analysed. The basic theories of liability and tortious negligence are 
described, so critical analysis can be drawn to see whether there are gaps between loss 
allocation liability theory and its practice in the real world. From case analysis, it is 
revealed that even though regulation concerning consumer protection and a bank’s 
obligation to secure a consumer’s transactions is quite strong and complete, in practice 
consumer protection for unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions is still absurd and far 
from objective. In almost all of the adjudication cases in the formal court system court 
(several of which cases were initially aired in ADR adjudication forums), the court 
verdicts always favoured the bank. It is argued that the verdicts had many flaws, were 
misleading, and not sensible. These wrong decisions arguably occur because the courts 
implement outmoded and unjust pure contributory negligence principle in the 
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  See LIET arts 21(2)c and 21(5); LCP.art s19(1) and 19(5)  
1383
  See Chapter 5 / section 5.5 of this thesis. 
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examination of cases. Therefore, regardless of how dominant the bank’s negligence is in 
regard to securing its ATM/debit card infrastructure and its deficiency in giving fraud 
risk education to consumer, the pendulum of the liability will always reside with the 
consumers. Typical reasons for the verdicts were that the consumer had demonstrated 
contributory negligence and/or because the unauthorised transaction had been 
conducted with the correct consumer’s card data and PIN.
1384
 
In Chapter 7, all relevant theories and facts in relation to the operation of bank 
ATM/debit cards and unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions are analysed, discussed 
and synthesized to reach general conclusions and make recommendations. This chapter 
highlights flaws in unauthorised ATM/debit card dispute resolution practices between 
bank and consumers in a variety of ADR/court forums and presents the compelling 
reasons why legal reform on the loss allocation rules regulation and the ADR/court 
adjudication practices in Indonesia is necessary. It is argued in this chapter that such 
legal reform is required due to (among other things) continuation of market failure in 
ATM/debit card operations and the flaws in and/or misleading decisions from the 
ADR/courts concerning disputes between banks and consumers on unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions in Indonesia.  
The flaws and unfair practices in the bank’s internal dispute resolution unit generally 
emerges in association with the use of liability dumping provisions in a bank’s standard 
contract. This is cited by the bank to settle the unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction 
dispute. Therefore, almost always a bank will reject a consumer’s claim for redress on 
the ground that either the unauthorised transaction was conducted with the correct 
consumer card data and PIN and/or the consumer must have been negligent and that 
facilitated the occurrence of identity theft/fraud. This decision is generally reached by a 
bank regardless of who was the perpetrator (first party, second, and third party fraud) 
and/or how slight the consumer’s negligence was. In joint liability cases where a bank 
actually had a dominant contribution in terms of negligence that (in turn) caused or 
facilitated the subsequent negligence by the consumer, such as in card trapping cases 
(where a bank fails to safeguard a consumer’s genuine card by failing to keep their 
ATM free from a fraudster’s malicious devices) and where a consumer fails to 
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 See Evi Yulisna v Harahap v Bank Mandiri case, Mr Bahari v PT Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) 
Tbk, Muhajidin Tahir, SE v PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk and PT Advantage CSM, Nasruddin v PT. 
Bank Mandiri Tbk in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
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safeguard the secrecy of his/her own PIN data from a fraudster’s social engineering trap 
(where the bank again may not have kept the ATM free of fake call centre number 
stickers or provided adequate consumer education)  and whether or not that third 
party fraud was obvious  a bank typically will also reject a consumer’s claim on the 
ground that the loss was due to the consumer’s own negligence.
1385
  
Meanwhile, the Banking Mediation Agency / Banking Facilitated Agency run by Bank 
Indonesia was also deemed to have failed to protect consumer interest. This is due to 
mediation being the only dispute resolution method acknowledged in the agency in 
many instances. Bank Indonesia as the mediator cannot make any binding decision but 
can only attempt to persuade the disputants to conclude a win-win agreement. However, 
mediation proceedings typically only replicate the original argumentation and the 
rejection of the claim by a bank’s internal dispute resolution unit. The few banking 
mediation agency decisions which granted consumer claims, whether in part or in full, 
were typically derived from feelings of compassion or in order to have credit with the 
central bank, not from compelling fraud liability rules.
1386
  
In contrast to a bank’s internal dispute resolution unit and the Banking Mediation 
Agency, dispute resolutions results from Consumer Dispute Settlement Board decisions 
always favour consumers. In the CDSB, the adjudicators tend to blame banks for a 
consumer’s losses on the ground that the bank has failed to safeguard a consumer’s 
transaction on the bank’s premises. Several instances of consumers’ negligent conduct 
(such as by letting their family and acquaintances have access to their ATM/debit card 
and PIN) were justified with argumentation that the practice is acknowledged in 
customary law (adat). Nevertheless, consumers never benefit from such a victory since 
the banks always appeal to the court and challenge the CDSB’s verdict. There is also 
tendency for banks to avoid the CDSB as an adjudication forum to settle a dispute with 
a consumer, since CDSB verdicts favour consumers. Banks may refuse to have a 
dispute to be handled by the CDSB simply by filing an objection with the adjudicator 
and indicate that they prefer the court as a forum to resolve the dispute.
1387
 As CDSB 
mediation is a voluntary process that needs the cooperation of both parties, this prevents 
any adjudication in that forum when a bank objects.  
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  See Chapter 7 / section 7.2.2.1 in this thesis. 
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  See Chapter 7 / section 7.2.2.2 in this thesis. 
1387
  See Chapter 7 / section 7.2.2.3 in this thesis. 
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The court, as the final forum for settling any dispute on unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions, has apparently also failed to make sensible, fair and predictable decisions. 
Most court decisions favour banks, based on the use of the pure contributory negligence 
principle. That is, unless a plaintiff has can show no fault/negligence at all (clean hands 
policy), the plaintiff will always liable for his/her losses on unauthorised ATM/debit 
card transactions regardless how big and even dominant the defendant’s 
fault/negligence was. In the absence of expert witnesses, it is apparent that a judge’s 
verdicts were not based on actual facts and a genuine undesrtanding of the situation 
(especially in regards to technological matters) nor on the basis of comprehensive 
regulations relevant to ATM/debit card operations. Bank failure to fully abide by the 
regulations where they do exist (such as the obligation to secure their ATM/debit card 
infrastructure (both logical and physical security), and including a failure to conduct 
active surveillance of its consumer activated terminals, and/or to provide adequate fraud 
risk education to the consumer  all of which became dominant contributing factors to 
the occurrence of identity theft/fraud  were not considered. This unfortunate situation 
is also exacerbated by the dearth of publicly available and officially unauthorised 
ATM/debit card figures that make a plaintiff’s attempts to prove the proliferation of 
fraudulent activities more difficult.
1388
 
Concerning the existence of flaws in dispute resolution in ADR/court forums, it is 
argued that poor ADR/court verdicts on unauthorised ATM/debit card disputes are 
actually caused by: 1). the adjudicators’ lack knowledge of the economic and 
technological factors involved, and the precise relevant law and legal principle 
concerning the circumstances of unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction disputes; and 
2). the lack of clear, fair, detailed, and decisive loss allocation rules on unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions in Indonesia. It is also feared that misleading verdicts of 
ADR/courts could reduce consumer confidence, increase legal and reputational risks of 
the banking industry, and hinder e-banking and e-commerce development in Indonesia.  
In order to remedy this situation of market failure,
1389
 it is submitted that legal reform in 
Indonesia is necessary and immediately relevant. Pertinent economic, technological and 
legal facts and prominent principles are employed in the analysis so as to ensure that the 
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  See Chapter 7 / Section 7.2.2.4 in this thesis. 
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  See Chapter 7 / section 7.2.1 in this thesis. 
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recommendations for legal reform on loss allocation rules for unauthorised ATM/debit 
card transactions in Indonesia can be established according to world best practice and 
current trends in development on loss allocation regulation which give more protection 
to the consumer.  
From an economic perspective, it is arguably very important that the Cooter and Rubin 
theory on loss spreading, loss reduction and loss imposition principles are established 
and are considered in regard to unauthorised ATM/debit card disputes.
1390
 The loss-
spreading principle is deemed acceptable in this respect as it always places liability on 
the financial institution/banks instead of consumers. Banks in Indonesia generally earn 
huge profits each year from their operations. Much of Bank Indonesia’s regulation has 
also encouraged banks to build good risk management into the ATM/debit card system 
and prepare a buffer fund to absorb losses from the fraudulent activities. Therefore, it is 
argued that the adoption of the loss-spreading principle is in accordance with LCP and 
LIET and Bank Indonesia’s regulation that embraces the presumed liability principle.
1391
 
That is, the liability for damages will first be placed on the shoulders of the bank as the 
professional and fiduciary institution unless the bank can prove that the losses incurred 
are actually due to the consumer’s own fault/negligence.  
In regard to the loss-reduction principle, it is argued that it is very important to establish 
this principle in disputes between banks and consumer on unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions. This principle becomes the key to determining which party should be 
liable for the losses, whether the bank or the consumer is solely liable, or the bank and 
consumer together are jointly liable. According to this principle, liability should reside 
with the party who can avoid identity theft/fraud at the lowest cost. However, it is 
submitted that this principle should be associated with technological and legal aspects in 
order to perform optimally. Since fraudsters’ identity theft and methods are varied and 
can be directed at either bank infrastructure or consumers, or both the bank 
infrastructure and consumer as a joint target, the loss-reduction principle should assess 
the situation on a case by case basis according to the specific identity theft/fraud 
circumstances coupled with relevant technological and legal facts and principles.  
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  See Cooter and Rubin, above n 105. 
1391
  See Makarim, above n 857; Samsul, ‘Perlindungan Konsumen’, above n 863. 
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In this regard, the technological aspects that should be considered closely pertaining to 
the loss-reduction principle are (among other things) the quality and comprehensiveness 
of a bank’s ATM/debit card infrastructure and the technology employed by the 
fraudsters to perform the fraudulent activities. As has been described in Chapter 2, a 
bank’s ATM/debit card system as part of an electronic fund transfer system is heavily 
supported by information technology infrastructure. This technology is involved in 
almost all aspects of a bank’s ATM/debit card operations, both in logical or physical 
aspects, such as the ATM/debit plastic card with magnetic stripe and/or chip 
technology, ATM/EFT-POS machines, the bank’s host computer server, networks, 
software used for data communication, encryption, and so on. From the discussion in 
the chapters 2 and 3, it is also revealed that there is trade-off between the security 
technology aspect of securing ATM/debit card operations with business and the 
economic aspect of optimising revenue. In practice, banks generally equip their 
ATM/debit card infrastructure only with moderate security features regardless of the 
fact that most ATM/debit card fraud risks are foreseeable and identity theft and/or fraud 
has happened repeatedly.   
Concerning incidents of identity theft/fraud in the ATM/debit card operations, the fact 
should be highlighted by parties to any dispute that many of the fraudsters’ malicious 
devices are difficult or even impossible for consumers to detect because they are in the 
form of intangible material (such as malicious software, eavesdropping devices and so 
on) or if of a solid material, the malicious devices are hidden or disguised perfectly by 
fraudsters in the consumer activated terminal or its surroundings (such as in the case of 
card trapping and skimming methods). This is especially the case for the adjudicator in 
the adjudication proceedings who has to determine who is the least cost avoider.
1392
 
Hence, it is argued that any expectation that the consumer spot the fraudsters’ malicious 
devices in many identity theft/fraud incidents is unfair and unrealistic, especially when 
banks have not given any specific and comprehensive fraud or risk education to the 
consumer.
1393
 In contrast, most of identity theft and fraud methods in ATM/debit card 
transactions are consider as foreseability risks for banks. Other than this, many 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions occur because of phantom transactions, that 
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  See Chapter 4 / sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2., and 4.2.3 of this thesis. 
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  For instance, see statement from Diebold Incorporated, ‘White Paper: ATM Fraud and Security’, 
above n 348, 47.  
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is, the transaction happens using the correct consumer card data and PIN but the 
consumer denies having initiated the transaction. In this instance, several relevant 
technological facts should be considered: 
  the bank’s magnetic stripe card data and consumer’s PIN are considered a very 
old and weak  hence very vulnerable to compromise by fraudsters with or 
without a consumer’s fault/negligence, such as what happened in the card 
skimming with PIN-hole camera/PIN-pad overlay method, malware, and eaves 
dropping methods; 
  a bank or bank’s agent/third party counterpart including merchants data based 
computer and/or network are also not infallible from various identity theft 
attacks, such as malware, hacking/cracking activity, eavesdropping, or simply 
that the data may be abused by an insider (where consumers are absolutely not 
involved whatsoever in the flow of ATM/debit card data); and/or 
  PIN has no non-repudiation aspect. 
These should always be considered by the disputant parties and adjudicator when 
determining liability. Of course, the possibility of first party fraud and second party 
fraud instead of third party fraud also should always be considered.  
From a legal perspective, many regulations have obliged banks to secure their 
ATM/debit card system. These obligations include the obligation to conduct fraud risk 
education in order to safeguard consumer safety in ATM/debit card transactions. Many 
of the regulations are quite detailed and are to be complied with as a security standard 
that banks should meet in their ATM/debit card operations. This includes the obligation 
to encrypt ATM/debit card data, provide anti malware and firewalls, perform logical 
and physical surveillance of the consumer activated terminals, and so on. Therefore, 
banks absolutely have occupiers’ liability for their consumers in ATM/debit card 
operations, because the entire ATM/debit card system and infrastructure are provided 
by the banks and banks intentionally invite their consumer to perform the ATM/debit 
card transaction in banks’ consumer activated terminals such as ATMs and EFTPOS 
terminals. In this regard, the regulations also clearly define that banks have vicarious 
liability for their agent or third party counterpart. It is also clearly stated in the 
regulation and court verdicts that banks should still be responsible and liable for a 
consumer’s loss even though the damages were caused by third party attack. Hence, a 
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new intervening act or novus actus interveniens is not acceptable as a defence 
submitted by banks. All in all, it is argued that banks indeed have statutory duty and 
owe a duty of care to consumers.  
From the analysis of courts verdicts on unauthorised ATM/debit card disputes between 
banks and consumers, it is revealed that judges in Indonesia still utilised the old, unjust 
and largely abandoned pure contributory negligence principle when determining the 
party liable for the damages. The judges also appear unable to understand the complete 
picture of the facts involved in unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions. Apparently, 
this occurred due to judges’ lack of knowledge of the economic aspects, as well as the 
state-of-the-art technology employed, and legal aspects that are relevant to ATM/debit 
card operations. Consequently, the judges — almost without fail — direct that the 
consumer bear all their losses, often just based on anecdotal evidence that the consumer 
must be fault or negligent and contributed to the unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transaction. In this regard, the fact that a consumer probably only has slightly negligent 
conduct compared to the dominant negligence by banks was not a factor in their 
consideration of the cases before them. In most other countries, the pure contributory 
negligence principle has been replaced by the comparative negligence principle, which 
is deemed fairer, and could trigger incentives for banks and consumers to improve their 
precautions to avoid identity theft/fraud. 
Therefore, there is no doubt that legal reform should be implemented in the adjudication 
proceedings to resolve disputes between banks and consumers concerning which party 
should be liable for consumer losses from unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions. In 
this regard, it is argued that several legal reforms should be implemented in the 
ADR/court proceedings concerning unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction disputes 
in order to achieve the most sensible result. These reforms include:  
 in general, adjudicators should consider all economic, technological, and legal 
aspects that involved in the specific unauthorised ATM/debit card transaction in 
order to have a comprehensive picture of the circumstances of the specific 
identity theft and/or fraud; 
 the comparative negligence principle should replace the pure contributory 
negligence principle; 
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 the least cost avoider should be determined on the basis of teh location of the 
point of compromise in the specific identity theft and/or fraud circumstances; 
 since a bank is the owner of the ATM/debit card system and possesses all 
ATM/debit card transactions data, the onus of proof should lie with the bank 
instead of on the consumer’s shoulders. In this regard, negligence per se and res 
ipsa loquitur doctrine should be acknowledged by adjudicators; and  
 a bank cannot have as a defence only that the fraudulent transaction conducted 
with the correct consumer’s card data and PIN.  
It is believed that law reform on the ADR/court adjudication proceedings using 
economic, technological, and legal approaches will create more accurate, fair, and 
sensible decisions. Pertaining to this, several recommendations on law reform in civil 
liability adjudication/litigation proceedings have been drawn in Chapter 7. These 
include recommendations: 
 to use negligence per se as a basis for civil liability adjudication. To give clear 
inputs to stakeholders in a dispute on an unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transaction, Table 5 ‘ATM/debit Card Point of Compromise, Identity Theft 
Methods and Bank’s Statutory Duties’ depicts many bank obligations to improve 
security features to combat fraud based on regulations; 
 to ensure that in tortious liability/negligence liability civil lawsuits that the 
burden of proof in the adjudication proceedings lies with the defendant, based on 
provisions in LCP and LIET; or based on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine (as is 
argued in the thesis); and 
 a flow chart of test for the use of the comparative negligence doctrine (Figure 
20) to establish whether a defendant owes a duty of care to a plaintiff or has 
breached of duty of care, and also to establish the causality between the 
defendant’s breach and plaintiff’s losses. In order to fairly allocate the loss to the 
least cost avoider, multi-disciplinary approaches that contain economic, 
technological, and legal approaches were utilised. From the flow chart test using 
the comparative negligence approach, it is apparent that a defendant cannot 
avoid liability for plaintiff losses caused by unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transaction for a number of reasons. First, the defendant as a professional and 
fiduciary entity has a statutory duty to safeguard a consumer’s safety; secondly, 
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most of the fraud risks are foreseeable; and thirdly, in many instances, a 
defendant was negligent in fulfilling its obligation to secure its ATM/debit card 
infrastructure and provide adequate fraud risk education to consumers.  
However, to mitigate the risk of prolonged disputes and misleading adjudication 
verdicts that might occur because of different interpretations by banks, consumers, and 
adjudicators concerning what constitutes fault or negligence on unauthorised 
ATM/debit card transactions (considering that every adjudicator might have a different 
level of knowledge regarding relevant and recent economic, technological and legal 
factors), it is also argued that in the quest for the liable party in any such dispute, it is 
important that a set of clear, fair, detailed, and decisive loss allocation rules on 
unauthorised ATM/debit card be established and used as a common binding guide. 
Therefore, having compared and analysed the advantages and disadvantages of US and 
Australian loss allocation rules regulation, it is submitted that the ePayment Code of 
Australia is more appropriate for Indonesia’s current legal and regulatory framework for 
unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions. It is believed that the establishment of 
detailed and clear bank and consumer liability on unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transactions, based on specific circumstances, will create far more uniform and 
predictable results. It is expected that this kind of regulation could encourage disputant 
parties to resolve the dispute between themselves, and hence avoid the hassle and the 
waste of excessive resources in terms of both time and money for dispute adjudication 
in ADR/court forums. 
It is also believed that the Australian model is fairer because it puts the consumer and 
the bank in a relatively equal position. In the ePayment Code, a bank is also not allowed 
to use the defence with the sole evidence that the unauthorised ATM/debit card 
transaction had been conducted using the correct consumer ATM/debit card data and 
PIN. Therefore, it is believed that the adoption of the Code could also give greater 
incentives for bank and consumer in Indonesia to avoid losses from identity theft/fraud. 
On the one hand, it is expected that banks will have more incentives to improve their 
ATM/debit card infrastructure security features, including the use of surveillance and 
security guard personnel, and pay more attention to their agent or third party 
infrastructure and procedures, and give comprehensive fraud risk education to 
consumers. To be able avoid liability, it is believed that banks will put more 
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surveillance devices such as CCTV on their ATM infrastructure and ensure their regular 
maintenance. Hence, in first party fraud and second party fraud, the bank will have 
more opportunity to create a legitimate defence, by submitting that there more than just 
the fact that the correct card and PIN were used in the transaction. On the other hand, 
consumers also will have greater incentive to be more vigilant after having had fraud 
risk education from banks so as to avoid become the victim of fraud and/or be liable for 
losses. This ePayment Code can be adopted in Indonesia in either the banking industry 
code of conduct (or also known as ‘by-laws’) or in the form of Bank Indonesia’s 
Regulation (loss imposition).  
Conversely, the US fraud liability model (EFTA and Regulation E) which employs strict 
liability rules which put more liability on banks, though it probably has justification 
from loss-spreading, loss-reduction, and loss-imposition principle (by being easy to 
administer). However, it is feared that this kind of fraud liability model is not 
appropriate for retail payment system such as ATM/debit card transactions where 
consumer involvement in the initial transaction is necessary, especially as a holder of a 
payment card. Empirical evidence has also shown that consumers — as probably the 
weakest in the link in the ATM/debit card operation — have become a prominent target 
for identity theft, especially from social engineering attacks. Therefore, it is believed 
that the US fraud liability model will create disincentives, especially for consumers, to 
improve precautions. This result would be unfair for banks and it is feared that such an 
approach could nurture the proliferation of fraudulent activities. 
It is submitted, that even though this thesis specifically only discusses loss allocation 
rules for unauthorised ATM/debit card transactions, the economic, technological, and 
legal principles embedded in the discussion could arguably also be implemented in 
other types of unauthorised electronic banking transactions such as card not present, 
internet banking, and SMS banking fraud  of course with appropriate modification 
according to the specific point of compromise and e-banking circumstances. 
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PARTICIPATION INFORMATION SHEET FOR BANKS’ OFFICERS 
TITLE: 
 “Regulation of Unauthorised Electronic Funds Transfer and Consumer Protection 
in Indonesia: A Critical Analysis of Law and Practice” 
PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH: 
The aim of the research is to examine the adequacy and effectiveness of Indonesia’s law 
in dealing with increasing frauds in ATM/Debit Card transactions (unauthorised 
ATM/Debit Card transaction). In particular, this research will investigate how to impose 
fair civil and criminal liabilities for unauthorised ATM/Debit transactions in Indonesia, 
especially when there is no clear evidence in regard to who actually accessed the EFT 
system. This research is expected to create fair, detailed and better fraud liabilities 
regulation and practice, and also improve bank’s consumer protection and confident for 
banking Industries in Indonesia. 
INVESTIGATORS: 
Prof. Andrew Goldsmith 
Faculty of Law/ Centre for 
Transnational Crime 
Prevention 
+61 2 4221 8025 
agoldsmi@uow.edu.au  
Dr. Charles Chew 
Faculty of Law 
+61 417247736.  
charles@uow.edu.au 
Iwan Setiawan,  
Faculty of Law/ Centre for 
Transnational Crime 
Prevention,  
+61 433739823 
 is708@uow.edu.au 
METHOD & DEMANDS ON PARTICIPANTS: 
If you choose to be included you will be asked to participate in a one – two hour 
interview by Mr. Iwan Setiawan. On this visit the researcher will conduct face-to-face 
interview that will be audio taped to ascertain the factors that enable or inhibit 
unauthorised consumers ATM/Debit card transaction (EFT fraud) in your institution, 
along with its ramification such as how to apportioned liability for the money lost 
caused by the frauds. Since the unauthorised ATM/Debit card transactions contain 
difference aspects such as legal (private, criminal, cyber, and consumer protection law) 
and technical aspects relating to card based payment system (magnetic stripe, chip, 
switching network, fraud method such as skimmer, sniffing, etc), you are welcome to 
bring colleagues from different department to support you during the interview. 
Typical questions in the interview include: 
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1. Do you delivered ATM/Debit card transactions record to your consumers in
regular basis? If yes, in what form and how often?
2. Do you record any of unauthorised ATM/Debit card transaction that affects your
consumers?
3. What sorts of fraud methods have been employed by fraudsters to defraud your
consumer’s ATM/Debit Card?
4. Could you explain how your bank keeps update with the development/evolution
of e-banking fraud methods and the security features technology to tackle it?
5. If your ATM booth is equipped with CCTV camera, are you recording all
transactions 24/7? How long will the recording data be stored in your database?
6. How do you manage the legal relationship and adequate security standard of
your card based payment system with your affiliate third parties such as
merchants, sharing ATMs banks and switching companies?
7. Could you explain in brief how is your complaint handling mechanism
especially toward unauthorised ATM/Debit card transaction claim by your
consumer?
8. Could you explain what sort of actions by consumers you would consider as
negligent/fault conduct?
9. Do you have an opinion why law enforcers prefer to use old criminal law
(KUHP) in prosecuting ATM/Debit card perpetrators instead of new and more
severe cyberlaw as in Information and Electronic Transaction Law (UU ITE)?
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION: 
Your involvement in the study is voluntary and you may withdraw your participation 
from the study and any data that you have provided up until three months (90 days) 
since the interviewing date. Refusal to participate in the study will not affect your 
relationship with the University of Wollongong. 
CONFIDENTIALITY: 
The interview basically is conducted by the de-identifiable method. It means that no 
individual or organization/institution will be identified (unless there is consent). All data 
and information that is collected during the interview will remain confidential. The data 
and information will be stored securely at Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention, 
University of Wollongong. The data and information that have been obtained from you 
during the interview will be analysed along with that of the other participants in this 
study and used in the preparation of a thesis and associated academic publications.  
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE: 
A consent form is attached. You need to complete and sign the consent form and return 
it at the time of the interview. Once you have completed the form, you will be 
considered to have given your consent to be involved in the research. 
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BENEFITS: 
This study will not provide direct benefits to you personally. However, through 
participating in this research, you may be providing benefit to your organization/ 
institution and potential better card based payment system regulation in the future that 
could benefit both banking industries and improve consumer protection in Indonesia.  
POSSIBLE RISKS, INCONVENIENCES & DISCOMFORTS: 
Apart from the one – two hours of your time for the interview, we can foresee no risks 
for you. During the interview you will have the right to decide which questions to 
answer and which not. As mentioned before, there will be de-identifiable method in 
collecting and processing data, both for individuals and organisations/institutions. 
Therefore, individual and collective interests will be protected for the entire process of 
the research, including after the completion of the research. The interview will focus on 
how laws and technical mechanisms are implemented at the practical level.  
ETHICS REVIEW & COMPLAINTS: 
If you have any further questions about this study, please contact Professor Goldsmith 
or Dr. Chew (details provided above). You will also have the opportunity to ask 
questions to the researcher before, during and after the interview.  
This study has been reviewed by the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC), 
social sciences of the University of Wollongong. If you have any concerns or 
complaints regarding the way this research has been conducted, you can contact the 
UOW Ethics Officer on +61 (2) 4221 3386 or email: rso-ethics@uow.edu.au.  
Thank you for your interest in this study. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR BANKS’ OFFICERS 
TITLE: 
“Regulation of Unauthorised Electronic Funds Transfer and Consumer Protection 
in Indonesia: A Critical Analysis of Law and Practice”  
1. When was the first time your ATM and Debit card product published in 
Indonesia? 
2. Could you please tell me how many consumers’ saving account that you have in 
your bank? 
3. How many consumers’ saving accounts that also equipped with ATM/Debit 
cards? 
4. From your consumers’ saving accounts that also equipped with ATM/Debit 
card, how many of them that also having an Internet Banking account? 
5. Can your consumers open a saving account without having an ATM/Debit card?  
6. Whether your consumers of ATM/Debit card must have used the ATM/Debit 
card along with their pass-book saving account in withdrawal cash at bank 
teller? 
7. Do you delivered ATM/Debit card transactions record to your consumers in 
regular basis? If yes, in what form and how often? 
8. Do you automatically notify consumers immediately, i.e. via SMS to their 
mobile once there is transaction occuring in their account?  
9. If none of the above notification methods apply, how does a customer know 
about their ATM/Debit card transaction records? 
10. Do you record any of unauthorised ATM/Debit card transaction that affects your 
consumers?  
11. What sorts of fraud methods have been employed by fraudsters to defraud your 
consumer’s ATM/Debit Card?  
12. Are you consider all those ATM/Debit card fraud methods that commonly 
employed by fraudster such as skimming, card trapping, etc. as a foreseeable 
risk?  
13. Do you have data about ATM/Debit card fraud that has affected your consumer 
and how much its damages (if possible yearly data in the last five years or 
more)? 
14. Could you explain how your bank keeps update with the development/evolution 
of e-banking fraud methods and the security features technology to tackle it? 
15. Why your bank has been relying quite a long time on magnetic stripe as a 
storage data on the ATM/Debit card which notoriously has been long know with 
it vulnerabilities and inherent foreseeable risks for card counterfeiting by various 
relatively easy method?  
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16. Do you use ATM and Debit Card system with ‘neural networking’ system that
commonly employed in credit card system to help bank fraud management
detect unauthorised ATM/Debit card transaction immediately?
17. If your ATM booth is equipped with CCTV camera, are you recording all
transactions 24/7? How long will the recording data be stored in your database?
18. Are consumers’ PIN and ATM/Debit card data encrypted during transmission
from electronic agent site (ATM/EDC) to banks’ data centre and vice versa?
19. Which fraud prevention method (physical/logical) have you employed to prevent
particular consumer’s ATM/Debit card data/ATM-Debit card being stolen at
your particular point of compromised (PoC):
PoC Targeted 
Object 
Fraud 
Method 
Fraud Pre-
vention has 
employed & 
percentage of 
coverage to 
all your PoC? 
Remark 
ATM 
Machine 
Card Data 
in mag. 
stripe 
Skimming 
ATM/Debit 
card 
Card trapping/ 
Lebanese loop 
PIN Pin pad overlay/ 
key logger 
ATM/Debit 
card 
data/PIN 
Insert sniffing 
device in ATM 
machine  
Bank 
database 
centre 
Consumers 
ATM/Debit 
card + PIN 
Cracking or 
insider attack 
ATM 
booth 
PIN Pin hole camera 
PIN Fake CS phone 
sticker + social 
engineering 
PIN Shoulder surfing 
ATM 
Network 
Card data + 
PIN 
Sniffing/man in 
the middle attack 
Merchants Debit card 
data + PIN 
at EFT-
POS 
Insert sniffing 
device in EFT 
POS machine 
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machine 
Merchants Debit card 
data at 
mag-stripe 
Illegal skimming 
using skimmer 
  
‘Legal’ 
skimming using 
cashiers cash 
register machine 
  
PIN Pin hole camera   
  Peep by cashier   
Merchant 
database 
centre 
Debit card 
data + PIN 
Cracking or 
insider attack 
  
20. Do you think consumer’s PIN in ATM/Debit card transaction is equal to 
consumer’s signature in paper based transactions (such as signature in cheque)? 
21. Do you think merely ATM/Debit card with : 
a). magnetic stripe + PIN Data; or 
b).Chip + PIN Data; 
have already fulfilled ‘non repudiation’ aspect of IT security and legal 
requirement? 
22. Do you have any plan to migrate to chip based card payment system for your 
ATM/Debit Card? 
23. Do you think chip based payment card is infallible?  
24. How do you manage the legal relationship and adequate security standard of 
your card based payment system with your affiliate third parties such as 
merchants, sharing ATMs banks and switching companies?  
25. Is your bank allowed your counterpart’s merchants to ‘swipe’ consumer’s card 
to their cash machine/computer register instead of just at EFT-POS/EDC 
terminal? (Are you aware of all consumer debit card data (track 1 and 2) then 
also stored at merchants computer)? 
26. Explain in which way your consumer could report the occurrence of 
unauthorised ATM/Debit card transaction?  
27. Is the ‘bank’s hot line’ available for 24/7?  
28. Is all conversation happen in bank’s hot-line be recorded? 
29. Could you specify all these banks’ hot line access (phone numbers, email 
address, etc). 
30. Could you explain in brief how is your complaint handling mechanism 
especially toward unauthorised ATM/Debit card transaction claim by your 
consumer? 
31. Is there any expired date for unauthorised ATM/Debit card transaction claim by 
consumer? 
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32. How you resolve unauthorised ATM/Debit card case where the point of
compromised to consumers data has happened in other banks or third parties
electronic agent (ATM/EDC), i.e in ATMs sharing or ATM owned by switching
companies. Who will be liable for the consumers’ loss?
33. In the event consumers’ ATM/Debit card data were being compromised in your
own electronic agent site (ATM/EFT-POS/EDC) where impossible to
distinguished whether the fraudster were first party or third party, how you
resolve the problem and who should bear all the loss?
34. When unauthorised ATM/Debit card transactions occurs that drain consumers’
funds in his/her account within your bank, how and in what grounds do you
apportioned liabilities between bank, consumer and/or third parties, in the event
of:
a). consumer negligence/faulty;
b) Third party (affiliation institution) negligence/fault;
c). Bank negligence/fault; 
d) Bank, third party, and/or consumer sharing negligence/fault;
35. Could you explain what sort of actions by consumers you would consider as
negligent/fault conduct?
36. Do you distinguished negligence with gross negligence?
37. What is your policy regarding unauthorised ATM/Debit card transaction that
still occur after consumer has notified you?
38. In what circumstances will the consumer money that had been stolen by
fraudster be replaced by the bank?
39. According to your experiences after investigating unauthorised ATM/Debit card
claimed by consumers, who were the most common perpetrators revealed:
bank’s/counterparts party employee, consumers itself, consumer’s
acquaintances, or unknown third party?
40. What is your stance in terms of liability regarding unauthorised ATM/Debit card
transactions that have happened under conditions below:
o It was conducted with consumer consent by consumer acquaintances such as
spouse, family member, work colleagues, ‘office boy/girl’, and alike.
o It was conducted without consumer consent by consumer acquaintances
such as spouse, family member, work colleagues, ‘office boy/girl’, and
alike.
o It was conducted under duress or threatening;
o It was conducted by unknown third party/fraudsters;
o It was conducted under hypnosis.
41. In the disputes between bank and consumer regarding unauthorised ATM/Debit
card transactions, who should have burden of proof? Why?
42. When your ATM/Debit card has Visa/MasterCard logo in it, is there any ‘zero
liabilities rules’ apply by Visa/MasterCard to the cards if unauthorised
ATM/Debit Card has occurred?
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43. Why do you still have indemnity clause in your consumer-banking contract 
which limit your liability and deliver most liability to your consumer, which 
might be in conflict with the provisions of the Indonesian Consumer Protection 
Act? 
44. If fraud liabilities that relatively have no regulation should be regulating, which 
regulation model is do you think best for banking industries in Indonesia: 
legislation act (UU), Bank Indonesia Regulation (PBI) or banks’ bye laws/code 
of conduct? 
45. When contentious disputes occurred between you and your customer over 
unauthorised ATM/Debit card transaction and could not be resolved internally, 
which legal settlement is more preferable for you between court, Consumer 
Settlement Disputes Body (Badan Penyelesaian Sengketa Konsumen), or 
Banking Mediation Directorate (Direktorat Mediasi Perbankan – Bank 
Indonesia) and why?  
46. One of the Indonesia’ Supreme Court decision constitute bank’s failure to secure 
its ATM booth that enable fraudulent activities have consequences for banks to 
cover all consumer’s damages. What do you think about this decision? 
47. As can be read in many articles in national news papers/on-line news, it’s very 
common bank withdrawal consumers’ claim over unauthorised ATM/Debit card 
transactions only by the fact that ‘purported’ consumer using the right card data 
and PIN. What is your opinion about this phenomenon? 
48. Different countries have different regulation over unauthorised ATM/Debit card 
transaction. In United States, in principle, banks will always be liable for 
unauthorised ATM/Debit card transactions, regardless of any negligent conduct 
by the consumers. In Australia and European Union countries, consumers only 
should liable for unauthorised ATM/Debit card transaction if he/she has 
conducted gross negligence. Other than that, banks are forbidden by regulation 
to use ATM/Debit card data including right PIN number as the only factor to 
authorise the ATM/Debit card transactions. What do you think if these 
regulations are going to be implemented in Indonesia? 
49. Could you explain in what ways and how often you have consumer education 
programmes? 
50. Does your consumer education programmes includes state of the art of 
ATM/Debit card fraud methods? 
51. How do you gauge that your consumer education programmes can effectively 
reach all segment of your consumer?  
52. Could you provide me some examples (letters, brochures, leaflets, etc) of your 
consumer education programmes? 
53. Do you think all these ATM/Debit fraud wave that recently happened in 
Indonesia will impact on consumers’ confidence in saving their money in the 
bank and/or conducting ATM/Debit card transactions?  
 
432 
 
  
54. According to your knowledge, do you know whether or not transnational crime 
actors (international criminal networks) are involved in ATM/Debit fraud in 
Indonesia? 
55. Do you have any civil litigation experience regarding consumer’s claim over 
unauthorised ATM/Debit card transactions in the past ten years?  
56. Do you have any experienced that one or more fraudsters that defraud your bank 
have been convicted by criminal court? If yes, could you provide me a copy/ of 
the court verdicts? 
57. In general, are you satisfied with some district court criminal verdict over 
unauthorised ATM/Debit card perpetrators in Indonesia?  
58. Do you have an opinion why law enforcers prefer to use old criminal law 
(KUHP) in prosecuting ATM/Debit card perpetrators instead of new and more 
severe cyberlaw as in Information and Electronic Transaction Law (UU ITE)? 
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PARTICIPATION INFORMATION SHEET FOR BANK/SECURITY EXPERTS 
TITLE: 
 “Regulation of Unauthorised Electronic Funds Transfer and Consumer Protection 
in Indonesia: A Critical Analysis of Law and Practice”  
 
PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH :  
The aim of the research is to examine the adequacy and effectiveness of Indonesia’s law 
in dealing with increasing frauds in ATM/Debit Card transactions (unauthorised 
ATM/Debit Card transaction). In particular, this research will investigate how to impose 
fair civil and criminal liabilities for unauthorised ATM/Debit transactions in Indonesia, 
especially when there is no clear evidence in regard to who actually accessed the EFT 
system. This research is expected to create fair, detailed and better fraud liabilities 
regulation and practice, and also improve bank’s consumer protection and confident for 
banking Industries in Indonesia. 
INVESTIGATORS : 
 
Prof. Andrew Goldsmith 
Faculty of Law/ Centre for 
Transnational Crime 
Prevention 
+61 2 4221 8025 
agoldsmi@uow.edu.au  
 
Dr. Charles Chew 
Faculty of Law 
+61 417247736.  
charles@uow.edu.au  
 
 
Iwan Setiawan,  
Faculty of Law/ Centre for 
Transnational Crime 
Prevention,  
+61 433739823 
 is708@uow.edu.au 
 
 
METHOD & DEMANDS ON PARTICIPANTS:  
If you choose to be included you will be asked to participate in a one – two hour 
interview by Mr. Iwan Setiawan. On this visit the researcher will conduct face-to-face 
interview that will be audio taped to ascertain the factors that enable or inhibit 
unauthorised consumers ATM/Debit card transaction (EFT fraud) in your institution, 
along with its ramification such as how to apportioned liability for the money lost 
caused by the frauds. Since the unauthorised ATM/Debit card transactions contain 
difference aspects such as legal (private, criminal, cyber, and consumer protection law) 
and technical aspects relating to card based payment system (magnetic stripe, chip, 
switching network, fraud method such as skimmer, sniffing, etc), you are welcome to 
bring colleagues from different department to support you during the interview. 
Typical questions in the interview: 
 
434 
 
  
1. What is your comment concerning unauthorised ATM/Debit Card transactions that 
are on the rise in Indonesia? 
2. What sorts of fraud methods have been employed by fraudsters to steal banks’ 
consumer’s ATM/Debit card data?  
3. Which fraud prevention methods should be implemented by banks in Indonesia in 
order to prevent unauthorised ATM/Debit card transactions to occur by various 
fraud methods?  
4. Do you think the implementation of ATM security features such as anti-skimmer 
devices, jitter; etc by banks in Indonesia could overcome unauthorised ATM/debit 
card problems? 
5. Do you think chip based payment card will be infallible, therefore consumers will 
be always liable in the event of unauthorised ATM/Debit Card transactions?  
6. Do you think consumer’s PIN in ATM/Debit card transaction is equal to consumer’s 
signature in paper based transactions (such as signature in cheque)? 
  
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION:  
Your involvement in the study is voluntary and you may withdraw your participation 
from the study and any data that you have provided up until three months (90 days) 
since the interviewing date. Refusal to participate in the study will not affect your 
relationship with the University of Wollongong. 
CONFIDENTIALITY:  
The interview basically is conducted by the de-identifiable method. It means that no 
individual or organization/institution will be identified (unless there is consent). All data 
and information that is collected during the interview will remain confidential. The data 
and information will be stored securely at Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention, 
University of Wollongong. The data and information that have been obtained from you 
during the interview will be analysed along with that of the other participants in this 
study and used in the preparation of a thesis and associated academic publications.  
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE: 
A consent form is attached. You need to complete and sign the consent form and return 
it at the time of the interview. Once you have completed the form, you will be 
considered to have given your consent to be involved in the research. 
BENEFITS:  
This study will not provide direct benefits to you personally. However, through 
participating in this research, you may be providing benefit to your organization/ 
institution and potential better card based payment system regulation in the future that 
could benefit both banking industries and improve consumer protection in Indonesia.  
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POSSIBLE RISKS, INCONVENIENCES & DISCOMFORTS: 
Apart from the one – two hours of your time for the interview, we can foresee no risks 
for you. During the interview you will have the right to decide which questions to 
answer and which not. As mentioned before, there will be de-identifiable method in 
collecting and processing data, both for individuals and organisations/institutions. 
Therefore, individual and collective interests will be protected for the entire process of 
the research, including after the completion of the research. The interview will focus on 
how laws and technical mechanisms are implemented at the practical level.  
ETHICS REVIEW & COMPLAINTS: 
If you have any further questions about this study, please contact Professor Goldsmith 
or Dr. Chew (details provided above). You will also have the opportunity to ask 
questions to the researcher before, during and after the interview.  
This study has been reviewed by the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC), 
social sciences of the University of Wollongong. If you have any concerns or 
complaints regarding the way this research has been conducted, you can contact the 
UOW Ethics Officer on +61 (2) 4221 3386 or email: rso-ethics@uow.edu.au.  
Thank you for your interest in this study. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR BANK/SECURITY EXPERTS 
TITLE: 
“Regulation of Unauthorised Electronic Funds Transfer and Consumer Protection 
in Indonesia: A Critical Analysis of Law and Practice”  
 
1. What is your comment concerning unauthorised ATM/Debit Card transactions 
that are on the rise in Indonesia? 
2. What sorts of fraud methods have been employed by fraudsters to steal banks’ 
consumer’s ATM/Debit card data?  
3. What are the most common fraud methods that have been employed by fraudsters 
to defraud bank’s consumer’s ATM/Debit Card?  
4. Which fraud prevention methods should be implemented by banks in Indonesia in 
order to prevent unauthorised ATM/Debit card transactions to occur by various 
fraud methods such as ‘skimming’+ pin hole camera, pin-pad overlay, social 
engineering using ‘fake customer service/call centre sticker’, shoulder surfing, and 
‘Lebanese loop’?  
5. Why has the bank been relying only on the magnetic stripe technology as a storage 
data on the ATM/Debit card when it has been known for a long time to be very 
vulnerable to card counterfeiting? 
6. Do you think the implementation of neural network method is useful for bank in 
order to help bank fraud management detect unauthorised ATM/Debit card 
transactions immediately?  
7. Do you think the implementation of ATM security features such as anti-skimmer 
devices, jitter; etc by banks in Indonesia could overcome unauthorised ATM/debit 
card problems? 
8. Do you think installation of security cameras in every ATM booth is important? 
9. Do you think banks in Indonesia have adequate security standard in their card 
based payment system?  
10. When unauthorised ATM/Debit card transactions have occurred, which party is 
more likely have to bear the fraud loss? Why?  
11. Different countries have different regulations over unauthorised ATM/Debit card 
transaction. In United States, in principle, banks are liable for unauthorised 
ATM/Debit card transactions, regardless of any negligent conduct by the 
consumers. In Australia and European Union countries, consumers are only liable 
for unauthorised ATM/Debit card transaction if he/she has conducted gross 
negligence. Other than that, banks are forbidden by regulation to use ATM/Debit 
card data including right PIN number as the only factor to authorise the 
ATM/Debit card transactions. What do you think if these regulations are to be 
implemented in Indonesia?  
 
437 
 
  
12. Do you think chip based payment card will be infallible, therefore consumers will 
be always liable in the event of unauthorised ATM/Debit Card transactions?  
13. What is your opinion regarding merchants’ practices to swipe consumer’s card to 
their cash machine/computer register instead of just at EFT-POS/EDC terminal? 
14. Do you think all these ATM/Debit fraud wave that recently happened in Indonesia 
will impact on consumers’ confidence in saving their money in the bank and/or 
conducting ATM/Debit card transactions?  
15. Do you have any suggestions for banks and Banks Indonesia in order to reduce 
unauthorised ATM/Debit card transactions in Indonesia? 
16. Could you explain typology of ATM/Debit card fraudsters?  
17. Do you consider of ATM/Debit card fraud as high technology crime or just low 
technology crime? 
18. According to your knowledge, are consumers’ PIN and ATM/Debit card data 
encrypted during transmission from electronic agent site (ATM/EDC) to banks’ 
data centre and vice versa? 
19. Do you think consumer’s PIN in ATM/Debit card transaction is equal to 
consumer’s signature in paper based transactions (such as signature in cheque)? 
20. Do you think merely ATM/Debit card with : 
a). magnetic stripe + PIN Data; or 
b).Chip + PIN Data; 
Have already fulfilled ‘non repudiation’ aspect of IT security and legal 
requirement? 
21. According to your knowledge, are transnational crime actors (international criminal 
networks) involved in ATM/Debit fraud in Indonesia?  
22. Do you have any suggestions to consumers or banks to prevent their electronic 
banking transactions being victimized by fraudster? 
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PARTICIPATION INFORMATION SHEET FOR BANK’S CONSUMERS 
TITLE: 
“Regulation of Unauthorised Electronic Funds Transfer and Consumer Protection 
in Indonesia: A Critical Analysis of Law and Practice”  
 
PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH:  
The aim of the research is to examine the adequacy and effectiveness of Indonesia’s law 
in dealing with increasing frauds in ATM/Debit Card transactions (unauthorised 
ATM/Debit Card transaction). In particular, this research will investigate how to impose 
fair civil and criminal liabilities for unauthorised ATM/Debit transactions in Indonesia, 
especially when there is no clear evidence in regard to who actually accessed the EFT 
system. This research is expected to create fair, detailed and better fraud liabilities 
regulation and practice, and also improve bank’s consumer protection and confident for 
banking Industries in Indonesia. 
INVESTIGATORS: 
 
Prof. Andrew Goldsmith 
Faculty of Law/ 
Centre for 
Transnational 
Crime Prevention 
+61 2 4221 8025 
agoldsmi@uow.edu.au  
 
Dr. Charles Chew 
Faculty of Law 
+61 417247736.  
charles@uow.edu.au  
 
 
Iwan Setiawan,  
Faculty of Law/ Centre for 
Transnational Crime 
Prevention,  
+61 433739823 
 is708@uow.edu.au 
 
 
METHOD & DEMANDS ON PARTICIPANTS:  
If you choose to be included you will be asked to participate in a one – two hour 
interview by Mr. Iwan Setiawan. On this visit the researcher will conduct face-to-face 
interview that will be audio taped to ascertain the factors that enable or inhibit 
unauthorised consumers ATM/Debit card transaction (EFT fraud) in your institution, 
along with its ramification such as how to apportioned liability for the money lost 
caused by the frauds. Since the unauthorised ATM/Debit card transactions contain 
difference aspects such as legal (private, criminal, cyber, and consumer protection law) 
and technical aspects relating to card based payment system (magnetic stripe, chip, 
switching network, fraud method such as skimmer, sniffing, etc), you are welcome to 
bring colleagues from different department to support you during the interview. 
Typical questions in the interview: 
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1. Do you have to use your ATM/Debit card along with your pass-book to 
withdrawn your money from bank’s teller?  
2. Does your bank send your ATM/Debit card or saving account detail transaction 
report regularly to you, such as monthly reports? In what way and how often does 
the bank send this report?  
3. Do you think your bank’s ATM/Debit card systems are infallible?  
4. Do you use your birthday date or part of your birthday date as your PIN? 
5. Have you experienced unauthorised ATM/Debit card transaction?  
6. What do you know about the magnetic stripe in your ATM/Debit card? 
7.  Do you think the bank’s education programmes are adequate enough to make you 
understand about e-banking risk and the way how to avoid them? 
 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION:  
Your involvement in the study is voluntary and you may withdraw your participation 
from the study and any data that you have provided up until three months (90 days) 
since the interviewing date. Refusal to participate in the study will not affect your 
relationship with the University of Wollongong. 
CONFIDENTIALITY:  
The interview basically is conducted by the de-identifiable method. It means that no 
individual or organization/institution will be identified (unless there is consent). All data 
and information that is collected during the interview will remain confidential. The data 
and information will be stored securely at Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention, 
University of Wollongong. The data and information that have been obtained from you 
during the interview will be analysed along with that of the other participants in this 
study and used in the preparation of a thesis and associated academic publications.  
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE: 
A consent form is attached. You need to complete and sign the consent form and return 
it at the time of the interview. Once you have completed the form, you will be 
considered to have given your consent to be involved in the research. 
BENEFITS:  
This study will not provide direct benefits to you personally. However, through 
participating in this research, you may be providing benefit to your organization/ 
institution and potential better card based payment system regulation in the future that 
could benefit both banking industries and improve consumer protection in Indonesia.  
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POSSIBLE RISKS, INCONVENIENCES & DISCOMFORTS: 
Apart from the one – two hours of your time for the interview, we can foresee no risks 
for you. During the interview you will have the right to decide which questions to 
answer and which not. As mentioned before, there will be de-identifiable method in 
collecting and processing data, both for individuals and organisations/institutions. 
Therefore, individual and collective interests will be protected for the entire process of 
the research, including after the completion of the research. The interview will focus on 
how laws and technical mechanisms are implemented at the practical level.  
ETCHICS REVIEW & COMPLAINTS: 
If you have any further questions about this study, please contact Professor Goldsmith 
or Dr. Chew (details provided above). You will also have the opportunity to ask 
questions to the researcher before, during and after the interview.  
This study has been reviewed by the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC), 
social sciences of the University of Wollongong. If you have any concerns or 
complaints regarding the way this research has been conducted, you can contact the 
UOW Ethics Officer on +61 (2) 4221 3386 or email: rso-ethics@uow.edu.au.  
Thank you for your interest in this study. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CONSUMERS  
TITLE: 
“Regulation of Unauthorised Electronic Funds Transfer and Consumer Protection 
in Indonesia: A Critical Analysis of Law and Practice”  
1. What is your bank’s name where you have ATM/Debit Card facility? 
2. Did you read all terms and condition in your contract with bank when opening a 
saving account with ATM/Debit card features? 
3. Do you have to use your ATM/Debit card along with your pass-book to withdrawn 
your money from bank’s teller?  
4. Does your bank send your ATM/Debit card or saving account detail transaction 
report regularly to you, such as monthly reports? In what way and how often does 
the bank send this report if any? 
5. Does your bank notify you immediately by SMS every time you finished your 
ATM/Debit card transactions? 
6. Do you have Internet banking facility where you can see all your detail ATM/Debit 
card transactions? If yes, how many months backward can you retrieve the monthly 
report? 
7. Do you think your bank’s ATM/Debit card systems are infallible? 
8. How many digits are your ATM/Debit cards PIN? 
9. Did you change the default PIN from your bank to your own series of number as 
your new PIN? 
10. Do you change your ATM/Debit card PIN regularly?  
11. Do you use your birthday date or part of your birthday date as your PIN? 
12. Do you use easy numbers to remember such as 1234 as your PIN? 
13. Do you put your PIN record inside your wallet or purse/bag or even stick it to your 
ATM/Debit card to help you write down PIN during ATM/Debit card transaction? If 
yes, whether this PIN record 
o Disguise? Or 
o Not disguise. 
14. Will you revealed your PIN if someone from the banks asks you to, as prerequisite 
for one particular banks’ service? 
15. Do you know your bank’s consumer service / hot line number? Do you record this 
number in your mobile phone? 
16. Have you ever asked a favor from your trusted person to withdraw or transfer 
money using your ATM/Debit card and PIN (such as spouse, children, best friends, 
girl/boy friend or your trusted ‘office boy/girl’ in the office)? 
17. Have you experienced unauthorised ATM/Debit card transaction?  
18. If the answer of question 17 is ‘yes’, could you explain how your money was lost 
from your bank and whether or not bank replaced your money? 
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19. Do you know that conducting electronic banking including ATM/Debit card 
transaction has certain risk including fraud risk?  
20. Do you know that fraudster targeted bank’s consumer ATM/Debit card data in order 
to make unauthorised ATM/Debit card transactions?  
21. If your answer to questions 19 and 20 is ‘yes’, how do you know this knowledge: 
o From my bank; 
o From Bank Indonesia as a central bank; 
o From other source such as email from experts, mailing list, news paper article, 
etc. 
22. Do you examine ATM booth and ATM machine carefully to find something unusual 
before conducting ATM/Debit card transaction?  
23. Do you know what is these terminology mean: 
o pin-hole camera; 
o skimmer; 
o pin-pad overlay; 
o card trapping;  
o fake CS stickers; or 
o Shoulder surfing. 
24. Do you always cover the PIN-pad at the ATM booth or merchant’s EFT-POS EDC 
before conducting ATM/Debit card transactions? Why?  
25. What will you do if for some reason, your ATM/Debit card got stuck inside the 
ATM machine: 
o Call the bank’s consumer service number sticker as shown at the ATM booth; 
o Ask help from ‘a good Samaritan’ around the ATM booth; 
o Check the ATM machine especially the card entrance hole in ATM machine to 
find anything that unusual such as black sticky tape, black ribbon, or alike. 
o Something else, please explain…. 
26. If case like number 25 happened to you and you call your bank’s customer service 
(CS) number as shown in the stickers at the ATM booth, and according to the CS 
the only way to secure your ATM/Debit card is to give your PIN to the CS in order 
to enable the CS to cancel your card and issue a new one, would you give your PIN? 
27. What do you know about magnetic stripe in your ATM/Debit card? 
28. What do you know about chip based payment card? 
29. Would you perform an ATM/Debit card transaction at another bank’s ATM/EFT-
POS? Why?  
30. Indonesia has suffered from massive ATM fraud back in 2010 such as what 
happened in Bali which caused damaged more than 10 billion Rupiahs. Do you 
think such fact will affect your confidence to conduct ATM/Debit card transactions? 
31. In many cases as you might have read from mass-media, many bank’s consumers 
claim that unauthorised ATM/Debit card transaction have been rejected by banks on 
the grounds that consumers have obligation to secure its ATM/Debit card and PIN 
secrecy, and the transactions are deem valid because the right card and PIN have 
been used. What do you think about this fact? 
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32. In contrast with statement number 31, in many other countries such as US and 
Australia, banks in most of the cases is obligated by law or by code of conduct to 
replace consumer’s damage caused by unauthorised ATM/Debit card transaction – 
except if it can be proved that the consumer is at fault due to gross negligence. Do 
you thing this kind of regulation could increase your confidence on conducting EFT 
transactions in Indonesia? 
33. According to you, in regard of unauthorised ATM/Debit card transactions, which 
party is deemed should be liable for the damages? 
34. If a consumer is negligent or careless when using his/her ATM/Debit card so that 
the fraudster is able to obtain the consumer’s EFT data including PIN, do you thing 
its fair and right if consumer should bear all or some part of his/her loss of money? 
35. Have you heard about: 
o Bank Indonesia’s Directorate of Mediation and Investigation; 
o Consumer Settlement Disputes Body; or 
o Civil Court; 
which of these bodies have capability to help resolve contentious disputes between 
consumer and the bank concerning unauthorised ATM/Debit card transactions? 
36. If your answer to question number 35 is “yes”, which institution is more preferable 
for you to settle the disputes: court, Consumer Settlement Disputes Body (Badan 
Penyelesaian Sengketa Konsumen), or Banking Mediation Directorate (Direktorat 
Mediasi Perbankan – Bank Indonesia) and why?  
37. Banks in Indonesia have obligation to educate its consumer about many aspect of 
banking including e-banking fraud. Have you received any kind of e-banking risk 
education programme during your account relationship with your bank? If yes, how 
did you get this education programme: 
o Via bank’s TV programme; 
o Via bank’s news paper programme; 
o Via bank’s letter; 
o Via bank’s statement; 
o Via bank’s email; 
o Via bank’s SMS; 
o Via bank’s flyers or pamphlet;  
o Via bank’s other sources: …….. 
38.  Do you think bank’s education programmes are adequate enough to make you 
understand about e-banking risk and the way how to avoid them? 
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PARTICIPATION INFORMATION SHEET FOR LAW ENFORCERS 
OFFICERS 
TITLE: 
“Regulation of Unauthorised Electronic Funds Transfer and Consumer Protection 
in Indonesia: A Critical Analysis of Law and Practice”  
 
PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH :  
The aim of the research is to examine the adequacy and effectiveness of Indonesia’s law 
in dealing with increasing frauds in ATM/Debit Card transactions (unauthorised 
ATM/Debit Card transaction). In particular, this research will investigate how to impose 
fair civil and criminal liabilities for unauthorised ATM/Debit transactions in Indonesia, 
especially when there is no clear evidence in regard to who actually accessed the EFT 
system. This research is expected to create fair, detailed and better fraud liabilities 
regulation and practice, and also improve bank’s consumer protection and confident for 
banking Industries in Indonesia. 
INVESTIGATORS : 
 
Prof. Andrew Goldsmith 
Faculty of Law/ Centre for 
Transnational Crime 
Prevention 
+61 2 4221 8025 
agoldsmi@uow.edu.au  
 
Dr. Charles Chew 
Faculty of Law 
+61 417247736.  
charles@uow.edu.au  
 
 
Iwan Setiawan,  
Faculty of Law/ Centre for 
Transnational Crime 
Prevention,  
+61 433739823 
 is708@uow.edu.au 
 
 
METHOD & DEMANDS ON PARTICIPANTS:  
If you choose to be included you will be asked to participate in a one – two hour 
interview by Mr. Iwan Setiawan. On this visit the researcher will conduct face-to-face 
interview that will be audio taped to ascertain the factors that enable or inhibit 
unauthorised consumers ATM/Debit card transaction (EFT fraud) in your institution, 
along with its ramification such as how to apportioned liability for the money lost 
caused by the frauds. Since the unauthorised ATM/Debit card transactions contain 
difference aspects such as legal (private, criminal, cyber, and consumer protection law) 
and technical aspects relating to card based payment system (magnetic stripe, chip, 
switching network, fraud method such as skimmer, sniffing, etc), you are welcome to 
bring colleagues from different department to support you during the interview. 
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Typical questions in the interview: 
1. Do you record any of the unauthorised ATM/Debit card transaction cases that have 
been brought to you on a national scale?  
2. What are the most common fraud methods that have been employed by fraudsters 
to defraud bank’s consumer’s ATM/Debit Card?  
3. Could you explain typology of ATM/Debit card fraudsters? 
4. According to your knowledge/experience, whether or not transnational crime actors 
(international criminal networks) are involved in ATM/Debit fraud in Indonesia? 
5. According to several criminal court verdicts over some ATM/Debit Card fraudster, 
all the fraudster of unauthorised ATM/Debit card transactions including those 
responsible for ATM fraud deluge in Jakarta and Bali in 2010 - have been 
convicted by old criminal code provisions (KUHP), even though relatively new 
‘cyber crime law’ such as Information and Electronic Transactions Law (UU ITE) 
which have more severe punishment for fraudster of unauthorised ATM/Debit card 
transactions, have been enacted in 2008 (according to Indonesia law system, special 
law should be prevail over general law). Could you explain why law enforcers 
prefer to use old provisions in KUHP instead of UU ITE? 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION:  
Your involvement in the study is voluntary and you may withdraw your participation 
from the study and any data that you have provided up until three months (90 days) 
since the interviewing date. Refusal to participate in the study will not affect your 
relationship with the University of Wollongong. 
CONFIDENTIALITY:  
The interview basically is conducted by the de-identifiable method. It means that no 
individual or organization/institution will be identified (unless there is consent). All data 
and information that is collected during the interview will remain confidential. The data 
and information will be stored securely at Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention, 
University of Wollongong. The data and information that have been obtained from you 
during the interview will be analysed along with that of the other participants in this 
study and used in the preparation of a thesis and associated academic publications.  
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE: 
A consent form is attached. You need to complete and sign the consent form and return 
it at the time of the interview. Once you have completed the form, you will be 
considered to have given your consent to be involved in the research. 
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BENEFITS:  
This study will not provide direct benefits to you personally. However, through 
participating in this research, you may be providing benefit to your organization/ 
institution and potential better card based payment system regulation in the future that 
could benefit both banking industries and improve consumer protection in Indonesia.  
POSSIBLE RISKS, INCONVENIENCES & DISCOMFORTS: 
Apart from the one – two hours of your time for the interview, we can foresee no risks 
for you. During the interview you will have the right to decide which questions to 
answer and which not. As mentioned before, there will be de-identifiable method in 
collecting and processing data, both for individuals and organisations/institutions. 
Therefore, individual and collective interests will be protected for the entire process of 
the research, including after the completion of the research. The interview will focus on 
how laws and technical mechanisms are implemented at the practical level.  
ETHICS REVIEW & COMPLAINTS: 
If you have any further questions about this study, please contact Professor Goldsmith 
or Dr. Chew (details provided above). You will also have the opportunity to ask 
questions to the researcher before, during and after the interview.  
This study has been reviewed by the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC), 
social sciences of the University of Wollongong. If you have any concerns or 
complaints regarding the way this research has been conducted, you can contact the 
UOW Ethics Officer on +61 (2) 4221 3386 or email: rso-ethics@uow.edu.au.  
Thank you for your interest in this study. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR LAW ENFORCERS OFFICERS 
TITLE: 
“Regulation of Unauthorised Electronic Funds Transfer and Consumer Protection 
in Indonesia: A Critical Analysis of Law and Practice”  
 
1. Do you record any of the unauthorised ATM/Debit card transaction cases that 
have been brought to you on a national scale?  
2. What are the most common fraud methods that have been employed by fraudsters 
to defraud bank’s consumer’s ATM/Debit Card?  
3. Do you think installation of security cameras in every ATM booth is important? 
4. Do you think banks in Indonesia have adequate security standard in their card 
based payment system?  
5. Could you explain typology of ATM/Debit card fraudsters? 
6. According to your knowledge/experience, whether or not transnational crime 
actors (international criminal networks) are involved in ATM/Debit fraud in 
Indonesia? 
7. Do you think of ATM/Debit card fraud as high technology crime or just low 
technology crime? 
8. Do you think consumer’s PIN in ATM/Debit card transaction is equal to 
consumer’s signature in paper based transactions (such as signature in cheque)? 
9. Do you think merely ATM/Debit card with : 
10. a). magnetic stripe + PIN Data; or 
11. b).Chip + PIN Data; 
12. Have already fulfilled ‘non repudiation’ aspect of IT security and legal 
requirement? 
13. Do you have any suggestions to consumers or banks to prevent their electronic 
banking transactions especially ATM/Debit card transactions being victimized by 
fraudster? 
14. According to several criminal court verdicts over some ATM/Debit Card 
fraudster, all the fraudster of unauthorised ATM/Debit card transactions including 
those responsible for ATM fraud deluge in Jakarta and Bali in 2010 - have been 
convicted by old criminal code provisions (KUHP), even though relatively new 
‘cyber crime law’ such as Information and Electronic Transactions Law (UU ITE) 
which have more severe punishment for fraudster of unauthorised ATM/Debit 
card transactions, have been enacted in 2008 (according to Indonesia law system, 
special law should be prevail over general law). Could you explain why law 
enforcers prefer to use old provisions in KUHP instead of UU ITE? 
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PARTICIPATION INFORMATION SHEET FOR MEDIATION OFFICERS 
TITLE: 
“Regulation of Unauthorised Electronic Funds Transfer and Consumer Protection 
in Indonesia: A Critical Analysis of Law and Practice”  
 
PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH :  
The aim of the research is to examine the adequacy and effectiveness of Indonesia’s law 
in dealing with increasing frauds in ATM/Debit Card transactions (unauthorised 
ATM/Debit Card transaction). In particular, this research will investigate how to impose 
fair civil and criminal liabilities for unauthorised ATM/Debit transactions in Indonesia, 
especially when there is no clear evidence in regard to who actually accessed the EFT 
system. This research is expected to create fair, detailed and better fraud liabilities 
regulation and practice, and also improve bank’s consumer protection and confident for 
banking Industries in Indonesia. 
INVESTIGATORS: 
 
Prof. Andrew Goldsmith 
Faculty of Law/ Centre for 
Transnational Crime 
Prevention 
+61 2 4221 8025 
agoldsmi@uow.edu.au  
 
Dr. Charles Chew 
Faculty of Law 
+61 417247736.  
charles@uow.edu.au  
 
 
Iwan Setiawan,  
Faculty of Law/ Centre for 
Transnational Crime 
Prevention,  
+61 433739823 
 is708@uow.edu.au 
 
 
METHOD & DEMANDS ON PARTICIPANTS:  
If you choose to be included you will be asked to participate in a one – two hour 
interview by Mr. Iwan Setiawan. On this visit the researcher will conduct face-to-face 
interview that will be audio taped to ascertain the factors that enable or inhibit 
unauthorised consumers ATM/Debit card transaction (EFT fraud) in your institution, 
along with its ramification such as how to apportioned liability for the money lost 
caused by the frauds. Since the unauthorised ATM/Debit card transactions contain 
difference aspects such as legal (private, criminal, cyber, and consumer protection law) 
and technical aspects relating to card based payment system (magnetic stripe, chip, 
switching network, fraud method such as skimmer, sniffing, etc), you are welcome to 
bring colleagues from different department to support you during the interview. 
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Typical questions in the interview: 
1. Could you provide general data about mediation process that involved disputes 
between bank and its consumer regarding unauthorised consumer ATM/Debit 
card transactions? 
2. What sort of theory, regulation or principle have you used in determining who 
should be liable for consumer’s lost caused by unauthorised ATM/Debit card 
transactions? 
3. What sort of circumstances or condition are commonly used as compelling factors 
in order to ‘decide’ whether banks, consumers, or both of them should be liable 
for the lost?  
4. If both bank and consumer share negligence or faulty conduct, how do you 
apportion liability between these two parties? 
 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION:  
Your involvement in the study is voluntary and you may withdraw your participation 
from the study and any data that you have provided up until three months (90 days) 
since the interviewing date. Refusal to participate in the study will not affect your 
relationship with the University of Wollongong. 
CONFIDENTIALITY:  
The interview basically is conducted by the de-identifiable method. It means that no 
individual or organization/institution will be identified (unless there is consent). All data 
and information that is collected during the interview will remain confidential. The data 
and information will be stored securely at Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention, 
University of Wollongong. The data and information that have been obtained from you 
during the interview will be analysed along with that of the other participants in this 
study and used in the preparation of a thesis and associated academic publications.  
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE: 
A consent form is attached. You need to complete and sign the consent form and return 
it at the time of the interview. Once you have completed the form, you will be 
considered to have given your consent to be involved in the research. 
BENEFITS:  
This study will not provide direct benefits to you personally. However, through 
participating in this research, you may be providing benefit to your organization/ 
institution and potential better card based payment system regulation in the future that 
could benefit both banking industries and improve consumer protection in Indonesia.  
POSSIBLE RISKS, INCONVENIENCES & DISCOMFORTS: 
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Apart from the one – two hours of your time for the interview, we can foresee no risks 
for you. During the interview you will have the right to decide which questions to 
answer and which not. As mentioned before, there will be de-identifiable method in 
collecting and processing data, both for individuals and organisations/institutions. 
Therefore, individual and collective interests will be protected for the entire process of 
the research, including after the completion of the research. The interview will focus on 
how laws and technical mechanisms are implemented at the practical level.  
ETHICS REVIEW & COMPLAINTS: 
If you have any further questions about this study, please contact Professor Goldsmith 
or Dr. Chew (details provided above). You will also have the opportunity to ask 
questions to the researcher before, during and after the interview.  
This study has been reviewed by the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC), 
social sciences of the University of Wollongong. If you have any concerns or 
complaints regarding the way this research has been conducted, you can contact the 
UOW Ethics Officer on +61 (2) 4221 3386 or email: rso-ethics@uow.edu.au.  
Thank you for your interest in this study. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MEDIATION OFFICERS 
TITLE: 
“Regulation of Unauthorised Electronic Funds Transfer and Consumer Protection 
in Indonesia: A Critical Analysis of Law and Practice”  
 
1. Could you provide general data about mediation process that involved disputes 
between bank and its consumer regarding unauthorised consumer ATM/Debit card 
transactions? 
2. What sort of theory, regulation or principle have you used in determining who 
should be liable for consumer’s lost caused by unauthorised ATM/Debit card 
transactions? 
3. What sort of circumstances or condition are commonly used as compelling factors 
in order to ‘decide’ whether banks, consumers, or both of them should be liable 
for the lost? 
4. Magnetic stripe technology that has been used as storage data in bank’s 
ATM/Debit card for a long time are very vulnerable to compromised by fraudster 
(have no encryption or security layer) and banks are fully aware of it as 
foreseeable risk. What do you think about this fact in relation with bank’s liability 
as an electronic banking provider?  
5. Do you think consumer’s PIN in ATM/Debit card transaction is equal to 
consumer’s signature in paper based transactions (such as signature in cheque)? 
6. Do you think merely ATM/Debit card with : 
a). magnetic stripe + PIN Data; or 
b).Chip + PIN Data; 
7. Have already fulfilled ‘non repudiation’ aspect of IT security and legal 
requirement? 
8. Do you have opinion whether or not ATM/Debit card with magnetic stripe 
technology + PIN could/could not satisfy ‘non repudiation’ requirement required 
by central bank or other security standards? 
9. Do you think ‘negligent’ and ‘fault’ between banks and consumers are important 
factor in determining who should be liable for unauthorised ATM/Debit card 
transactions?  
10. Could you share what sort of action or inaction that can be constituted as 
‘negligence’ and ‘fault’? For instance, many unauthorised ATM/Debit card frauds 
were successful because fraudster managed to collect consumers’ data by 
successfully putting skimmer, pinpad overlay, pin hole camera, card trapping 
device (Lebanese loop), fake consumer care telephone number stickers at bank’s 
ATM booth/merchant’s Electronic Data Capture (EDC). However, banks always 
defended this fact by showing that it’s impossible for bank to supervise its entire 
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ATM booth/merchant’s EDC because of its huge numbers of machines. What do 
you think about this matter? 
11. If both bank and consumer share negligence or faulty conduct, how do you 
apportion liability between these two parties? 
12. Different countries have different regulations over unauthorised ATM/Debit card 
transactions. In United States, in principle, banks will always be liable for 
unauthorised ATM/Debit card transactions, regardless of consumer negligence 
being the cause of the unauthorised ATM/Debit card transaction. In Australia and 
European Union countries, consumers are only liable for unauthorised ATM/Debit 
card transactions if he/she has conducted gross negligence. Other than that, banks 
are forbidden by regulations to use ATM/Debit card data including right PIN 
number as the only factor to authorise the ATM/Debit card transactions. What do 
you think if these regulations are going to be implemented in Indonesia? 
13. Banks very commonly still have indemnity clausal in their consumer-banking 
contract which limit bank’s liability and deliver most liability on to consumer 
shoulders, which are in conflict with the provisions of the Indonesian Consumer 
Protection Act? Do you think this bank’s clausal should be null and void? 
14. How is your recommendation regarding fraud liability if there is neither clear 
evidence regarding bank nor consumer negligence that enabled unauthorised 
ATM/Debit card transaction? 
15. Do you think all these ATM/Debit fraud wave that recently happened in Indonesia 
will impact on consumers’ confidence in saving their money in the bank and/or 
conducting ATM/Debit card transactions?  
 
